Talk:Meta-ontology/Archive 4

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Modern assessment

This section is not a rehash of the present section Meta-ontology#Deflationism, but an attempt to replace this section with another one having the more ambitious goal of providing a modern assessment of the Quine-Carnap debate and more specifically the meta-ontology it involves. The replacement section should go beyond deflationism, which is is only one side of this assessment, to provide all points of view. The reverted section probably is imperfect but its reversion without comment here on this Talk page is not helpful in arriving at a better version. Brews ohare (talk) 14:42, 27 May 2013 (UTC)

Below is the assessment by Ryan:

Quine's pragmatic challenge to the analytic-synthetic distinction has won many sympathizers, including Nelson Goodman, Morton White, and Hilary Putnam. Critics, however, maintain that some notion of analyticity is indispensable to any coherent account of either formal systems or our everyday use of language. H.P. Grice and P.F. Strawson, for example, contend that analyticity, necessity, and cognitive synonymy constitute an internally coherent family of terms, which Quine takes out of context in appealing to extensional criteria such as semantic reference. Others follow Wittgenstein in restricting analyticity to pure logical tautology, noting that Quine himself does not contest logical truths or stipulations. Even such counterproposals, however, concede a severe curtailment of the distinction, and in the wake of challenges from pragmatism it is hard to envision the analytic and the synthetic ever again enthroned in resplendent isolation.[1]

— Frank X. Ryan, "Analytic: Analytic/Synthetic" in American Philosophy: An Encyclopedia
[1] Frank X Ryan (2004). "Analytic: Analytic/Synthetic". In John Lachs, Robert B. Talisse, eds (ed.). American Philosophy: An Encyclopedia. Psychology Press. pp. 36–39. ISBN 020349279X. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link)

Brews ohare (talk) 15:54, 27 May 2013 (UTC)

Whatever, you are still writing original research and it is really tedious when editors wait a few weeks then go back yet again to similar issues ----Snowded TALK 16:02, 27 May 2013 (UTC)
Snowded: What are you talking about - what on earth is WP:OR in any of this? Do you know what WP:OR means, or do you just throw this term around as a synonym for "Snowded doesn't like this material"? Brews ohare (talk) 16:12, 27 May 2013 (UTC)
I've lost count of how many editors have tried to explain OR to you Brews. The latest new one was yesterday as I recall. I've lost patience. Its opposed, see if anyone else agrees otherwise let it go ----Snowded TALK 16:28, 27 May 2013 (UTC)
OK Snowded, I'll explain to you why none of this is WP:OR: it is straightforward. First, let's be clear about what is the subject of this objection. It is, I assume, the content of this thread that refers to this proposed section and also quotes verbatim Frank Ryan. Now the last, the quote, is inconceivably original research being a direct quote from a reputable third-party source. The first, this proposed section, entitled Modern Assessment, contains no opinion or argument of mine, but is entirely sourced, sentence by sentence. Therefore, your use of the policy WP:OR to describe either of these items is a blatant misunderstanding and misuse of the policy, and your claims that I am somehow boring you with my lack of comprehension is baloney. Brews ohare (talk) 16:44, 27 May 2013 (UTC)
As far as I can see Brews is a collection of quotes from primary sources selected and strung together by you. Bad style, primary sourcing etc. etc. etc (see arguments of myself and other editors over multiple articles)----Snowded TALK 18:59, 27 May 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: You just aren't looking at what is in front of you. Let's look line by line:

Carnap argues that ontological sentences are trivial within a 'framework' and meaningless outside of it,[4] a skeptical view of ontology called 'Carnapian deflationism'.[8][21]
Straight statement of what is said by sources.
Quine, on the other hand, proposed that ontological questions are significant, and can be addressed by introducing the notions of 'quantification' and 'ontological commitment', a methodology endorsed by Inwagen, although he objected to the conclusions Quine drew from the use of his methods.[22] A critique is provided by Stokes.[23]
Straight statement of what is said by sources.
Some feel a modified form of Carnap's position is viable.[24][25][21]
Straight statement by sources.
Others, labeled 'deflationists', have taken the view that such matters are beyond resolution or are perhaps meaningless. Eklund, for example, doubts that these questions are genuinely worthwhile.[26]
Straight statement of what is said by sources.
The remainder is a repeat of what already is already there in the article. Snowded, what are you talking about, please? Brews ohare (talk) 19:14, 27 May 2013 (UTC)
Snowded, perhaps you think these sources are engaged in WP:OR? Or, perhaps you think that a statement like: "Author A in their work W, said x. See W.Link to W" is WP:OR? Brews ohare (talk) 21:19, 27 May 2013 (UTC)
Straight statement of what is said in primary sources Brews. ----Snowded TALK 21:21, 27 May 2013 (UTC)

I think that when there is an objection to multiple changes, it can be very difficult to discuss and come to an agreement on the package. In that situation, it may be easier to make progress if one small change is made or proposed at a time, and then discussed if there is an objection. --Bob K31416 (talk) 22:40, 27 May 2013 (UTC)

