User:Gunbirddriver/László Ede Almásy

This is a work page

The myth of Soviet-Western harmony shattered by an unnecessary cold war

User:Halibutt/Western betrayal

The Western powers signed the Yalta agreement, but after World War II did very little to prevent the eastern European states from falling under the control of Soviet communism. Later, during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, Hungary received neither military nor moral support from the Western powers during the uprising, which was eventually suppressed by the Red Army. The West's failure to act was repeated in 1968 when Warsaw Pact armies led by the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to crush the Prague Spring, which had been an effort to change the Communist system of governing.

Soviet repressions against former prisoners of war

Soviet liquidation of the Russian Liberation Army

Repatriation of Cossacks after World War II

Berlin Blockade

</nowiki>

A Cold War incident known as the "Revolt of the Admirals" involved a number of retired and active-duty United States Navy admirals who publicly disagreed with President Harry S. Truman and Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson in their emphasis on strategic nuclear bombing executed by the United States Air Force as the primary means by which the nation and its interests were defended. The episode occurred in 1949 during a time wherein the administration was attempting to severely reduce military expenditures.

Section 1 BG

Following the end of World War II, the Truman administration was concerned over the large deficit spending that had been necessary for the war effort. To reduce expenditures Truman instructed the services to draw-down their forces quickly and return to a peacetime military. The two main issues facing the services were the question of unification of the services under a single command, and the funding that each branch would have in the markedly reduced military budget. The discussion of the post-war military flowed from General of the Army George C. Marshall's call for unification of the Department of War and the Department of the Navy. Marshall believed that the services needed a unified overall command to better coordinate their activities and to minimize redundancy. He first advanced his general ideas on the subject in November 1943, and his proposals led to what became known as the "unification debates".

Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, flanked by Fleet Admiral King(l) and Fleet Admiral Nimitz(r), November 1945

The Army made a proposal of command structure which would unite the U.S Army, the U.S. Navy and a soon-to-be-formed U.S. Air Force under a single Department of National Defense. The Army accepted as a foregone conclusion that the Army Air Corps/Army Air Forces would emerge as a separate service. The commanding general of the Air Corps, Henry H. Arnold, was one of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, coequal with General Marshall and Admiral King. The Navy, however, was reluctant to accept these changes. The service did not want to lose its independence from the Army, and opposed both changes, arguing that what had worked well in winning the war did not need to be changed.

The generals from the Army Air Force believed that with the increased destructive power they could now apply against potential enemies, big changes in the manner in which the nation was defended were warranted. With the advent of the nuclear age, the question arose as to what need existed for conventional military forces. The Air Force generals believed that much of the forces of the other services were unnecessary and could be cut. They held that the future for national defense lay with a long-range bomber force carrying nuclear weapons. This limited and ultimately flawed view was accepted by the administration as being correct, and the meaningful existence of the other services came into jeopardy.

President Truman stands with Secretary of State Dean Acheson (left) and Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson (far right)

Along these lines came the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 which reorganized the military, creating a means by which the various commands were coordinated under a military establishment of three equal executive departments, the Army, Navy and Air Force. The unified command establishment was named the Department of Defense, and was created along with the National Security Council (NSC), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and an independent United States Air Force. The Act left the Navy with the autonomy it had sought and the Act's passage seemed to end the debate, but soon after President Truman decided massive reductions in defense spending still had to be made, and the nation's military budget was cut from $45 billion to $14.3 billion in a single year. This placed tremendous pressure on all military departments. Soon, efforts were set in place by the Air Force to amend the Act.

(Image|President Truman signs the National Security Act Amendment, 1949) The generals of the newly formed air force propounded a new doctrine: that strategic bombing, particularly with nuclear weapons, was the sole decisive element necessary to win a future war, and was therefore the sole means necessary to deter an adversary from launching a Pearl Harbor-like surprise attack or war against the United States. To implement this doctrine, which the air force and its supporters regarded as the highest national priority, the air force proposed that it should be funded by the Congress to build a fleet of U.S. based long-range strategic heavy bombers. The air force generals argued that this project should receive large amounts of funding, beginning with an upgraded B-36 Peacemaker intercontinental bomber. With four times the payload of the B-29 and twice the range. (Image|A B-36A bomber dwarfs a Boeing B-29 Superfortress bomber, the largest bomber of World War II.} The Navy seeing an opportunity for funding to avoid the drawdown, disagreed. Pointing to the impact the Navy's carrier arm had on the outcome of the war in the Pacific, they argued that tactical naval power and carrier aviation were essential to maintaining national defense. Admiral Marc Mitscher, the former commander of the Fast Carrier Task Force, was one such officer who publicly commented on the value of the US Navy in winning the war, and its value in the future defense of the nation. The Navy leadership believed that wars could not be won by strategic bombing alone. The Navy also held a moral objection to relying upon the widespread use of nuclear weapons to destroy the major population centers of an enemy homeland. The Navy pointed out that with the "supercarrier" ships they hoped to build in the future. Naval aviation would be able to continue in its tactical role of close air support using modern aircraft and in addition would, the Navy believed, also be able to take on the strategic role of nuclear deterrence. USS United States (CVA-58) was designed to handle aircraft up to 100,000 pounds, which the Navy believed, would be large enough to carry the nuclear weapons of the day. Plans for the United States-class carriers called for them carrying up to 14 heavy bombers each, with enough aviation fuel for eight bombing raids per plane. With a capability to run 112 nuclear weapon drops before resupply became necessary, the United States-class carriers would be capable of performing the nuclear deterrence mission. The admirals requested funding for the building of eight United States-class carriers over a five-year period.

Fiscally the Navy request was four times larger than the Air Force's request for funding while providing for only a tenth of the combat bomber aircraft.

The first Secretary of Defense, former Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, supported the Navy position and on 28 July 1948 authorized construction of United States with a production run of five ships. Of special note, is the timing of this announcement to the Nov 1948 presidential elections. The President at this time, was focused on campaigning off the back of a Pullman train doing "whistle stop" appearances all across the United States covering almost 22,000 miles in total.

Section 2 Cancellation of USS United States

(ImageUSS United States, pictured in drydock with her keel] Following the re-election of President Truman in November 1948, President Truman "reminded Forrestal about fiscal spending goals" not being met within his Defense Department. In late February 1949 President Truman asked Forrestal to resign. The President did not believe Forrestal had adequate control over the various services, and he appeared unwilling to command the cuts in the Navy that the president wanted. The drawdown for the Navy was well behind schedule and causing budgetary embarrassment for the administration with Congress.

The now-common procedure of in flight refueling was demonstrated in a circumnavigation of the globe by an Air Force B-50 completing on 2 March 1949 which set a new world non-stop flying record of 23,452 miles. The public relations impact of this milestone event resonated positively with the public and at nearly every level of government. The main Air Force argument in support of the B-36, compared to the proposed carrier United States, was cost, both in lives and money. Through some convincing calculations published in Reader's Digest, Air Force advocates contended that the cost of one super carrier and its task force was equal to 500 B-36s and exposed 242 times as many men to danger. Public opinion supported a "more bang for the buck" move to a "peacetime" military.

Fiscal 1951 proposed budgets, made public, cut the Navy's total allocation by an additional two-thirds from the already lean 1949 budget. This proposed budget was threatening to literally mothball what was left of the Navy (including all or nearly all of the carriers) reducing the Navy to little more than escort and cargo ships, transfer the Marines to the Army and all aviation assets to the Air Force.

