User:Hcberkowitz/Sandbox-invasion

At various times, under its own authority or in accordance with directives from the President or White House/National Security Council staff, the Central Intelligence Agency has attempted to influence domestic and international public opinion, and sometimes law enforcement. This article does not address, other than incidental to influencing opinion or actions reasonably associated with CIA security, possibly illegal domestic surveillance.

This is an area with many shades of gray. There is little argument, for example, that the CIA acted inappropriately in providing technical support to White House operatives conducting both political and security investigations, with no legal authority to do so.

Not all inappropriate activities were initiated or conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency, but by other members of the United States Intelligence Community. In particular, the Federal Bureau of Investigation took a very broad view of its mandate to collect information to protect against domestic subversion. In other cases, the National Security Agency intercepted eletronic communications without the warrants deemed necessary at the time. Army Intelligence also engaged in domestic surveillance in matters generally considered outside military scope.

Origins of CIA Involvement in "Internal Security Functions"

The National Security Act of 1947 explicitly prohibited the CIA from exercising "police, subpoena, or law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions." But the Act did not address the question of the CIA's authority to conduct clandestine intelligence activity within the United States for what United States Secretary of Defense James Forrestal called "purposes outside of this country."

Under FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI interpreted the term "internal security functions" broadly to encompass almost "anything that CIA might be doing in the United States." Throughout the 1950's and into the early 1960's, Director Hoover's position led to jurisdictional conflicts between the CIA and the FBI. The Bureau insisted on being informed of the CIA's activity in the United States so that it could be coordinated with the Bureau. As the FBI liaison with the CIA in that period recalled, "CIA would take action, it would come to our attention and we would have a flap."

In 1966 the FBI and CIA negotiated an informal agreement to reguIarize their coordination. This agreement was said to have "led to a great improvement" and almost eliminated the "flaps." Under the agreement, the CIA would "seek concurrence and coordination of the FBI" before engaging in clandestine activity in the United States and the FBI would "concur and coordinate if the proposed action does not conflict with any operation, current or planned, including active investigation of the FBI." When an operative recruited by the CIA abroad arrived in the United States, the FBI would "be advised" and the two agencies would "confer regarding the handling of the agent in the United States." The CIA would continue its "handling of the agent for "foreign intelligence" purposes. The FBI would also become involved where there were "internal security factors," although it was recognized that the CIA might continue to "handle" the agent in the United States and provide the Bureau with "information" bearing on "internal security matters."

As part of their handling of "internal security factors," CIA operatives were used after 1966 to report on domestic "dissidents" for the FBI. There were infrequent instances in which, according to the former FBI liaison with CIA:

CIA had penetrations abroad in radical, revolutionary organizations and the individual was coming here to attend a conference, a meeting, and would be associating with leading dissidents, and the question came up, can he be of any use to us, can we have access to him during that period.

In most instances, because he was here for a relatively short period, we would levy the requirement or the request upon the CIA to find out what was taking place at the meetings to get his assessment of the individuals that he was meeting, and any other general intelligence that he could collect from his associations with the people who were of interest to us.

The policies embodied in the 1966 agreement and the practice under 'it clearly involved the CIA in the performance of "internal security functions." At no time did the Executive branch ask Congress to amend the 1947 act to modify its ban against CIA exercising "internal security functions." Nor was Congress asked to clarify the ambiguity of the 1947 act about the CIA's authority to conduct clandestine foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities within the United States, a matter dealt with even today by Executive Order.

Moreover, National Security Council Intelligence Directive 5 provided authority within the Executive Branch for the Director of Central Intelligence to coordinate, and for the CIA to conduct, counterintelligence activities abroad to protect the United States against not only espionage and sabotage, but also "subversion." 443 However, NSCID 5 did not purport to give the CIA authority for counterintelligence activities in the United States, as provided in the FBI-CIA agreement of 1966. This was an issue even before the CIA was formed. "The vagueness of Congress's prohibitions of "internal security functions" by the CIA left room for the Agency's subsequent domestic activity. A restriction against "police, law enforcement or internal security functions" first appeared in President Truman's order establishing the Central Intelligence Group in 1946.

