Talk:Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki/Archive 21

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Leaflet listing names of targeted cities

Why are we having so many arguments about what the leaflet which names the targeted cities? One editor keeps removing the information, including the fact that Hiroshima was not named as a targeted city. What do our sources say?

  • Richard Lee Miller says "Almost all of the major cities had been bombed except four: Kyoto, Niigata, Nagasaki, and Hiroshima. The leaflets the Americans had dropped the day before warned of devastation to a number of other cities: Yawata, Saga, Takayama, Akita. Ominously, Hiroshima was not on that list. It was never on the list." [1]
  • Gifu.np.co.jp says leaflets were dropped on more than 32 cities in Japan at the end of July 1945. The leaflet listed 12 cities for destruction. [2]
  • Bungei Shunjū Senshi Kenkyūkai says "On 30 July, also, American planes dropped leaflets over the city of Hiroshima. They read: 'If the war goes on, Japan will be destroyed. This is certain. The longer the war goes on, the more Japan will be crippled and the harder will be the task of post-war reconstruction. It is not difficult for a man to give up his life for his country, but true loyalty now means the termination of the war and the concentration of the national effort on the rehabilitation of the country.'" (The Day man lost: Hiroshima, 6 August 1945, page 219.) On pages 214–215, he discusses the Potsdam Proclamation and Japan's indecision: "Nevertheless, after Togo left, His Majesty spent quite some time with his chamberlains, poring over both the English text and the Japanese translation [of the Potsdam Proclamation]. Half an hour after his audience with the emperor, Togo attended the regularly scheduled meeting of the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War. It is interesting to note that this was not considered an emergency session, and, with the exception of Togo, the Big Six did not regard the proclamation as an actual ultimatum. Even the final phrase—'The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction'—failed to persuade them, for Japan had already been visited with nearly utter destruction. Between 17 July and 24 July, British and American planes had bombarded cities, airfields, and warships anchored in the Inland Sea. How, the Big Six wondered, could devastation be more prompt or utter? They were destined, unfortunately, to find out. That same day also the cabinet met, and they too decided to adopt a wait-and-see attitude. Their chief concern remained the status of the emperor, and so long as that was unclarified, they agreed that Japan must continue to procrastinate until the Soviet Union tendered its reply. Had Stalin subscribed to the proclamation, the Japanese government might have realized that it no longer had time for procrastination; but the Soviet Union, according to the terms of the earlier pact, was still in a state of neutrality. This was soon, with American assistance, to be circumvented, but for the moment the Japanese decision to delay its decision served Stalin's purposes well. With great astuteness, he was playing a cat-and-mouse game, a game in which he himself was the cat—while the mice were the Japanese government as well as the governments of his wartime allies. At that same cabinet meeting, it had been decided that the government would not attempt to withhold the fact of the proclamation from the people—this, indeed, would have been impossible—but instead would release the text in an expurgated version, instructing the newspapers to play it down as much as possible and to refrain from editorial comment. In an attempt to counter this anticipated move, the Americans, that same day, rained tens of thousands of leaflets onto Japan's twelve major cities, explaining the proclamation and pointing out that the Allied powers did not consider the Japanese people to be their enemies but rather the military that had plunged the country into this disastrous war. The surrender that the Allies were calling for, the leaflet said, would free the people from the army's stranglehold and create the opportunity for building a new and better Japan. But, the leaflet continued, unless the country agreed to immediate surrender, the bombings would continue. On the back of the leaflet, along with a photograph of a Superfortress, were listed the cities destined for destruction: Otaru, Akita, Hachinohe, Fukushima, Urawa, Takayama, Iwakuni, Tottori, Imabari, Yawata, Miyakonojo, and Saga. Hiroshima, it will be noted, is absent from the list; so were Nagasaki, Kokura, and Niigata."
  • The CIA page says "By noon on 28 July, OWI's presses on Saipan were rolling with notices warning civilians to evacuate 35 Japanese cities scheduled to be bombed within the next few days. About 1 million leaflets fell on the targeted cities whose names appeared in Japanese writing under a picture of five airborne B-29s releasing bombs." [3]
  • Theodore H. McNelly says "On July 30th, American planes dropped leaflets over Hiroshima announcing that 'if the war goes on Japan will be destroyed.' Neither in the Potsdam Declaration nor in the leaflets dropped on Japan was there a warning of the use of a revolutionary new weapon." [4]
  • Robert Jay Lifton says that "Leaflets were dropped on Hiroshima from American planes on July 27, threatening Hiroshima (and other major cities on which they were dropped) with total destruction if Japan did not surrender immediately, but they made no mention of the atomic bomb or of any other special weapon. Nor did the leaflets appear to have reached many people—only a single person among those I interviewed, then a child, remembered picking one of them up, and when he brought it back to his elders, they scoffed at it, whether out of genuine disbelief or, more likely, a sense of how one was supposed to react to such a threat. In any case, the people of Hiroshima received no warning about the atomic bomb; American policymakers, for various strategic reasons, had decided against any prior notice." [5]

From these source I gather that Hiroshima was leafleted in late July (or early August) and that the leaflets listed cities targeted for destruction. Hiroshima was not listed. Binksternet (talk) 05:35, 16 February 2013 (UTC)

Edit Request Concerning Leaflets Dropped on Hiroshima

Under the heading "Choice of Targets," the author inaccurately claims that "The US had previously dropped leaflets warning civilians of air raids on 35 Japanese cities, including Hiroshima and Nagasaki." The article cited to says nothing about leaflets dropped on Hiroshima before the August 6 bombing. The article cited merely states that on August 9, leaflets were dropped across Japan detailing the destruction of Hiroshima. A Los Angeles Times article confirms that leaflets warning civilians of atomic destruction were not dropped until after Hiroshima was struck (http://articles.latimes.com/2005/aug/05/opinion/oe-bird5). Moreover, the Truman administration's silence on the impending atomic destruction of Hiroshima before August 6 is detailed in several news artifacts in the Hiroshima Peace Museum. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.10.11.164 (talk) 09:50, 21 November 2012 (UTC)

The USAAF official history (The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, p. 656) identifies the cities warned on the night of 27/28 July as "Aomori, Tsu, Ichinomiya, Uji-Yamada, Ogaki, Uwajima, Nishinomiya, Kurume, Nagaoka, Koriyama, and Hakodate". More leaflets were dropped on 1 and 4 August, but the official history doesn't identify the cities targeted. Nick-D (talk) 21:54, 22 November 2012 (UTC)

Various sources say various things about this, though all agree that leaflets were dropped after Hiroshima and before Nagasaki.

  • "American planes did drop leaflets warning Hiroshima inhabitants that the city was going to be demolished and urging them to evacuate from it. But these were apparently similar to leaflets dropped over all Japan's major cities, and there was no mention of the atomic bomb. Moreover very few people appeared to have seen the leaflets, and those who did tended to ignore them as enemy propaganda." The threat of impending disaster; contributions to the psychology of stress, page 188. George Herbert Grosser, Henry Wechsler. MIT Press, 1964.
  • "American aircraft two days earlier [meaning August 4] had dropped three-quarters of a million warning leaflets informing citizens of Hiroshima that the city would be obliterated, but few Japanese had heeded the message." A Patriot's History of the United States, page 699. Larry Schweikart, Michael Allen. Penguin, 2007.
  • "General LeMay's bombers had been dropping warning leaflets on Japanese cities in the ten days before the destruction of Hiroshima, but... these leaflets were not dropped on Hiroshima or Nagasaki and the warnings made no mention of a new, more devastating atomic bomb." Collateral Damage: Americans, Noncombatant Immunity, And Atrocity After World War II, page 172. Sahr Conway-Lanz. CRC Press, 2006.
  • "Leaflets were dropped on Hiroshima from American planes on July 27, threatening Hiroshima (and other major cities on which they were dropped) with total destruction if Japan did not surrender immediately, but they made no mention of the atomic bomb or of any other special weapon. Nor did the leaflets appear to have reached many people..." Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima, page 17. Robert Jay Lifton. University of North Carolina Press, 1987.
  • "Before the Hiroshima bomb was dropped, the city was given the standard psychological warfare treatment prior to an incendiary attack. Leaflets were dropped on Hiroshima, indicating, along with several other cities, that they were to be fire bombed within a few days and to evacuate the city. The leaflets are on display at the Peace Museum in Hiroshima and were dropped on the city several days prior to the atomic bombing." No Strategic Targets Left, page 103. F. J. Bradley. Turner Publishing Company, 1999.
  • "But, the leaflet continued, unless the country agreed to immediate surrender, the bombings would continue. On the back of the leaflet, along with a photograph of a superfortress, were listed the cities destined for destruction: Otaru, Akita, Hachinohe, Fukushima, Urawa, Takayama, Iwakuni, Tottori, Imabaru, Yawata, Miyakonojo, and Saga. Hiroshima, it will be noted, was absent from that list; so were Nagasaki, Kokura, and Niigata." The Day man lost: Hiroshima, page 215. Bungei Shunjū Senshi Kenkyūkai. Kodansha International, 1981.