Bob: I think the problem here is a misreading of WP policies by Snowded. First, he cannot decide between notability and original research. Second, Snowded refuses to explain his views by explicitly pointing out the offending text and how it conflicts with policy, in his opinion. So it is not possible to compare notes on a specific instance to see why we don't agree. He just isn't interested in reaching an understanding.
What this boils down to, as I don't believe Snowded is an idiot, is that Snowded doesn't read carefully enough what he comments upon, seldom reads revisions at all - which he automatically assumes are inadequate and say the same thing as before - and has a picture of how things work as a hit-and-run operation where he can whack off dozens of one-line edit comments a day and never engage, and doesn't need to look at individual cases carefully. He feels his say-so is iron, and no explanation is demanded of him.
In this particular instance, Snowded first states the problem is OR, even when sources are provided, and then (when it is pointed out that sources are there) arguing that primary sources are cited, apparently suggesting either bias or insignificance, it's unclear which.
Of course, sometimes primary sources are exactly what is required. For instance, here it is said that some philosophers refer to 'Carnapian deflationism', and Thomasson and Hirsch are cited as two philosophers that do that. Apparently Snowded thinks we need an encyclopedia article that says "Some philosophers speak of 'Carnapian deflationism'. For instance, see Thomasson and Hirsch." Brews ohare (talk) 00:55, 28 May 2013 (UTC)
Here's a link to 'Carnapian deflationism'. Brews ohare (talk) 16:14, 28 May 2013 (UTC)
Well everytime you have tested my reading of policies with other editors they have failed to agree with you so I think there is a pattern there. Secondly its legitimate to say this is OR and even if it wasn't it is not notable. They are not mutually exclusive categories you know. Otherwise given that you constantly make similar edits, do not pay attention to the responses on the RfC's you raise and worse attempt to get other editors to engage in OR discussions you should not be surprised if they put less and less time into responding to you and increasingly terse in their responses. It is very very evident over multiple pages that you do not get, or do not intend to understand OR. Also (as ever) you restate my (as you have others) position in a form I do not recognise which indicates you have not understood what is being said to you. After months of this I have lost patience so expect more brief responses and more references to previous discussions. ----Snowded TALK 04:19, 29 May 2013 (UTC)
I have the impression that Snowded's application of policy regarding primary sources and OR has been mostly incorrect. (See WP:PRIMARY and WP:NOR.) However, edits need to be more than just items that satisfy policy. They have to be improvements to the article, and Snowded can object on that basis. One thing he objected to was too many quotes. I think that the information from sources should be included without quoting excerpts, except in special cases. Excerpts have more of a place in footnotes, to help the reader determine what in the source supported the text, if reasonably necessary. --Bob K31416 (talk) 17:04, 29 May 2013 (UTC)
Hi Bob: The question of quotations and when they are appropriate is interesting. I'd certainly agree that almost any point can be made without quotations, and probably the best use of them is to convey a source's viewpoint when the source is particularly eloquent on a topic. Given the incoherence of most of WP that may happen more often than in published works. However, a second reason for using quotations is peculiar to WP. That is the anonymous authorship of WP articles, which leads to doubt about the accuracy with which sources are portrayed in WP articles, and to sloppy scholarship. A verbatim quote helps to establish that the source actually was read and actually had the opinion quoted. A footnote can help with that if it has an on-line link to relevant text, but many citations in WP are just pro forma and are not formulated to assist the reader. That helps cultivate a sloppy habit in readers of just ignoring footnotes. WP can use all the authority it can muster, as its reputation for accuracy is one it has to shore up whenever it can.
Any more thoughts, Bob? Brews ohare (talk) 18:02, 29 May 2013 (UTC)
I think the guidance essay WP:Quotation has some useful thoughts and the following excerpts seemed the most relevant.
"quoting a brief excerpt from an original source can sometimes explain things better and less controversially than trying to explain them in one's own words"
"Using too many quotes is incompatible with the encyclopedic writing style."
Regarding what is considered too many quotes, it seems to come down to a matter of judgement for a particular article. I think that a quote should only be used if it is clear that it is necessary and an improvement over one's own words with respect to the Wikipedia article. Note that when one's own words are used, the text can coordinate and fit more smoothly and concisely into the article since the quoted excerpt has a different context than the Wikipedia article, requires a preface, and may also contain superfluous material. --Bob K31416 (talk) 12:59, 30 May 2013 (UTC)
Bob: Apparently we agree about avoiding quotes leading to more concise articles. Apparently we also agree that a good reason to use quotes is eloquence of the source, although the notion of gaining agreement about that on WP has all the doubts that implies. The notion that the quote is seriously mismatched to the text, requiring preamble and containing extraneous material probably militates against using such a quote, but is not a reservation that applies broadly to most quotes. You have not brought up the value of quotes in reassuring readers that the subject is being properly portrayed. That also is the role of quotations when used in dictionaries to illustrate usage. Oddly (perhaps) Snowded has the contrary idea, feeling that quotes tend to introduce bias and undue weight unless they're from 'third-party' sources, and tempt a WP author to string together quotations that are unrelated to any common thread of exposition, like bangles on a charm bracelet. Brews ohare (talk) 14:45, 30 May 2013 (UTC)
Re "You have not brought up the value of quotes in reassuring readers that the subject is being properly portrayed." — That was one of the points in your previous message, and I thought it wasn't useful for the main text. Using the reasoning in your previous message (i.e. "the anonymous authorship of WP articles, which leads to doubt about the accuracy with which sources are portrayed in WP articles, and to sloppy scholarship) most of Wikipedia's text would consist of quoted excerpts either alone or accompanying editor's own words, which would not be consistent with Wikipedia's general style. --Bob K31416 (talk) 16:06, 30 May 2013 (UTC)
The 'charm-bracelet' view of quotations may indicate one problem: the interspersal of quotations in text may prove distracting to readers who are unable to maintain the flow of thought when they (as they may interpret the matter) 'digress' to read a quote. I'd say in Meta-ontology, the very extended footnoted quotes from Katz (Notes 5 & 11) introduced by MachineElf are in this category. Brews ohare (talk) 15:34, 30 May 2013 (UTC)
The quotes in 5 and 11 look too long. Perhaps they should be moved to this talk page to consider info from them, in editors' own words, to be used in the main text. --Bob K31416 (talk) 16:06, 30 May 2013 (UTC)

