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Upon the death of Henri III, the role of surintendant des finances (superintendant of the finances) was held by the king's favourite D'O who had been appointed to the charge in 1588.[1] When he died on 24 October 1594, Henri IV abolished the post of surintendant des finances. [2] In its place was created a conseil des finances composed of nine men. These were the duc de Nevers (duke of Nevers); maréchal de Retz (marshal of Retz); connétable de Montmorency (constable of Montmorency); the comte de Cheverny who was the chancelier (chancellor); the comte de Nanteuil (count of Nanteuil) and seigneur de Sancay who had both raised money and soldiers for Henri in the Holy Roman Empire; the royal sécretaires d'État (secretaries of state) the seigneur de Fresnes and the seigneur de La Grange-le-Roy; and finally the only financial expert on the council, Bellièvre who had preceded d'O as Henri III's surintendant des finances.[2] This conseil was responsible for setting the brevet de la taille (the sum to be collected for the taille in a given year - the land tax) by September and for drawing up the statements on revenue and expenditure.[1]

Of these men, Henri's favourite in financial matters from May 1595 to June 1598 was the seigneur de Sancay. In the public eye it was he who controlled the royal finances.[3]

Henri quickly lost the enthusiasm he had for his new conseil des finances. The needs of the war he was waging necessitated money that the conseil proved unable to provide him. This infuriated the king. For example during the conduct of the siege of La Fère, Henri wrote to the conseil informing them that he needed immediate funds to pay for the income of his infantry and Swiss soldiers. They looked to the bankers of Paris to solve the problem. A little while later Henri requested the provision of 30,000 écus (crowns) within eight days. Bellièvre wrote back that he and the other members of the conseil were working hard to ensure the expenses of the army were met.[3]

The crowns debts were by 1596 enormous. The receivables owed totalling around 90,000,000 livres (pounds), while the total debt of the crown was somewhere around 200,000,000 livres. For the Swiss soldiers alone, Henri owed 36,000,000 livres on their wages and pensions. This was against a state income in 1595 of 28,000,000 livres.[4] In part these debts were induced by the large sums Henri afford to former leaders of the Catholic Ligue (League) to buy their loyalty with the duc de Lorraine receiving 2,700,000 livres, the duc de Mayenne receiving 2,460,000 livres and the duc de Guise receiving 1,888,500 livres among many other figures. Henri had several foreign backers of prominence who had advanced him large sums: queen Elizabeth of England had loaned him 3,400,000 livres, the granduca di Toscana (grand duke of Toscana) had loaned him 3,500,000 livres and the fürst von Anhalt (prince of Anhalt) had afforded him 3,200,000 livres.[1]

Though he was ill inclined to do so, Henri was compelled to convene an assembly so that he could gain the resources required to bring his war with España to a close.[5]

With the king's creditors exhausted, and Henri's relationship with the Estates poor, Bellièvre proposed that rather than concede to a need to call an Estates, that Henri utilise a method the crown had used at the start of the troubles in the kingdom, an Assembly of Notables.[5]

The advantage of an Assembly of Notables over an Estates General was that it allowed Henri to invite whoever he saw fit, and end the Assembly at his discretion.[5]

The king chose for the Assembly to imitate the construction of the Estates General. The notables would be chosen by the three orders (clergy, nobility, commons), and would enjoy the same powers as members of the Estates would have had.[5]

Orders of convocation were issued on 25 July 1596.[5] In the same month, he imposed the baron de Rosny on the conseil des finances.[3] His placement on the conseil was designed to enforce Henri's will over the body and serve as an intermediary with the comte de Nanteuil, Sancay and Bellièvre.[6]


Two financial projects were drawn up for the attention of the notables in the conseil des finances. Bellièvre had prepared a package typified by austerity and reorganisation. Meanwhile the the baron de Rosny devised a package of quick expedients.[5]

The two mens approaches varied considerably. Bellièvre favoured the reduction of royal expenditure, the growth of indirect taxation, the reduction in the number of those exempted from taxes and rigorous control of funds. The baron de Rosny by contrast wished to abolish the cour des aides and chambres des comptes in addition to gaining funds through the sequestering of the incomes of officials.[6]

In September five commissioners were sent out across France to secure funds for the crown. It was to be their responsibility to drive the zeal of the généraux des finances and trésoriers (generals of finance and treasureres). One of these commissioners was the baron de Rosny. He operated with far less scruples for the raising of funds than his colleagues and brought back from Orléans and Tours 300,000 écus pilfered from the wages of royal officers and pensions.[6] Henri was greatly impressed by de Rosny's energy and ability to quickly raise funds.[7]