I think we will have to tell the reader that several contradictory versions of the leaflet story appear in our reliable sources: that the leaflets were dropped or not dropped on Hiroshima, that Hiroshima was listed or not listed as a target for destruction. Binksternet (talk) 03:26, 23 November 2012 (UTC)

The leaflet story was started by the Truman White House, which had it inserted into the 1947 movie at the bombing, The Beginning or the End. In his review of the movie in The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (March 1947, p. 99) , Harrison Brown described this as "the most horrible falsification of history" in the film:

Actually Hiroshima was a secondary target and had not been pelted with leaflets at all. Several other Japanese cities were warned of the possibility of destruction but no mention was made in the leaflets of atomic bombs.

Hawkeye7 (talk) 23:42, 31 December 2012 (UTC)

I'm trying to mediate this, as I AM a history dork too. It would appear that XXzoonamiXX is most likely Japanese (My assumption). Keep that in mind as we proceed, Mr. Binksternet. Obviously there is no level of hair-splitting that is too much for someone who could have a deep emotional investment in the historical accuracy...even of the smallest detail of moral or ethical error or omission. Obviously Japan and its people have the dubious distinction of being the only ones having had a nuclear attack perpetrated upon them. If that's not cause for sensitivity, I don't know what is. I think both XXzoonamiXX and Mr. Binksternet also need to recognize and work with XXzoonamiXX's language barrier. That's an obstacle.
If I'm not mistaken, from reading these notes, XXzoonamiXX (fun handle) seems to think there is a moral case to be made and understood by readers if Hiroshima had been leafleted, but, the city itself was not listed in that leaflet for possible destruction. XXzoonamiXX has told me that it bears mentioning that even though Hiroshima WAS leafleted that it's name did not appear on the leaflet sited in, The Day man lost: Hiroshima. Is that correct XXzoonamiXX? --50.128.155.168 (talk) 07:23, 16 March 2013 (UTC)

infobox

Am I only one who thinks that "infobox military conflict" looks just silly here? Not every article needs to have a box on upper right corner, and this is one of those that in my opinion would do well without one.--Staberinde (talk) 11:59, 16 March 2013 (UTC)

I think it is useful enough and that it looks okay. Binksternet (talk) 16:57, 16 March 2013 (UTC)
I don't really see any serious usefulness here. It just seems as an attempt to push nuclear cloud into standard box because most pacific war articles have one. But as this isn't normal "battle" in any meaningful sense, it just looks out of place.
Also looking at specific details, going from top:
1) Date - Why have here period then it was simply 2 different bombings? 7th august isn't different from 6th or 10th in this context.
2) Location - thats stating obvious that is already in title
3) Results - This looks like some weird humor. We have two cities wiped out and "result" is a debate, huh?
4) Belligerents - what makes UK a belligerent here?
5) Commanders and leaders - on one side we have guys who sat in plane that did the bombing, on other side we have guy who commanded half of all Japanese armed forces on Home Islands. This is meaningless, you could as well put Hirohito there.
6) Units involved - Manhattan district as combatant? And 509th Composite Group vs Second General Army?
7) Casualties and losses - Japanese casualties are relevant but also already in lede.
Overall I don't really see what this box adds to article that isn't already in lede. It just looks like an attempt to turn this thing into "battle" then it hardly is one in normal sense.--Staberinde (talk) 13:14, 17 March 2013 (UTC)
  • This seems to demonstrate the value of the infobox, as you are learning something new.
    1. The reason that the Manhattan District is listed as one of the units involved is because it was. MED Project Alberta personnel prepared the bombs and were on board the planes during the missions. As a point of fact, the commander of the Hiroshima mission was Deak Parsons, and not, as many people think, Paul Tibbets.
    2. The British flag represents the British personnel on board the planes during the Nagasaki mission. They were there specifically to support the British government's desire that it should be an Allied rather than purely American mission.

Hawkeye7 (talk) 01:08, 18 March 2013 (UTC)

"Manhattan district" as a "unit" is only slightly less generalizing then for example "United States Army Air Forces" would be.
No, it was a district of the US Army Corps of Engineers. So similar to the 509th Composite Group:
Army Service Forces -> Corps of Engineers -> Manhattan District
Army Air Forces -> Twentieth Air Force -> 509th Composite Group Hawkeye7 (talk) 19:23, 18 March 2013 (UTC)
I dont see any mention of British personel in "Nagasaki" section (not counting British POWs), did I miss it? Nor do I see any mention of British participation in lede (only: ... conducted by the United States during ...). I see short mention about Truman agreeing with British presence in Potsdam, but this doesn't seem to be followed up anywhere. So unless I missed it somehow, the British participation in bombing is either missing from article, or its so trivial that it doesn't even deserve a mention in text.--Staberinde (talk) 18:23, 18 March 2013 (UTC)
This time Penney and Cheshire were allowed to accompany the mission, flying as observers on the third plane, Big Stink Hawkeye7 (talk) 19:17, 18 March 2013 (UTC)
Oh, I failed to add up that Potsdam ultimatum part with this one. I guess it can be used as argument for inclusion in infobox, although quite very borderline criteria. But anyway, looks like I am alone in belief that infobox just looks unsuitable in this article, so let it be then.--Staberinde (talk) 20:47, 18 March 2013 (UTC)

War crime

Why is missing the World War II crimes among the categories? --Norden1990 (talk) 01:25, 28 February 2013 (UTC)

Probably because it has never been agreed with absolute certainty that the acts were "crimes", and even if one thinks that they were crimes, consider that nobody has ever been charged, and there have never been any international judicial proceedings. Therefore, not a crime. Boneyard90 (talk) 15:05, 28 February 2013 (UTC)
Perfect example of double standards with famous phrases like: "success is never blamed", "victors are not judged", "victors don't have to justify themselves". Humanity made universal meaning of what crime is it in UN international law. Westsomething (talk) 10:23, 25 March 2013 (UTC)
Perhaps people may find this Chicago Tribune article, published on August 19, 1945 telling. The article pretty much states that General MacArthur wrote a 40-page memo to President Roosevelt in January of 1945 where he stated that the Japanese were offering to surrender. Here's Hoffman's introduction to the article:
Perhaps the most telling aspect of World War Two historical orthodoxy is its one-dimensional view of war criminals; by current definition these are the losers of a war. The winners decide the degree of the losers' culpability and the depth of their depravity.
Apart from this victor's morality play is the reality of the difficult-to-envision scope of the war criminality of such vaunted heroes of democracy as Franklin D. Roosevelt and Truman, as well as those who, as "good Americans" carried out their policies of deliberate and needless mass murder.
On an equivalent level of incomprehension rests the knowledge that incontrovertible proof of the war crimes of the Allied leadership had no more impact on their legend of benevolence than revelations about the war crimes of Zionism and the duplicity its intellectual apologists have had on foreign policy or public opinion today.
Some proof of the former was offered by Chicago Tribune reporter Walter Trohan. Due to wartime censorship, he was forced to withhold for seven months the biggest story of America’s war in the Pacific. It was finally published on the Sunday following VJ-Day, August 19,1945, on the front pages of both the Tribune and the Washington Times-Herald.[1]
Ljfeliu (talk) 01:53, 30 March 2013 (UTC)

References

  1. ^ Michael A. Hoffman II (Winter 1985-6). "Chicago Tribune history". The Journal for Historical Review (http://www.ihr.org), Volume 6 number 4. ISSN: 0195-6752. p. 508. Reprinted from The Journal of Historical Review, PO Box 2739, Newport Beach, CA 92659, USA. Domestic subscriptions $40 per year; foreign subscriptions $60 per year. {{cite web}}: |access-date= requires |url= (help); Check |authorlink= value (help); Check date values in: |date= (help); External link in |authorlink= (help); Missing or empty |url= (help)

New Article About Leaflet Issue

Alex Wellerstein, an historian of science at the American Institute of Physics, has posted an excellent article about the leaflet issue, entitled A Day Too Late, on his blog, Restricted Data: The Nuclear Secrecy Blog. It may help to resolve some issues discussed on this talk page. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.163.88.59 (talk) 19:28, 26 April 2013 (UTC)

not one mention of BOXSCAR

It's pretty bad when a hundred notations of the ENOLA GAY, which dropped the smaller bomb. gets ALL the attention and not one(1) mention of the B29 BOXSCAR. terrible mistake.

i still love wikipedia....... — Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.74.215.9 (talk) 01:57, 3 May 2013 (UTC)

There are, however, quite a few mentions of "Bockscar", which is the correct spelling of the name of the plane. Donner60 (talk) 02:12, 3 May 2013 (UTC)
"There are, however, quite a few mentions of "Bockscar", which is the correct spelling of the name of the plane." LOL! Azx2 03:51, 2 August 2013 (UTC)

post-attack casualties

This section needs attention. Because the errors are too numerous, I will present my observations as a list:

  1. The first sentence is about direct casualties. It does not belong in the section devoted to post-attack casualties, which most will assume to be those who died from the lingering effects of nuclear weapons. It is irrelevant at best, and misleading at worst. It should be removed.
    2. The second sentence gives an estimate of 90,000 to 166,000 post-attack casualties. However, the two sources do not substantiate that claim.
    • The figure 90,000 to 166,000 is taken directly from the Radiation Effects Research Foundation's FAQ page. However, the source categorizes the figure as the estimates for acute deaths, in other words those who died on impact or shortly thereafter.
    • The second source, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, is a document from 1946 which is simply not a suitable authority for a section on long-term effects. Moreover, again the total deaths from the bombings were incorrectly stated in the Wiki article as post-attack casualties.
    • The third sentence incorrectly states that its source estimates the post-attack casualties to be 200,000. The estimate from the source material includes the number of those who died on impact. Furthermore, the source material is not a scientific document and its estimate of 200,000 total Hiroshima deaths within five years of the nuclear attack is unsourced.
    • Sentence four should state explicitly that the RERF estimates total cancer victims to be 1,900. It is surprising that the one authoritative and scientific source is obfuscated and misquoted, while estimates from unscientific sources are stated concisely and directly, no matter how implausible they may be.
      • Pensiveneko (talk) 12:20, 1 July 2013 (UTC) As two weeks have passed without retort, I am deleting the erroneous passages from the Post-Attack Casualties section. Pensiveneko (talk) 10:44, 10 July 2013 (UTC)

Irrelevant to compare to deaths caused by Japanese occupations?

