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Senator Robert M. La Follette Jr.

The La Follette Committee

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The La Follette Committee, or the La Follette Civil Liberties Subcommittee, was a special subcommittee of the US Senate that sat from 1936 to 1941 to investigate violations of civil liberties and civil rights that occurred between capital and labor during the depression era.[1].

The subcommittee held expansive investigations and hearings into employer violations of the rights of labor workers to organize and bargain collectively. While the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) catalyzed the momentum for such an investigation, Senator Robert M. La Follette Jr. of Wisconsin headed the inquiry[2]. He was co-chaired by Senator Elbert D. Thomas of Utah[3]. Focused primarily on labor disputes in steel, mining, automobile, and California agriculture, the Committee’s extensive investigations exposed corporate America’s tactics to deny workers their rights to organize, form unions, and bargain collectively. The Committee’s efforts uncovered long-standing antiunion practices of espionage, industrial munitions, strikebreaking and private policing[4].

Background

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World War I

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American liberty and freedom, since the conception of the Bill or Rights, were largely measured upon a notion of “governmental noninterference” well into the late 19th century. The rise of an organized civil liberties movement in the early 20th century was in opposition to federal legislation[5]. Protestors, pacifists, and objectors to wartime legislation espoused their fervent rejection of the Espionage and Selective Service acts of 1917, and the Sedition Acts of 1918, through the National Civil Liberties Bureau, a predecessor to the ACLU. Such federal legislation, enacted shortly after the US entered World War I, suppressed radical ideology in an effort to deter insubordination in the military and prevent support of US enemies[6]. While the Supreme Court ruling of Schenck v. United States[7] held that these legislations did not violate the freedom of speech, the severity and expansive reach of such broad federal policies provided, for some, substantiated proof that “centralized authority” remained “the most serious challenge to [American] freedom”[8].

ACLU and the New Deal

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Wartime threats to civil liberties eventually waned. The ACLU, nonetheless, emerged to defend the rights of labor. With the onset of The Depression and its widespread socioeconomic ravages, F.D.R’s New Deal, again, incited fears of a repressive government armed now with a model of centralized authority from the nation’s wartime experience. In 1934, the ACLU, despite any evidence of federal suppression, held that the “enormous increase of power of the federal government under New Deal policies carries with it inevitable fears of inroads on the rights of agitation. Alarms are widely expressed over alleged dictatorship by the President, the abrogation of States’ rights and the vast economic powers of the federal government…”[9] Where the ACLU remained skeptical of Roosevelt’s centralized administration, it had greater misgivings towards corporate America, which it regarded to hold “control over the exercise of Civil liberty”[10].

New Deal Legislation

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The passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act and subsequently the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) provided the legislative framework for mass unionization. Section 7-a of NIRA protected collective bargaining rights of unions and the Wagner Act ensured the basic rights of private employees to unionize, collectively bargain, and strike if necessary.

Where New Deal recovery legislation, such as NIRA and the Wagner Act, inaugurated a reform effort to redistribute America’s purchasing power, the efficacy of such policies were undermined by antiunion tactics of capitalists in most industries. Major civil liberties issues, thus, arose during the New Deal era[11]. Workers struggled to organize, bargain collectively, and strike against the forceful and oppressive grain of private employers.

History

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Resolution 266

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By the mid thirties, Senator Robert M. La Follette Jr. of Wisconsin had emerged as a vocal patron of labor organizations[12]. His vehement support for the movement towards organized labor, and collective bargaining extended well beyond political rhetoric[13]. Two distinct yet related developing problems during the New Deal era pushed Senator La Follette to bring congressional intervention within the ongoing civil liberties battles: the violent suppression of the Southern Tenant Farmers Union in northeastern Arkansas, and the paralysis of the National Labor Relations Board, a New Deal agency created to resolve labor management difficulties.

To ameliorate the plight of the Southern Tenant Farmers Union, and to restore authority to the NLRB, Senator La Follette Jr. introduced Resolution 266 pending senate approval. Resolution 266 would allow the Committee on Education and Labor to investigate “violations of the rights of free speech and assembly and undue interference with the right of labor to organize and bargain collectively”[14]. The seventy-fourth Senate approved Resolution 266 in June of 1936. Senator Robert La Follette became head of the newly formed “La Follette Civil Liberties Subcommittee”.

The Southern Tenant Farmers Union and the Cosmos Club

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In northeastern Arkansas, during 1934, the Southern Tenant Farmers Union, formed by a band of tenant farmers and sharecroppers under the tribulations of the Depression, faced violent, and concerted resistance. “Tenants sympathetic to the union were flogged and evicted from their decrepit shacks; their churches were padlocked to deter union rallies; and several Arkansas towns passed ordinances banning public meetings"[15]. A dinner with church organizations, labor leaders, government officials, and educators was arranged at the Cosmos Club in Washington to express the grievances of the Southern Tenant Farms Union, and to discuss possible remedies to the “wide-spread violations of our Constitutional Bill of Rights”[16]. President of the United Mine Workers’ Union, John L. Lewis, was quoted to have said at the dinner that congressional intervention within matters of civil liberties would not happen “until there [is] blood flowing in the streets of our cities”[17]. Senator Robert M. La Follette Jr., here, surprised all by pledging to introduce a Senate resolution, S. 266, calling for a civil liberties inquiry.

