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Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS)
The Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) system was first introduced by President George H.W. Bush in 1991. This system was created to adjust and repurpose former President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). [1] The GPALS system was introduced at a time when the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States was becoming less hostile. One of the core ideas behind the GPALS system was that the Soviet Union would not always be assumed as the aggressor and the United States would not always be assumed as the target. [1]
Military Strategy
The GPALS system provided a major adjustment to the United States’ military strategy in several ways. First, it shifted the United States away from fighting an all-out war with the Soviet Union. Instead, the GPALS system prompted the United States military to begin fighting smaller battles with various opponents all around the globe. [1] These other opponents included nations who might have acquired nuclear weapons or broken-up sections of the Soviet Union. Second, the GPALS system focused more heavily on protecting the United States from limited nuclear attacks that involved smaller numbers of warheads. [1] Third, and finally, this system was introduced to protect not just the United States, but also its military forces around the world and its allies. [1]
Adjustments to SDI
GPALS was introduced to cut the total cost of the SDI system. The new system was created to cut the proposed costs of the SDI system from $53 billion to $41 billion over a decade. [1] Also, instead of making plans to protect against thousands of incoming missiles, the GPALS system sought to provide flawless protection from up to two hundred nuclear missiles. [2] The GPALS system also was able to protect the United States from attacks coming from all different parts of the world. [2] Finally, the GPALS system was created to handle and protect the United States from accidental nuclear weapon launches, not just purposeful attacks. [1]
Difficulties with Design
At the time of the GPALS system’s inception, the tension between the United States and the Soviet Union was lower and the perceived risk for all-out nuclear war was lower. [1] However, this did not make the design of the system any easier. The GPALS system sought to provide perfect protection from more limited strikes, which made it difficult to design. As stated in a report sent to the Chairman on Governmental Affairs in the Senate, the level of protection outlined in the GPALS system would require excellent performance in multiple different defense functions, including tracking, detecting, and communicating. [1]
Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS)
The development of the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) was one of the first steps taken by the Soviet Union to utilize space for the delivery of nuclear warheads. [1] The primary objective of the FOBS was to bypass the weapon detection systems in the United States. [1] In order to accomplish this, the FOBS was designed to briefly place nuclear warheads into the earth’s orbit. After orbiting for a short period of time, the bombs would deploy and fall to its target from space. [1] A weapon with this capability was first demonstrated by the Soviet SS-9 Scarp, which was capable of space-launch, in 1967. [3] However, the accuracy of these FOBS missiles was unclear, because they only partially orbited earth and had lower re-entry angles. [3]
The FOBS testing and development most likely indicated that the leadership in the Soviet Union viewed space as the ultimate high ground. [1] This means they saw space as the ideal medium in which they could deploy nuclear weapons from. [1] Space was seen as ideal, because it would allow the Soviet Union to quickly and efficiently deploy nuclear weapons, which would be able to reach their target in an incredibly short amount of time. [1] The bombs would not have to travel from continent to continent. Instead, they would fall from earth’s orbit, thus decreasing the overall flight time. [1]
Even though the Outer Space Treaty was passed, the military and government leadership in the United States determined that a FOBS missile was technically not in orbit, because it did not make a complete cycle around the earth, and therefore decided not to officially ban it. [1]
While the provisions laid out in SALT II, or the second Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty, aimed to ban the use of FOBS missiles, it was never actually ratified by the United States legislature. This unratified treaty would have called for the deconstruction of multiple FOBS vehicles that were being developed by the Soviet Union. [1] It would have also banned the future testing and construction of future FOBS missiles. [1] Even though the SALT II treaty never became official, the Soviet Union still adhered to it and cancelled their testing of the FOBS. [1]
After the testing of this weapon system was halted, the Soviet Union went back to using space as an area for conducting reconnaissance missions with satellites. [1] These reconnaissance missions were conducted in hopes of contributing to the overall process of arms control in the Cold War.
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) II
The Incrementalism Approach
The goal of both SALT I and SALT II was to create a set of policies that would gradually evolve through revisions and adjustments. The initial policies set forth in SALT I would gradually change according to current situations, and policymakers would be able to more easily adjust to new rules and regulations. [4] Additionally, incrementalism in policymaking, and therefore treaty making, allows for there to be similarity and consistency between multiple iterations of the same plan. This consistency helps ensure that both sides of the treaty are on the same page and that their relationships with one another would not become strained. [4] SALT II was therefore intended to act as a step towards SALT III and greater control of the growing Arms Race.
