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The European Union as a maritime military actor

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The EU's maritime military strategy

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The European Union's military strategy has evolved since the late 1990s, transitioning from focusing on conflict prevention and peacekeeping to a more comprehensive common defense policy [1]. There are six EU agencies concerned with maritime issues: the European Fisheries Control Agency[2], the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), Frontex (the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the external borders of the Member States), the European Defence Agency, the European Environment Agency and the European Space Agency [3]. The Common Security and Defense Policy[4] (CSDP) lays the groundwork for the EU to take a leading role in strengthening international security [5]. CSDP military operations need the legal basis of an European Council decision in combination with either an invitation by the host state or a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter[6] [7]. There are no permanent military headquarters [8].

The EU emphasized the importance of maritime security for economic prosperity and declared its ambition to be a global maritime security provider [9]. There are three main problems in the maritime realm that the EU wants to tackle [10]:

  1. Interstate conflicts, including militarized confrontations at sea
  2. Extremist violence
  3. Blue Crimes, including Piracy, Smuggling, and Environmental Crimes at sea

In 2014, the Council of the European Union[11] adopted the European Union Maritime Security Strategy[12] EUMSS. The EUMSS's goals can be summarized in four main principles[13]:

  1. Close cooperation with all agents in the maritime field with respect to each internal structure
  2. Functional integrity that avoids creating a new administration
  3. Respect for the international law
  4. Maritime multilateralism, including all relevant organizations

When it comes to countering terrorism and blue crime, the coordination between military and civil agencies is of importance [14]. This encompasses a fast exchange of information, operative coordination, and the ability of the military to carry out policing roles where necessary [15]. The Common Information Sharing Environment[16] (CISE), aims to tackle the problem of having 400 different national authorities (border police, coastguards, customs, intelligence agencies, etc.), who each collect data on their own and do not share it [17]. Brexit poses new uncertainties for the EU and its relationship with NATO, and the EU lost one of its most capable navies and gained a series of new maritime borders [18].

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There is no EU Navy. The EU could theoretically use the resources of its Member States, which would be three aircraft carriers, 63 destroyers, and 48 frigates, but using these is not easy in reality [19]. No matter how strong a navy is, it can only do as much as its support system allows [20]. In the EU, there is a shortage of ships that provide essential support like long-range travel, refueling, and transporting goods [21]. Smaller EU countries often can't afford to buy and operate these support ships because they prioritize their own local waters and have limited defense budgets [22]. Member States have different approaches to maritime security, depending on their circumstances [23]. There are the landlocked ones (Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, Slovakia) that do not have designated maritime security institutions [24]. Some states possess sole-agency structures, while others adopt a dual-agency structure with a clear division of military (naval) and law-enforcement (Coast Guard) tasks, and there are also ones that operate with multiple-agency structures [25].

In 2021, the EU introduced the concept of Coordinated Maritime Presences. It is a tool that enables collective engagement, through information sharing on maritime security through the Maritime Area of Interest Coordination Cell (MAICC) [26]. MAICC is employed in the Gulf of Guinea and the North-Western Indian Ocean [27]. Additionally, the EU plans to undertake an annual maritime security exercise that involves naval ships and coast guards from member states to be best prepared to defend, work together, and react swiftly to new threats [28].

Procedure of launching a naval mission

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Planning

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In order to launch a mission, all Member States need to approve through a Council Decision [29]. The whole process is administrated by the Crisis Management Procedures.

Assembling Forces

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Military assets and personnel are mostly provided by the Member States [30].

Command and Control Structures

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When the military operation is running, the Political and Security Committee exercises political and strategic control, under the authority of the Council and the High Representative. Each mission and operation has one chain of command to ensure efficient conduct [31].

If the mission has an executive mandate (e.g. Operation Irini), an operational headquarters is provided by a Member State, which is then the framework nation of the whole operation [32]. Another option is to use the NATO command structures. The UN and NATO often decide whether an EU presence is wanted in the region of crisis [33], and sometimes, the resources that national states can offer to the EU (eg. Ships) have already been offered to NATO [34]. Through the Berlin Plus agreement, the EU was given access to NATO’s military assets and planning capabilities for its own military operations without launching a NATO-led operation[35].under the Berlin- Plus agreements.