In late March 1949, Truman fired Forrestal and replaced him with Louis A. Johnson. A former Assistant Secretary of War, he had been the primary fundraiser for Truman's campaign for the White House in 1948. Johnson had no qualms over supporting Truman's military budget reductions and fiscally preferred the Air Force's argument. The Air Force disliked the Navy's aircraft carriers, as they were an expensive asset the Air Force planners considered obsolete in the age of long range aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. Johnson, who was a staunch proponent of the nuclear capable bomber force, consequently sought to limit as much as possible the Navy's procurement of the new large carriers to conserve funds in the markedly reduced post-war military budget. (Image Daniel Gallery (pictured here as a Captain)}

Less than a month after taking office, and without consulting Congress, Johnson ordered cancellation of United States on 23 April 1949. This vessel was the symbol and hope for the Navy's future, and its cancellation greatly demoralized the service. Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan and a number of high-ranking admirals resigned in protest effective 24 May 1949. Johnson did not seem disturbed by the resignations. His decision to cancel United States provided him with economy in the military budget needed to meet his budgetary goals, while demonstrating that he was in firm control of the military and able to make difficult decisions.

To replace Sullivan, Johnson recommended Francis P. Matthews for the position of Secretary of the Navy. A lawyer from Omaha, Nebraska, during the Second World War he had served as a director of the USO, a service organization that entertained the troops. He came to the attention of Johnson by assisting him with political fund raising for the 1948 Truman campaign. Upon being considered for the position, Matthews admitted the nearest he had come to naval experience was rowing a boat on a lake. On 24 May 1949 Truman made the appointment.

Said Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson:

There's no reason for having a Navy and Marine Corps. General Bradley (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), tells me that amphibious operations are a thing of the past. We'll never have any more amphibious operations. That does away with the Marine Corps. And the Air Force can do anything the Navy can do, so that does away with the Navy.

On or about 17 May 1949, Secretary Johnson announced his intent to transfer the United States Marine Corps aviation assets to the Air Force. At this time his decisions were met with an uproar from Congress, in June, to "cease and desist" as investigative hearings were being called for. Any new or additional force changes had to be withdrawn and quietly dropped, as Congress announced hearings on matter related to" unification and strategy". With an initial focus on recent anonymous documents that inferred fraud and collusion on the part of the B36 manufacturer Convair and Secretary of Defense Johnson.

A research group, Op-23, a naval intelligence unit formed in early 1948 by order of Admiral Louis E. Denfeld to advise the CNO on unification and later headed by Captain Arleigh A. Burke, had been gathering information to help defend the Navy's position, including material critical of the B-36's performance and capabilities. in late May 1949 an anonymous document which came to be known as the "Worth Paper" appeared. The document pointed out that prior to his posting as Secretary of Defense Johnson had been on the board of directors of Convair, the manufacturer of the B-36 bomber. It pointed out he had an apparent conflict of interest in representing the government with this manufacturer. It went on to claim that the B-36 was a "billion-dollar blunder" and alleged "fraud" on the part of B-36 contractors regarding: costs, capabilities and test results.

Secretary Johnson's idea of an executive was someone who gave orders, and those orders were to be carried out immediately and without question. When the naval officers had the audacity to question his decisions on weapons and strategy (Such as the cancellation of the super carrier), he took that as a sign of unparalleled insubordination. When unsupported attacks appeared against his character, he wanted those responsible to be severely punished. This could explain the animosity he felt for the Navy at the time of the admiral's revolt.

The situation was exacerbated by a series of articles written for the public by Rear Admiral Daniel V. Gallery which appeared in the The Saturday Evening Post. The final article in the series, "Don't Let Them Scuttle the Navy!", so angered Johnson that he wanted Admiral Gallery court-martialed for gross insubordination. Gallery was not made to sit before a court-martial, but he was passed over for promotion to vice admiral, effectively ending his career.

Section 3 Congressional hearings

(Image|Admiral Louis Denfeld) The first phase of the House Armed Services Committee hearing and investigation on "Unification and Strategy" was held 9–25 August 1949. The focus was on the allegations of fraud and corruption emanating from the "Worth Paper". The author of the "anonymous document" was determined to be Cedric R. Worth, a former Navy commander serving as a civilian assistant to Under Secretary of the Navy Dan A. Kimball. Worth was called as a witness and testified before the House Investigating Committee. The committee found no substance to charges of improper interest relating to the roles of Johnson and Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington in aircraft procurement.The Air Force was exonerated of all charges of wrong doing. At the conclusion, the committee recommended that Worth be fired. Following a naval court of inquiry, Worth was dismissed. The apparent vindication for Secretary Johnson and inappropriate work by Worth was an embarrassment to the Navy.

A second hearing convened in October focused upon the proposed reduction in the Navy and the cancellation of the USS United States project and the soundness of the proposed expansion of the strategic bomber forces. The Army and Air Force command testified that naval aviation should be used to reinforce the Air Force, but could not be used for sustained actions against long range in-land targets. Regarding the USS United States, Air Force Chief of Staff Hoyt Vandenberg commented: "I accept the military capability of this ship as stated by the Chief of Naval Operations. My opposition to building it comes from the fact that I can see no necessity for a ship with those capabilities in any strategic plan against the one possible enemy." The new Secretary of the Navy, Francis Matthews, announced that no Navy man would be censored or penalized for the testimony he offered at the hearing. The naval officers called to testify were expected to support Secretary Matthews, but instead officer after officer arose to testify that the Air Force reliance on the B-36 was inadequate for national defense, and that the entire strategy of atomic bombing was misguided. Among the officers testifying from 6–17 October, were the naval leaders of World War II: Ernest King, Chester Nimitz, William Halsey, Raymond Spruance, Thomas Kinkaid, Richard Conolly, Robert Carney and Captain Arleigh Burke. Captain Burke had run tests which showed the Navy was already in possession of a fighter aircraft, the McDonnell F2H Banshee, that could reach high enough altitudes to intercept bombers like the B36, and he knew it would be unreasonable to assume that an opposing major world power would not also have developed such an aircraft. In that case, the B-36 would need to be accompanied with long range fighter escorts with the requisite range and ceiling to complete its mission, and the Air Force had no such fighter available in their inventory. The Air Force rebutted all previous testimony, point by point, with only Secretary of the Air Force Symington and Air Force General Vandenberg on 18–19 October. The remainder of the testimony before the House Armed Services Committee further weakened the already faltering Navy position. Of particular note were the arguments of Army General Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He stated that there would be no need in the future for an island hopping campaign or large amphibious capabilities, and more importantly, strategic bombing was "our first-priority retaliatory weapon." Bradley made no attempt to hide his contempt for the Navy's methods during the case, and he directly accused senior naval officers of poor leadership, disloyalty, and being "completely against unity of command and planning". (Image|180px|right|Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews]]

The House Armed Services Committee found a number of actions taken by the administration and by the services involved to be overstepping. It held that evaluation of the B-36's worth was the responsibility of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, and that the services jointly should not pass judgment on weapons proposed by one service. On cancellation of the supercarrier, the committee questioned the qualifications of the Army and Air Force chiefs of staff, who had testified in support of Johnson's decision, to determine vessels appropriate for the Navy. In disapproving of Johnson's "summary manner" of terminating the carrier and his failure to consult congressional committees before acting, the committee stated that "national defense is not strictly an executive department undertaking; it involves not only the Congress but the American people as a whole speaking through their Congress. The committee can in no way condone this manner of deciding public questions." The committee expressed solid support for effective unification, but stated that "there is such a thing as seeking too much unification too fast" and observed that "there has been a navy reluctance in the inter-service marriage, an over-ardent army, a somewhat exuberant air force... It may well be stated that the committee finds no unification Puritans in the Pentagon."