National Labor Relations Board

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Concurrently, in late 1935 the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found itself in a state of absolute paralysis. The NLRB was instated under New Deal legislation as the principle “agency vested with responsibility for implementing the mandate of the Wagner Act”[18]. While it was expected that American industries would not openly welcome the provisions of the Wagner act, such unprecedented resistance came as a surprise. The NLRB faced harsh attack by the America Liberty League, a powerful anti-New Deal organization. To exacerbate the matter, a myriad of unfortunate court decisions impaired the Board’s function, depriving it of any authority to implement the mandate of the Wagner Act. Furthermore, the few investigations that the NLRB had conducted had shown definitive proof of widespread anti-labor practices and numerous civil liberties violations. Senator La Follette’s resolution remained a glimpse of hope for the NLRB to restore its functions.

Alliance with the CIO

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On June 6, 1936 the Senate approved S. 266 establishing the La Follette Civil Liberties Subcommittee. While the committee’s initial goal was to work under a similar purview as that of the NLRB, its scope broadened greatly with the interjection of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). “The massive CIO organizing drives in steel, in automobiles, and in mining coincided with the initial phase of the La Follette investigation”[19]. The La Follette Committee functioned “as the cutting edge of the CIO’s support for its campaigns and tactics”[20].

Espionage, Industrial Munitions,Strikebreaking, and Private Police

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The Committee, working in conjunction with the CIO exposed four major antiunion practices: espionage, industrial munitions, strikebreaking and private police. Using direct witness testimonies, the Committee was allowed an “unprecedented glimpse of the underside of American industrial relations”[21]. Espionage, as the committee concluded was a common and universal industrial practice in America. Where espionage failed to deter labor organization, munitions succeeded. Industry management invested in “tear and nauseating gas, machine guns, gas bombs and billy clubs”[22] to halt labor efforts. When militancy tactics failed, industry often turned to an ample supply of strikebreakers, who would effectually undermine the efficacy of any strike. Ultimately, employers turned to private police. “When the armed forces of the employer are injected into the delicate relations of labor and management, the consequences seriously threaten the civil rights of citizens and the peace and safety of whole communities”[23].

Major Investigations

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General Motors

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The La Follette Committee had investigated many of the largest detective agencies in relations to industrial espionage. Investigation into the Pinkerton Agency had revealed a vast espionage network at play within General Motors. Inquiry into GM’s labor relations began after a wave of sitdown strikes in Kansas City, Missouri and Flint, Michigan. In the wake of Judge Edward Black’s issuance of an injunction restraining the Flint strikers, the United Automobile Workers pushed for the La Fallotte Committee to expedite its investigation of GM’s anti-labor practices[24]. Four day’s after the strike’s termination, The General Motors hearings began on February 15, 1937. The Committee concluded that that GM had expended an unprecedented $900,000 for industrial espionage within the last three years. The Committee’s investigation helped ameliorate public opinion and reaction to the strikes[25].

Harlan County Coal Operations

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Harlan County miners, in 1937, remained the last crucial mining labor force that was yet to organize and unionize.  “Unless the union organized the Harlan miners and secured a contract with the coal operators, union officials believed, neighboring fields would find it impossible to maintain union standards and the entire drive in coal would collapse”[26]. Harlan County Coal, nonetheless, resisted unionization with great fervor. Since the economy of Harlan County was driven primarily by its coal production, towns and local governments within the county were under company control. The police force, too, was believed to be highly sympathetic to Harlan County Coal’s cause. To exacerbate the corruption within Harlan, a series of unsolved murders of union organizers were dismissed as “deaths from natural causes”[27]. The Committee’s investigation into Harlan County Coal revealed that efforts to unionize were resisted with discharges, intimidation, coercion, beatings, and murder. The Committee’s investigation and its findings led to the Department of Justice to begin its own investigations, indicting Harlan executives and deputies.

Outcomes

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The influence of the La Follette Committee in ameliorating and expanding labor movements, and rejecting anti-labor practices cannot be undermined. Since its conception in 1936, the Committee achieved widespread success in disclosing wrongful, illegal, and brutal antiunion practices within American Industry. Its successes in mining, steel, and automobile stood as unequivocal testaments to its capacity to uphold the Bill of Rights and protect civil liberties. The Committee’s success in bringing congressional support to the National Labor Relations Board until the National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation Supreme Court case deemed the Wagner Act constitutional demonstrated its ability to function as an “instrument of government labor policy”[28]. The La Follette Committee operated in alliance to the CIO. While the success of either institution was not entirely dependent on the other, their cooperation made for a mutually advantageous relationship. The La Follette Committee did have its shortcomings. Throughout its term, from 1936 to 1941, the Committee was often criticized for its unbalanced approach to civil liberties violations. It is almost undeniable that the Committee’s interests were inherently biased towards organized labor. Beyond its bias, the Committee did not have a strong basis within the federal government. Backed by only two liberal senators, Senator Robert M. La Follette and Senator Elbert D. Thomas, the La Follette Committee was by no means a federal commitment to protect civil liberties of Americans. In its essence, the La Follette Committee was the by-product of liberal representation within a liberal administration. To assure its long term survival, the Committee would have needed to “identify with, and draw sustenance from, a force greater than itself”[29], one that remained impartial and protected civil liberties on a broader scale. Neither the CIO, nor the NLRB provided the Committee with the legitimacy it needed to remain relevant and active.