General Hoyt Vandenberg testified in 1947 that this restriction was intended to "draw the lines very sharply between the CIG and the FBI" and to "assure that the Central Intelligence Group can never become a Gestapo or security police." 202 Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal testified that the CIA would be "limited definitely to purposes outside of this country, except the collection of information gathered by other government agencies." The FBI would be relied upon "for domestic activities." The CIA, however, did received information gleaned from the activities of other agencies, and did not necessarily notify internal or external oversight of inappropriate activities of which it was witting. CIA authority came from a 1947 National Security Council directive: Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102(d) of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. The Director of Central Intelligence shall conduct all organized Federal espionage operations outside the United States and its possessions for the collection of foreign intelligence information required to meet the needs of all Departments and Agencies concerned, in connection with the national security, except for certain agreed activities by other Departments and Agencies.

2. The Director of Central Intelligence shall conduct all organized Federal counter-espionage operations outside the United States and its possessions and in occupied areas, provided that this authority shall not be construed to preclude the counter-intelligence activities of any army, navy or air command or installation and certain agreed activities by Departments and Agencies necessary for the security of such organizations.

3. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for coordinating covert and overt intelligence collection activities.

4. When casual agents are employed or otherwise utilized by an IAC Department or Agency in other than an overt capacity, the Director of Central Intelligence shall coordinate their activities with the organized covert activities.

5. The Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate such intelligence information to the various Departments and Agencies which have an authorized interest therein.

6. All other National Security Council Intelligence Directives or implementing supplements shall be construed to apply solely to overt intelligence activites unless otherwise specified.

In the House floor debate Congressman Holifield stressed that the work of the CIA:

is strictly in the field of secret foreign intelligence -- what is known as clandestine intelligence. They have no right in the domestic field to collect information of a clandestine military nature. They can evaluate it; yes.

Consequently, the National Security Act of 1947 provided specifically that the CIA "shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions. However, the 1947 Act also contained a vague and undefined duty to protect intelligence "sources and methods". Some activities, such as security clearance investigations of prospective employees, and guarding CIA buildings, are clearly part of this responsibility, and are assigned to the CIA Office of Security. The "Sources and methods" text later was used to justify domestic activities ranging from electronic surveillance and break-ins to penetration of protest groups.

Office of Security

CIA's Office of Security does have a charter to protect the facilities and personnel of the agency, but it has never been seriously suggested that this overrides the prohibition against domestic law enforcement activities. In principle, when there is a specific domestic threat, local or Federal law enforcement groups should be called in for the appropriate protection outside the agency facilities, where it can have its own guard force.

The National Security Act of 1947 granted the Director of Central Intelligence a vaguely-worded responsibility for "protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." The legislative history of this provision suggests that it was initially intended to allay concerns of the military services that the new CIA would not operate with adequate safeguards to protect the military intelligence secrets which would be shared with the CIA. However, this authority was later read by the CIA to authorize infiltration of domestic groups in order to protect CIA personnel and facilities from possibly violent public demonstrations. It was also read to permit electronic surveillance and surreptitious entry to protect sensitive information.

CIA's Office of Security does have a charter to protect the facilities and personnel of the agency, but it has never been seriously suggested that this overrides the prohibition against domestic law enforcement activities. In principle, when there is a specific domestic threat, local or Federal law enforcement groups should be called in for the appropriate protection outside the agency facilities, where it can have its own guard force.

The CIA Office of Security established two programs, (Project MERRIMACK and Project RESISTANCE) directed at protest demonstrations which involved the CIA in domestic affairs on the theory that doing so was necessary to safeguard CIA facilities in the United States.

Legal review

In practice, the National Security Act of 1947 was inadequately specific in what the statutory responsibility to protect "sources and methods," vis-a-vis the statutory probibition against "internal security functions." While legal opinions were sometimes gotten from in-house counsel, it was extremely rare for the CIA to consult the Attorney General. Perhaps ironically, the United States Department of Justice set up a unit for storing and evaluating intelligence about civil disorders. This unit took information from non-intelligence sources and from military intelligence, and then sent the list of citizens to the CIA and the IRS.

The CIA undertook a series of specific security investigations within the United States, in some cases to find the, source of news leaks and in others to determine whether government employees were involved in espionage or otherwise constituted "security risks." These investigations were directed at former CIA employees, employees of other government agencies, newsmen and other private, citizens in this country. Among the techniques used were physical surveillance, mail and tax information coverage, electronic surveillance, and surreptitious entry. Attorney General Robert Kennedy appears to have authorized CIA wiretapping in one of these investigations. With this exception, however, there is no suggestion that the CIA's security investigations were specifically approved by the Attorney General

These programs illustrated fundamental weaknesses and contradictions in the statutory definition of CIA authority in the 1947 Act. While the Director of Central Intelligence is charged with responsibility to protect intelligence "sources and methods," the CIA is forbidden from exercising law enforcement and police powers and "internal security functions." The CIA never went to Congress for a clarification of this ambiguity, nor did it seek interpretation from the chief legal officer of the United States -- the Attorney General -- except on the rarest of occasions.

