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Corruption in North Korea: Bribery Practices

An overview
Corruption is a widespread and growing problem in North Korean society. With a recent study on bribery in North Korea finding that half of the respondents had given a bribe at some point, the practice has become commonplace with the years following the famine of 1994-1998. Although bribery is prevalent on the different areas of society, it is most common in the informal sector. Individuals selling goods, but especially those working in informal foreign trade, are the most likely to bribe officials in order to be able to conduct their business. That is because sanctions against the informal importation of foreign goods are severe if caught. However, because bribery is so prevalent, sellers can almost always avoid the consequences when seized, allowing them to pursue their activities with little repercussions except a bribe to the official. North Korea is ranked 175 out of 177 countries in Transparency International's 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index (tied with Somalia and Afghanistan).

Bribery during the famine
From 1994 to 1998, a devastating famine ravaged North Korea, killing from six hundred thousand and one million people, representing between three to five percent of the country's population. Referred to as the "Arduous March", the origins of the famine are rooted in a combination of events that happened in the 1990s. As North Koreans were dependent on the Public Distribution System (PDS), a centralized farming system created in the 1950s, they could not cultivate plots of land for individual use. Therefore, when a series of floods and natural disasters hit in 1995, 1.5 million tons of grain were destroyed and the country's infrastructure was greatly damaged. It is estimated that up to 15% of North Korea's farmable land could no longer be used. Such a massive loss of the nation's reserves had a significant impact on the regime's ability to evenly distribute food to its completely dependent citizens. Additionally, three years before, in 1991, the collapse of the USSR had brought onto North Korea a decrease in Soviet and Chinese foreign aid. By the time the floods arrived, the aid had completely ceased. However, the regime was highly dependent on it to sustain its damaged centralized farming system and feed its citizens. The combined effects of the floods and the decrease in foreign aid to maintain the DPS were then both the causes of the tragedy, cutting the basic ration from 450 grams to 128 grams per day and starving the masses.

An important consequence of this large-scale famine was the widespread practice of bribery. Now that North Koreans could no longer rely on the state to provide food, individuals had to turn to illegal markets to purchase basic products. When the international community mobilized itself, food shipments arrived and brought down the prices of available products from 25 to 35 percent, making the private market more accessible to citizens. Another consequence the tragedy had was to make poorer sections of the population independent from the regime's food distribution, which had been one of the most prevalent forms of control. More specifically, by 1994, the regime had completely shutdown the food distribution program in the northern regions of North Korea due to their remoteness. Only 6 percent of the country's population was receiving food, meaning that the vast majority resorted to private markets. As mentioned in a paper by the United States Institute of Peace, "public anger is more typically reflected in growing corruption, black market activities, and other anti-system behavior" in North Korea.

Even though the famine occurred more than two decades ago, bribery practices still remain nowadays. The famine has normalized illegal actions that were initially caused by a need for survival. As such, individuals still cultivate illegal plots of land to grow a limited amount of crops. Most officials take advantage of the illegality of it and use their power to bribe farmers and get a share of the harvest. The fact that these practices are still prevalent in North Korean society nowadays, although the famine had now ended, reinforces the idea that the centralized farming system has broken "the social contract between farmers and the rest of society". Individual food production is thus now tolerated, as citizens no longer trust the regime to provide for them.

Bribery and political stability
Just like its citizens, the regime also takes advantage of some bribery practices. Examples can be found in the infrastructure sector, in which resources flow from the informal sector to the formal one. Because some products needed to undertake projects are hard to find in the official system, a simpler way to proceed is to engage in illegal activity. A similar situation is found within the bureaucracy, where bribes incentivize employees to be more efficient. To obtain legal government permits to visit China, for instance, giving a bribe of US$50-100 to the employee will accelerate the process to have it the same day. For local trips such as visiting Pyongyang, the bribe paid will be around US$15-30. Furthermore, as both managers, entrepreneurs and workers engage in bribery, there is no longer a sense that hard work is rewarded or valued. The economic incentives of engaging in corrupt acts are high enough to maintain the masses content, with corruption and criminality being seen as "the most lucrative career path". In some cases, however, bribery practices do undermine the stability of the government. Individuals can bribe their way into working less formal hours to spend more time in the informal market. As of 2010, 62 percent of North Korean defectors had worked in the informal market. Even though this allows them to make more money out of the illegal system, it is done at the expense of the regime's stability, as workers are no longer productive in official projects . These assessments are consistent among different demographic groups surveyed, even those that had a favourable position within the regime.

