Jump to content

User:MyMoloboaccount/Relations between Nazi Germany and Second Polish Republic

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Relations between Nazi Germany and Second Polish Republic

Nazi views on Poles and Poland before obtaining power

[edit]

Hitler viewed from the beginning of his career Poles negatively, influenced by his anti-slavism which led him to believe already before the war that they are subhuman[1]. In his view of racial hierarchy Poles were lower than Czechs but higher than Russians, whom he hated especially intensively, leaving to Poles contempt and resentment[2].In 1919 Hitler remarked that Poles are of little worth and shouldn't be Germanized. During Polish-Bolshevik war in 1920 he accused France of harming Germany by providing military support to Polish forces and in speech made in Rosenheim, Bavaria in August he openly declared possibility of alliance between Soviet Russia and Germany against Poland as long as alleged "Jewish leadership" would be removed from Power in the communist state[3].

Already during conference of NSDAP 1920 a program was established demanding not only abolishing of the Treaty of Versailles-which allowed restoration of Polish state-but also establishing of Greater Germany which encompass all German minorities living on European continent which implicated large scale annexations of territories from other countries[4]. At the same time Hitler rejected limitation of German annexations to border of 1914 believing that true Lebensraum could only be obtained by expansion of German borders beyond those of 1914 [5]. Additionally he rejected the idea of Germanizing the local population as it would spoil the racial purity of German nation. During the Polish uprising against German rule in Upper Silesia, Hitler formulate his early idea of eradication of Polish state, at the time however, he didn't consider it possible yet, due to weakness of Germany and his belief that Poles had strong military forces[6]. Before the war in his speeches and writing, Hitler expressed his low view of Poles as a "race" and agreed with anti-Polish sentiments present in Germany.[7] In December 1931 during a press conference Hitler supported annexation of Polish territories connecting it to the sea[8]


Non-aggression pact with Poland

[edit]

As early as the autumn of 1933 Hitler envisioned annexing such territories as Bohemia, Western Poland, Austria to Germany and creation of satellite or puppet states without economies or policies of their own.[9]

After gaining power until February 1939 Hitler tried to conceal his true intentions towards Poland and revealed them only to his closest associates; the signing of non-agression pact with Poland in 1934 was a political maneuver to conceal his true intentions towards Poland.[10] At this time only Hitler's closest circle knew about his true intentions towards Poland and his desire to destroy the country completely in pursuit of Lebensraum, and as result some diplomats from Nazi Germany pursued further talks with Poland[11]

Mistreatment and abuse of Polish population in Germany after signing of the non-aggression pact

[edit]

Wardzynska

Preparations for war against Poland and extermination of Polish population

[edit]

Since 1934 Nazi Germany has been preparing German minority in Poland for war[12] At least since 1935 weapons were being smuggled and gathered in frontier Polish regions by Nazi intelligence, and spying networks established[13]

In November 1938, Nazi Germany organized German paramilitary units in Polish Pomerania that were to engage in diversion, sabotage as well as murder and ethnic cleansing upon German invasion of Poland.[14].

In 1937, Hitler continued to assure Poland[15] that Germany had no claims on Danzig, while at the same time on 5th November 1937 during a secret meeting of Reich Chancellery he informed military officials to prepare within a year for war and conquest of Lebensraum[16]. At the end of 1938 one of the first editions of Sonderfahndungsbuch Polen was printed by the Nazis, containing several thousand names of Poles targeted for execution and imprisonment after invasion of Poland[17] In November 1938, Danzig's district administrator, Albert Forster, reported to the League of Nations that Hitler had told him Polish frontiers would be guaranteed if the Poles were "reasonable like the Czechs". German State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker reaffirmed this alleged guarantee in December 1938.[18]In March 1939 Hitler informed his military that he will resolve the disputes dispute with Poland by use of force, believing Polish state to be a "foreign object" on European continent[19] In November 1938 Nazi Germany organized German paramilitary units in Polish Pomerania that were to engage in diversion, sabotage as well as murder and ethnic cleansing upon German invasion of Poland[20] German minority organizations in Poland such as Jungdeutsche Partei, Deutsche Vereinigung, Deutscher Volksbund and Deutscher Volksverband actively cooperated with Nazi Germany through espionage, sabotage, provocations and political indoctrination. They maintained close contact with and were directed by the NSDAP, Auslandsorganisation, Gestapo, SD and Abwehr. It is estimated that 25% of the German minority in Poland was members of these organizations.

By October 1938, SD agents were organizing the Selbstschutz in Poland. Ethnic Germans with Polish citizenship were trained in the Third Reich in various sabotage methods and guerrilla tactics.