Generally accepted activities

Security clearance for CIA employees

Applicants for CIA employment undergo an extensive background investigation, which begins with the applicant filling out a lengthy biographical form. Investigators confirm the information on the form, follow any questionable information that the investigation reveals, and check various government and civilian (e.g., credit reporting) data bases. A polygraph examination is usually given after the investigations are complete, to confirm or discard information obtained during the investigation.

Agreed-to surveillance during employment

Employees agree to periodic re-examination. Those working on specific and highly sensitive projects may be re-investigated more frequently. It appears that the employment agreement may give consent to telephone tapping.

Activities violating domestic prohibition

Project MERRIMACK

Project MERRIMACK (1967 to 1973) involved the infiltration by CIA agents of Washington-based peace groups and Black activist groups. The stated purpose of the program was to obtain early warning of demonstrations and other physical threats to the CIA. However, the collection requirements were broadened to include general information about the leadership, funding, activities, and policies of the targeted groups.

Project RESISTANCE

Project RESISTANCE (1967 to 1973) was a broad effort to obtain general background information about radical groups across the country, particularly on campuses. The CIA justified this program as a means of predicting violence which might threaten CIA installations, recruiters, or contractors, and gathering information with which to evaluate applicants for CIA employment. Much of the reporting by CIA field offices to headquarters was from open sources such as newspapers. But additional information was obtained from cooperating police departments, campus officials, and other local authorities, some of whom in turn were using collection techniques such as informants.

Federal Encouragement of Local Police Intelligence

In contrast to previous policies for centralizing domestic intelligence investigations, the Federal Government encouraged local police to establish intelligence programs both for their own use and to feed into the Federal intelligence-gathering process. This greatly expanded the domestic intelligence apparatus, making it harder to control.Army intelligence developed programs for the massive collection of information about, and surveillance of, civilian political activity in the United States and sometimes abroad.

In reaction to civil disorders in 1965-1966, Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach turned for advice to the newly created President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice]. After holding a conference with police and National Guard officials, the President's Commission urged police not to react with too much force to disorder "in the course of demonstrations," but to make advance plans for "a true riot situation." This meant that police should establish "procedures for the acquisition and channeling of intelligence" for the use of "those who need it." Former Assistant Attorney General Vinson recalled the Justice Department's concern that local police did not have "any useful intelligence or knowledge about ghettos, about black communities in the big cities."

During the winter of 1967-1968, the Justice Department and the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (the "Kerner Commission") reiterated the message that local police should establish "intelligence units" to gather and disseminate information on "potential" civil disorders. These units would use "undercover police personnel and informants" and draw on "community leaders, agencies, and organizations in the ghetto." The Commission also urged that these local units be linked to "a national center and clearinghouse" in the Justice Department. One consequence of these recommendations was that the FBI, because of regular liaison with local police, became a channel and repository for much of this intelligence data.

Local police intelligence provided a convenient manner for the FBI to acquire information it wanted while avoiding criticism for using covert techniques such as developing campus informants. For example, in 1969, Director Hoover decided "that additional student informants cannot be developed" by the Bureau. Field offices were instructed, however, that one way to continue obtaining intelligence on "situations having a potential for violence" was to develop "in-depth liaison with local law enforcement agencies. " Instead of recruiting student informants itself, the FBI would rely on local police to do so.

These Federal policies contributed to the proliferation of local police intelligence activities, often without adequate controls. One result was that still more persons were subjected to investigation who neither engaged in unlawful activity, nor belonged to groups which might be violent. ...This conclusion was forwarded "as a fact" to the FBI. Subsequently, an agency seeking, "background information" on that person from the Bureau in an employment investigation or for other purposes would be told that the individual was "a member." The Cook County grand jury stated, in November 1975,

"The Chicago Police Department's failure to assist this Grand Jury, seemed to us to be an attempt to frustrate our investigation. The Department's attitude and conduct surprised and disappointed this Grand Jury.

"The evidence has clearly shown that the Security Section of the Chicago Police Department assaulted the fundamental freedoms of speech, association, press and religion, as well as the constitutional right to privacy of hundreds of individuals.

