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The Third Battle of Mount Hermon...

Prelude

The recapture of the Hermon remained on the IDF General Staff and Northern Command's (NC) agenda. The order of battle for Operation Dessert was accelerated on October 15, when General Yitzhak Hofi met with the Chief of Staff (Ramatkal) David Elazar, to discuss NC activity. Elazar said, inter alia, that the Hermon outpost must be recaptured and subordinated the Chief Infantry Headquarters to NC, to plan and carry out the operation. Hofi opposed an attack on the upcoming night because of insufficient Intelligence regrading the Syrian deployment. In a discussion session held before noon, Elazar ordered NC to plan the recapture of the Hermon with the Infantry Headquarters, to infiltrate observations into the area and attack on the first chance starting the night of October 16–17. Hofi ordered a reconnaissance patrol by Unit 269 to the Hermon, which was not carried out for various reasons.

On October 16, the Deputy Chief Infantry Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Aryeh Zimmel, presented to Hofi the plan to recapture the Hermon as follows: In phase A the Syrian outpost would be captured, and in phase B the Israeli outpost would be captured by two 317th Brigade battalions, which would be landed by helicopters. Hofi again ordered a reconnaissance patrol by Unit 269 to the Hermon, and for the attack to be carried out within 48 hours from notice. In the General Staff discussion held in the morning of October 19 Elazar repeated the necessity of capturing the Hermon and that the 317th Paratroopers Brigade is needed. He therefore did not authorize the brigade to attack Tel Kudneh that night. He ordered NC to attack once the artillery that NC currently misses is centralized. Later that night, General Staff estimated the situation, and learned about the Soviet demand that Kissinger come to Moscow immediately, and concluded that a ceasefire is near. Assessing that every possible accomplishment had to be achieved within three days, Elazar said that at least both Hermon outposts must be captured, and its peak too, if possible. Elazar's deputy, General Israel Tal, updated him that the operation was set to October 21, and that NC was detailed 3,000 artillery shells, helicopter transportation support, air and artillery support as needed, and that on October 20 the Israeli Air Force would keep the Syrians from breaking a road between the outposts. It was also decided that the Chief Infantry Officer would not be commanding the operation because he was earmarked for commanding an operation to capture Port Said. Elazar ordered Hofi to plan the operation within 48 hours. Hofi decided to appoint a team headed by his deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Yekutiel Adam in charge of the planning, which would operate as a secondary headquarters.

At 09:30 on October 20, a meeting was held at NC to discuss the attack. Hofi presented the details as follows: The 317th Brigade was to be flown to the Syrian Hermon by nightfall. Under the cover of darkness, it would move and clear it, and would be on alert to go down to the Israeli Hermon. The Golani Brigade would capture the Israeli Hermon moving in two forces and by two axes: One force would move on foot from Majdal Shams to the upper ski lift, and then to the Israeli outpost. The second force would be motorized and ascend up the road parallel to the first force. Unit 269 would place an observation at "Mitzpe Shlagim" at night and on the operation night it was to send a company there to cut the road between the Syrian Hermon and the Israeli Hermon, observe and direct the artillery. The36th Division was to secure the flank and hit any escaping Syrians. The support for the Golani Brigade would be based on heavy mortar fire and the support for the Paratroopers Brigade would be based on 155mm guns. The operation night would be the night of Sunday–Monday, and assuming it would last until Monday night, he ordered to set up a helicopter base at the Mahanayim airfield to provide supply and evacuation of wounded during the battle. The command was to be divided into two teams, since on Monday morning NC was to attack southward in the Syrian enclave. Adam's team would command the capture of the Hermon, and Hofi's team would command the attack. Later, the plan for flying the Paratroops Brigade was presented, including the air and artillery support. Hofi then flew to the General Staff and presented the plan to Tal.

At 14:00, while Hofi was presenting the plan at the General Staff, NC war room held a preliminary briefing, including Adam, the 317th Brigade commander, Haim Nadel, Drori, and others. The operation was scheduled for 18:00 on October 21. Drori asked that instead of climbing up the mountainside ridge, as NC ordered, the main infantry force would leave Hadar to Mitzpe Shlagim and attack the Syrian deployment from the northeast, while a secondary force would attack the Israeli outpost from its rear and the Golani reconnaissance company would position observations at Mitzpe Shlagim. Adam agreed that the brigade would offer both plans. He ordered Nadel to present a detailed plan to capture the Syrian outpost and the "curves" area, as well as two alternatives in case helicopters would not be detailed: the first being flying the brigade on helicopters to Har Dov, moving on foot to the Lebanese village of Shebaa, and then moving on foot to the Syrian Hermon; the second being an advance on foot from Hadar via Mitzpe shlagim and then to the Syrian Hermon. Adam told Unit 269 commander, Lieutenant Colonel Giora Zorea, to present a plan for moving to Mitzpe Shalgim and then through Duvdevan ridge to an observation over the Syrian Hermon and blocking the road between the outposts, disregarding the plans of the brigades. The brigade commanders started planning their missions. In the afternoon, Drori presented his plan to Adam, which Adam rejected mostly for the following reasons:

1. The advance trail was too steep
2. The 51st Battalion was to be divided into task forces too small
3. There might have been an evacuation clearing problem
4. It was already planned the a Unit 269 force would ascend that trail to take up positions west of Mitzpe Shlagim.

Drori preferred his plan, but agreed to the NC plan.