Representative Clarence Cannon, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, when justifying the cancellation of the carrier United States and the need for more strategic bombers stated, "We must hit within one week after the war starts and it can be done only by land-based planes such as we now have."

During the hearings public opinion shifted strongly against the Navy. The Navy's tendency to favor covert approaches to public relations resulted in efforts during the revolt being perceived as deceitful and underhanded. OP-23's use of questionable documents that made use of false capability limitations regarding "strategic bombing myths" damaged the Navy's credibility before the House Armed Services Committee during the October 1949 testimonies. Throughout 1949 the Air Force public relations machine had been extremely effective, using aviation magazines and other widely circulated press organizations to publish informative articles, garnering support both in Congress and directly with the American people. "What drives a distinguished group of admirals to denounce strategic bombing while pleading for the means with which to conduct it, to find the A-bomb immoral in the hands of the Air Force but quite moral in the hands of the Navy?" (Time Magazine) The Philadelphia Inquirer captured the mood, as reported by the popular press, best. "The Navy brass can contribute to national safety by dropping their guerilla warfare against the other services and endeavor by forthright, constructive criticism to improve on defense strategy." The Washington Post added: "A real meeting of minds can not be achieved until both sides are willing to play on the same team, and right now the burden of proof is on the Navy." A Gallup poll conducted on 15 October showed an overwhelming 74% of voters favoring the Air Force role in any future war, with only 4% favoring the Navy.

After the hearings, Secretary Matthews set about punishing those officers who had testified and were still actively serving in the Navy, in defiance of his own public promise not to do so. Admiral Denfeld (OP-23s creator) was first to go, he was summarily relieved on Navy Day, October 27, 1949. He explained that he and Denfeld disagreed widely on strategic policy and unification. Matthews then had vice admiral William H. P. Blandy reassigned to a rear admiral posting, an assignment below the standing of his rank, he subsequently retired. Vice Admiral Bogan, also chose to retire rather than face assignment to a position of lesser authority. Secretary Matthews ordered him to a posting in a rear admiral's billet the week before he retired, preventing the "tombstone" promotion to four stars he would have otherwise received. OP-23 was disbanded but not before the Inspector General's office seized all documents. Captain Crommelin, an outspoken antagonist, continued to openly speak out against the system and the "trend toward military dictatorship" he was sent home to Alabama on 15 March 1950 on "extended furlough" with half pay. In December, an attempt was made by Matthews and Johnson to block the promotion of Captain Burke by lining out his name from the promotion list, but this was seen and reversed by the direct intervention of President Truman.

The House Armed Services Committee condemned the dismissal of Admiral Denfeld by Secretary Matthews, concluding that Denfeld's removal was a reprisal because of his testimony to Congress. The Committee asserted that such actions taken by the executive branch posed a challenge to effective representative government.

Section 4 Outcome

The Truman administration essentially won the conflict with the Navy, and civilian control over the military was reaffirmed. Military budgets following the hearings prioritized the development of Air Force heavy bomber designs, accumulating a combat ready force of over 1,000 long-range strategic bombers capable of supporting nuclear mission scenarios. These were deployed across the country and at dozens of overseas bases. The Air Force portion of the total defense budget significantly grew, while the Navy's and Army's portion of the total defense budget was reduced.

What decisively saved the postwar Navy and Army, was the Korean War. Within six months, 25 June 1950, the Korean War broke out and the U.S. was forced to confront an invading army with the forces it had on hand. The Truman administration immediately decided not to use the nuclear arsenal, and sought to check North Korean aggression with conventional forces.

As an initial response, Truman called for a naval blockade of North Korea, and was shocked to learn that such a blockade could only be imposed "on paper", since the U.S. Navy no longer had the warships with which to carry out his request. In fact, due to the extensive defense cuts and the emphasis placed on building a nuclear bomber force, none of the services was in a position to make a robust response with conventional military strength.

Shortly after the North Korean attacks began Defense Secretary Johnson made requests for an increase in defense appropriations and promised the Navy would soon get approval for a new "supercarrier" project. The secretary hastily proposed a supplemental appropriation request of $10.5 billion, (an increase of 79%), bringing the total requested to $23.8 billion. In making the additional request, Johnson informed a House appropriations subcommittee that "in light of the actual fighting that is now in progress, we have reached the point where the military considerations clearly outweigh the fiscal considerations."

Preoccupied with public criticism of his handling of the Korean War, and wishing to deflect attention from the peacetime defense economy measures he had previously espoused, Truman decided to ask for Johnson's resignation. The president realized he now needed a Secretary that had the confidence of all three services, preferably one with significant military experience. Within three months of the start of the conflict Johnson was dismissed from his position as Secretary of Defense. He was replaced by the soldier and statesman George Marshall, one of the original architects for the unification of the defense branches. Marshall deferred "overall unification" issues until after the fighting stops, but did insist on "regional unification" to "optimize combat" efforts and operations.

The Korean War made it clear that aircraft carriers were still a primary means of projecting conventional force and enforcing U.S. foreign policy. The B-36 had little place in the conflict, as the Air Force was not willing to risk the aircraft in combat in Korea, though it did find some use as a high altitude reconnaissance aircraft. Image

The Navy after 2 years of delays, did get a new "supercarrier" design. Launched in October 1955, Forrestal at 60,000 tons was 1.5 times the size of World War II Midway class carriers. She featured an armoured flight deck just large enough and sturdy enough to land a heavy bomber carrying a small nuclear bomb. The ship was also equipped with steam catapult launchers to assist the heavier nuclear bombers in getting airborne. The flight deck was angled, allowing the new carrier to launch and recover aircraft at the same time. The 1951 through 1955 development of hydrogen bomb technologies, significantly increased the weight of the bomb load well beyond original expectations. All efforts to develop a viable carrier based, heavy nuclear bomber during the 1950s from the: P-2 Neptune, AJ Savage to the P6M SeaMaster resulted in failures and cancellations.

Throughout the 1950s multiple efforts focused on nuclear warhead miniaturization, which resulted in a myriad of technological advances. This in turn enabled the Navy to realize missile submarines to accomplish a strategic nuclear mission starting in 1960.

Proponents of the Air Force doctrine saw the Korean War as an anomalous event, the demands of which were not relevant to dealing with the now real strategic nuclear threat from the Soviet Union. Ultimately Soviet aggression never materialized thru a massive nuclear attack and this can be attributed, during the decade of the 1950s, to the counter-strike potential of the US Air Force's and NATO's nuclear bomber forces.