An editor deleted a line comparing the death tolls from the atomic bombings with the civilian (non-military) death toll caused by the Japanese occupations of other countries (more than 5 million). Here is the diff of the deletion: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Atomic_bombings_of_Hiroshima_and_Nagasaki&diff=553648763&oldid=553601701 What do other editors think? It seems relevant to me, and necessary for a neutral point of view, because looking at the deaths of the atomic bomb victims in isolation gives an unbalanced view of historical events. Ghostofnemo (talk) 07:15, 6 May 2013 (UTC) If an article on the battle of the Little Big Horn only mentioned the losses of General Custer's men, and didn't mention the invasion and massacres of native Americans leading up to the battle, it would give readers a distorted picture of the conflict - i.e. that the U.S. soldiers were massacred for no apparent reason. Wow, I just checked that article and it doesn't mention anything about the conflicts leading up to the battle! Wikipedia, got to love it. Ghostofnemo (talk) 12:14, 6 May 2013 (UTC)

I agree with the removal of this material - it's not necessary, and comparing all the deaths caused by Japan with the deaths caused by these two attacks (which formed only part of the highly destructive campaign against Japanese cities) is not sensible. The goal of the attacks was to force the Japanese to surrender, and not to somehow balance the ledger of fatalities. If someone was to add material to the Nanking Massacre article comparing the deaths there with those which resulted from the Allied attacks on Japan it would (I hope) also be removed on these grounds. Nick-D (talk) 12:23, 6 May 2013 (UTC)
The 5 million is far short of all the deaths caused by Japanese forces during the war! That is only civilians who were massacred. To not mentioned those deaths is to obscure the background to the event. Mentioning those deaths also puts the number of deaths into perspective. Ghostofnemo (talk) 12:36, 6 May 2013 (UTC)
I agree with Ghostofnemo that it is important material to give readers a feel for the over all context of the event, that is, to understand the state of warfare at that time. However it clearly has no place in the intro, and although it should be in the article, it should be placed further down in its own category, or in the Debate of the Bombings page, rather than shoe horned into the introduction. In respect to Nick-D's point and analogy, its on egg shells, the Nanking massacre came before any major allied attacks on Japan, therefore did not affect it unless someone in Japan built a time machine. However, I think I know what he is driving at, he opposes the material on the grounds that it may appear more suited to a list of civilian deaths in war page. However although it would undoubtedly also be a good contribution to such a page, because the majority of these democide deaths perpetrated by Japan occured before the nuclear bombings, it is a piece of the puzzle to quickly convey to a reader, how could someone justify ordering such a thing(a nuclear attack).
Boundarylayer (talk) 16:00, 29 May 2013 (UTC)
Yes, the information is useful in the article body but not in the introduction. It would be simplistic to try and establish a tit-for-tat relationship between the number of deaths caused by militant Japan and the deaths caused by the atomic bombs, but certainly the Allies were very much aware of how deadly Japan's aggression had been. The numbers by themselves provide little context, so it would be helpful to refer to analysis from a well-known historian to connect the dots for the reader. Binksternet (talk) 16:59, 29 May 2013 (UTC)
No, that's not what I'm getting at at all I'm afraid. I don't think that we need to include figures on the number of deaths the Japanese were responsible for here because it's simply not relevant to the topic of the article, and encourages false comparisons. There's a huge literature on why the US dropped the atomic bombs, and the decision to do so had almost nothing to do with the number of people the Japanese had killed: the focus was almost entirely on the hope that the bombs would end the war and avoid the expected huge number of American casualties which would result from the invasion of the Japanese home islands. The US wasn't seeking revenge, and didn't decide that the wickedness of Japan's policies made the atomic bombings morally permissible, it just wanted to shock the Japanese leadership into admitting that the country was defeated. Much of the literature on the bombings also notes the change in the US Government's attitude to bombing over the war, starting from a strong emphasis on precision bombing to avoid civilian casualties, and slowly moving towards an acceptance of area attacks which deliberately targeted civilians. To a significant degree, the atomic bombings were seen as a continuation of the huge raids which had destroyed Tokyo and most of Japan's other cities in the final months of the war (though there was always a realisation that destroying entire cities with a single bomb was a significant escalation of these attacks). Similarly, the great majority of people in the Japanese cities had nothing to do with the war crimes and killings committed by Japanese forces, so to imply a connection is false. To the extent that there was a debate over the comparative morality of the bombings, it took place after the war, and is better covered in the Debate over the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki article. Nick-D (talk) 23:45, 29 May 2013 (UTC)
I see your point. Among American war planners, there was no concern about past deaths caused by Japanese militarism, only about future casualties from a land invasion. The later debate is where this number is applicable. Binksternet (talk) 04:19, 30 May 2013 (UTC)

I think it's relevant to mention the victims of Japan's military in this article to put the death toll from the atomic bombings into context. In Japan, there is a tendency to ONLY focus on the victims of the atomic bombings, and to COMPLETELY overlook the much higher death tolls inflicted on civilians during Japanese occupations of other countries. Japan, innocent victim, America, evil slaughterers of civilians. The reality, which Wikipedia should reflect, is that both countries are guilty of committing huge war crimes.Ghostofnemo (talk) 04:38, 30 May 2013 (UTC)

From what I saw during my visit to Japan and the works I've read about Japanese perspectives of the war, your claim that Japanese people generally believe that their country did nothing wrong and were 'victims' is not at all correct (the much-visited Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum is very clear on the point of Japanese misconduct, for example). Nick-D (talk) 04:49, 30 May 2013 (UTC)
Interesting, because that doesn't seem to be reflected in that article. Ghostofnemo (talk) 00:14, 14 November 2013 (UTC)
And also worth mentioning because it's a little known fact that Japanese troops killed far, far more civilians than the U.S. during WWII. Ghostofnemo (talk) 04:54, 30 May 2013 (UTC)
I agree Ghostofnemo, it is a routinely downplayed, or uncared for fact that the Japanese committed a large amount of civilian killing, perhaps not downplayed by the Japanese themselves, but by the general public, very few people have even heard of Japanese war crimes by comparison, which you may argue would be an edit that is simply an attempt to "right a great wrong", but as I will explain in the next paragraph, it is not the case. In sum, it is my 2 cents that a brief mention to what you had in mind is suited for the article, with of course the larger discussion of it being more fitted to the Debate over the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki page, something everyone here appears to be in agreement on.
To Nick-D and Binksternet, who have argued "there was no concern about past deaths caused by Japanese militarism", you both really need to listen to Truman's quote again. - I realize the tragic significance of the atomic bomb...having found the bomb, we have used it. We have used it against those who attacked us without warning at Pearl Harbor, against those who have starved and beaten and executed American prisoners of war, against those who have abandoned all pretense of obeying international laws of warfare. We have used it in order to shorten the agony of young Americans. We shall continue to use it until we completely destroy Japan's power to make war. Only a Japanese surrender will stop us.
Yet you're trying to argue, that past actions by the Japanese had no bearing on the decision to drop the bombs, that not only was there - "no concern about the past deaths caused by Japanese militarism", but that it is irrelevant to even mention Japanese atrocities as being an important component in the rationale of making the decision to conduct the bombings?
As James Kenneth Bowen of Counsel states, Truman would have been aware of the brutality, racism and fanaticism routinely displayed by the Japanese military; the cruelty towards, and frequent murder of prisoners of war and non-combatants; the raping and looting; the mass slaughter of Chinese civilians....
http://www.pacificwar.org.au/AtomBomb_Japan.html
As an aside to Nick, I must disagree, and issue a reply to your suggestion, that "the great majority of people in the Japanese cities had nothing to do with the war crimes and killings committed by Japanese forces, so to imply a connection is false". If you are helping your country in a total war, which is a war were almost every single able-bodied "civilian" contributes to the war effort. Then you cannot make the claim that the majority of Japanese people were mere bystanders to what their country was doing. To absolve them of wrong doing, and just deferring blame on up the ranks to the "government", takes away from the fact that it was the "majority of people in Japan" who were greasing the wheels of the war machine, by arming, and feeding, the imperialist Japanese military as it went around setting up colonies in oceania.
Boundarylayer (talk) 06:13, 21 June 2013 (UTC)
Several Japanese politicians have denied the Nanjing massacre ever occurred: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nanjing_massacre#Denials_of_the_massacre_by_public_officials_in_Japan Ghostofnemo (talk) 07:55, 12 November 2013 (UTC)
General Arnold travelled to Manila in June 1945, and was greatly affected by what had happened there. Groves recalled informing the Chief of Staff of the bombing of Hiroshima:

General Matrshall expressed his feeling that we should guard against too much gratification over our success, because it undoubtedly involved a large number of Japanese casualties. I replied that I was not thinking so much about those casualties as I was about the men who had made the Bataan death march. When we got into the hall, Arnold slapped me on the back and said, "I am glad you said t\hat - it's just the way I feel." Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 324

Harry Truman

Discussion closed—not about article improvement. Binksternet (talk) 17:03, 26 May 2013 (UTC)
The following discussion has been closed. Please do not modify it.