Katz quotation

Bob, following up on your suggestion above, here is a very long quotation from Katz found in Meta-ontology:

"Driven by his perennial positivism about the nature of philosophical disagreement, Carnap claimed that issues about logical or mathematical truth that arise outside linguistic systems with explicitly formulated rules for theoremhood are meaningless. Moreover, since there is no cognitive basis for external debate about the correctness of such systems, philosophers can do no more than propose linguistic systems. Anything (everything?) is okay as long as it is explicitly Formulated… Quine [1936] famously refuted the first answer, showing that stipulation cannot even explain the truth of logical laws (much less their certainty). Logical truths, being infinite in number, must be captured as instances of general principles, but, as logic is required for this enterprise, conventionalism offers no explanation of logical truth… Quine [1961] also mounted a powerful attack on the second answer. Carnap’s noncognitivism has two components: a positivistic motivation for the claim that linguistic systems are essentially unconstrained proposals and a conception of analyticity as a basis for the under standing of logic and mathematics. Since positivism was widely seen as a failed program, the issue came down to whether Carnap’s apparatus of meaning postulates can explain analyticity… [which] “might better be untendentiously [labeled] as ‘K’ so as not to seem to throw light on the interesting word ‘analytic’.” There is nothing to distinguish the recursively specified class of sentences with the label “analytic” from any other class of sentences, except for the fact that someone chose to label them such. [Camap, 1963] replied that analyticity is no worse off than other notions of formal logic, but this reply is grist for Quine’s mill. Construed along Carnapian lines, “S is a logical truth in L,” “S implies S’ in L,” and so on are, of course, no worse off than analyticity, but, as Quine sees it, they are no better off either."

— JJ Katz, Realistic Rationalism, p. 70

This quote is useful, but seems to be here in Meta-ontology as a replacement for development that belongs in the main text, but was put here as a quote out of some laziness about actually writing about the ideas it contains. Brews ohare (talk) 16:33, 30 May 2013 (UTC)

This long quote occurs in footnote 5 of the introduction to Meta-ontology and appears to try to replace or supplement the discussion in that article in the section Carnap and Quine. So as a first step, I'd suggest moving this quote out of the introduction. Then we have to ask how it fits into Carnap and Quine. Let's look at the beginning:

""Driven by his perennial positivism about the nature of philosophical disagreement, Carnap claimed that issues about logical or mathematical truth that arise outside linguistic systems with explicitly formulated rules for theoremhood are meaningless. Moreover, since there is no cognitive basis for external debate about the correctness of such systems, philosophers can do no more than propose linguistic systems. Anything (everything?) is okay as long as it is explicitly formulated…"

In my opinion, the long expression 'issues about logical or mathematical truth that arise outside linguistic systems with explicitly formulated rules for theoremhood are meaningless' is far from (i) intelligible and (ii) eloquent. All that is meant is that 'all theorems or propositions formulated outside a framework are meaningless'. The next sentence is: 'Moreover, since there is no cognitive basis for external debate about the correctness of such systems, philosophers can do no more than propose linguistic systems. Anything (everything?) is okay as long as it is explicitly formulated…' That is a weird formulation of Carnap's position, which was not that 'there is no cognitive basis for external debate'. Carnap's position is that frameworks are an act of creation, and their value is not found by internal justification but by pragmatic (that is, non-philosophical) questions of utility in dealing with the 'external' world. (If Euclidean geometry works for your survey, use it. If you need spherical geometry, then use that. If you are a philosopher, then by all means enjoy debating which postulate about parallel lines is most aesthetic, crossing or not crossing.) My reaction to the Katz quotation up to this point is (i) it is wordy, (ii) it is hard for an unversed reader to understand and (iii) it distorts Carnap's views. Brews ohare (talk) 19:29, 30 May 2013 (UTC)

The second part of the quote is about Quine's arguments against Carnap. They are again (i) wordy. (ii) hard to follow, and (iii) exaggerated. Carnap's views have not been 'demolished' and many modern philosophers think variants of Carnap's views are the best solution to the quandary of matching mathematical models to physical reality (examples are Inwagen and Thomasson, and probably many of the philosophers of science like Kuhn and Popper). It begins to appear that inclusion of the Katz quotation in Carnap and Quine will raise a number of issues that might well be interesting to explore, but Katz is going to come out on the short end of this discussion. Brews ohare (talk) 19:38, 30 May 2013 (UTC)