The non-executive military missions operate under the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) in Brussels. The MPCC provides some continuity, yet military command and control (C2) structures remain organized at hoc for naval operations [36].

Financing Military Operations

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Military missions are expensive and are not paid by the common EU budget. Instead, they are funded by Member States through the European Peace Facility[37][38].


Maritime Military Operations (past and present)

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There are three running naval operations: Operation Atalanta in Somalia, Operation Irini in Libya, and Operation Aspides in the Red Sea [39].

Atalanta

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Between 2005 and 2013, almost 200 ships were hijacked around the coast of the Horn of Africa, the pirates made approximately $400 million in ransoms [40]. The EU NAVFOR Somalia was formed in 2008 to combat this piracy, its main task was to protect vessels from the World Food Programme[41]. Despite NATO’s presence, some EU Member States preferred EU-led initiatives to pave the way for the EU’s role as a maritime security provider [42]. The mission started with five frigates and two surveillance aircraft, later on, a dozen ships, assisted by three maritime patrol, reconnaissance aircraft, and eight helicopters were added [43]. Operation Atlanta was extended until December 2024 [44], it “holds a 100% success rate in protecting WFP vessels delivering humanitarian aid to internally displaced and refugees in Somalia” [45].

Sophia and Irini

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These operations differ from Operation Atalanta because when a pirate has hijacked a ship and its crew, he needs to negotiate to get money. Smugglers, on the other hand, have already gotten theirs once the migrants have left the shore [46]. Operation Sophia started in May 2015 in response to the flow of migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea from Libya, specifically after the death of 800 migrants after a boat capsized off the Libyan coast on 19 April 2015 [47]. The mission had the authorization to ‘take all necessary measures’ against smuggler’s vessels, and after a phase of intelligence gathering, they would be actively chased down [48]. Operation Sophia was called unsuccessful [49]. It was unable to completely stop the flow of migrants or disrupt smugglers’ networks. Moreover, there were unintended consequences of destroying vessels leading to smugglers adapting and using unseaworthy boats, resulting in increased deaths[50]. The EU was divided over the goals, methods, and resources allocated to Operation Sophia [51]. There seemed to be a gap between humanitarian rhetoric and the desire to stem the flow of migrants [52].

Irini is the successor of Operation Sophia. It was launched on March 31, 2020, and extended to March 31, 2025, its core task is to implement the UN arms embargo on Libya [53]. It faced criticism for prioritizing border control over search and rescue operations. Despite successes in saving lives, both operations have faced scrutiny for their approaches to migration issues [54].

Aspides

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Operation Aspides was launched on February 19, 2024, to counter the numerous attacks from the Houthi movement on international vessels since October 2023 in the Red Sea [55]. The Red Sea Route is used for 15 percent of seaborne trade worldwide, and the Iran-backed Houthis began striking as a response to Israel’s attacks in Gaza [56]. Within its defensive mandate, the operation wants to provide maritime security by accompanying vessels and protecting them against possible multi-domain attacks [57]. This is a possibility for the EU to establish a presence next to the US and UK inland activities against the Houthis [58]. Aspides receives contributions from seven Member States: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Spain [59].

European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz

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Another existing collective European effort is the European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz, launched in 2020 [60]. The European Maritime Awareness aims to create a safe environment de-escalate and facilitate dialogue [61]. France initiated this in cooperation with Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Norway, but outside of the EU framework [62].