The design of the "supercarrier" has evolved through Enterprise, to the Nimitz class, to the Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carriers. As of 2014, the US Navy has eleven nuclear powered supercarriers in active service as well as one conventionally powered supercarrier in reserve. Two Gerald R. Ford-class carriers are currently under construction, with eight more planned to follow through the 2040s with the first of the class replacing Enterprise and first nine of the Nimitz-class carriers on a one for one replacement when the Nimitz-class vessels begin to hit their 50-year life expectancy. The final Nimitz-class carrier, George H.W. Bush commissioned in January 2009 and is expected to serve alongside the Gerald R. Ford class until 2059 when the next generation supercarrier is commissioned.

Tank losses for the battle are difficult to determine, and vary with which units you are discussing. Soviet records indicate about 300 tanks destroyed in the 5th Tank Army and another 300 damaged. The 2nd Tank Corps was reduced to

Most of the German tank losses occurred late in the afternoon as the 3rd SS advanced to the road north of Prokhorovka, moving through mine fields covered by Soviet anti-tank guns. German records indicate 3 to 5 tanks were destroyed, while 40 to 70 received damage. German manpower losses are estimated at 500 killed.

The Luftwaffe command understood that for success to be found in Operation Citadel their support would be crucial, but their preparations were hampered by problems with supply shortfalls. Partisan activity, particularly behind Army Group Center, slowed the rate of re-supply and cut short the Luftwaffe's ability to build up essential stockpiles of petrol, oil, lubricants, reserves of aircraft and engines, which meant that they would be unable to replace damaged aircraft over the course of the operation. Fuel was the most significant limiting factor. To help build up supplies for the support of Citadel, the Luftwaffe greatly curtailed its operations during the last week of June. Despite this conservation of resources, the Luftwaffe did not have the resources to sustain an intensive air effort for more than a few days after the operation began.

In the months preceding the battle, Luftflotte 6 (supporting Army Group Center) noted marked increase in the strength of the opposing VVS formations. The Soviet forces encountered displayed better training, and were flying improved equipment with greater aggressiveness and skill than had been seen earlier. The introduction of the Yakovlev Yak-9 and Lavochkin La-5 fighters gave the Soviet pilots near parity with the Luftwaffe in terms of equipment. Furthermore, large numbers of ground attack aircraft, such as the Ilyushin Il-2 Shturmovik and the Pe-2, were available as well. The Soviet Air Force also fielded large quantities of aircraft supplied via lend-lease. Huge stockpiles of supplies and ample reserves of replacement aircraft meant the Soviets would be able to conduct an extended campaign without slackening in the intensity of their effort.

Hamish Mahaddie

To achieve commonality, the production team modified the later Mark Spitfires to "standardise" them as Mark Is. This meant adding elliptical wingtips to the Mark Vs, replacing the bubble canopies on the later marks and other changes. To classic aircraft fans, they became known as "Mark Haddies" (a play on Grp. Capt. Mahaddie's name).

After he retired from the military he was involved in a great number of films, in 14 of which he received screen credit as either T.G. Mahaddie or more frequently Hamish Mahaddie. Those he was accredited in include 633 Squadron (1964) for which he acquired 11 Mosquitos and the aircrews to fly them. After filming was completed Mahaddie purchased one of the aircraft, Mosquito RS712.

• The memoir is told from an older Mahaddie of his 80s to a young girl by the name of Yvonne who was his transcriptionist.

Battle of Britain

• The Battle of Britain article

• aircraft taken to 71 Maintenance Unit at RAF Henlow in Bedfordshire to restore the aircraft and bring them back to flying condition..
• Simpson's Aero Services hired to restore and maintain the aircraft. Many aircraft restored and brought back to airworthy condition due to the efforts to produce the film.
• many redundant Spitfires were located and restored and without which many would probably not exist today.
• Through his contacts at the Ministry of Defence and with some careful negotiations he persuaded the RAF to have a practical interest in the film. This was an unprecedented coup for Mahaddie and the film-makers.

• Battle of Britain was to be a widescreen colour production, wartime black and white newsreel film could not be used

It was apparent that a band of experienced pilots would be needed to fly these aircraft, so Mahaddie asked the MoD if a select group of pilots could be seconded to the film company, the pilots preferably coming from the Central Flying School. After some deliberation MoD came up with a list of ten flying instructors, all of whom had many hours experience of fighter type aircraft. They were led by Wing Commander George Elliot from RAF HQ Flying Training Command:-SILs M A Vickers, S St John Homer, 0 J Spink, 0 W Mills; FILs M R Merrett, OJ Curry, R O Coles, R B Lloyd, J M Preece. These pilots were to assume the mantle of RAF Fighter Command for the purpose of the filming.

CASA 2.111 Spanish built version of the He 111

Sources

Mosquitos of 105 Squadron making up a part of the Pathfinder Force in December, 1942

Pathfinder Recruiter Extraordinaire "Hamish" Mahaddie of the RAF

T.G. 'Hamish' Mahaddie DSO, DFC, AFC & Bar, FRAeS Scotsman who flew in Bomber Command and became a key member of the Pathfinder Force as chief procurer of aircrew talent, commonly referred to as Don Bennett's "horse thief."

• "Hamish" Mahaddie died 16th January 1997.

IMDB

IMDB Bio

• returned to operations with the elite Pathfinder force, the RAF's target finders for night bombing operations.
• taken off operations in March 1943 with the rank of Group Captain, given the task of recruiting aircrew for the Pathfinder force.
• July 1944 appointed command of RAF Warboys, the Pathfinder Force training unit.
• This unit trained aircrew on the Avro Lancaster and the De Haviland Mosquito.
• continued his post war career in the RAF until March 1958, retired with the rank of Group Captain
• over the course of his career he was awarded DSO, DFC and AFC to his credit.

• died on 16th January 1997.

A Horse-thief for the Pathfinders

Bomber Command Museum (Canada)

• awarded the Air Force Cross (AFC) - a non-combat award that Hamish referred to as the "Avoiding Flak Cross."

• As "Group Training Inspector," Hamish regularly visited operational squadrons, giving lectures to four hundred or more aircrew on the changing tactics and techniques employed by the Pathfinders. But before visiting a station, Hamish would have already identified crews that he felt were candidates for the PFF by studying aiming point photographs that indicated which crews were dropping their bombs accurately on the targets.

• Through this, and other techniques, Mahaddie recruited thousands of the most highly regarded Bomber Command aircrew to the Pathfinders, including Ian Bazalgette. S/L Bazalgette had attended a lecture given by Hamish at which he was introduced to the methods utilized by the Pathfinder Force. Not satisfied with his assignment to No. 19 O.T.U. at Lossiemouth, Scotland, Baz was, according to Hamish, "one of many tour-expired bomber pilots that seemed to rot in our O.T.U.'s." He recalled that Baz, "plagued me weekly with letters and telephone calls beseeching me to take him back on operations. Hamish's answer was always, "You just stay there (at the O.T.U. at Lossiemouth, Scotland) and I will get you out." "This wasn't just an idle promise," Hamish insisted, "because there was the type of fellow that I wanted to be a squadron commander eventually."

Flypast magazine

The making of "Battle of Britain" Flypast Magazine September 1989

Warbirds Worldwide The making of Battle of Britain Part I, Number Five (May 1988); Part II Number Six (August 1988); Part III Number Seven (November 1988)

• Excerpt

Comments on the article

Any purpose in this article:

The Wellingtons moved out of RAF Marham in 1941, and Mosquitos from No. 105 Squadron arrived. Marham became a base of operations for part of the Pathfinder force. They also tested and proved the Oboe device for direction finding and precision bombing.