Even before the war, Selbstschutz activists from Poland helped to organize lists of Poles who later were to be arrested or executed in Operation Tannenberg.

Prelude to war

[edit]

The overall goal of German state and its war towards Poland was clear and discussed among leadership of Wehrmacht, Nazi Party, Waffen SS and Kriegsmarine:the extermination of Polish people, considered "sub-human", eradication of Polish nation, and complete destruction of Polish state, a first step to a far larger goal of conquering and colonizing lands further east[21] However, there was one exception: in the night of 25–6 August, a German sabotage group which had not heard anything about a delay of the invasion made an attack on the Jablunkov Pass and Mosty railway station in Silesia. On the morning of 26 August, this group was repelled by Polish troops. The German side described all this as an incident "caused by an insane individual" (see Jabłonków Incident).

Map showing the planned and actual divisions of Poland according to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.
Planned and actual divisions of Poland, according to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, with later adjustments

On 26 August, Hitler tried to dissuade the British and the French from interfering in the upcoming conflict, even pledging that the Wehrmacht forces would be made available to Britain's empire in the future.[22] The negotiations convinced Hitler that there was little chance the Western Allies would declare war on Germany, and even if they did, because of the lack of "territorial guarantees" to Poland, they would be willing to negotiate a compromise favourable to Germany after its conquest of Poland. Meanwhile, the increased number of overflights by high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft and cross border troop movements signaled that war was imminent.

On 29 August, prompted by the British, Germany issued one last diplomatic offer, with Fall Weiss "Case White" yet to be rescheduled. That evening, the German government responded in a communication that it aimed not only for the restoration of Danzig but also the Polish Corridor (which had not previously been part of Hitler’s demands) in addition to the safeguarding of the German minority in Poland. It said that they were willing to commence negotiations, but indicated that a Polish representative with the power to sign an agreement had to arrive in Berlin the next day while in the meantime it would draw up a set of proposals.[23] The British Cabinet was pleased that negotiations had been agreed to but, mindful of how Emil Hacha had been forced to sign his country away under similar circumstances just months earlier, regarded the requirement for an immediate arrival of a Polish representative with full signing powers as an unacceptable ultimatum.[24][25] On the night of 30/31 August, German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop read a 16-point German proposal to the British ambassador. When the ambassador requested a copy of the proposals for transmission to the Polish government Ribbentrop refused on the grounds that the requested Polish representative had failed to arrive by midnight.[26] When Polish Ambassador Lipski went to see Ribbentrop later on 31 August to indicate that Poland was favorably disposed to negotiations, he announced that he did not have the full power to sign, and Ribbentrop dismissed him. It was then broadcast that Poland had rejected Germany's offer, and negotiations with Poland came to an end. Hitler issued orders for the invasion to commence soon afterwards.

On 29 August, German saboteurs planted a bomb at the railway station in Tarnów and killed 21 passengers, leaving 35 wounded.

On 30 August, the Polish Navy sent its destroyer flotilla to Britain, executing Operation Peking. On the same day, Marshal of Poland Edward Rydz-Śmigły announced the mobilization of Polish troops. However, he was pressured into revoking the order by the French, who apparently still hoped for a diplomatic settlement, failing to realize that the Germans were fully mobilized and concentrated at the Polish border.[27] During the night of 31 August, the Gleiwitz incident, a false flag attack on the radio station, was staged near the border city of Gleiwitz by German units posing as Polish troops, in Upper Silesia as part of the wider Operation Himmler.[28] On 31 August 1939, Hitler ordered hostilities against Poland to start at 4:45 the next morning. Because of the prior stoppage, Poland managed to mobilize only 70% of its planned forces, and many units were still forming or moving to their designated frontline positions.