References

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  1. ^ Larsson, O., & Widén, J. (2022). The European Union as a maritime security provider – The naval diplomacy perspective. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2022.2058863.
  2. ^ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Fisheries_Control_Agency
  3. ^ Germond, B. (2011). The EU’s security and the sea: defining a maritime security strategy. European Security, 4 (January 2012), 37–41.
  4. ^ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Security_and_Defence_Policy
  5. ^ The Common Security and Defence Policy. (n.d.). EEAS. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/common-security-and-defence-policy_en#8761.
  6. ^ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chapter_VII_of_the_United_Nations_Charter
  7. ^ Tardy, T. (2015). Operation Sophia: Tackling the refugee crisis with military means. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS).
  8. ^ Bueger, C., & Edmunds, T. (2023). the European Union’s Quest to Become a Global Maritime- Security Provider. Source: Naval War College Review, 76(2), 67–86.
  9. ^ The Common Security and Defence Policy. (n.d.). EEAS. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/common-security-and-defence-policy_en#8761. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chapter_VII_of_the_United_Nations_Charter
  10. ^ Bueger, C., & Edmunds, T. (2023). the European Union’s Quest to Become a Global Maritime- Security Provider. Source: Naval War College Review, 76(2), 67–86.
  11. ^ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Council_of_the_European_Union
  12. ^ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union_Maritime_Security_Strategy
  13. ^ Vai, L. (2016). The European Union’s Maritime Security Strategy: Cogito Ergo Sum? In A. Marrone & M. Nones (Eds.), Italy and Security in the Mediterranean (pp. 93–108). Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09859.9
  14. ^ Vai, L. (2016). The European Union’s Maritime Security Strategy: Cogito Ergo Sum? In A. Marrone & M. Nones (Eds.), Italy and Security in the Mediterranean (pp. 93–108). Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09859.9
  15. ^ Vai, L. (2016). The European Union’s Maritime Security Strategy: Cogito Ergo Sum? In A. Marrone & M. Nones (Eds.), Italy and Security in the Mediterranean (pp. 93–108). Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09859.9
  16. ^ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Information_Sharing_Environment
  17. ^ Vai, L. (2016). The European Union’s Maritime Security Strategy: Cogito Ergo Sum? In A. Marrone & M. Nones (Eds.), Italy and Security in the Mediterranean (pp. 93–108). Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09859.9
  18. ^ Bueger, C., & Edmunds, T. (2023). the European Union’s Quest to Become a Global Maritime- Security Provider. Source: Naval War College Review, 76(2), 67–86.
  19. ^ Dombrowski, P. & Reich, S. (2019). The EU’s maritime operations and the future of European Security: learning from operations Atalanta and Sophia. Comp Eur Polit 17:860–884. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-018-0131-4.
  20. ^ Brake, M. & Bruns, S. (2020). Towards a Standing European Union Auxiliary Navy. Brussels: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
  21. ^ Brake, M. & Bruns, S. (2020). Towards a Standing European Union Auxiliary Navy. Brussels: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
  22. ^ Brake, M. & Bruns, S. (2020). Towards a Standing European Union Auxiliary Navy. Brussels: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
  23. ^ Bueger, C., & Edmunds, T. (2023). the European Union’s Quest to Become a Global Maritime- Security Provider. Source: Naval War College Review, 76(2), 67–86.
  24. ^ Bueger, C., & Edmunds, T. (2023). the European Union’s Quest to Become a Global Maritime- Security Provider. Source: Naval War College Review, 76(2), 67–86.
  25. ^ Bueger, C., & Edmunds, T. (2023). the European Union’s Quest to Become a Global Maritime- Security Provider. Source: Naval War College Review, 76(2), 67–86.
  26. ^ Factsheet: Coordinated Maritime Presences. (n.d.). EEAS. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/factsheet-coordinated-maritime-presences_en.
  27. ^ Factsheet: Coordinated Maritime Presences. (n.d.). EEAS. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/factsheet-coordinated-maritime-presences_en.
  28. ^ Maritime security. (o. D.). Consilium. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/maritime-security/#:~:text=Through%20the%20revised%20strategy%2C%20the,concept%20of%20Coordinated%20Maritime%20Presences.
  29. ^ EU Missions and operations. (n.d.). EEAS. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-missions-and-operations_en.
  30. ^ EU Missions and operations. (n.d.). EEAS. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-missions-and-operations_en.
  31. ^ EU Missions and operations. (n.d.). EEAS. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-missions-and-operations_en.
  32. ^ EU Missions and operations. (n.d.). EEAS. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-missions-and-operations_en.
  33. ^ Engberg, K. (2013). Ten years of EU military operations. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS).