Drori and his staff returned on Saturday night to the brigade HQ at Hadar, where Drori gathered the force commanders and updated them regarding the outline of the NC plan. A briefing was set for 06:00, after which Drori was to return to NC to present his plan for Hofi's approval. Nadel finished planning the airlift operation with representatives of the IAF and the general infantry headquarters, and presented his plan to Adam close to midnight. After Adam's approval, Nadel and his staff drove to the Mahanayim Airfield to prepare the brigade briefing, planned for 10:00 the next day. His deputy moved the brigade from Kala to Mahanayim. At 06:15 on October 21, Golani held their first briefing at Hadar, after which Drori and his Intelligence officer went to present their plan to Hofi. At 08:30, a second briefing was held and both plans were approved. At 10:15 Hofi updated Elazar on the phone regarding the plan, since Elazar could not attend the second briefing himself. Meanwhile, the paratroopers were briefed at Mahanayim. At 11:00 five Yas'ur helicopters out of six that were supposed to, landed at Mahanayim, and a detailed planning of the airlift began.

Preparations and preliminary operations

The Israeli Air Force (IAF) was given several missions: Bombing the Syrian forces on the Hermon ridges as a preliminary action; airlifting the paratroopers and landing them north of the "curves" outpost; airlifting reserve forces according to contingency and evacuating casualties during the battle; preventing Syrian forces from intervening, especially on the Syrian Hermon, and providing the forces with an aerial cover; taking air photos over the Hermon for Intelligence purposes; observation flights for artillery pinpointing; and maintaining an aerial relay during the airlift. The IAF earmarked the 109th Squadron for an attack support. The joint planning of the IAF Northern Command representative and the IAF headquarters determined that the IAF should attack mostly near the landing areas. The 118th Helicopter Squadron, under the command of Colonel Yuval Efrat, was earmarked for airlifting the paratroopers. The IAF attack and reconnaissance flights began on October 20. To assist the preliminary artillery strike on the Syrian Hermon, the 109th Squadron carried out five observation flights between 16:45 and 09:00.

The Artillery Corps also took part in the preparations. The commander of the corps' Northern Command, Lieutenant Colonel Avraham Bar Dor, concentrated as many artillery pieces as he could, without harming the ability to hold the Syrians and Iraqis at bay. Because of the problematic topography in the region, mostly 120 mm and 160 mm mortars were used. To counter possible Syrian reinforcements against the 317th Brigade, some long-range 155 mm cannons were also deployed. Additional ammunition was also requested from the General Staff and the Chief of Staff's assistant, Aluf Rehavam Ze'evi.

The full artillery force numbered 14 batteries and one platoon, as follows:

• 334th Battalion of the 282nd Brigade, consisting of two 160 mm mortar and one 155 mm cannon batteries
• 871st Battalion of the 212th Brigade, consisting of three 155 mm cannon batteries
• 335th Battalion of the 212th Brigade, consisting of three 120 mm mortar batteries
• 313rd Battalion of the 212th Brigade, consisting of two 160 mm mortar batteries
• 343rd Battalion of the Central Command, consisting of three 120 mm mortar batteries
• Platoon of 120 mm mortars from the 833rd Battalion

Special two-digit codes were given for the shelling targets by the command to confuse enemy intelligence, but because the Israeli field commanders could also add their own codes, this also caused misunderstandings on the Israeli side. Bar Dor was also tasked with providing liaison officers to the Golani Brigade.

The Northern Command took control of the joint artillery and air forces, in order to better coordinate their actions. The first air force observation flight was manned by an artillery officer, who coordinated the efforts on the ground. However, he was unable to physically cope with the flight on an A-4 Skyhawk, so coordination on the other four flights was done by the pilots themselves, and was considered unsatisfactory. The actual preparations on the ground were meant to begin at 06:00 on October 21 (12 hours before zero hour), although they started at 09:00, three hours late. The air force strikes began at 10:30, and the Artillery Corps also employed 130 mm and 175 mm cannons in order to disrupt the operations of Syrian SAM sites.

Battle

The 417th Battalion's first helicopter arrived at 14:19 and its 2nd Company was tasked with guarding the landing zone. The incoming troops from other companies dispersed and moved to a location about 200 meters (220 yd) south, in order to avoid Syrian artillery fire. The 2nd Company meanwhile conducted reconnaissance patrols in order to use the remaining daytime hours to learn the territory. The brigade's commander also set up a position to the south of the landing zone, at 16:50, and the last landing took place at 17:25. The Syrian position consisted of the 183rd Commando Battalion and two companies from the 83rd Commando Battalion. After organizing, the Israelis moved toward this position slowly and with artillery support, fearing that they might tire out quickly because of the thinner air at their elevation.

The first obstacle to the Israelis was the "Twists position". The 2nd Company, which led the Israeli force, came to the point from which they would attack this position at 18:15. Fire was opened on them immediately, and an officer was killed. The counter-assault ended in a victory at 19:05, when the "Twists position" was captured. Five Syrian bodies were discovered. Israeli forces subsequently turned to blocking the approach from the Syrian village Irneh to the east. They set up an anti-tank ambush and blew a large hole in the road to the "Twists position". At 00:45, Syrian reinforcements began moving from as-Saberani to Irneh. Upon reaching the hole in the ground created by the Israelis, the Syrians dislodged from their vehicles and continued on foot. Upon encountering the Israeli ambush, they fled, leaving five trucks behind (the sixth managed to escape). Two Syrian soldiers were killed in the encounter.

Aftering taking the "Twists position", the 1st Company then proceeded slowly to the "Cliff position" about 1.4 km to the south of the "Twists". By 22:00, the company reached the staging area, from where it assaulted the position starting at 22:25. The close-range encounted lasted an hour and a half, with 12 Syrian KIAs and no Israeli casualties. The company then proceeded to its final destination closer to the Syrian Hermon position, followed by the 4th Comapny. On the way, it encountered numerous abandoned Syrian posts.