The Assembly opened in the city of Rouen on 4 November 1596.[5]

Among the attendees of the Assembly were 80 men which broke down to nine members of the clergy, nineteen members of the nobility and fifty two members of the commons (primarily drawn from the parlements and chambres des comptes (chamber of accounts).[5]

Their deliberations would be conducted in three chambers, which were chaired by maréchal de Retz, maréchal de Matignon and the prince du sang the duc de Montpensier.[5]

Henri arrived to win over the deputies alongside his mistress the marquise of Montceaux and the royal court.[5]

Pressured by the urgency of circumstance, the notables voted for several measures.[5] They approved the creation of a new tax, which would be known as the pancarte a tax on the entry of goods intno towns for fairs and markets, the value of which was a sou on every livre.[8] This amounted to a 5% tax.[7] They further approved a suspension of the payment of royal salaries for a year. The notables also approved the granting of 1,500,000 écus to Henri.[9]

The notables were concerned about what use Henri would put the resources to, given his reputation for financial liberality. Ss a result of this they proposed dividing the projected income of 10,000,000 écus into halves. Five million écus would be for Henri to spend at his discretion on his household and the prosecution of war. The other five million would be devoted to debts and wages and would be spent under supervision.[9]

They further clarified that the new tax they had approved was to only exist for three years. After this another Assembly would have had to approve its continuity, these assemblies becoming triennial affairs.[9]

The notables indicated their approval for a curtailing of state expenditure through the limiting of pensions and reduction of interest on annuities.[7]

On 26 January the cahiers de doléances were provided to the king by the notables. Henri's council protested the prospect of the assembly becoming triennial.[9]

The pancarte tax was instituted on 10 March with the expectation it would yield revenues of 4,000,000 livres. With considerable reluctance it would be registered by the cour des aides on 28 April. The tax raised considerable opposition in the countryside.[9] Tempers ran particularly high concerning the tax in Limoges. It would yield far lower revenues than anticipated, totalling around 800,000 livres. As a result of these problems the tax would be abolished in 1602.[4]

The Spanish capture of Amiens in March 1597 created a new need of the king for money.[9] Bellièvre and the conseil des finances protested that they had no incomes for the king.[6]

Opposition to Henri from the parlementaires also emerged. In April 1597 Henri was approached in Saint-Germain-en-Laye by the parlementaire Achille de Harlay [fr]. He accused Cheverny, Bellièvre and the sécretaire d'État Villeroy of gorging themselves at the expense of the people of France.[9] The money they had taken should be returned. This incensed Henri who denounced Harlay repeatedly as a liar causing the parlementaire to break down. Henri opined disapprovingly to the connétable about the foolish men of the parlement and resolved on his plan to visit them to force through the decision of the Assembly.[10]

Henri endeavoured to have the cahiers de doléances applied and to this end divided the royal expenses into two parts. The part that was managed under supervision was named by the baron de Rosny the conseil de raison (council of reason) though officially its name was the conseil du bon ménage or bon ordre (council of good household/order). Its membership was composed of 12 men from a list of 48 selected by the parlement. The cardinal de Gondi assumed the presidency of this conseil on 21 May. The body would have a short half life, surviving only two months. Pressing military expenses and the fact it was run by non experts doomed it.[10]

Meanwhile Henri circumvented the conseil des finances and wrote directly to the baron de Rosny to secure funds for the recapture of the city. Rosny raised funds through means of expedient: the creation and sale of new venal offices and an increase in the gabelle among other means. The king complained to Rosny about the chambre des comptes and urged him not to let the funds pass through their hands. Rosny was ordered to join with him with the funds outside Amiens without informing the conseil des finances. Upon his arrival, Henri felt some guilt at circumventing the body and wrote to assure them the money was being put towards a worthy use.[11]

Sources[edit]

  • Babelon, Jean-Pierre (2009). Henri IV. Fayard.
  • Le Roux, Nicolas (2022). 1559-1629 Les Guerres de Religion. Gallimard.

References[edit]

  1. ^ a b c Le Roux 2022, p. 370.
  2. ^ a b Babelon 2009, p. 739.
  3. ^ a b c Babelon 2009, p. 740.
  4. ^ a b Le Roux 2022, p. 372.
  5. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Babelon 2009, p. 726.
  6. ^ a b c d Babelon 2009, p. 741.
  7. ^ a b c Le Roux 2022, p. 371.
  8. ^ Babelon 2009, pp. 726–727.
  9. ^ a b c d e f g Babelon 2009, p. 727.
  10. ^ a b Babelon 2009, p. 728.
  11. ^ Babelon 2009, p. 742.