• mention should be made of Bomber Commands goal of defeating Germany by bombing them out of the war. How this in fact could not be achieved, as the Germans kept fighting. Quote from Hamish about how devastated Germany was after the war, and his amazement at their perseverance once he was stationed in Germany after the war.
• look back at the sources and note a couple that mentioned Mahaddie's charm. These are in the obits below.
• quote from Hamish about the loss of his crew.

Google books

Bomber Barons, Bowyer

Bomber Command: Reflections of War - The Heavies Move in 1942-May 1943, Martin Bowman

[1]

• Butt Report
• Air Vice Marshal Sidney Bufton pushed hard for a new unit called the Target Marking Unit. It was Harris that called the force the Pathfinder Force, and it was Harris who brought on Bennett to command it. Bennett had been a junior officer under Harris in a flying boat squadron.

Airbourne Espionage

Weather

• would fly in very bad weather, often completed their missions when no other squadron flew.
• primary reason a mission failed: cloud cover over the field.
• primary reason for a Lysander to be destroyed was mud on the field.
• Verity said the most frightening experience he had was in trying to land his Lysander through the fog after a failed trip. Coming down he pulled back on the stick and cut the throttle as he usually did thinking he was a foot or two above the tarmac. In fact he was still 30 feet up into the air and he dropped it 30 feet onto the Tangmere airfield and broke it up.
• fog was worse than cloud, as you could not find even the rivers.
• First Lysander trip was done for SIS on 3 September 1940. It was a Lizzie from No. 2 Squadron that was flown to do a pick-up at Tours.

"Our lives were governed by the phases of the moon. We needed moonlight to map read by; we needed moonlight to find our way to the dropping zones for parachuting and to the small fields that served as landing grounds; and we needed moonlight to be able to see the ground clearly enough to make a safe landing."

Pick-up operations

Prior to a mission, the pilot would plot out his course, made up of a series of legs to easily recognizable terrain features they called pinpoints. The most current information on the location of German flak would be used so that the route plotted avoided it. The last pinpoint in the series was the most important. Besides maps, the pilots were provided a photo of the target field taken by the Photographic Reconnaissance Unit at RAF Benson.

Halifax in daylight flight, 1942

If there was extensive cloud or fog it was impossible to pick out the terrain features needed to navigate to the target. These were long, slow flights in the dark to reach poorly lit fields. German night fighters were also a hazard, and one never knew when landing if you would be greeted by the resistance or the Gestapo.

• The packages contained special instructions, forged documents or money.
• The legless pilots description of picking up and escorting in a Lysander late on its return. Good story, please cite.{citation needed}

Training

Operator training

They would travel about by car with the agents looking at farm fields and evaluate them as prospective landing sites. To practice bringing in a Lysander they would use the "dummy" RAF airfield at "RAF Somersham" to practice marking out a field for a landing, first in daylight and then at night. To land a Lysander only required a skeleton flare path of 3 flashlights.

Pilot training

Routes were laid out navigating from pinpoint to pinpoint. A pinpoint was a point that one could navigate to where your position was fixed. An identifiable point easily recognized at night from the air. Water was the best landmark," Verity said. "Coast, rivers, or lakes, and after that, forests and railways."

• The pilots referred to the secret service they were flying for as "The Firm."

Formations

• No. 1477 Flight was based in Scotland. from 138 Squadron works in Norway, made up of Norwegian pilots, used to supply SOE in Norway The No. 333 (Norwegian) Squadron was formed from expanding No. 1477 (Norwegian) Flight) under the 210 Squadron of the British Royal Air Force, on 8 February 1942, by Captain Finn Lambrechts. The squadron was located in Woodhaven, Fife, Scotland. On 10 May 1943 333 squadron was formed from this flight with Mosquito Mk.IIs at RAF Leuchars and PBY-1b Catalinas at Woodhaven. The squadron's Catalinas did convoy support and anti-submarine work, and also operated in the 'Special Duties' role landing both personnel and supplies at points along the Norwegian coast.

Polish contingent in the SD units

Polish pilots transferred from 301 to 138 By 1942 C Flight was an all Polish Flight. Polish airmen played a significant role, carrying out many hazardous operations to their homeland and elsewhere. The Polish Flight in 138 Squadron was all lost over Warsaw during the uprising.

By the end of the war 138 Squadron had flown more than 2,500 sorties, dropped 40,000 packages and 995 Joes into occupied Europe. Nearly all of these missions were in Handley Page Halifax bombers, modified to provide a parachute hatch called the "Joe hole."

Airfields

• 138 Squadron always operated at Tempsford, but the Lysanders of 161 moved forward at RAF Tangmere on the southern coast of England which they used as a forward staging base.
• The forward base at Tangmere was almost 100 miles south of Tempsford, which enabled the Lysanders a longer flying time over France.
• The airfield at Tempsford became the RAF's most secret base.

were placed along the perimeter track, made of concrete, with their centres at least 150 feet (46 m) from the edge of the track and the edges of each hardstand separated from each other and from the funnels by a minimum of 150 feet (46 m). The purpose of the hardstands was to allow aircraft to be dispersed some distance from each other so that an air attack on the airfield would be less likely to destroy all the aircraft at once. Dispersal also minimised the chance of collateral damage to other aircraft should an accident occur whilst bombing-up. Hardstands were either of the Frying-Pan or Spectacle Loop type, with the Spectacle type being the easiest in which to manoeuvre aircraft.

• Airfield nearing completion, handed over to No 3 Group RAF, responsible for Special Duty Operations, October 1941.
• No. 138 (Special Duty) Squadron moved into Tempsford together with their Whitley and Lysander aircraft to carry out covert supply and agent delivery operations. Stores and administration follow from Stradishall, 11 March 1942

The Lysanders did the pick-ups, done during periods of a full or near full moon to provide some measure of illumination to the ground below. The "moon period" for pick-ups worked out to a week before and a week after the full moon. Overcast weather could markedly reduce the opportunities for pick-ups.

From time to time the base at Tangmere was bombed. Once a Lysander returning from a mission returned in the midst of a bombing attack on RAF Tangmere. The pilot calmly circled the field while he waited out the attack, before setting down.

• One time a Lysander returned from a trip, arriving over Tangmere in the midst of a German raid on the airbase.

• Lysander was a robust aircraft, designed for using small fields in the front line, heavy losses in 1940 by daylight, useless in its designed role, proved ideal for night insertion operations. 4th torch was for signaling the morse-code letter.
• weather was the main danger.

Aircraft used

Lysander

• The romantic – and hazardous – side of the job was flying the old unarmed Lysanders and bigger Hudsons to the secret landing grounds in France guided only by the dim lights of torches held by patriots. All the pick-ups were made in France.
• Lysander used in France for Army co-operation work

If not knocked out in the first pass a Lysander pilot would turn inside the night fighter and dive to evade and escape. It was very difficult to find another aircraft in the dark of night, and the pilot might escape into the dark with a few violent maneuvers. Lysander incursions into France faced far fewer interdictions then Bomber Command faced flying into Germany.