When it comes to the Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there are some curious misconceptions that have sprung up:

  • Truman publicly announced that the Hiroshima bomb was as powerful as the Trinity explosion. This was an innocent mistake, but for some years no American could look into the subject because it would be contradicting the president, who was assumed to always tell the people the truth.
  • Truman was briefed about the decision to use atomic weapons against Japan, but all the decisions had already been taken. Nor was his authorisation final, due to the Quebec Agreement with Britain. Historians searching for a momentous decision point have always been disappointed.
  • The figure of one million casualties has a long and colourful history which historians have tracked in detail, but beyond the scope of the article, which explicitly excludes postwar debate (which has its own article). The important point for editors of this article is that it was not before Truman in 1945.
  • There was a change to the lead to say that the use of two bombs was authorised. This is not the case, and is why the article goes on to mention the third bomb, of which the assembly was at Wendover and the core at Los Alamos when the hold order came through. After Nagasaki, the Joint Chiefs began considering whether to continue the rolling campaign against industrial targets or to save the bombs up for Olympic.

Since the lead has to stand on its own, it is important that it cannot be misread as supporting any of these common misconceptions, which may well already be in the reader's mind. Hawkeye7 (talk) 19:43, 6 May 2013 (UTC)

I find it difficult to determine what each item in your list means—whether the item represents a "curious misconception" or whether it represents your own take on the issue. You have previously expressed your notion that Truman made no decision at all, that his role was only to announce the bomb after it was dropped. This is laughable; as Commander-in-Chief, Truman was able to veto any particular US military action. The Quebec Agreement required the approval of the standing president for the dropping of the bomb, so Truman was able to cancel it if he wished. He was briefed about the special bomb, he understood it was a much bigger bomb than usual, and he discussed how it should be employed; he did not want to be responsible for the deaths of thousands more American soldiers such as had just been experienced in Okinawa. He communicated his wish to save as many American military lives as possible. This was his decision to drop the bombs—he said to his generals to go ahead and carry out the plan which had been so long in the making. Theodore H. McNelly, professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland, College Park, wrote that Truman ordered atomic bombs to be dropped "after about August 3rd"; plural bombs, so that Japan would see that the US was able to make more than one. Truman's concern about not repeating Okinawa was expressed at the 18 June 1945 meeting with top brass.[6] McNelly writes that the decision to drop the bombs was taken 24 July 1945. On that date, USAAF General Arnold received an update from Colonel John Stone who said that plans to drop the "special bombs" were in progress under the approval of Generals Eaker and Spaatz. This note could have been countered by Truman but was not, which many historians determine was a decision. In his diary on 25 July, Truman wrote "The weapon is to be used against Japan between now and August 10th. I have told the Sec. of War Mr. Stimson to use it so that military objectives and soldiers and saliors [sic] are the target and not women and children."[7] For those looking for his active hand, Truman responded to a note from Stimson about the "Groves project" on 30 July, saying "suggestions approved. Release when ready but not before August 2."[8] USAF historian Jacob Neufeld reviewed the McNelly paper "The Decision to Drop the Bomb" and put it into his larger book called Pearl to V-J Day: World War II in the Pacific. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chief Historian J. Samuel Walker questions whether the bombs should have been dropped at all but he does not question the fact that Truman authorized them by default rather than by direct order. (See Prompt and Utter Destruction, p. 96 and elsewhere.) Military historian Richard B. Frank writes in Downfall and here that Truman decided to use the bomb based on his appreciation of a few tens of thousands of US deaths expected in the initial invasion of Kyushu, but possibly hundreds of thousands or even a million if Japan refused to surrender such that Japanese forces everywhere continued to fight to the death. Frank never says that Truman was unable to stop the bomb. In "Marshall, Truman, and the Decision to Drop the Bomb", Gar Alperovitz (Fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies) and Robert L. Messer (Professor of History at the University of Illinois at Chicago) argue that the top three decision makers in dropping the bombs were Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary of State Byrnes (who Truman had "hand-picked"), and C-in-C Truman himself. Stanford professor Barton Bernstein writes about the decision to drop the bomb being one of the momentum of the Manhattan project, but he never says that Truman was powerless to stop the bombs.
Let me suggest that McNelly, Neufeld, Frank, Alperovitz, Messer, Bernstein and Walker are strong enough authorities on the matter for us to exclude any expression of Truman being unable to stop the bomb. Binksternet (talk) 22:54, 6 May 2013 (UTC)
No, no. I completely agree with you on this point. Truman could have vetoed the attack at any time. And he went over the target list with Stimson; he could have removed particular cities from the list. All of these historians agree that Truman authorized them by default rather than by direct order. I just want to avoid a wording that gives the impression of a more active, contemplative and deliberative Truman than was the case. The bit you linked was just me pointing out that Truman did not bear sole responsibility; Churchill too could have vetoed the attack. Hawkeye7 (talk) 23:36, 6 May 2013 (UTC)
Saying Truman was not responsible for the attack is same as saying Hitler didn't commit the Holocaust. People didn't see Hitler herding people into gas chambers in person, but does that really mean he didn't commit the holocaust in the general framework. Truman wasn't the one releasing the hatch on the bomb from the plane, but does that mean he wasn't responsible for the bombing. I don't think so. Somebody needs to stand up for responsibility. It is all technicality or shifting blame to some imaginative entity. Truman was the president, he authorized it. Not some low-level atomic scientist didn't drop the bomb. It takes many steps from developing a bomb and dropping it on some city. If Truman isn't responsible, Hitler isn't responsible for the Holocaust. Same logic. Playing around with words isn't going to help the article. Lastly, US shouldn't elect an incompetent, uneducated and irresponsible person is the lesson from all of this. 75.70.142.23 (talk) 10:11, 26 May 2013 (UTC)
Your comparison is greatly flawed in that Hitler certainly was responsible for the Holocaust but Truman a) did not start the Manhattan Project, b) did not shape the policy for the air war on Japan which had shifted on 9–10 March 1945 (before FDR died) to the killing of large numbers of civilians in cities, and c) did not consider the atomic bombs to be anything more than an escalation of actions that were already being taken. He thought the war would be shortened and American lives saved, which was the whole point. Your jibe at "incompetent, uneducated and irresponsible" shows how little you know of Truman, who was very well versed in ancient history, who read voraciously and was usually the one politician in the room who most thoroughly understood the bill under discussion, and was famous for taking responsibility: the Truman Committee and "The buck stops here." I recommend the David McCullough biography Truman as a corrective. Binksternet (talk) 15:03, 26 May 2013 (UTC)
Who was the president of the United States? Truman. If Truman didn't drop the bomb, who dropped it? Oppenheimer dropped it? Einstein dropped? Kid playing outside dropped it? Hirohito dropped? Who gave the authorization? Who is the commander in chief of the US? Did the Japanese drop bombs on themselves after creating the bomb? Someone needs to be responsible for this bombing. The bomb was designed before Truman was president but Roosevelt was already dead by the bomb was dropped. Roosevelt was history when the decision to drop the bomb was made. I don't know anything about Truman being well versed in history and I don't care, I'm talking about the decision to drop the bomb. It is not complicated. I'm not talking about philosophy and meanings of life. I'm talking about chain of command. Your argument doesn't work. As long as Truman wasn't releasing the bomb, he is not responsible is basically your argument. Hideki Tojo took responsibility for the war, Hirohito issued numerous apologies, but where is Hitler and Truman in this matter. It is always somebody's faults when it comes to them and Truman is no exception. Truman was just an angel when suddenly the bomb was dropped and Truman was so shocked and confused about the bombing is the picture you are trying to paint. This "buck stops here" talk is so ridiculous. It doesn't even make sense. It is jingoistic and egomaniacal statement. I can say buck stops here, but that would just sound stupid and totally irrelevant. 75.70.142.23 (talk) 16:38, 26 May 2013 (UTC)

Mentioning Truman's decision to drop the bombs is clearly, undeniably, about article improvement. The buck did stop with Truman. Please see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_Hxk3qS2TQ8 Ghostofnemo (talk) 05:11, 30 May 2013 (UTC) This is the diff that sparked this discussion: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Atomic_bombings_of_Hiroshima_and_Nagasaki&diff=553823794&oldid=553770072 See the reference referred to at: http://www.ushistory.org/us/51g.asp Ghostofnemo (talk) 05:15, 30 May 2013 (UTC)