Reagan’s Attitude Towards SALT II
SALT II was devised during the time of the Carter Administration. Their goal was to continually strengthen the regulations proposed in SALT I and push forward into more advanced future arms control plans. However, when Ronald Reagan took office, he openly discredited the quality of the SALT II plan. [4] According to President Reagan, SALT II contained fundamental errors that needed to be addressed. [4] This open criticism of the past president’s foreign policy plan was an unusual occurrence, and it resulted in the overall rejection of SALT II. It is usually customary for a president to reassess their predecessor’s foreign policy plans and make adjustments based on what is going on in the world.
Despite Reagan’s criticism and SALT II’s inability to become ratified, his administration continued to follow to the terms laid out in the treaty until November 1986. [4]
Reagan’s Decision to follow SALT II
There are several reasons for the Reagan administration’s adherence to the terms of SALT II. First, there were not very many constraints for weapon systems development detailed in the plan. [4] This allowed the United States to continue testing and developing new weapon systems. Additionally, the SALT II plan offered some unique strategic advantages for the United States and the Reagan administration. It prevented the Soviet Union from increasing the number of nuclear warheads in their stockpiles. It also prevented them from developing and implementing several different types of missile launchers. Finally, adherence to the SALT II plan allowed the Reagan administration to ease the pressure that was being directed towards them to make progress in the arms control movement. ^ When Reagan came into office, there was not a better solution than SALT II that could be immediately implemented, so he and his administration decided to follow its guidelines in order to appease Congress. [4]
The decision to accept the SALT II provisions was also influenced by European allies to the United States. The United States had installed missile launch sites in several locations across Europe. [4] The Reagan administration wanted to make sure that the worries of their European allies regarding arms control were put to rest. In order to do so, Reagan decided to continue following the plan until one he saw as more appropriate was developed.
Therefore, the political, technological, and strategic advantages provided by SALT II led to Reagan choosing to uphold its guidelines, despite his initial distaste for the plan.
The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)
Russian Views of RMA
Orgarkov called the early idea of RMA the Military Technological Revolution. Pentagon officials in the United States changed the name of his original idea, which is how it became known as RMA. [5] Orgarkov’s belief that the potential and possibility for new weapons was increasing rapidly led to the development of his initial idea.
At the time of the initial development of the idea, the Russians anticipated that certain technologies, including energy weapons and robots, would be utilized by 2015 at the latest. [5] They believed that the use of large ground forces would be minimalized. In their place, these new technologies would be implemented in order to establish dominance on the battlefield. Russians also believed that control of space would become essential for maintaining dominance in future conflicts. Russians believed that it would be essential to control the satellite space around earth, in order to more effectively relay information. They also anticipated the ability to use space as a medium in which they could deploy weapons. [5]
References
1 = Mowthorpe, M. (2004). The Militarization and Weaponization of Space (1st ed.). New York: Lexington Books.
2 = Morrison, D. (1992). Starburst. The New Republic, 206(17), 21-23.
3 - Fought, S. (N.D.) Strategic Missiles. In Encyclopedia Britannica.
4 = Diehl, P. (1990). Ghost of Arms Control Past. Political Science Quarterly, 105(4), 597-615.
5 = Mowthorpe, M. (2005). The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA): The United States, Russian and Chinese Views. The Journal Of Social, Political, And Economic Studies, 30(2), 137-152.
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- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u Matthew, Mowthorpe (2004). The Militarization and Weaponization of Space. New York: Lexington Books.
- ^ a b Morrison, David (1992). "Starburst". The New Republic. Vol. 206. pp. 21–23.
- ^ a b Fought, Stephen (N.D.). "Strategic Missiles". Encyclopedia Britannica.
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(help) - ^ a b c d e f g h Diehl, Paul (1990). "Ghost of Arms Control Past". Political Science Quarterly. 105: 597–615. doi:10.2307/2150937. JSTOR 2150937.
- ^ a b c Mowthorpe, Matthew (2005). "The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA): The United States, Russian and Chinese Views". The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies. 30: 137–152.