For now, I don't think this Katz quote is useful. Some of the info is roughly similar to info from another source, which seems clearer,
Amie L Thomasson. "Carnap and the prospects for easy ontology". To be published in Ontology after Carnap Stephan Blatti & Sandra Lapointe (eds.)
Perhaps info from the Katz quote could be used later. For now, I think the info in the first three paragraphs of the section 1. Carnap's approach to existence questions, of the above Thomasson ref is worth including in the Carnap section. In those three paragraphs, Thomasson describes Carnap's idea of internal and external questions relative to a linguistic framework. --Bob K31416 (talk) 22:13, 30 May 2013 (UTC)
Hi Bob: I see you removed the above Katz quotation and are suggesting a bit of a rewrite of the section Carnap's approach to incorporate some of what is said by Thomasson. Her first few paragraphs say at some length that something 'along the lines of Carnap's original form of ontological deflationism' has been missed or dismissed and replaced by 'the common assumption that Quine had won the Carnap-Quine debate', and mistakenly Carnap's position is often associated wrongly with anti-realism and the 'historical wrong turn' of 'quantifier variance'. Is this the discussion you wish to add?
There are a couple of issues with this that can be resolved but require some commitment. First, to make the discussion clear there are several rather technical issues to present clearly (like 'quantifier variance'). Second, Thomasson's position apparently opposes several very eminent figures, among them Quine, of course, and also Putnam and Hirsch. That means, in the interest of NPOV, that their views on the subject also have to be presented. These two requisites mean that even with some skills at articulation, a quite long addition will be needed. Is all this within the vision you are entertaining? Brews ohare (talk) 23:54, 30 May 2013 (UTC)
Maybe I got the wrong Thomasson article? Perhaps you were referring to this one? Its beginning discusses 'serious' ontologists and those, like Carnap, that think ontology is hogwash. Brews ohare (talk) 00:02, 31 May 2013 (UTC)
In my last message, I was referring to the first three paragraphs of the Thomasson article's section 1. Carnap's approach to existence questions, not the first three paragraphs of the Thomasson article. --Bob K31416 (talk) 01:29, 31 May 2013 (UTC)
Hi Bob: Sorry I didn't read your suggestion carefully. In §1 of Carnap and the Prospects for Easy Ontology Thomasson outlines Carnap's use of 'internal' and 'external' questions and the idea of a 'framework'. The 'internal' questions that arise inside a 'framework' are what every mathematician is very familiar with. The only other kind of questions that make sense according to Carnap are practical questions about the advisability of using a framework in a specific real-world setting, for example, using Euclidean geometry for small-scale Earth-bound surveying. Carnap felt these problems were not philosophical in nature, but pragmatic issues. That left no room for ontology. I think the present discussion in Carnap & Quine covers these points pretty well. Perhaps you could indicate what you think needs amplification?
Thomasson thinks there is more to Carnap than this. Thomasson's thesis about what questions Carnap leaves for philosophers to think about probably is not part of what you are concerned with at this point, eh Bob? In my opinion, although I don't think Thomasson would put matters like this, the actual philosophical questions that remain concern how one delimits the portion of the real world within which any particular 'framework' is useful. These restrictions are implicit in the use of the language in a practical way, and the philosopher can tease out just what these subtle implications are. (Like maybe what a hadron collider has to do with the concept of a quark?) Brews ohare (talk) 06:45, 31 May 2013 (UTC)
Continued below in section Carnap's approach — internal existence questions. --Bob K31416 (talk) 12:39, 31 May 2013 (UTC)

Snowded

To Snowded: It is a common approach of yours to avoid engagement by suggesting that you share the opinions about me of "other editors". So far as philosophy is concerned, the "other editors" are very few, and 98% of my discussion on philosophy Talk pages consists of my repeated pleas for you to be clear about your use of WP policies in objections. Your approach to any proposed text is to state summarily that it is OR and uses primary sources. Period. Revert. Any attempt to flesh that out on a Talk page with specific comparison to text you object to and how it conflicts with your reading of WP policy is stonewalled. Among your favorite reasons are that generic policies apply that need no explanation (even as to what part of a policy applies, in your opinion), or that any discussion of OR (an unexplained classification made on your own) is a useless waste of your time. Your resistance to providing specific critique suggesting specific changes to improve particular text doesn't help in crafting evolution of WP articles, an activity you seldom engage in. Brews ohare (talk) 18:26, 29 May 2013 (UTC)

I've been very clear Brews and in three RfCs other editors have been clear as well as in other comments if you both to read them. Where I can I leave your edits, where you draw conclusions from primary sources I remove them. Primary sources, per policy can be used to support factual statements but that is about it. I've spent a lot of time explaining things in detail, I am not required to continue to do so ad nausium if you choose not to listen. Otherwise lay of the personal attacks and commentary, try and deal with the issues ----Snowded TALK 20:50, 29 May 2013 (UTC)
As is usual with you, Snowded, you repeat yourself without a single new thought or example, and avoid all dialog. The idea that primary sources are to be used only for 'facts' has no basis anywhere in WP policy. You are aware of the many ways sources are used in philosophical discourse, and WP articles on philosophy are not different. Brews ohare (talk) 14:55, 30 May 2013 (UTC)

Carnap's approach — internal existence questions

(This is a continuation of a discussion that began near the current end of a previous section Katz quotation.)

Brews ohare wrote, "In §1 of Carnap and the Prospects for Easy Ontology Thomasson outlines Carnap's use of 'internal' and 'external' questions and the idea of a 'framework'. The 'internal' questions that arise inside a 'framework' are what every mathematician is very familiar with. The only other kind of questions that make sense according to Carnap are practical questions about the advisability of using a framework in a specific real-world setting, for example, using Euclidean geometry for small-scale Earth-bound surveying. Carnap felt these problems were not philosophical in nature, but pragmatic issues. That left no room for ontology. I think the present discussion in Carnap & Quine covers these points pretty well. Perhaps you could indicate what you think needs amplification? " —

The first paragraph of Thomasson's §1 describes Carnap's internal existence questions and the linguistic framework in which they are asked, i.e. where they are internal. Here's an excerpt from the first paragraph.

"To be able to speak about a kind of entity at all, or inquire about its existence, we must introduce terms for the relevant entity as part of a 'linguistic framework'. Internal questions Carnap initially characterizes as 'questions of the existence of certain entities of the new kind [asked] within the framework'; they include questions (asked within the framework of everyday language) such as 'Is there a white piece of paper on my desk?' (1950, 207) or (asked within the framework of natural numbers) 'Is there a prime number greater than 100?' (1950, 208–9)."