"One group operating during this period was an organization known as the Legion of Justice, a now defunct militant organization which advocated violence as a means of obtaining its objectives. There is no question that some members of the Security Section (of the Chicago Police Department) maintained a close working relationship with the Legion of Justice. Our conclusion is not based solely upon the testimony of former members of the Legion of Justice, but rather on the totality of evidence presented to the Grand Jury.

Since federal agencies accepted data from the Security Section without questioning the procedures followed, or methods used to gain information, the federal government cannot escape responsibility for the harm done to untold numbers of innocent persons.

"One group operating during this period was an organization known as the Legion of Justice, a now defunct militant organization which advocated violence as a means of obtaining its objectives. There is no question that some members of the Security Section (of the Chicago Police Department) maintained a close working relationship with the Legion of Justice. Our conclusion is not based solely upon the testimony of former members of the Legion of Justice, but rather on the totality of evidence presented to the Grand Jury.

The Socialist Workers Party obtained an order, from the US Court of Appeals, "Under these circumstances, the court finds that the plaintiffs have demonstrated a compelling necessity with sufficient particularity for discovery of the grand jury transcripts. . . .

Foreign Intelligence and Domestic Dissent

In the late 1960s, the CIA increasingly was drawn into collecting intelligence about domestic political groups, particularly the anti-war movement, in response to FBI requests and to pressure from Presidents Johnson and Nixon. The initial impetus was to determine whether the antiwar movement -- and to a lesser extent the "black power" movement -- were controlled by foreigners. Despite evidence that there was no significant foreign influence, the intelligence gathering which culminated in CIA's "Operation CHAOS" followed the general pattern of broadening in scope and intensity.

This was an intelligence collection mission, not an activity with a clear linkage to security of CIA sources, methods, personnel, and facilities. The intelligence collection was domestic, and aimed at unwitting sources.

Operation CHAOS

The CIA did not restrict itself to servicing the FBI's requests. Under White House pressure, the CIA developed its own program -- Operation CHAOS -- as an adjunct to the CIA's foreign counterintelligence activities, although CIA officials recognized from the outset that it bad "definite domestic counterintelligence aspects."

Former CIA Director Richard Helms testified that he established the program in response to President Johnson's persistent interest in the extent of foreign influence on domestic dissidents. According to Helms, the President would repeatedly ask, "How are you getting along with your examination?" and "Have you picked up any more information on this subject?" CIA station chiefs were first given this requirement in August 1967.

Following the consistent pattern of intelligence activities, those original instructions gradually broadened without any precision in the kind of foreign contacts which were to be targeted by CIA operations. See chronology/

Thus, this attempt to ascertain and evaluate "foreign links', was so broadly defined that it required much more than background information or investigation of a few individuals suspected of being agents directed by a hostile power. Instead, at a time when there was considerable international communication and travel by Americans engaged in protest and dissent, a substantial segment by American protest groups was encompassed by CIA collection requirements to investigate foreign "encouragement," "inspiration," "casual contacts" or "mutual interest." Once again, the use of elastic words in mandates for intelligence activity resulted in overbroad coverage and collection.

In addition to their intelligence activity directed at Americans abroad, CHAOS undercover agents, while in the United States in preparation for overseas assignment or between assignments, provided substantial information about lawful domestic activities of dissident American groups, as well as providing leads about possible foreign activities. In a few instances, the CIA agents appear to have been encouraged to participate in specific protest activity or to obtain particular domestic information. The CHAOS program also involved obtain inforination about Americans from the CIA mail opening project other domestic CIA components and from a National Security Agency international communications intercept program.

CIA officials recognized that the CIAs examination of domestic groups violated the Agency's mandate and thus accorded it a high degree of sensitivity. As CIA Director Richard Helms wrote in 1969, when he transmitted to the White House the CIA's study of "Restless Youth:"

In an effort to round out our discussion of this subject, we have included a section on American students. This is an area not within the charter of this Agency, so I need not emphasize how extremely sensitive this makes the paper. Should anyone learn of its existence, it would prove most embarrassing for all concerned.

A subsequent memorandum to the CIA Inspector General further confirmed that "Restless Youth", in its full version, was considered to be exceptionally sensitive. The full document containing material on US protest was given only to President Richard M. Nixon, National Security Advisor Walter Rostow, and Cyrus Vance (former Deputy Secretary of Defense). Another version, which removed the references to Americans, was sent to 20 people outside CIA. It was updated, without the US material, in February 1969, and sent to the Vice President and National Security Advisor Henry A. Kissinger. An even more abbreviated version went to the Attorney General in March 1969. While the actual classification was SECRET, a relatively low grade, the extremely tight controls on dissemination effectively made it as restricted as the most highly classified documents.