Lysander

• Moving from the Lysander to the Hudson: Lysander 4,000 pounds, had auto slats that brought the stall speed down to 50 mph, could drop down and land at a steep go up and down, if not like an elevator at least like an escalator. Hudson 12,000 pounds, faster, required twice the length to land and take off. The shortest would be 450 yards.
• Flair path had to be longer. Instead of 150 yards it was 450 yards, and clear before and behind, and no cart paths in the landing area.
• Lysander operations against V-1 sites? (McCairns)
• Use of the Hudson in 161 Squadron is described by Foot
• use of the Anson (hold this to use as a flashback when you describe the Hudson flights

Officers of note

• Flight-Lieutenant John "Whippy" Nesbitt-Dufort: flew first pick-up for the SIS on 4 September 1940. Born in 1912, John Nesbitt-Dufort, D.S.O. had been flying since he was 18 in 1930. He became a flight instructor to many of the pilots who would go on to become famous during the Battle of Britain. His nickname came after he had to make a forced landing due to engine failure following an acrobatic airshow display. He came down in a grassy patch and then discovered a rhinoceros trotting toward his aircraft, head down. He jumped out and climbed the fence, finding he was in the animal enclosure of the Whipsnade Zoo in Bedfordshire. Citation Jerrard Tickell (1956), Moon Squadron, Allan Wingate (p 37 of the 1960 Hodder and Stoughton paperback edition) He survived the war, and afterwards wrote the book Scramble: Flying the aircraft of World War II. John "Whippy" Nesbitt-Dufort described in Oliver pp 54-55.

• Flight Lt. A. M. "Sticky" Murphy first commander, first pilot, ambushed in Belgium on first mission picking up
• Flight Lieutenant Keast replaced Farley. Trained many of the Battle of Britain pilots. After the war wrote a book about flying the various wartime aircraft.

• W. H. Farley was the commanding officer of Flight 419, the first Special Duties flights. Farley was killed April 1942 on a long range flight to Czechoslovakia.

Edward Fielden

• Edward "Mouse" Fielden was the first AOC of 161 Squadron. Fielden had been with the King's Flight. The King's Flight was combined with the "C" Flight of 138 Squadron to form the new unit, 161 Squadron.
• Edward Fielden known as “Mouse” .

Guy Lockhart

• William "Guy" Lockhart 161 Squadron Commander Lancaster crash and death 1944

Lewis Hodges

• Lewis "Bob" Hodges was the CO for B Flight, 161 Squadron.
• Hodges took over 161 Squadron from Pickard and had command from May 1943 to 1944.

161 A Flight: 6 Lysanders on the line, one more in reserve, commanded by Guy Lockhart till Verity took over command November 1942. Verity flew his first mission on 23 December 1942.

161 B Flight: 5 Halifaxes, 2 Wellingtons, 1 Hudson, commanded by "Bob" Hodges

• Wing Commander Lewis "Bob" Hodges, commanding officer of No. 161 Squadron during 1943/44.

"Our lives were governed by the phases of the moon. We needed moonlight to map read by; we needed moonlight to find our way to the dropping zones for parachuting and to the small fields that served as landing grounds; and we needed moonlight to be able to see the ground clearly enough to make a safe landing."

Hodges survived the war and remained in the RAF, rising to the rank of air chief marshal before his retirement in 1976.

Boxer

• Wing Commander AHC Boxer took over 161 from Hodges in 1944.

• Wing Commander Vincent J. Sofiano, MBE, Bronze Star ("Sophie") (Inter-Services Liaison Department (ISLD) mounted missions in occupied territory). After the war became head of R2, the SIS air transport section (known during the war as Section IV). Sofiano held this post till 1964. (RAF 19122) His Bronze Star is mentioned in the London Gazette of 30 April 1946, third supplement (published 3 May 1946)

Mission results

1941

By the end of 1941 138 Squadron had moved 37 agents to France while picking up 5. 55% of their missions failed due to bad weather or due to failure to make contact with the reception operator.

1942

By the end of 1942 138 and 161 Squadrons had carried to France 155 agents and 23 tons of supplies, while picking up 19.

1943

By the end of 1943 the SD squadrons had flown 625 sorties, delivered 589 tons of supplies, carried in 102 agents and taken out of France 223.

Similar operations for other Allied nations

• US forces arrive. 801 Bomb Group (Provisional) (Code named: The Carpetbaggers),
• flew B-24 Liberators painted black; Dakotas;
• operated out of RAF Alconbury and then later from Harrington.
• trained by the RAF at RAF Tempsford.
• 4 January 1944 was first drop operation flown by an all American carpetbagger force
• On 13 August 1944 the official unit designation of the Group Headquarters of the 801 Bomb Group (Provisional) was changed to the 492 Bomb Group.

The Far East

• 357 (Special Duties) Squadron in the Far East. Equipped with Liberators, Dakotas, Lysanders, Catalina Flying Boats. 357 dropped more supplies than other units dropped bombs.

Results

• Who does the summaries of movement of supplies and agent pick-ups? That new book, Oliver? We need that.
• flown in 1,488 agents had been dropped by parachute into enemy occupied Europe
• a further 485 had actually been landed
• flown out were 575 agents, family members, politicos and the occasional evading RAF or USAF aircrew were brought out on the return trips.
• 126 aircraft had been lost, in accidents or shot down by enemy action
• By the end of the war 161 (Special Duties) Squadron had received 142 individual awards for gallantry

• By the end of the war the "Special Duties" squadrons had made a significant contribution to liberating the occupied countries.
• Between 1940 and 1944, the "Special Duties" squadrons lost 13 Lysanders on 279 sorties flown. Six pilots were killed on pickup operations. In addition to the losses, there were a great number of close calls.

The SOE organization was dissolved after the war on 15 January 1946.

Sources

Numbering key

• Armstrong, David At Close Quarters: SOE Close Combat Pistol Instructor Colonel Hector Grant

• Armstrong, David At Close Quarters: SOE Close Combat Pistol Instructor Colonel Hector Grant-Taylor (2013)

3rd Group Bomber Command

• 1) Control to 3rd Group when Flight 419 moved to Stradishall.
• 1) RAF Stradishall and the first flight to Poland
• 4) Pilots had to have special characteristics, and were recruited for these.

• 1) March 1941 Flight 419 became Flight 1419
• 1) Flight 1419 at RAF Newmarket, an airfield built over a racecourse, and which featured the longest runways
• Whippy Nesbitt-Dufort

• Flight 1419 became 138 Squadron 25 August 1941
• 138 moves to Stradishall
• 14 February 1942 161 Squadron formed around a nucleus of 138 aircraft and crews combined with the King’s Flight.
• 138 moves to Tempsford 14 February 1942, Tempsford described, built over a reclaimed bog across the Gibraltar Farm
• 161 joins 138 at Tempsford, Lysanders at Tangmere, Tangmere cottage
• Batchelor takes over command of 138 Squadron on 28 February 1943. He has a career similar to Pickard’s.
• Pickard’s 3rd DSO operation to Tournais of 24/25 described; he is posted to CO Lissett

Airborne Espionage

• 2 pinpoints were readily identifiable landmarks from which one could set your position. Flights were from pinpoint to pinpoint.