Your source is a film? Poor choice. Stick to historians and books. Binksternet (talk) 12:44, 30 May 2013 (UTC)
Also, the URL http://www.ushistory.org/us/51g.asp is incorrect in saying that Truman's decision was difficult. He did not sweat so much over the decision. If the atomic bombs were going to save American lives, then they were to be used. In July 1945, Truman also enjoyed informing Stalin of America's powerful new weapon (though Stalin already knew, from spies.) Binksternet (talk) 12:50, 30 May 2013 (UTC)
I've supplied reliable sources (a documentary film about Truman and an article on a U.S. history website), while you supply no references at all and are apparently just stating your personal opinions. Which position carries more weight on Wikipedia? Ghostofnemo (talk) 18:50, 14 June 2013 (UTC)
I've noted in the lead-in that it was Truman's decision to drop the bombs. I made no mention of his reasoning. Ghostofnemo (talk) 06:07, 17 November 2013 (UTC)
We have two reliable sources which say that it was Truman's decision to drop the bombs. Why is this being deleted? Ghostofnemo (talk) 11:36, 17 November 2013 (UTC)
Probably because it was seen as connected to your unwarranted addition of the USSR to the combatants list.[9] There's also the WP:LEAD guideline which tells us that the lead section is for article summary rather than article expansion. Binksternet (talk) 12:10, 17 November 2013 (UTC)

I think the "who" as in "who did it" is important enough to be mentioned in the lead-in. It was obviously not connected to the USSR tags (which is off the subject, but then why is there a British tag?). Ghostofnemo (talk) 12:57, 17 November 2013 (UTC)

The answer of "who did it" is not simply Truman. Truman rubber-stamped the dropping of the bombs with his order to proceed. It was not his idea in the first place. It was not his pet project.
The British technically held the power of veto over the operation, but Churchill was satisfied with the reduction of Japan by any means. Binksternet (talk) 13:54, 17 November 2013 (UTC)
The British flag is there because British personnel participated in the actual bombing missions. (See the article for details.) The decision to use atomic bombs against Japan was formally listed as a decision of the Combined Policy Committee over Wilson's signature, but the British expressed some reservations (see Gowing for details), which required Truman to verify Churchill's approval at Potsdam. With this in hand, orders went out on 25 July over Handy's signature. Note that this was before the Japanese response to the Potsdam declaration was received, not after. Hawkeye7 (talk) 20:20, 17 November 2013 (UTC)
I've supplied two reliable sources that say it was Truman's decision. You've got your personal opinion. I don't think that justifies deleting this material. Ghostofnemo (talk) 01:05, 18 November 2013 (UTC)
Your ushistory.org reference is incorrect with regard to whether or not Truman found it difficult to drop the atomic bombs—he did not. It was a simple matter of arithmetic: he was told by trusted advisors that dropping the bombs would save a lot of American lives. That was the only factor he cared about. It is clear that the writers of ushistory.org, the private citizens who started the Independence Hall Association in Philadelphia, have not read the Truman biography by McCullough, and they have not read the history books which examine the military sequence of events. The IHA says that its mission is "to educate the public about the Revolutionary and Colonial eras of American history, as well as Philadelphia generally." The history of WWII and Truman and the atomic bombs is clearly outside of their mission, and evidently outside of their area of expertise.
The antiquated movie clips in your youtube source do not support the impression that Truman was very important to the bombing project. We should not give such an impression. Instead, the movie clips show Truman explaining the bombs late in his life. This is not a good source for measured analysis of the sequence of events because it is Truman himself. Historians should be involved in weighing the various sources. Binksternet (talk) 01:58, 18 November 2013 (UTC)

Well, someone gave the orders to drop the bombs, and Truman and at least some historians claim it was him! We can't have the article in the passive tense ("the bombs were dropped"). It if wasn't Truman, who was it? This needs to be in the article. Ghostofnemo (talk) 05:55, 19 November 2013 (UTC) I've restored the line that Truman ordered the bombing, with 5 reliable sources to support it. If you want to add a line to the contrary, feel free to do so, with supporting reliable sources of course. Ghostofnemo (talk) 06:21, 19 November 2013 (UTC)

I found a sixth source (Truman Library) that also says Truman authorized the bombing, but there is a link to a barely readable document that implies he authorized the bombing in advance (in the event the Japanese refused to surrender). So I reworded the line about Truman's authorization to include this possibility. Ghostofnemo (talk) 06:50, 19 November 2013 (UTC)
The article sources Craven and Cate, the US Air Force historians. In Truman's Year of Decisions pp. 420-421 he reproduces Handy's 24 July order. This order had already gone out before Potsdam. The article is quite precise about this. You have your twin chains of command: Wilson -> Handy -> Spaatz -> Tibbets and Wilson -> Groves -> Parsons. In his 1955 memoirs, Truman says he concurred with Stimson's target selection, and obtained Churchill's agreement. He claimed that he could have countermanded the orders. You found the 30 July note. It's quite legible and reads: "SecWar [Stimson]: Reply to your 41011. Suggestion approved. Release when ready but not sooner than August 2." However, it is referring to the official announcement of the bombing, which was being prepared in consultation with the British [Chadwick] and not the bombing itself. Hawkeye7 (talk) 11:15, 19 November 2013 (UTC)
You've deleted 6 reliable sources that identified Truman as authorizing the dropping of the bombs and replaced it with an unsourced assertion that Churchill co-ordered the bombings, while you admit above that Churchill was merely consulted. I've placed a "fact tag" on this line and I hope you can find a reliable source that supports this. Ghostofnemo (talk) 12:08, 19 November 2013 (UTC)
It is sourced to Gowing in the article, which explains why the bombing had to be jointly authorised by the United States and Great Britain. And you have your answer as to who issued the order; it was Handy. Hawkeye7 (talk) 18:55, 19 November 2013 (UTC)
Once again, there is nothing in the lead about who ordered the bombing. I supplied 6 reliable sources that said Truman was responsible for ordering the bombing. Handy must have been someone down the chain of command who may have giving the final go-ahead to the pilots, but "the buck stops" with Truman. They were U.S. planes, U.S. pilots and U.S. bombs. He was the president. He took responsibility and the 6 RS I provided agree that he gave the order to execute the bombings. Ghostofnemo (talk) 00:41, 20 November 2013 (UTC)
Handy was acting CSA. He ordered the bombing. Do you think this is important enough to include in the lead? Hawkeye7 (talk) 08:48, 20 November 2013 (UTC)

Probably not, but it could be mentioned in the article. Do you have a policy source on not using references in the lead? I've never heard of that before and it seems very un-Wikipedia like. Ghostofnemo (talk) 00:36, 21 November 2013 (UTC)

References are not required for the lead section if it is purely a summary of the article body. So ideally, references should not be in the lead section. In practice, however, references are often found in the lead section to support disputed facts or to directly follow quotes. Binksternet (talk) 00:50, 21 November 2013 (UTC)

Leaflets

A suggested addition to the section on leaflets, because there is considerable confusion about this on the Internet.

After the bombing of Hiroshima, special leaflets were prepared that described the bomb and warned against future bombings. This effort was, however, not coordinated with further bombing efforts. These leaflets were almost ready for delivery when the Soviet invasion of Manchuria began, and the leaflets were revised to reflect this. The revised leaflets were not ready for dropping until after the bombing of Nagasaki. Logistical mishaps resulted in Nagasaki getting warning leaflets about the atomic bomb the day _after_ it had been attacked with the atomic bomb. No city that was bombed with atomic bombs was thus warned about impending atomic attack.

Source:

--NuclearSecrets (talk) 21:42, 4 December 2013 (UTC)

We will need a more substantial source than your blog. Kai Bird and Martin J. Sherwin talk about specifically atomic-warning leaflets being dropped after both atomic bombs. Rajesh Kapoor and John Richard Shanebrook both say that Nagasaki was not leafleted until after the atomic bomb, though they say LeMay's other non-specific leaflets were still being dropped.[10][11]
Your suggested text does not tell about the regular radio transmission warnings which were not late.
Also, your suggested text does not touch upon whether the day-late leaflets had any effect on the enemy psychology, whether the leaflets helped bring about surrender. Tatsuichirō Akizuki and Gordon Honeycombe describe some leaflet effects in the 1982 book Nagasaki 1945: the first full-length eyewitness account of the atomic bomb attack on Nagasaki, ISBN 0704333821. It is possible that Marquis Kōichi Kido saw one of these late leaflets which helped him argue for surrender. Certainly the author Akizuki was aided in his medical responsibilities by the leaflets which made him recognize the illnesses he was dealing were radiation sickness. See pages 105 to 107. Binksternet (talk) 22:53, 4 December 2013 (UTC)
The blog link was included simply as a context for the document in question and for my comment. Either way, I think it ought to be noted on here, as I have seen people erroneously cite this page to justify the idea that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were somehow "warned." --NuclearSecrets (talk) 01:28, 5 December 2013 (UTC)

Yoshio Nishina report after Hiroshima

I think it would be good to mention Dr. Yoshio Nishina flying to Hiroshima to study the bomb effects, at which time he confirmed it was an atomic bomb. The source for this text was Gossman's self-published book, Occupying Force: A Sailor's Journey Following World War II. This book cannot be considered reliable. Gossman cites Hoyt for his basic facts. Of course, we should look to the Hoyt book ourselves: Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict, Edwin Palmer Hoyt, 2001, Rowman & Littlefield ISBN 0815411189