The reaction to such admissions of illegality was neither an instruction to stop the program or an attempt to change the Iaw. Rather, the White House continued to ask for more information and continued to urge the CIA to confirm the theory that American dissidents were under foreign control.

Director Richard Helms testified that the only manner in which the CIA could support its conclusion that there was no significant foreign influence on the domestic dissent, in the face of incredulity at the White House, was to continually expand the coverage of CHAOS. Only by being able to demonstrate that it had investigated all anti-war persons and all contacts between them and any foreign person could CIA "prove the negative" that none were under foreign domination.

NSA Monitoring

The National Security Agency was created by Executive Order in 1952 to conduct "signals intelligence," including the interception and analysis of messages transmitted by electronic means, such as telephone calls and telegrams. In contrast to the CIA, there has never been a statutory "charter" for NSA.

The executive directives which authorize NSA's activities prohibit the agency from monitoring communication between persons within the United States and communication concerning purely domestic affairs. However, NSA has interpreted "foreign communications" to include communication where one terminal is outside the United States. Under this interpretation, NSA has, for many years, intercepted communications between the United States and a foreign country even though the sender or receiver was an American. During the past decade, NSA increasingly broadened its interpretation of "foreign intelligence" to include economic and financial matters and "international terrorism."

The overall consequence, as in the case of CIA activities such as Project CHAOS, was to break down the distinction between "foreign" and "domestic" intelligence. For example, in the 1960s, NSA began adding to its "watch lists," at the request of various intelligence agencies, the names of Americans suspected of involvement in civil disturbance or drug activity which had some foreign aspects. Second, Operation Shamrock, which began as an effort to acquire the telegrams of certain foreign targets, expanded so that NSA obtained from at least two cable companies essentially all cables to or from the United States, including millions of the private communications of Americans.

Intrusive Techniques

As domestic intelligence activity increasingly broadened to cover domestic dissenters under many different programs, the government intensified the use of covert techniques which intruded upon individual privacy.

Informants were used to gather more information about more Americans, often targeting an individual because of his political views and "regardless of past or present involvement in disorders." The CIA's mail opening program increasingly focused upon domestic groups, including "protest and peace organizations" which were covered at the FBI's request. Similarly, NSA-largely in response to Army, CIA, and FBI pressures -- expanded its international interception program to include "information on U.S. organizations or individuals who are engaged in activities which may result in civil disturbances or otherwise subvert the national security of the United States."

During this period, Director Hoover ordered cutbacks on the FBI's use of a number of intrusive techniques. Frustration with Hoover's cutbacks was a substantial contributing factor to the effort in 1970 -- coordinated by White House Aide Tom Charles Huston and strongly supported by DCI Helms, DIRNSA Gaylor and Hoover's Intelligence Division subordinates -- to obtain Presidential authorization for numerous illegal or questionable intelligence techniques.

Internal Revenue Service Program

During this same period, the CIA was obtaining tax returns in a similar manner to the FBI, although in much smaller numbers. Yet even after procedures were changed for the FBI's access to tax information in 1968, the IRS did not re-examine the CIA's practices. Therefore, CIA continued to receive tax return information without filing requests as required by the regulations.

Among the tax returns which the CIA obtained informally from IRS in an informal and illegal manner were those of the author of a book, the publication of which the CIA sought to prevent, and of Ramparts magazine which had exposed the CIA's covert use of the National Student Association. In the latter case, CIA memoranda indicate that its officials were unwilling to risk a formal request for tax information without first learning through informal disclosure whether the tax returns contained any information that would be helpful in their effort to deter this "attack on the CIA" and on "the administration in general ."

Among the tax returns which the CIA obtained informally from IRS in an informal and illegal manner were those of the author of a book, the publication of which the CIA sought to prevent, and of Ramparts magazine which had exposed the CIA's covert use of the National Student Association. In the latter case, CIA memoranda indicate that its officials were unwilling to risk a formal request for tax information without first learning through informal disclosure whether the tax returns contained any information that would be helpful in their effort to deter this "attack on the CIA" and on "the administration in general ."

Chronology

USA 1952

A number of projects, some run by NSA and some by CIA, intercepted mail and electronic communications of US citizens in the US. HTLINGUAL intercepted physical mail from the US to China and the Soviet Union, first simply recording the source and destintion addresses on the envelope, and later surreptitiously opening and reading mail. This ran from 1952 to 1973

These programs were, by 1975, discontinued as illegal without warrants. Various interception programs under the George W. Bush administration have been restarted, although the Administration has not explained them, and claims no warrants are needed under the doctrine of unitary authority.