• 3. Sticky Murphy is shot
• 138 Squadron stats for missions run, losses suffered in 1941
• 7. Whippy crashes on landing, leaves Lysander in France Picked up by Sticky Murphy in a borrowed Avro Anson.
• 4. 161 Squadron formed,

• 5. first Hudson mission flown 2 February 1942
• 7. Guy Lockhart

• 1a. C-type containers
• 161 Squadron taken over by Guy Lockhart 20 June 1942.
• Halifax crews in 138 Squadron were all Polish. (Transferred over from 301 Squadron)
• 161 Squadron taken over by Guy Lockhart 20 June 1942.
• Whitleys and Hallifaxes were used in bombing raids during their off periods.

(Lysanders also used in bombing, thought to be accurate – where was that. Harris is mentioned at the same point?)

• Guy Lockhart’s Lyzzie is wrecked
• “Any bloody fool can drop Joes over France” from a Whitley. Try flying a real pilot’s

Airborne Espionage 2

• Pickard was noted to be efficient in both the planning and execution of the Bruneval raid. SOE saw this. Perhaps played a role in his transfer to 161 Squadron. (?)

• Hugh Verity joins 161, takes command of the A Flight November 1942
• SOE in North Africa, Inter-Service Signals Unit 6, 'Massingham'
• Pull back on the stick and cut the throttle, aicraft drops the last foot or so onto the tarmac. If you cannot see the drop may be more, as when Verity dropped 30 feet, shred the undercarriage and propeller 25 February 1943
• Special Liberator Flight and X Flight renumbered No. 148 (Special Duties) Squadron, equipped with Liberators, Halifaxes and Lysanders.
• April 1943 most busy month to date
• Bridger blows off a tire to take off
• Norwegian Special Duties 1477 Flight (Woodhaven) re-desgnated A Flight No. 333 (Norwegian) Squadron, Coastal Command on 5 May 1943.

Bedfordshire Times

• War-time security requirements were such that only those directly concerned knew of its special mission, that of fostering the resistance movement in Nazi occupied countries.
• Americans were trained there, and moved to their own station.

• agent saboteurs were taken from Tempsford to the Continent, and people of political importance were brought back. Among passengers who had arrived in this way was a woman who, three hours after landing, gave birth to a baby.

Hugh Verity

• Mac appeared highly charged with nervous energy. He was frightfully polite, and spoke with a psudo-Scots, half-American accent.
• Not all the pilots at 161 would be suited to a conventional career in a peacetime service
• Nesbit-Dufort avoids German night fighters with a diving turn. Verity shakes a night fighter
• Sticky Murphy flies a borrowed Anson painted black to do a rescue of 1/2 March 1942.
• Tempsford became the home for 138 and 161 Squadrons.

Jimmy McCairns

• fields inspected, signaling directions planned, flare-paths planned.
• Hugh Verity was an invaluable asset to the flight: his perfect French, his night flying experience, and long association with Fighter Command Headquarters all made for smooth running. To him more than anyone else I would say thanks were due for the bus-like service subsequently rendered by the Lysanders.
• John Bridger - long range attempts, successful. Meticulous in preparation. Said Bridger: "If you followed the rules of the Bridger system, you just could not go wrong."

Hugh Verity: Imperial War Museum Oral History

• type of officer: less routine discipline, individual responsibility.
• Hugh preferred 161 over Beaufighters or staff work, skill required, contact with passengers politicians, MI9, agents.

Jacobiparochie

Jacobiparochie: Tempsford Like it, but you need to buff it to use it. Jedburgh teams were small three man teams composed of one SOE officer, one officer from the native land, and one wireless operator. RAF Tempsford is a former RAF station located 2.3 miles (3.7 km) north east of Sandy, Bedfordshire, England and 4.4 miles (7.1 km) south of St. Neots, Cambridgeshire. The airfield was perhaps the most secret airfield in World War II. It was home to the Special Duties Squadrons, No. 138, which dropped Special Operations Executive (SOE) agents and their supplies into occupied Europe, and No. 161, which specialised in personnel delivery and retrieval by landing in occupied Europe. These 2 squadrons were often referred to as 'the Cloak & Dagger squadrons, and 'the Moonlight Squadrons. Their job was to deliver arms, agents, ammunition, food, and other vital supplies to Resistance organisations in the occupied territories.

For three years the airfield, built over what had been an area of marsh, was the air centre of the resistance movements of all Europe.. Night after night, villagers heard airplanes go off, and probably heard them droning back in the small hours. But they never saw the people, men and women in civilian clothes, who were driven down the prohibited road from the airfield, the men and women who had been brought to England from Occupied France under the very noses of the Wehrmacht and Gestapo. On other trips, they dropped Czech, Polish and Dutch agents in their own countries.

The Moon Squadrons

• In November 1943, Hodges flew a Hudson into France to pick up a party that included an agent called "Morland." As he learned later, Morland was François Mitterand, a future President of France.

• The BBC broadcast coded messages to let agents and Resistance leaders know when their missions were on. A January 1943 message, "Le castor foulera la neige deux fois" ("The beaver will tread the snow twice"), for example, was notification that two Lysanders rather than one would be coming for a delivery and pickup that night.
• The squadron's missions were a secret that was not disclosed until after the war.
• the Lysanders were painted black and had a extra fuel tank slung under the fuselage to extend their range. Later Verity and a number of others had their upper surfaces camouflaged back to a gray and green pattern, but the under surfaces remained black just as Bomber Command's aircraft were painted.
• Agent Philip Schneidau had a ladder attached to the sides of the aircraft to make the exchange of passengers quicker.
• Pickard told those curious that they were doing photo reconnaissance, and that the cylinder contained special photographic equipment.
• one mission crashed on the return, and a number of dead civilians washed up Britain's shore. Pickard said they were press people who went along for a ride to document the effects of the bombing campaign. When questioned further the newspaper received a visit from security and the questions stopped. (Verity?)
• the pilots were not allowed to keep notes or a diary, thus there is little material from which to write about their activities.
• The pilots made their own cockpit maps from larger "half-million" (scale of one-to-500,000) maps. From these, they cut a long strip with their route in the middle and covering 50 miles to either side. The strip map was then folded so the pilot could hold it in one hand and study two panels while flying. The last two panels used a closer scale (one-to-250,000) for more detail on final approach to the landing site.

• On Dec. 8, 1941, Flight Lt. A. M. Murphy approached Neufchâteau, Belgium, for a scheduled pickup. The Morse signal flashed from the ground was the wrong letter, but Murphy decided to land anyway. The Germans were waiting and opened up on Murphy, who took off under fire..

• One of the Halifax missions remains clouded in mystery. The aircraft, flown by Wing Commander W. R. Farley—the same officer who flew the very first Moon Squadron mission back in 1940—crashed into a mountain in Bavaria on April 20, 1942. Not much is known about the flight. It was part of secret Operation Pickaxe, in which the RAF dropped more than 20 Soviet agents into Western Europe by parachute.

The air base at Gibralter

• the pilots rarely got to know their passengers, for obvious reasons of security. The pilots simply referred to their charges as "Joes" Some of these people were very important to the SOEs work and to the French government..

• Fielden flew a Hudson mission to central France, and found that by the time they were ready to leave they had lost much of the night, which would expose them to day fighters if they returned north to cross the channel. Instead he chose to fly due south across the Mediterranean to Algeria, and then from their flew on to the RAF base at Gibraltar. This became a frequent route for deep missions if they were running late. (Wellington image from Gibraltar 1944).
• Operated out of RAF Tempsford in Bedfordshire, which became the RAF’s most secret base.
• The modus operandi was usually the same. SOE agents were lodged in a local hotel before being ferried to farm buildings that had unusually been left standing within the perimeter track of the airfield. This was the famous “Gibraltar Farm”. After final briefings and checks at the farm, the agents were issued firearms in the barn, and then boarded onto an awaiting aircraft flown by one of a team of pilots that included Pickard. If a parachute drop was not deemed suitable, the aircraft would be required to land in darkness in a French field, where they would hopefully be met by French Resistance. He and Hugh Verity established techniques for use of the Hudson, which was larger, faster and could carry more.