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  35. ^ Krimi, S. (2020). The NATO-EU Partnership in a changing global context. In (037 PCNP 20 E rev.2 fin). NATO PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY.
  36. ^ Bueger, C., & Edmunds, T. (2023). the European Union’s Quest to Become a Global Maritime- Security Provider. Source: Naval War College Review, 76(2), 67–86.
  37. ^ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Peace_Facility
  38. ^ EU Missions and operations. (n.d.). EEAS. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-missions-and-operations_en.
  39. ^ Maritime security. (o. D.). Consilium. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/maritime-security/#:~:text=Through%20the%20revised%20strategy%2C%20the,concept%20of%20Coordinated%20Maritime%20Presences.
  40. ^ Dombrowski, P. & Reich, S. (2019). The EU’s maritime operations and the future of European Security: learning from operations Atalanta and Sophia. Comp Eur Polit 17:860–884. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-018-0131-4
  41. ^ Mission | EUNAVFOR. (n.d.). https://eunavfor.eu/mission.
  42. ^ Larsson, O., & Widén, J. (2022). The European Union as a maritime security provider – The naval diplomacy perspective. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2022.2058863.
  43. ^ Dombrowski, P. & Reich, S. (2019). The EU’s maritime operations and the future of European Security: learning from operations Atalanta and Sophia. Comp Eur Polit 17:860–884. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-018-0131-4
  44. ^ Mission | EUNAVFOR. (n.d.). https://eunavfor.eu/mission
  45. ^ Mission | EUNAVFOR. (n.d.). https://eunavfor.eu/mission
  46. ^ Johansen, A. (2017). Assessing the European Union’s strategic capacity: the case of EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia, European Security, 26:4, 507-526, DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2017.1361933.
  47. ^ Tardy, T. (2015). Operation Sophia: Tackling the refugee crisis with military means. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS).
  48. ^ Tardy, T. (2015). Operation Sophia: Tackling the refugee crisis with military means. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS).
  49. ^ House of Lords European Union Committee. Operation Sophia: A Failed Mission, 2nd Report of Session 2017–19, July 12, 2017.
  50. ^ House of Lords European Union Committee. Operation Sophia: A Failed Mission, 2nd Report of Session 2017–19, July 12, 2017.
  51. ^ Dombrowski, P. & Reich, S. (2019). The EU’s maritime operations and the future of European Security: learning from operations Atalanta and Sophia. Comp Eur Polit 17:860–884. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-018-0131-4.
  52. ^ Dombrowski, P. & Reich, S. (2019). The EU’s maritime operations and the future of European Security: learning from operations Atalanta and Sophia. Comp Eur Polit 17:860–884. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-018-0131-4.
  53. ^ Operation EUNAVFOR MED IRINI: Mission. (2024, April 2). Operation Irini. https://www.operationirini.eu/about-us/
  54. ^ Larsson, O., & Widén, J. (2022). The European Union as a maritime security provider – The naval diplomacy perspective. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2022.2058863.
  55. ^ Security and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea: Council launches EUNAVFOR ASPIDES. (2024, February 19). Consilium. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/02/19/security-and-freed om-of-navigation-in-the-red-sea-council-launches-new-eu-defensive-operation/
  56. ^ Shah, S. (2024, January 8). How Attacks in the Red Sea Could Increase Costs of Items from Clothing to Coffee. TIME. https://time.com/6553141/red-sea-houthi-attacks-consumer-prices-cost/.
  57. ^ Security and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea: Council launches EUNAVFOR ASPIDES. (2024, February 19). Consilium. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/02/19/security-and-freed om-of-navigation-in-the-red-sea-council-launches-new-eu-defensive-operation/
  58. ^ Allard, L., Bianco, C., Droin, M. (2024, March 7). With Operation Aspides, Europe is charting its own course in and around the Red Sea. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/with-operation-aspides-europe-is- charting-its-own-course/.
  59. ^ Allard, L., Bianco, C., Droin, M. (2024, March 7). With Operation Aspides, Europe is charting its own course in and around the Red Sea. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/with-operation-aspides-europe-is- charting-its-own-course/.
  60. ^ Allard, L., Bianco, C., Droin, M. (2024, March 7). With Operation Aspides, Europe is charting its own course in and around the Red Sea. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/with-operation-aspides-europe-is- charting-its-own-course/.
  61. ^ Home | EMASOH. (n.d.). EMASoH. https://www.emasoh-agenor.org/.
  62. ^ Allard, L., Bianco, C., Droin, M. (2024, March 7). With Operation Aspides, Europe is charting its own course in and around the Red Sea. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/with-operation-aspides-europe-is- charting-its-own-course/.
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