Wikipedia talk:WikiProject Military history/News/September 2021/Op-ed
I really enjoyed this Op-Ed, and I hope that there will be more articles on acquisition projects. I have some additional observations:
- Fee structure. The most common forms are the cost-plus contract and the fixed-price contract. Both have their uses, but cost-plus got a bit of a bad name, and that led some people to attempt to substitute fixed-price contracts. The lesson, learned over and over, is that fixed-price should never, ever be used for a research and development project.
- Customisation. If you build something and Taylor it for Australian conditions, then you won't be able to sell it overseas without modifications. The reverse is also true: buying "off the shelf" may look cheaper, but you need to factor into the price modifications that you need to make to suit it to Australian conditions.
- Gold plating. Brings to mind such projects as the Lockheed AH-56 Cheyenne helicopter and the MBT-70 tank. But conversely, there is a danger in buying proven technology. As one British commentator put it (in the Polaris (UK nuclear programme) article) "we either buy weapons which don’t exist or buy those destined for the junkyard of Steptoe & Son."
Hawkeye7 (discuss) 06:50, 24 September 2021 (UTC)
- Nick-D, interesting Op-Ed. Modern (post the early 1980s) Australian defense procurement has, with a few exceptions, been an unmitigated disaster. You didn't mention the Tiger ARH or the MRH-90 and I would dispute your assertion that the Collins class are now "some of the best submarines of their type in the world." If I was to oversimplify the reasons for this it would be unnecessary or unnecessarily complicated local modifications and/or poor local manufacturing and maintenance quality. Mztourist (talk) 07:01, 26 September 2021 (UTC)