Thomasson gives two examples of linguistic frameworks: everyday language and natural numbers. Another example of a linguistic framework could be Wikipedia, where an internal existence question could be, "Is there a reliable source for such and such material?" I think Carnap's term 'linguistic framework' has a meaning that is different from 'conceptual framework' mentioned at the beginning of the current Wikipedia article section Carnap's approach and it should be corrected. --Bob K31416 (talk) 12:27, 31 May 2013 (UTC)

Hi Bob: You raise a good point. Carnap's views evolved over time, and it may be necessary to point that out. The narrower view of 'framework' restricted to axiomatic and definitional constructions like branches of mathematics was Carnap's original idea, and the one he argued about with Quine and Wittgenstein. As a result of these arguments, Carnap shifted position somewhat. It's my impression that taking WP as a 'framework' is far outside anything Carnap had in mind, and the furor that arises every day over WP policies is testimony that it lacks anything like what Carnap would call a framework. It would seem we need to look more closely at the later views of Carnap and see how much they actually changed. Brews ohare (talk) 14:55, 31 May 2013 (UTC)
Perhaps we can use Thomasson's work to help us through this process. We have to be aware that she is proposing what she calls a neo-Carnapian form of deflationism, indicating that it is not exactly what Carnap had in mind. Brews ohare (talk) 15:04, 31 May 2013 (UTC)
Thomasson suggests that Carnap referred to two kinds of 'framework': logical and empirical/factual. She says "there is no reason 'that general existence questions, e.g. about the existence of numbers, can't be intended as general internal questions." She implies that Carnap viewed things that way. However, she goes on to say that Carnap viewed "general" existence questions as of two types: internal and external, and the external ones are "ill-formed pseudo-questions" that should be interpreted as regarding whether or not to accept a particular linguistic framework. Such questions about advisability are not ontological in nature, leaving the "the philosopher's work lies in "constructing linguistic frameworks and making practical decisions about which to adopt for which purposes". That sounds exactly like what Carnap discussed with Quine and Wittgenstein.
Thomasson then goes on to propose what she sees as a viable extrapolation of Carnap's views. The idea is that internal questions are about use (usage?) while external questions mention these terms, and do not attempt to meddle with their usage. She goes on to adopt what looks to me as exactly what Wittgenstein had to say: in everyday language terms have a huge variety of meanings that may overlap but contain no over-arching common thread. Wittgenstein said that one could define a boundary around one aspect of everyday usage and force-fit the term (for example, 'number') into a circumscribed framework where it has a limited allowed usage (for example, 'number theory'), but that should not be confused as elucidating the term in everyday language.
None of this contradicts Carnap, but he wasn't discussing ordinary language. Brews ohare (talk) 15:27, 31 May 2013 (UTC)
You brought up other topics, but I would like to first finish with the topics mentioned in my previous message before moving on.
Re your comment about the excerpt from Thomasson in my last message, "We have to be aware that she [Thomasson] is proposing what she calls a neo-Carnapian form of deflationism, indicating that it is not exactly what Carnap had in mind." — Note that the excerpt I gave was well before Thomasson discussed neo-Carnapian form of deflationism, as indicated in the article's abstract, "I'll close by sketching a contemporary neo-Carnapian form of deflationism, arguing that its prospects are rather promising." --Bob K31416 (talk) 15:43, 31 May 2013 (UTC)
OK. Brews ohare (talk) 15:44, 31 May 2013 (UTC)
The 'ordinary language' concept provides a context for 'external questions', a wider universe that appears more interesting than Carnap's description of the universe as either internal or external. This wider view seems to suggest that the 'real' world is somehow buried in ordinary language, and probably sees developments in science as language formation that is partly construction of 'internal' systems and partly development of interpretation of the 'real' world. Brews ohare (talk) 16:08, 31 May 2013 (UTC)
When Thomasson mentioned 'ordinary language', it was just one example of a linguistic framework, no more, no less. Linguistic frameworks are not concerned with reality, which seems to be one of the points of the following excerpt from the third paragraph of §1.
"Reconstrued as practical questions about the advisability of adopting a certain linguistic framework, there is here again no special philosophical or ontological insight into reality involved."
--Bob K31416 (talk) 18:17, 31 May 2013 (UTC)
Bob: I'm not clear where you are headed here. The claim that "there is here again no special philosophical or ontological insight into reality involved" is a paraphrase of Carnap. Thomasson is at pains to suggest there are two kinds of framework, and as far as I can see is trying to relate or extend Carnap's views of 'external' or 'empirical/factual' frameworks that concern the application of 'internal' frameworks to real things. These issues have no 'ontological' significance in Carnap's view because they are about practical matters and not the esoterica of philosophy, but they do concern the 'real' world. Brews ohare (talk) 18:47, 31 May 2013 (UTC)