Hoyt says Nishina's report included the estimate that the Americans had one or two more atomic bombs, which was correct. Hoyt says the generals council in Tokyo determined that the atomic bomb damage was tolerable if there were so few of them to come. General Korechika Anami said that the Soviet attack and the Nagasaki bomb of August 9 indicated a greater need to continue the defensive war. Hoyt says nothing about Admiral Soemu Toyoda estimating one or two more atomic bombs, so I don't know where that bit came from. Binksternet (talk) 02:41, 4 December 2013 (UTC)

The date is August 8, not a day after the bombing. Additionally, the decisive proof was X-ray films exposed to radiation. See [12] and [13]. See also [14]. Though it is a blog, I think it's helpful. The original page and the translation. Oda Mari (talk) 09:50, 5 December 2013 (UTC)
Yes, that is helpful. Good find! Binksternet (talk) 14:53, 5 December 2013 (UTC)

(Nuclear) Holocaust Denial

It had to happen, I suppose: there is now a web site devoted to proving that the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings were all a big hoax. http://www.big-lies.org/NUKE-LIES/www.nukelies.com/forum/5-Hiroshima-Nagasaki-myth-in-fact-not-nuked.html Muzilon (talk) 01:03, 8 December 2013 (UTC)

edit request: include image with "air raids on Japan section"

Please insert this pic of Tokyo after it's fire bombing.

This Tokyo residential section was virtually destroyed.

86.44.239.203 (talk) 00:15, 15 December 2013 (UTC)

Done. Appears to be image of the event referred to, and is a more graphic representation of the devastation. Ghostofnemo (talk) 00:50, 15 December 2013 (UTC)

British Flag!

why is the union flag here? as an englishman that believes the bomb WAS correct i dont think we have any right to bolt ourselves on to this one...i know we had two observers but still,it should be removed.Bullseye30 (talk) 21:19, 19 November 2013 (UTC)

This has been discussed before, check archives - Talk:Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki/Archive 20. The British flag represents the British personnel on board the planes during the Nagasaki mission. They were there specifically to support the British government's desire that it should be an Allied rather than purely American mission. ChrisWet (talk) 02:21, 27 November 2013 (UTC)
Still, I agree that having the flag is undue weight as it makes it look like a 50:50 enterprise. I have removed it. --John (talk) 12:41, 11 December 2013 (UTC)
I have reverted your change. The flags in MilHist infoboxes do not confer equal weight (whether it was a 50:50 enterprise is arguable). Take this to Wikipedia talk:WikiProject Military history if you disagree. Hawkeye7 (talk) 21:23, 11 December 2013 (UTC)
I will likely continue to remove it, as it breaches WP:NPOV. If you are desperate to keep it, you need to seek a wider consensus. You're not stupid and you know it wasn't 50:50. Having the two flags there implies that it was. Use your brain. --John (talk) 21:27, 11 December 2013 (UTC)
The use of flags in the infobox does not convey weight. See, for example World War II. I already have a consensus, and I will ask the MilHist coordinators to enforce it. Hawkeye7 (talk) 21:35, 11 December 2013 (UTC)
So adding a flag to indicate official involvement breaches NPOV? Fascinating. I'd contend that it breaches NPOV to remove the documentation or indication of that involvement. Flags indicate involvement...little more. A good example is the mass of flags found on the main Vietnam War article. Intothatdarkness 21:47, 11 December 2013 (UTC)

Repeating here, so it's directly linked with the article and John can also respond, my comment as a MilHist Coordinator over at that talk page... Firstly, a statement: I don't think we should be using little flags in infoboxes anyway, so I'd prefer to see them all go. Secondly, a query: is the dispute simply about a flag or is it about making any mention of British involvement in the infobox? What if, for instance, Britain was mentioned but all the flags were removed? Cheers, Ian Rose (talk) 21:58, 11 December 2013 (UTC)

The presence of the flag implies a greater British involvement than was in fact the case. The article quite correctly reflects that the bombing was an American operation. Why would the flags need to give a different impression? This article, you might notice, is not on a war but on a series of military operations within a war. A better comparison would be on Battle of Britain, where the Free French Air Force quite rightly does not get a flag in the infobox; neither does Belgium or even South Africa, in spite of Sailor Malan's contributions. We don't do this, because it would be daft to accord these small contributors equal visual weight with the big players. The same applies, even more so, on this article. --John (talk) 22:12, 11 December 2013 (UTC)
There's no suggestion anywhere or understanding that the presence of flags in conflict infoboxes indicates that those countries made an equal contribution to the topic of the article, and such an assertion is not really very helpful IMO. The general convention is to include a flag where there was a significant contribution to the engagement (as indicated by reliable sources), and that would be a more useful topic to discuss here in my view. I agree with Ian's views on national flags in infoboxes (debates over who should be included and the ordering absorb an absurd amount of the effort which is put into some articles), but there's general support for their use. Nick-D (talk) 22:31, 11 December 2013 (UTC)
At present the article says: "Under the 1943 Quebec Agreement with the United Kingdom, the United States had agreed that nuclear weapons would not be used against another country without mutual consent. In June 1945 the head of the British Joint Staff Mission, Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, agreed that the use of nuclear weapons against Japan would be officially recorded as a decision of the Combined Policy Committee.[79] At Potsdam, President Harry S. Truman agreed to a request from the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Winston Churchill, that Britain be represented when the atomic bomb was dropped. William Penney and Group Captain Leonard Cheshire were sent to Tinian, but found that LeMay would not let them accompany the mission. All they could do was send a strongly worded signal back to Wilson.[80]" and then later "This time Penney and Cheshire were allowed to accompany the mission, flying as observers on the third plane, Big Stink, which was flown by the group's operations officer". This does not, IMO, constitute a "significant" contribution to the attack. Are there reliable sources which maintain that it was, that this was an Anglo-American attack? I'd be interested to see them. And I agree with you both that the flags are silly, for reasons that this discussion must make obvious. --John (talk) 22:37, 11 December 2013 (UTC)
We're replaying some of the arguments from the recent Arbcom case on infoboxes here. Bottom line: sometimes, when an infobox follows exactly the same pattern as other infoboxes but the situation it's trying to summarize is not at all the same, some readers will get completely the wrong idea. In these cases, we could all edit war, soak up massive amounts of time in an Arbcom case, and get banned, or if you prefer, we could just break the usual infobox rules and say for instance "two British crewmembers" rather than "United Kingdom". (No opinion on the flag icon or any icon.) - Dank (push to talk) 02:41, 12 December 2013 (UTC)
it's not about the flag icon, it is about listing the United Kingdom, making the bombing, and the Manhattan Project, an Allied endeavour. Hawkeye7 (talk) 20:46, 12 December 2013 (UTC)
Heaven forbid that Randy in Boise might have one of his preconceptions challenged through exposure to the facts.
  • Quebec Agreement makes the Manhattan Project an Allied effort. Establishes the Combined Policy Committee to govern it. Jones, Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb, pp. 241-243, Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, pp. 439-440
  • Penney is the British representative on the targeting Committee. Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 268
  • The Americans asked for British approval of the use of the bomb Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, p. 372
  • Mr Stimson and Field Marshal Wilson agreed amicably at the end of June 1945 to record the decision to use the weapon against Japan in a minute of the Combined Policy Committee... Mr Churchill simply initialled the minute and on July 4th the Combined Policy Committee in Washington duly noted the British agreement. Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, p. 372
  • Penney part of Project Alberta. Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 282
  • The War Cabinet in London had insisted that Britain should be represented when the bomb was dropped. President Truman had agreed in principle to this at Potsdam. Morgan-Witts and Thomas, Ruin From the Air, p. 326
  • Both Cheshire and Penney were grim-faced, having just been told that they were excluded from flying on the first atomic mission... He and Penney had sent a 'really stiff signal' to the British Mission in Washington Morgan-Witts and Thomas, Ruin From the Air, p. 370
  • Chadwick recognised that the operational questions questions must be controlled by the United States military authorities and that the British team would have little part to play in them. However, two observers, Group Captain Cheshire, VC, and Dr Penney were sent to Tinian to see how the operation was controlled and to give the United Kingdom some representation in the final stages. Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, p. 379
  • The local Commander would not allow Cheshire and Penney to join the observation plane in the attack on Hiroshima, and it was only after an appeal to Chadwick in Washington, and only three hours before the takeoff, that permission came for them to fly in the observation plane in the Nagasaki attack. Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, p. 380 [The local commander was LeMay, but NickD has pointed out that he often took the blame for others.]
  • It was arranged that certain atomic scientists, including Alvarez, Agnew and the British bomb expert Penney should accompany this second atomic air raid Jungk, Brighter than a Thousand Suns, p.204
  • On the whole the contribution of the British was helpful but not vital... On the other hand I cannot escape the feeling that without the active and continuing British interest there probably would have been no atomic bomb to drop on Hiroshima. Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 408
  • Stephanie Groueff, for example, termed the British/American Los Alamos collaboration "perfect", and the overall British Mission contribution "inestimable" Szasz, British Scientists and the Manhattan Project, p. 97
The story is similar to many operations of World War II:
  1. The Manhattan Project was an Allied project. The British effort was initially the larger and more important, but was dwarfed by the American contribution later in the war
  2. The token British contribution to the bombing (about 2% of the personnel involved) was precisely to fly the flag and emphasise this fact.
  3. Isolationist (to use the term of the time; some 21st century historians prefer "unilateralist") political sentiments in the United States in no way make World War II an all-American war. Hawkeye7 (talk) 20:46, 12 December 2013 (UTC)
Thank you Hawkeye7 for the details. More of these could be brought to the article or made more prominent so that Boise residents don't get their panties bunched up when they see the Union Jack. Binksternet (talk) 20:53, 12 December 2013 (UTC)
That's funny. Hawkye7, I appreciate the time you have spent doing research, but the essential problem remains; giving the flag of the nation which supplied two observers on one raid the same prominence as that of the nation which provided the aircraft, the weapons, and the other 98% of the personnel is still undue weight. I asked for sources which report the bombings as "an Anglo-American attack". I take it you were unable to find such. I am not aware of any such sources. Most, such as yours and mine, would report it as an American operation in which Britain sent observers who were allowed, on the second raid, to watch one of the bombings. I still strongly oppose the flag. --John (talk) 07:15, 13 December 2013 (UTC)
I must admit that I found it odd that the Union Flag was here as I always thought that the bombing was an American initiative, I always knew the Manhattan project was allied though. A good way to counter this weight issue, even though personally I think John is the only one seeing it, might be to introduce a strength section. Quite a few battles list the strengths of the two sides with breakdowns of the forces. We can list American forces as the 3 B-29's and however many personnel they were crewed with while the British strength can be down as the observers, this way people can quickly see the British involvement was mostly diplomatic. Japans strength can be set as Unknown or maybe a number of the ground forces on that day if we can find a decent source. Mishka Shaw (talk) 21:20, 20 December 2013 (UTC)
This sounds like a reasonable compromise. Most of the participants were aircrew and not notable, whereas the observers - Lawrence H. Johnston, William L. Laurence, William Penney and Leonard Cheshire - were. The exception is the mission commander, Frederick Ashworth, who later commanded the Sixth Fleet. I can find the Japanese strength, which I think is relevant as the troops themselves were the target in Hiroshima. Hawkeye7 (talk) 05:48, 22 December 2013 (UTC)
On reflection over this debate, I think the real problem is that we use flags at all. It's a text-book example of how flags over-emphasise nationality. If we got rid of the flags and merely noted the UK involvement in the infobox as we do in the text of the article, as this compromise proposes, then I think all would be well. I believe WP:MOSICON recommends being extremely careful with flag use for just this reason. --John (talk) 23:53, 26 December 2013 (UTC)
That'd be in line with my earlier thoughts, so I'm all for it. Cheers, Ian Rose (talk) 00:15, 27 December 2013 (UTC)