Nonetheless, the existence of the informal market is important for the stability of the regime, as it fills in the gaps left by the official system. With citizens being able to find elsewhere products that the government does not provide, significant discontent is less likely. Basic needs can be met fairly easily through illegal market structures and bribes. The regime thus tolerates the existence of corruption among its society to keep control and prevent an uprising of the masses. Plus, the era of globalization has affected everyone, including North Koreans, who now want to acquire foreign goods and private property as well. Tolerance and a slow opening towards market privatization are needed to maintain stability, despite the communist ideology of the regime. However, as the scholars Haggard and Noland, authors of Witness to transformation: refugee insights into North Korea, mention: "this divergence could create substantial risks for the regime over the longer run, particularly as repression is harnessed not to ideological objectives (...) but to private gain by government".

Bribery and the media
Media control is important for the North Korean regime. Used to spread propaganda and maintain ideological control, news are carefully selected and all mentions of economic hardships are avoided in order to paint a glorified picture of Kim Jong-un. In 2008, the launch of Koryolink, a national cellphone service, had a significant effect on society. Even though it allowed the regime to monitor conversations, it also allowed some individuals to connect to the Chinese mobile networks. The latter being strictly illegal, the punishments if caught are commonly evaded by offering bribes to police officers . Many citizens also access foreign media by modifying radio and television receivers. The desire to access foreign information shows a lack of trust in the government, as citizens are increasingly conscious that the information it provides is not always accurate. As of 2010, 27 percent of North Korean defectors had listened to a foreign radio. Plus, accessing one has become crucial to illegal trading practices close to borders. Thanks to their use, traders can now know market prices more accurately and sell items at a fairer price. Not owning a radio for a trader has become a serious obstacle, as the lack of information would make that person less competitive in the market.

More recently, North Korea’s state media has also admitted to widespread corruption in the country. When executing Jang Sung-taek in December 2013, then second most powerful man in North Korea and Kim Jong-un's uncle by marriage, the official statement mentioned accusations of bribery, deviation of materials, selling resources and land, securing funds and squandering money for private use by organizations under his control.. It is unusual for the regime to admit corrupt practices of such high-ranking members of the party, which illustrated Kim Jong-un's need to reaffirm his place as leader and representative of the morale. As such, the public execution of Jang Sung-taek was a significant event that undermined the change he represented within North Korean society. Being a figure of progress compared to Kim Jong-un, his death discouraged further challenges to the regime’s leadership .

Bribery and punishment
As bribery is now a common practice within North Korean society, approaches to punishment have evolved through time. Before the famine of 1994-1998, it was not as tolerated by society and being sent to a North Korean prison camp when caught could hardly be avoided. In recent years, there have been two revisions to the criminal code, in 2004 and 2007, which have criminalized economic activity and set new standards for officials. It is common that the amount of the bribe will vary according to the severity of the crime committed and the individual's capacity to pay, which could range from a pack of cigarettes to hundreds of dollars. As such, bribery is now accessible in the sense that a poor individual will not be asked to pay an unreasonable amount. In a 2010 survey, the most frequently cited motives for bribery were "being permitted to trade" and "avoiding punishment". This is especially true in geographically remote places, where Pyongyang's control is weaker and the fear of officials is not as strong .

In some cases, individuals might not be able to pay the bribe or the official might not be tolerant. For petty crimes committed by teenagers, a correction from the parents might be considered enough. However, when an individual is found guilty of a political crime, which is the most serious offence in the eyes of the regime and the hardest one to bribe, incarceration in the prison camps is almost assured. In these cases, the careful attention that is normally paid to the judiciary process is disregarded. Such a process is usually easily corrupted, but still present due to the bureaucratic nature of North Korea. For political crimes, the country's National Security Agency (NSA) handles cases individually behind close-doors, which is a contrast when compared to the "people's court" used for smaller crimes. As such, bribery allows individuals to avoid punishment for non-political crimes. For more serious offences to which the sentence is prison camp, the probability of succeeding is lower.

MagdalenaMorales (talk) 22:05, 25 April 2018 (UTC)