References

[edit]
  1. ^ Maciejewski
  2. ^ Maciejewski
  3. ^ Maciejewski
  4. ^ Maciejewski
  5. ^ Maciejewski
  6. ^ Maciejewski
  7. ^ Leitz, C (2004) Nazi Foreign Policy, 1933-1941: The Road to Global War, Psychology Press, P63
  8. ^ Sprawy międzynarodowe - Volume 5, Issue 5 - Page 88 1952.
  9. ^ Majer, Diemut (2003). "Non-Germans" under the Third Reich: the Nazi judicial and administrative system in Germany and occupied Eastern Europe with special regard to occupied Poland, 1939—1945. JHU Press. pp. 188–9. ISBN 0-8018-6493-3. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |note= ignored (help).
  10. ^ Stutthof. Zeszyty Muzeum, 3. PL ISSN 0137-5377. Mirosław Gliński Geneza obozu koncentracyjnego Stutthof na tle hitlerowskich przygotowan w Gdansku do wojny z Polsk
  11. ^ Himmler's Auxiliaries: The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the German National Minorities of Europe, 1933-1945 Valdis O. Lumans page 98
  12. ^ Maria Wardzyńska, "Był rok 1939. Operacja niemieckiej policji bezpieczeństwa w Polsce Intelligenzaktion Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, IPN 2009
  13. ^ Stutthof: hitlerowski obóz koncentracyjny Konrad Ciechanowski Wydawnictwo Interpress, 1988, page 13
  14. ^ Cite error: The named reference Konrad Ciechanowski Wydawnictwo Interpress 1988, p. 13 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  15. ^ Carl Tighe Gdańsk National Identity in the Polish-German Borderlands Pluto 1990 ISBN 0-7453-0474-5 Page 122
  16. ^ Immigration Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany: Negotiating Membership and Remaking the Nation By Douglas B. Klusmeyer, Demetrios G. Papademetriou page 37
  17. ^ Gdańsk 1939: wspomnienia Polaków-Gdańszczan Brunon Zwarra Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1984, p 13
  18. ^ Anna M
  19. ^ Wehrmacht Od inwazji na Polske do kapitulacji By Guido Knopp page 34
  20. ^ Stutthof: hitlerowski obóz koncentracyjny Konrad Ciechanowski Wydawnictwo Interpress, 1988, page 13
  21. ^ Wojna i dziecko Helena Boczek, Jacek Boczek, Jacek Edward Wilczur Nasza Księgarnia, 1979, page 25
  22. ^ Text version see also the original document
  23. ^ Reply of the German Chancellor to the Communication of 28 August 1939, from His Majesty's Government Cited in the British Blue Book
  24. ^ Viscount Halifax to Sir N. Henderson (Berlin) Cited in the British Blue book]
  25. ^ Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax (received 10 a. m.). Cited in the British Blue Book
  26. ^ Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax (received 9:30 a. m. 31 August) Cited in the British Blue Book
  27. ^ Seidner, Stanley S. Marshal Edward Śmigły-Rydz Rydz and the defence of Poland, New York, 1978, ch. 2
  28. ^ Cite error: The named reference Himmler was invoked but never defined (see the help page).

Żerko, Polska w hitlerowskiej koncepcji polityki zagranicznej 1933-1939

Polska i Polacy w propagandzie narodowego socjalizmu w Niemczech 1919-1945 Eugeniusz Cezary Król

Polska i Polacy w poglądach Adolfa Hitlera (1919–1945) Marek Maciejewski

Andrzej Gąsiorowski: Hitlerowskie przygotowania do agresji i eksterminacji Polaków na Pomorzu Gdańskim i w Wolnym Mieście Gdańsku in Stutthof: hitlerowski obóz koncentracyjny. Warszawa: Interpress, 1988

Tomasz Chinciński Forpoczta Hitlera. Niemiecka dywersja w Polsce w 1939 roku Gdansk-Warsaw, 2010.

Tomasz Chinciński – Niemiecka dywersja w Polsce w 1939 r. w świetle dokumentów policyjnych i wojskowych II Rzeczypospolitej oraz służb specjalnych III Rzeszy, część I (marzec-sierpień 1939)

The German Minority in Interwar Poland Winson Chu

Wolne miasto Gdańsk w rewizjonistycznej propagandzie niemieckiej 1920-1939


Polski korytarz czy niemiecka enklawa


Włodzimierz Wakar, Bohdan Koziełło-Poklewski


Problem "korytarza" w stosunkach polsko-niemieckich i na arenie międzynarodowej 1919-1939. Studium polityczne Grzegorz Łukomsk

II Rzeczpospolita a mniejszość polska w Niemczech Henryk Chałupczak Poznań Inst. Zachodni, 1992

Stosunki polsko-niemieckie 1938-1939 Stanisław Żerko Poznań : Inst. Zachodni, 1998

Maria Wardzyńska Był rok 1939 Operacja niemieckiej policji bezpieczeństwa w Polsce Intelligenzaktion, Wydawnictwo: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, IPN Rok wydania: 2009

Polski wywiad wojskowy wobec polityki III Rzeszy 1933-1939: Militarne aspekty polityki III Rzeszy w świetle analiz Oddziału II Sztabu Głównego Wojska Polskiego

Robert Majzner Wydawn. Adam Marszałek, 2007 - 411


[edit]

http://acienciala.faculty.ku.edu/hist557/lect15.htm

http://acienciala.faculty.ku.edu/hist557/lect16.htm


Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:MyMoloboaccount/Relations_between_Nazi_Germany_and_Second_Polish_Republic&oldid=1092305886"