Additional attacks authorized

Just to be clear about this. Handy issued written orders on 25 July for attacks on four cities (Hiroshima, Niigata, Kokura, Nagasaki) only. They were to be bombed as weapons became available. The orders were issued under the legal authority of the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War. Hawkeye7 (talk) 20:58, 14 January 2014 (UTC)

Question

Please explain this edit of yours, Hawkeye7. As far as I know, there was no talk/consensus on the date format change. Was there? If this question does not belong here, please let me know. I'll move it to the article talk page. Oda Mari (talk) 09:48, 12 October 2013 (UTC)

I did not intend to change the date format. My recollection is that the article was inconsistent, with multiple formats in use. The edit indicates that I clobbered the bot tag that was there when I pasted in the portal bar. Hawkeye7 (talk) 11:29, 12 October 2013 (UTC)
Unintentionally or not, I think it's inappropriate to change date format without consensus. IMHO, you should have checked what was the original. Will you please restore the mdy format per WP:DATE as the original/first was mdy? Additionally, please place the template near the top of article. Thank you. Oda Mari (talk) 09:37, 13 October 2013 (UTC)
Surely you are kidding. This was nearly two years ago and no one has taken issue with it as far as I can tell. If the date format was inconsistent then it is entirely appropriate to select one and use that per MOS:DATEUNIFY. Now that there is a consistent format and it has been used for so long changing it back seems more than just a little pointy. Perhaps it would be more appropriate now to seek a consensus as to the format to be adopted if you have a problem with the current one. Anotherclown (talk) 10:11, 13 October 2013 (UTC)
I'm serious. Because I've known dmy pushers who changed the format without checking the revision history. Though it's not mentioned in MoS-ja, most of the Japan-related articles use the mdy format and it looks natural to me. But I don't change format when I saw Japan-related articles with dmy format. I just restore/want to restore the mdy format. Hawkeye7 didn't provide edit summary and the template is usually placed on the top of the page. Please do not blame me for not noticing the change. I think Hawkeye7 should restore the format because it was his mistake. Oda Mari (talk) 10:50, 13 October 2013 (UTC)
Let's restore the longstanding mdy format, the one that was in the article from 2004 to 2011. Binksternet (talk) 13:11, 13 October 2013 (UTC)
For the record, they use dmy exclusively in Japan. It's also used in the United States, so the case for mdy is based exclusively on it being used in 2004. WP:STRONGNAT would mandate dmy. Hawkeye7 (talk) 08:29, 17 October 2013 (UTC)
Excuse me, what do you mean by "...they use dmy exclusively in Japan."? I don't understand. You mean dmy is used in the article Japan? If I remember correctly, the article used mdy and I guess it was changed by a dmy pusher without consensus. I'll check it later. Oda Mari (talk) 10:04, 17 October 2013 (UTC)
What on earth is a "dmy pusher"? Name calling over a minor matter seems a bit unnecessary. Nick-D (talk) 10:17, 17 October 2013 (UTC)
Like this one and s/he is not the only one. And I don't think it's a minor matter. Oda Mari (talk) 18:04, 17 October 2013 (UTC)
I don't think STRONGNAT is conclusive with regard to date format on this article. The USA uses mdy for civilian matters but the military uses dmy. An article such as this is widely read by civilians which is probably why it was first written in mdy style. It is not purely a Japan article or purely an American military article.
I think mdy should be restored because it is the first and most longstanding style. Binksternet (talk) 18:12, 17 October 2013 (UTC)
I should add that I already restored it to mdy. International articles should use the international format, which is dmy. There are practical reasons why dmy is better, some of which are now evident in the article. Hawkeye7 (talk) 19:31, 17 October 2013 (UTC)
That is your personal opinion. Mdy is an acceptable date format. Please do not change it without checking the original format and consensus again. If you disagree with the current MOS, please bring the matter to the MOS talk page.
As for Japan, the format was changed by this edit and there was no talk/consensus on the talk page in April 2012. And the original was this. I will restore the original format as soon as possible. Oda Mari (talk) 09:57, 18 October 2013 (UTC)
No, it is not my personal opinion; it is mandated by the MOS per WP:STRONGNAT. And do not change pages without seeking consensus. Hawkeye7 (talk) 10:26, 18 October 2013 (UTC)

Comment As Wikipedia is an encyclopedia designed for the general reader, using DMY on military articles is unacceptable. And given that of the two nations involved, the US and Japan, only the US is an English speaking country, so the article should use the date format of the English speaking country. JOJ Hutton 14:19, 17 November 2013 (UTC)

WP:STRONGNAT mandates DMY. I've lived in two English speaking countries, the US and Australia, both of which use DMY. If you want to change the world take it to the MOS talk page. In the meantime, the article already uses MDY. Hawkeye7 (talk) 19:59, 17 November 2013 (UTC)
DMY is hardly ever used in the US. It's not common and only used internally by the military, and even then not 100%. Unfortunately MOS:DATE has an unusually large amount of British page watchers so getting anything done there is like pounding ones head against the wall. JOJ Hutton 20:38, 17 November 2013 (UTC)

The strangest conversation ever this one.... Wikipedia is international. Articles in English language are read world-wide, not just in the US! I appreciate the comment in the guidance, but when it comes to something like Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings - the history of this does not belong to the US and Japan only. The ethical implications of the bombings are entirely and wholly global. This piece of history is what makes the whole world to be just a little bit saner when it comes to nuclear arms. To narrow the meaning of this disaster to an event in the US history is actually ignorant. Whitely3000 (talk) 17:00, 24 January 2014 (UTC)

Proposed demonstration

Now that the article has passed an A class review, all changes are expected to conform to the current style of the article with regard to dates and references. Everything must now conform to the MOS. Contributions that do not may be corrected, but any wiki-gnome may now revert changes on these grounds, and any unsourced or poorly sourced material, to maintain the article's quality.

With regard to the recent additions about a demonstration:

  • The new material did not follow the article's citation or date style, requiring it to be removed or corrected.
  • Two paragraphs were found to be uncited, requiring removal or {{citation required}}.
  • On looking for Compton's quote on page 141 of his book, it was not found on that page. Nor was the one said to be on page 145.
  • Peter Wyden is not a historian, and his opinions carry no greater weight that the Wikipedia editors
  • Even the first paragraph, which I have retained, contained material not cover by the source. I have sourced it.