Among these were Project SHAMROCK and Project MINARET surveillance data on Americans, judged inappropriate by the Director of NSA and shut down by 1975. Much to the surprise of some, not everything CIA received from NSA involved impropriety.

USA 1963

After approval by DCI John McCone, after discussion with Attorney General Robert Kennedy and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, CIA security personnel established telephone monitoring of two journalists, Robert Allen and Paul Scott, after their columns disclosed national security information. The surveillance ran from March 12 to June 15, and did not reveal the source of the target information, although "very productive" information was produced on conversations with members of Congress.

USA 1966

The procedure for one aspect of these programs was established by an informal agreement between the CIA and FBI in 1966, which permitted CIA to engage in "internal security" activities in the United States.

--President Johnson asked the CIA to conduct a study of "International Connections of the U.S. Peace Movement" following the October 1967 demonstration at the Pentagon. In response, CIA headquarters sent a directive to CIA stations seeking information on "illegal and subversive" connections between U.S. activists and "communist, communist front, or other anti-American and foreign elements abroad. Such connections might range from casual contacts based merely on mutual interest to closely controlled channels for party directives."

USA 1967

The first CHAOS instructions to CIA station chiefs in August 1967 described the need for "keeping tabs on radical students and U.S. Negro expatriates as well as travelers passing through certain select areas abroad." The originally stated objective was "to find out [the] extent to which Soviets, Chicoms (Chinese Communists) and Cubans are exploiting our domestic problems in terms of espionage and subversion."

USA 1968

the DDP described CHAOS to CIA stations as a "high priority program" concerning foreign "contacts" with the "Radical Left," which was defined as: "radical students, antiwar activists, draft resisters and deserters, black nationalists, anarchists, and assorted 'New Leftists *CHAOS*

USA 1969

President Nixon's White House required the CIA to study foreign communist support of American protest groups and stressed that "support" should be "liberally construed" to include "encouragement" by Communist countries. *CHAOS*

In the fall of 1969, CIA stations were asked to report on any foreign support, guidance, or "inspiration" to protest activities in the United States. *CHAOS*

As CIA Director Richard Helms wrote in 1969, when he transmitted to the White House the CIA's study of "Restless Youth:"

In an effort to round out our discussion of this subject, we have included a section on American students. This is an area not within the charter of this Agency, so I need not emphasize how extremely sensitive this makes the paper. Should anyone learn of its existence, it would prove most embarrassing for all concerned.

USA 1970

In July 1970, CIA security personnel broke into the office of a former defector, still under contract to the CIA. It was not known what agreements to surveillance, if any, the defector might have meade.

USA 1971

Physical surveillance of Washington Post reporter Michael Getler, approved by DCI Richard Helms, ran from October 1971 to January 1972.

CIA security personnel broke in to the business, and unsuccessfully tried to break into the residence, of a former CIA employee living with a Cuban national.

USA 1972

"Personal surveillance", consisting of physically watching the subjets but not using electronic surveillance or warrantless searches, were directd against journalist Jack Anderson and members of his staff from February 15 to April 12. The triggering event for the surveillance, authorized by DCI Richard Helms, was the revelation of the US "tilt to Pakistan".

USA 2001

Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, it was reported that the CIA and military intelligence had been issuing "voluntary" National Security Letters (NSL), which are requests for bank, library, financial and other documentary information provided for in the PATRIOT Act. Compulsory letters had been understood to be restricted to the FBI, and possibly other Federal agencies with a clear domestic law enforcement charter. Carl Kropf, speaking in 2007 for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, said that intelligence agencies like the CIA used the letters on only a "limited basis." The report indicated that Congress had refused the intelligence agencies the authority to issue mandatory national security letters.

Two former CIA attorneys, now in academia, questioned the NSL use. Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker, a former general counsel at both the National Security Agency and the CIA, "There's a strong tradition of not using our military for domestic law enforcement who is dean at the McGeorge School of Law at the University of the Pacific. "They're moving into territory where historically they have not been authorized or presumed to be operating."

A. John Radsan, an assistant general counsel at the CIA from 2002 to 2004 said: "The CIA is not supposed to have any law enforcement powers, or internal security functions, so if they've been issuing their own national security letters, they better be able to explain how they don't cross the line."