References

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  1. ^ Auerbach, Jerold S. (1964). "The La Follette Committee and the C.I.O."". The Wisconsin Magazine of History: 3.
  2. ^ Auerbach, Jerold S. (1964). "The La Follette Committee: Labor and Civil Liberties in the New Deal". The Journal of American History 51.3: 435–436.
  3. ^ Auerbach, Jerold S. (1964). "The La Follette Committee and the C.I.O."". The Wisconsin Magazine of History: 4.
  4. ^ Auerbach, Jerold S. (1964). "The La Follette Committee: Labor and Civil Liberties in the New Deal". The Journal of American History 51.3: 436.
  5. ^ Auerbach, Jerold S. (1964). "The La Follette Committee: Labor and Civil Liberties in the New Deal". The Journal of American History 51.3: 436.
  6. ^ Auerbach, Jerold S. (1964). "The La Follette Committee: Labor and Civil Liberties in the New Deal". The Journal of American History 51.3: 437–438.
  7. ^ Smith, Robert (2003). From Blackjacks to Briefcases: A History of Commercialized Strikebreaking and Unionbusting in the United States. p. 67.
  8. ^ Auerbach, Jerold S. (1964). "The La Follette Committee: Labor and Civil Liberties in the New Deal". The Journal of American History 51.3: 438.
  9. ^ Auerbach, Jerold S. (1964). "The La Follette Committee: Labor and Civil Liberties in the New Deal". The Journal of American History 51.3: 440.
  10. ^ Auerbach, Jerold S. (1964). "The La Follette Committee: Labor and Civil Liberties in the New Deal". The Journal of American History 51.3: 439.
  11. ^ Smith, Robert (2003). From Blackjacks to Briefcases: A History of Commercialized Strikebreaking and Unionbusting in the United States. p. 61.
  12. ^ Maney, Patrick J (2003). Young Bob: A Biography of Robert M. La Follette, Jr. Wisconsin Historical Society. pp. 22–24.
  13. ^ Maney, Patrick J (2003). Young Bob: A Biography of Robert M. La Follette, Jr. Wisconsin Historical Society. p. 37.
  14. ^ Inazu, John D. (2012). Liberty's Refuge: The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly. Yale University Press. p. 52. ISBN 0300173156.
  15. ^ Auerbach, Jerold S. (1964). "The La Follette Committee: Labor and Civil Liberties in the New Deal". The Journal of American History 51.3: 437.
  16. ^ Auerbach, Jerold S. (1964). "The La Follette Committee: Labor and Civil Liberties in the New Deal". The Journal of American History 51.3: 437–438.
  17. ^ Auerbach, Jerold S. (1964). "The La Follette Committee: Labor and Civil Liberties in the New Deal". The Journal of American History 51.3: 441.
  18. ^ Auerbach, Jerold S. (1964). "The La Follette Committee and the C.I.O."". The Wisconsin Magazine of History: 11.
  19. ^ Auerbach, Jerold S. (1964). "The La Follette Committee and the C.I.O."". The Wisconsin Magazine of History: 5-7.
  20. ^ Auerbach, Jerold (1966). Labor and Liberty. p. 89.
  21. ^ Auerbach, Jerold S. (1964). "The La Follette Committee: Labor and Civil Liberties in the New Deal". The Journal of American History 51.3: 442.
  22. ^ Auerbach, Jerold S. (1964). "The La Follette Committee: Labor and Civil Liberties in the New Deal". The Journal of American History 51.3: 451.
  23. ^ Auerbach, Jerold (1966). Labor and Liberty. p. 105.
  24. ^ Gall, Gilbert J. (1982). "Heber Blankenhorn, the La Follette Committee, and the Irony of Industrial Repression". Labor History: 247.
  25. ^ Auerbach, Jerold (1966). Labor and Liberty. p. 115.
  26. ^ Auerbach, Jerold S. (1964). "The La Follette Committee: Labor and Civil Liberties in the New Deal". The Journal of American History 51.3: 451–452.
  27. ^ Auerbach, Jerold S. (1964). "The La Follette Committee: Labor and Civil Liberties in the New Deal". The Journal of American History 51.3: 455.
  28. ^ Auerbach, Jerold S. (1964). "The La Follette Committee and the C.I.O."". The Wisconsin Magazine of History: 19-20.
  29. ^ Auerbach, Jerold S. (1964). "The La Follette Committee and the C.I.O."". The Wisconsin Magazine of History: 20.