I do see the need for the article to contain an extended discussion, and post-war arguments properly belong in the Debate over the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki article. I have inserted a contemporary quote which summarises the various opinions that people held at the time. I hope that this will suffice. Hawkeye7 (talk) 20:35, 27 January 2014 (UTC)

There is certainly a need for this article to cover the reasons that the USA decided against a demonstration bomb. An argument can be made that it only takes only a few sentences to tell the reader about this issue. Before the recent expansion on the issue, this is what the article said about it:

In preparation for dropping an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, US military leaders decided against a demonstration bomb, and against a special leaflet warning, in both cases because of the uncertainty of a successful detonation, and the wish to maximize psychological shock.

As you see the notion of a demonstration bomb was covered, albeit sparingly. The reference was to McNulty in Jacob Neufeld's Pearl to V-J Day: World War II in the Pacific. On page 132 McNulty says that scientists were pushing for a demonstration bomb, with the reasoning that the USA would otherwise provoke lasting hatred from other countries. I faintly remember that a few military men were also advocating for a demonstration bomb. Whoever they were, I think it would be useful to name the significant voices asking for a demonstration bomb. Still, it will not require more than a few sentences to convey this information. I don't think we need a paragraph, let alone multiple paragraphs. Binksternet (talk) 21:27, 27 January 2014 (UTC)
The demonstration section as well as the leaflet section of this article as of now doesn't exactly explained why the demonstration bomb was rejected, not just by the statement from the board or by the simple sentence. Otherwise, it would have made people feel like as they rejected the demonstration as they did it in favor of evil or out of stupidity. There are more reasons than just the uncertainty of the successful detonation. People would still be confused why exactly the demonstration bomb was rejected. There were many discussions among military leaders and scientists, such as the bomb might not shock the Japanese into surrender, the bomb demonstration loses its shock value, Allied POWs being moved to the site and be killed by the bomb, the U.S. only had a few bombs in the arsenals, etc. These are the reasons why the demonstration bomb was rejected which led to the atomic bombs being dropped on populated cities. There are more arguments against the demonstration than for it. That's the reason of the Americans at the time (and are historically accurate) and that's why the current demonstration section is not good without that info as I explained in my sentences. The section basically said we're rejecting it, not actually explicit giving out reasons why. People are not going to look up every information on the internet why because it would get them confused exactly why the demonstration bomb was not used and they don't take simple facts as good explanation why. Just look at the "Choice of targets" of this article, this already provided a good explanation why Hiroshima, Kokura, and Nagasaki were exactly chosen for the atomic bombs. This should not be that any different. I'm going to rework on this now and tone things down a bit. XXzoonamiXX (talk) 22:13, 27 January 2014 (UTC)

Okay, let's go through this.

What did the article say?

Many U.S. military leaders and scientists, including Robert Oppenheimer, argued that the demonstration bomb would sacrifice the shock value of the atomic attack, making the military mission less likely to produce surrender. They also had only two bombs available in their arsenals — not the vast majority — at the cost of billions of dollars and they could not afford the luxury of wasting the bomb for a demonstration. If they invite Japanese officers to see the demonstration, Allied prisoners of war would be moved to the demonstration site and be killed by the bomb. Many Japanese officers would treat the demonstration bomb as a sign of moral weakness of the U.S. The Japanese could easily deny that the atomic bomb was lethal and given the fact they rather fight to the death than to surrender no matter what the cost at the time (see the Bushido Code), the demonstration would not convince them to surrender, making the situation even worse than if the demonstration had not been made.


What does Levine say?

For months the Americans had considered how to use the A-bomb. General Leslie Groves, the head of the Manhattan Project, set up a target committee to select objectives that had not yet been damaged, were militarily important, and whose destruction would hurt Japan's will to fight on. The committee picked Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, and Kyoto as targets; at Secretary Stimson's order, Kyoto was dropped from the list because of its special cultural significance. Later, Nagasaki was substituted. These cities were put off limits for conventional bombing so that atomic attacks would have more spectacular effects. Hiroshima was ultimately put at the top of the target list because it was wrongly thought to be the only target city where there were no American prisoners of war.

Secretary of War Stimson had a group of leading officials and scientists, the Interim Committee, which had been studying the broad issues posed by the development of nuclear energy, independently discuss the use of the bomb. They considered the possibility of a "demonstration" use of the bomb or a specific warning mentioning the bomb be rejected this and confirmed Stimson's opinion that the bomb should be used in a surprise attack on an important war installation surrounded by housing. They concluded that no safe demonstration that would convince the Japanese could be devised. If the Japanese were told of a demonstration beforehand, they might shoot down the bomb-carrying plane or bring prisoners of war to the selected site. If the bomb was a dud, a demonstration might backfire.

One member of the committee, Under secretary of the Navy Ralph Bard, later changed his mind and recommended that a specific warning be issued before an atomic attack. Some people, such as Lewis Strauss and Edward Teller, wanted to demonstrate the bomb's power by dropping it on a forest outside Tokyo Or exploding it at high altitude over the. city; but they made no headway. Many scientists disliked using the A-bomb or wanted a specific warning or a demonstration before using it militarily. In the later famous Franck Report, some expressed opposition to using the bomb. But the Franck Report, although containing many valuable observations on the implications of nuclear energy, did not advance any arguments against dropping the bomb likely to convince those responsible for ending the war.

Comment: No footnotes, so we don't know where he got this from.

What does Weeramantry day?

Some scientists urged that before dropping the bomb on Japan there should be a demonstration at sea or in an unpopulated area. Nobel laureate Josef Franck and some others sent this request to Washington and a small group of Manhattan scientists-Oppenheimer, Fermi, Ernest Lawrence and A.H. Compton-were asked for their opinion. They divided, two on each side. Oppenheimer and Fermi were in favor of dropping the bomb without any preliminaries; Lawrence and Compton were against it.[20]

What were the reasons for the use of the bomb on an inhabited target? The following are among the more commonly advanced arguments:

  1. . There were only three bombs available-not a vast arsenal. These had been produced at a cost of billions. The Americans could not afford the luxury of "wasting" a bomb.
  2. . If there were an advertised demonstration and the bomb did not work, the blow to American prestige would have been too great. It would have been worse in the Than than if the demonstration had not been made.
  3. . There was the possibility of a Japanese attack upon the plane carrying the demonstration bomb. If the plane had been attacked, the consequences might have been very hazardous especially since the bomb was still in the developmental stage.
  4. . The Japanese High Command in Tokyo may not necessarily have been impressed by a remote demonstration of the power of the bomb. Japanese tenacity was so great that a more immediate demonstration was required of its ,power.
  5. . The advantage of surprise would have been lost.
  6. . Tens of thousands of American lives would have been lost if the bomb were not used and Japan had had 10 be taken by physical invasion.
  7. . The war needed CO be ended as early as possible, for every month of delay meant that Soviet influence in the Eastern theatre would increase. Without dropping the bomb, there was a greater likelihood of Soviet occupation of large areas of Asia and even of Japan itself.

Now what do we know about this? Close paraphrasing? That it is all about arguments advanced after the war. These are not in the Interim Committee minutes. So we cannot use any of this here. Hawkeye7 (talk) 11:16, 28 January 2014 (UTC)

We only really have one source about this, which is Compton's recollection:

It was evident that everyone would suspect trickery. If a bomb were exploded in Japan with previous notice, the Japanese air power was still adequate to give serious interference. An atomic bomb was an intricate device, still in the developmental stage. Its operation would be far from routine. If during the final adjustments of the bomb the Japanese defenders should attack, a faulty move might easily result in some kind of failure. Such an end to an advertised demonstration of power would be much worse that if the attempt had not been made. It was now evident that when the time came for the bombs to be used we should have only one of them available, followed afterwards by others at all-too-long intervals. We could not afford the chance that one of them might be a dud. If the test were made on some neutral territory, it was hard to believe that Japan's determined and fanatical military men would be impressed. If such an open test were made first and failed to bring surrender, the chance would be gone to give the shock of surprise that proved so effective. On the contrary, it would make the Japanese ready to interfere with an atomic attack if they could. Though the possibility of a demonstration that would not destroy human lives was attractive, no one could suggest a way in which it could be made so convincing that it would be likely to stop the war.

I suggest that we go with this. Hawkeye7 (talk) 11:16, 28 January 2014 (UTC)

Compton looks good. Binksternet (talk) 18:06, 28 January 2014 (UTC)
checkY Done. Hawkeye7 (talk) 20:14, 28 January 2014 (UTC)

Mushroom Clouds

The article is semi-protected, but can somebody link the phrase "mushroom cloud" to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mushroom_cloud ?

checkY Done. Hawkeye7 (talk) 19:19, 4 February 2014 (UTC)

Non-sequiter need to be straighten out

The following obviously needs correction:

"The loss of shipping also affected the fishing fleet, and the 1945 catch was only 22% of that in 1945."

Notice the same year is usedZedshort (talk) 01:27, 5 February 2014 (UTC)

checkY corrected. Hawkeye7 (talk) 07:53, 5 February 2014 (UTC)

New video released

Here is some new video of the prep and dropping of Fat Man that may be useful as an EL. (actually, as a govt work, it may be suitable for inclusion into commons) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z9v5sW6t0zI Gaijin42 (talk) 19:18, 7 February 2014 (UTC)

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