Re "I'm not clear where you are headed here." — Headed towards agreement that according to Thomasson, the linguistic frameworks of Carnap are not concerned with reality.
Re "Thomasson is at pains to suggest there are two kinds of framework" — Not two kinds of framework. There are two kinds of existence questions: those internal to a framework and those external to a framework, but I don't see more than one kind of framework discussed. Perhaps you meant that Thomasson gave two examples of a linguistic framework? --Bob K31416 (talk) 19:26, 31 May 2013 (UTC)
I'd say yes to point one.
I don't agree about point 2: quote of Carnap by Thomasson p. 2 (emphasis added by me)
"The answers to internal existence questions, Carnap holds, “may be found either by purely logical methods or by empirical methods, depending upon whether the framework is a logical or a factual one” (1950, 206).
Brews ohare (talk) 19:56, 31 May 2013 (UTC)
You're right. I'll give the sentence where you first mentioned it another look.
Re "Thomasson is at pains to suggest there are two kinds of framework, and as far as I can see is trying to relate or extend Carnap's views of 'external' or 'empirical/factual' frameworks that concern the application of 'internal' frameworks to real things." — Did Thomasson mention 'external frameworks' or 'internal frameworks'? If so, where. If not, perhaps you could clarify what you mean by these terms. --Bob K31416 (talk) 20:24, 31 May 2013 (UTC)
Bob, I have not looked again at the other two Thomasson works, but in this one she doesn't use this terminology. She uses 'framework' mostly in the combination 'linguistic framework' which is the axiomatic/definitional structure used by mathematics. However, she seems to suggest that concepts exist outside of frameworks so that one can ask questions about whether one linguistic framework applies or maybe a different one. Her conclusion (p. 17, underscore is mine) "That doesn’t mean there is no work to be done by metaphysicians, but it lies on the side of conceptual explication (in explicating the rules of our common language that may be made use of in answering the internal questions), conceptual choice on carefully considered pragmatic grounds, and what Carnap might have called ‘conceptual engineering’, in formulating new conceptual/linguistic systems for new purposes — not in deep theoretic inquiries into what really exists." Brews ohare (talk) 21:33, 31 May 2013 (UTC)
It is beside the point, but I think the issues boil down to trying to elucidate the way a mathematical theory (say the calculus) can be introduced in the description of 'real' phenomena (say, planetary motion). That is a bit more complicated than it seems because the notion of planetary motion is not itself a raw datum (that is, obviously 'real') but is already a construct that (for instance) smooths out the orbit and only later adds back in many other effects upon that ideal motion and calls these effects 'perturbations', that is, suggests certain aspects of the phenomena are inessential. This filtering out of what needs to be explained so it 'fits' the mathematical concepts is itself a process that requires close examination to insure it is not begging the question, that is, deliberately selecting for explanation what can be easily explained. The success of Newton's laws came from this process when the effects of friction that were once thought of as essential (and made slowing down a key feature of motion) were instead chosen to be mere complications, and the idea of free motion was introduced instead as the basic phenomenon. Brews ohare (talk) 21:46, 31 May 2013 (UTC)
Does this evolution mean 'friction' became less 'real', or 'uniform motion in a straight line' became more 'real'? I don't think so - the ontological issues about which is more real become futile, while the questions about which approach is more practical and why that is so become paramount. Brews ohare (talk) 22:02, 31 May 2013 (UTC)
Referring to the quote in my last messsage, what did you mean by 'external framework' and 'internal framework'? --Bob K31416 (talk) 22:48, 31 May 2013 (UTC)
I meant 'internal' = 'logical' and 'external' = 'factual'. So the 'internal' framework is the same as a 'linguistic framework' and a 'factual' framework is one that sets up the correspondence between a 'linguistic framework' and 'real' things. Brews ohare (talk) 23:12, 31 May 2013 (UTC)
Then let's use the source's terminology, if that's OK. Substituting into your most recent message, we get:
So the 'logical' framework is the same as a 'linguistic framework' and a 'factual' framework is one that sets up the correspondence between a 'linguistic framework' and 'real' things.
That's an interpretation of the Thomasson source that is different from my interpretation. First, I think that all the frameworks mentioned by the source are linguistic frameworks and the two terms, framework and linguistic framework, are used interchangeably. Second, I think that the source is saying that there are two types of linguistic frameworks: logical and factual. Is there somewhere in the source where it says that "a 'factual' framework is one that sets up the correspondence between a 'linguistic framework' and 'real' things", or says something like that, and implies that a factual framework is not a type of linguistic framework? --Bob K31416 (talk) 23:48, 31 May 2013 (UTC)
Bob: I don't think you are right in your interpretation about two types of linguistic framework. I'll get back to you on this. Brews ohare (talk) 02:34, 1 June 2013 (UTC)