• Dropped 995 agents into occupied Europe, 29,000 canisters, 10,000 packages; lost 70 aircraft
• Lysander pilots had to be trained to fly at night and to navigate by map reading, compass and dead reckoning. Had to land on a short field, had to
• Lysander had a number of modifications to suit their role. The rear gun was removed. An extra fuel tank was mounted behind the pilot and another in a cylinder mounted between the wheel struts.

Other sources

• Pathfinder Craig on 161
• The Tempsford Memorial Trust
• RAF Tempsford
• Harrington Museum: Tempsford Airfield provides dates of events
• Flying instructions:
• RAF Special Duties Flights
• Airborne Espionage: International Special Duty Operations

The Harrington Museum, RAF Tempsford

• The Harrington Museum, RAF Tempsford
• First covert supply mission carried out in the March moon period to drop zone in Northern France March 18th 1942.
• Provides dates of unit formation, key moments.

• First covert supply mission carried out in the March moon period to drop zone in Northern France, 18 March 1942.
• Squadron Leader "Sticky" Murphy hands over the Lysander flight to Squadron Leader Lockhart, 20 June 1942.
• March 1944: Wing Commander Boxer takes over 161 Squadron from Wing Commander Hodges.

The Evening Standard, 14 July 1945

• When one of our Hudson’s was grounded in mud……they rounded up 200 people, 12 oxen and six horses and worked…..to ensure the airplane could leave – with a number of important passengers. This flight was flown by Pickard

Method of laying on a mission

Once the SOE or SIS approved the request was passed on to the Air Ministry. On the night of the potential trip a discussion over the night's conditions would be held over a scrambled phone line between the squadron's commanding officer and the pilots who would fly the flight. Weather permitting the mission would be accepted and planned for. Meanwhile the agent to be transported accompanied by an escort officer would be driven over from London to RAF Tangmere. That night at the conclusion of the BBC's French language evening news their "Messages to France" delivered a series of innocuous sounding "personal messages", some of which were a code for operations on or off. In France the operator would be listening to see if his mission was on. The Germans were aware that the flights were going on, but what they never knew was when, to what field and with whom. Both squadrons depended on moonlight for visibility over the landing fields and drop zones.

If the Lysander was taking an agent out with them to the pilot would brief them before taking off. Familiarize with cockpit, where to sit, how to work the latch handle, putting on the parachute and Mae West life preserver, keeping an eye out for German night fighters, how to use the intercom, thermos, coffee, brandy. Cut out switch had to be installed to keep the Joes from talking over communication from flight controller.

BBC "Messages to France"

• "Le castor foulera la neige deux fois" (The beaver will tread the snow 2 times, i.e. Two Lysanders will arrive for pick-ups)

Pickard's 3rd DSO

Pickard's third DSO was given following one of his secret 161 Hudson flights. The flight was carried out on the night of 24th/25th February 1943. It was a typical winter night with sleet and snow. Pickard was sent to the Tourais/Caisey region to pick up 7 passengers that were being pursued by the Gestapo. After a 3 hour flight Pickard arrived over the field to find it cloaked in heavy cloud, making a landing impossible. Pickard was doggedly determined to complete a mission, once he was committed. Over the next 2 hours he circled about over the cloud and made 12 separate attempts before he finally was able to get the aircraft down. Shortly after landing his aircraft became bogged down in mud. It was freed up after 30 minutes but became bogged down again. Another hour and a half of work with the local villagers helping got the aircraft free. A short wet field made no guarantees that the aircraft would get airborne again, but it did just, striking tree branches as it lifted off the end of the field.

Miscellaneous Storage

• Valuable Hugh Verity source: Imperial War Museum Oral History.
• A second later interview with Hugh Verity Interview with Hugh Verity

• The river Loire was a key navigational feature, which in moonlight appeared as a long streak of silver, and was easily located on a clear night. And a small group if islands near Blois were a commonly chosen pinpoint. 47°39′05″N 1°25′28″E
• Source for image of map of occupied France: https://occupation-39-45.blogspot.com/2016/02/le-19-juillet-1940-churchill-crea-le.html
• After the war Somersham Airfield was used for the filming of the SOE/Government film "Now it can be told" produced by the RAF Film Production Unit for the British Government in 1946 (funded by the Central Office of Information).
• The special duties service required its own administrative support. Ordinary administrative procedures useful in the arming and targeting of large numbers of aircraft for bombing raids as practiced by the RAF were unsuitable for the work of secretly moving agents, arms, supplies and special funds by solitary flights to isolated fields in France. In November 1940 Colin Gubbins was seconded to the SOE. Gubbins was given three tasks: to set up training facilities; to devise operating procedures acceptable to the Air Ministry and the Admiralty; and to establish close working relations with the Joint Planning Staff.

• Verity drops his Lysander 30 ft, undercarriage shred, followed by the propeller, but both walked away unscathed.
• Fielden's Hudson trip to North Africa. First to use this route for a late exit out of central or southern France.
• SD Squadrons often would fly in very poor weather, when no one else would.
• In April 1941 the Wellington was the backbone of 3rd Group bomber formations and would continue to be so until October 1942
• Bufton and crew bailout 25/26 August 1941, evades capture and returns to England December 1941
• SOE and SIS were called "The Firm" by the pilots flying the operations.

• Peter Vaughan Fowler, naturally good pilot. Bunny Rymills. Robin Hooper. Escaped from the diplomatic service. Holed up in France for a month when his Lysander got stock.

• Channel dash.

• Alan “Sticky” Murphy lost his life on a Mosquito intruder mission in December 1944
• Guy Lockhart took over as CO of 7 Squadron in the PFF, died when his Lancaster was shot down over Germany at the end of April, 1943.
• WA Farley was killed while on a long range mission to Czechloslavakia
• Charles Pickard died when his Mosquito was shot down by a Focke Wolfe 190 while he was leading the Amiens Prison Raid
• Jimmy McCairns was killed in a training accident when one of his engines of his Mosquito failed while lifting off, causing the aircraft to crash into the ground a couple years after the war.

• Somersham 52°22′13.00″N 00°01′30.00″W

• During SOE and other operations flown directly from Tempsford, a total of 126 aircraft failed to return or were lost in crashes. This total was made up of 16 Whitleys, 80 Halifaxes, 18 Stirlings, 4 Hudsons, 5 Lysanders, 2 Lancasters and a Liberator.

Forces War Records; Unit History: RAF Tempsford https://www.forces-war-records.co.uk/units/1568/raf-tempsford/

References

Notes

Citations

Bibliography

• Hankin, Raymond (1968). "Filming the Battle". Flying Review International. (Vol. 24, no. 2, October 1968.)
• Grant, R.G. (2005). Battle: A Visual Journey Through 5,000 Years of Combat. Kindersley. ISBN 0-7566-1360-4. (Dorling?)