The key word here is "interpretation", its not at all clear that the conclusions you are drawing are supported by the texts which also appear to be primary sources. That aside, the material is only relevant in so far as it explains the term meta-ontology. This is not an article about Carnap, Quine or the debate between them ----Snowded TALK 11:21, 1 June 2013 (UTC)

I don't see how Carnap and the Prospects for Easy Ontology is being used as a primary source about Carnap's approach to meta-ontology, since it is the author Thomasson's description of Carnap's meta-ontology that is being used. --Bob K31416 (talk) 12:21, 1 June 2013 (UTC)
The point is that we are seeing elaboration or interpretation of what Thomasson is saying, not a use of the source to make a factual statement. Its also moving away from an illustration of meta-ontology ----Snowded TALK 12:33, 1 June 2013 (UTC)
Regarding interpretation of sources, that's the normal function of Wikipedia editors. If by elaboration you mean going beyond what is in the source, then that would be OR. Could you be specific about what you think is OR? --Bob K31416 (talk) 12:42, 1 June 2013 (UTC)
I think we use sources, interpretation can be problematic and you and Brews are reading the text in different ways so that should raise alarm bells. Also remember that Thomasson is elaborating on the original Carnap work rather than describing it and that view is not shown to be universal in the soruces so far provided. So it might be considered a primary source. Aside from that it's elaborating on what is meant to be an illustration - scope creep ----Snowded TALK 13:19, 1 June 2013 (UTC)
By interpret, I meant use, if that helps clarify what I said. I used the word interpret because editors are interpreting the meaning of a source's statement in their own words. Editors can use (or interpret) sources incorrectly if they go beyond what is in the source. Also, editors can disagree about whether a use is going beyond what is in the source, or is misunderstanding the source. In that case, it might be settled by consensus. In any case, it would help if you were specific about what you think is OR by giving an excerpt from the discussion here. Otherwise, it may not be worthwhile for me to continue this particular discussion with you. And who knows, maybe I'll agree with you that the excerpt is essentially proposing OR for the article. --Bob K31416 (talk) 14:53, 1 June 2013 (UTC)
Well our purpose is to summarise the sources and at the moment it seems that you and Brews are not agreed on the interpretation - hence my comment that alarm bells should be rung. Happy to try and explain my point in a different way if it would help. We have an article here about meta-ontology linked to a possible first use by one philosopher who illustrates the meaning of the word with the Carnap-Quine debate. The article is not about that debate per se, or about modern variations and disputes about the issues raised in those debates. Unless that is those modern variations are described in secondary sources as changing the nature of the field. So I think the addition is not yet justified on groupds of relevance as well as looking suspiciously like OR. I don't think it would be legitimate (without a secondary source) to say that meta-ontology is encompassed by the Carnap-Quine debate, that is just an illustration of it. So to take a development of that debate and impute a link to the subject of this article is OR. Now if there was an article on said debate and modern extensions I might take a different view. ----Snowded TALK 15:58, 1 June 2013 (UTC)
You didn't include the excerpt that I requested in my last two messages and without that, I think your remarks are too vague regarding OR. --Bob K31416 (talk) 16:40, 1 June 2013 (UTC)
Everyone is entitled to an opinion but to be honest I am not sure what you mean by requiring an excerpt. I've made the nature of my objection clear and just asking for an excerpt without explaining what that would be or why is not really a response. ----Snowded TALK 16:44, 1 June 2013 (UTC)
I should add another more general concern, that we are allowing the article to be defined solely within the linguistic/analytical tradition in Philosophy. Now this may be inevitable as anyone outside that school is likely to just talk about ontology. But given the overlap we are in danger of misleading the reader. Not sure what to do about this, if the article was a sub-section of Ontology (which I still think would be best) then it would not be a problem ----Snowded TALK 16:01, 1 June 2013 (UTC)
Looks like meta-ontology is a subject that is sufficiently notable for an article, as evidenced by the sources on the subject. I don't see any problem. --Bob K31416 (talk) 16:40, 1 June 2013 (UTC)
Well you haven't answered the point about the focus being linguistic/analytical which is just one school of Philosophy. I assume you are aware of the issues surround this? ----Snowded TALK 16:44, 1 June 2013 (UTC)
Snowded: Perhaps you could be specific about what text in the article is limiting its focus to the linguistic/analytical, and supposing that to be the case, what specific larger aspects of meta-ontology you would like to see get more attention? Brews ohare (talk) 16:57, 1 June 2013 (UTC)
Well all of it. Do I really have to explain that, you can see from the references. Trying to pull in Kant doesn't really change it and as you say its not really meta-ontology anyway. I suspect the term is only used within that tradition, and within a sub-section of the tradition. I've been looking (and asking some academic philosophers) and no one has really heard of it outside such a limited context. ----Snowded TALK 17:02, 1 June 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: I'll try rewriting your comment so it makes sense to me. If I have it wrong, please correct me:

I suspect the term {that is, meta-ontology] is only used within that tradition [that is, the linguistic/analytical tradition] and within a sub-section of that tradition. I've been looking (and asking some academic philosophers) and no one has really heard of it [that is, meta-ontology] outside such a limited context.

If my interpretation is correct, your objection to this article Meta-ontology is not that it is too narrow a treatment of meta-ontology, but that meta-ontology is a nonentity unworthy of separate discussion on WP? In other words, you are re-presenting your view that a merger with Ontology is the best course? Brews ohare (talk) 17:29, 1 June 2013 (UTC)

Brews I would really be happier if you stopped trying to re-express my views. You almost always get it wrong. If this is a stand alone article then there is an issue about the narrow use. Per your proposal below (and this tendency to create multiple threads is unnecessary and not helpful) we have limited citations so an earlier form which acknowledged that might be better for the introduction. Otherwise if you want to create another article on the Carnap-Quine debate then that might be a better place for some this material. But I suspect it is already handled elsewhere so I would check first. ----Snowded TALK 17:38, 1 June 2013 (UTC)
Snowded: I couldn't be sure just what some vague references meant, so I supplied my best guesses in brackets [...] and and asked for corrections if I was wrong. As you wish to remain incoherent (IMO) so be it. Brews ohare (talk) 17:48, 1 June 2013 (UTC)
Brews you may not have understood the argument but there were no references so they can't be vague. Coherence is an interesting concept in Philosophy and a current hot topic, I'm lecturing on it in the context of complexity in Australia in a weeks time at a joint session of a few Melbourne Universities. If you want some references let me know. Pending that try and behave in a civil manner please. If you are not familiar with the history and controversies around analytic/linguistic philosophy all you have to do is ask. I assumed that knowledge in my response ----Snowded TALK 17:59, 1 June 2013 (UTC)
Snowded: I believe I was entirely civil. I hope your lectures to a knowledgeable group in a distinguished setting goes well. Brews ohare (talk) 18:14, 1 June 2013 (UTC)
No Brews you were not. Your statement 'wish to remain incoherent' is the example. I also pointed out the irony of you not understanding a point with my lecturing on the subject of coherence at a major University. If you attempted to understand other arguments rather than trying to re-express them as strawmen we might get somewhere. ----Snowded TALK 11:00, 2 June 2013 (UTC)

Remaining Katz quotation

In the Introduction to Meta-ontology we have a footnote to the following long quotation:

"Carnap [1963] distinguished 'logical truths,' which 'do not state anything about the world of facts [but] hold for any possible combination of facts,' from 'factual truths,' which make empirical statements and do not hold for any possible combination of empirical facts. This reconstruction of Hume’s distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact gave rise to a new empiricism. Thanks to Frege’s logical semantics, particularly his conception of analyticity, arithmetic truths like '7 + 5 = 12' are no longer synthetic a priori, but analytic a priori truths in Carnap’s extended sense of 'analytic.' Hence, logical empiricists are not subject to Kant’s criticism of Hume for throwing out mathematics along with metaphysics."

— JJ Katz, Realistic Rationalism, p. 69

This lengthy quote contains a useful first sentence, but goes on into matters best left to later (discussion of Hume and Frege). I propose cutting this quote down to its first sentence. Brews ohare (talk) 18:07, 31 May 2013 (UTC)


Also, as MachineElf always does, he's left the imbedded reference to Carnap unidentified. Apparently it refers to Rudolf Carnap (1969). "Intellectual autobiography". In Paul Arthur Schlipp (ed.). The philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. Open Court Publishing. p. 64. Brews ohare (talk) 18:38, 31 May 2013 (UTC)

Does any part of the quote support the material in the sentence where the footnote is placed? --Bob K31416 (talk) 18:25, 31 May 2013 (UTC)
The discussion of Hume and Frege is certainly not needed here. The first sentence states Carnap's position, which would be useful in the Intro, but nothing in the quote supports anything about Quine, although the position of the footnote suggests it does. Brews ohare (talk) 18:38, 31 May 2013 (UTC)
Then it looks like the quote should be deleted. Also, that suggests the citation may not be supporting the sentence so if that's the case, the citation too should be deleted. --Bob K31416 (talk) 19:10, 31 May 2013 (UTC)
I agree that considering what is said in the intro, the citation should be omitted there. However, inasmuch as the introduction is opaque as it regards Carnap, a better version of the Intro might make use of the first line of this quote. Brews ohare (talk) 19:48, 31 May 2013 (UTC)
Suggest working on the Carnap section first, as we are doing in the above Talk section. --Bob K31416 (talk) 19:57, 31 May 2013 (UTC)

Proposal

At present we have the following sentence in the Introduction to Meta-ontology:

Inwagen[3] exemplifies meta-ontology using Rudolf Carnap's extension of Kant's analytic–synthetic distinction, a distinction between internal and external questions, respectively,[4] and Quine's famous refutations thereof.[5][6]
[3] Peter Van Inwagen (1998). "Meta-ontology". Erkenntnis 48: 233–250
[4] Carnap, Rudolf (1950.). Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology
[5] Katz, J.J. (2000). Realistic Rationalism
[6] Quote from David Manley (2009). "§2. Themes from Carnap and Quine"

I believe the reference to Kant is out of place insofar as the topic is meta-ontology. The footnote to Manley refers to a quote that isn't provided. Rather than the above sentence and footnotes, the following works better for me:

Inwagen[3] exemplifies meta-ontology using the contrast between Rudolf Carnap's discussion of ontology and that of Willard Quine. Carnap distinguished between the pragmatic acceptance of a 'form of language' and metaphysical assertions about the reality of the entities that language employs.[4] As explained by Carnap, a 'form of language' consisted of a logical portion and a pragmatic portion describing reasons for its adoption. Quine argued that Carnap's position involved an untenable distinction between these two aspects of a 'form of language', the so-called analytic-synthetic distinction, and Quine introduced formal techniques for deciding the ontological commitment of a language.[5]
[3] Peter Van Inwagen (1998). "Meta-ontology" Erkenntnis 48: 233–250
[4] Carnap, Rudolf (1950.). Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology
[5} David Manley (2009) Introduction to Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, p. 3

Brews ohare (talk) 16:32, 1 June 2013 (UTC)

I don't disagree with any of that, but it does seem to me to return to an earlier form in which meta-ontology is a word coined by Inwagen with some subsequent use within a specific school Philosophy. If you are proposing to reflect that with the above I'm happy to agree ----Snowded TALK 16:53, 1 June 2013 (UTC)
Snowded: I am not sure if that is your intention, but you raise the question of the scope of meta-ontology, and might be suggesting that the above introductory words restrict it to the designation of the particular issues that result from a comparison between Carnap and Quine. However, this sentence is not proposed to be the entire introduction, but just to replace the one sentence that has been identified. Brews ohare (talk) 14:53, 2 June 2013 (UTC)

Linguistic frameworks

Thomasson p. 2 (emphasis added by me) quotes Carnap as follows:

"The answers to internal existence questions, Carnap holds, 'may be found either by purely logical methods or by empirical methods, depending upon whether the framework is a logical or a factual one' " (1950, 206).

— Amie L Thomasson, Carnap and the prospects for easy ontology

It may be noted that the adjective 'linguistic' doesn't show up here.

"In either case, internal existence questions may be answered straightforwardly using standard analytic methods (here: of mathematics) or empirical methods (here: of looking)."

— Amie L Thomasson, Carnap and the prospects for easy ontology

The term 'linguistic framework' shows up as in:

"neither the nominalist’s nor the Platonist’s answer to the question ‘do numbers exist’, taken as an external question, should be embraced. Instead, the best we can do with them is to reinterpret them as implicitly practical questions regarding whether or not to accept the relevant linguistic framework

— Amie L Thomasson, Carnap and the prospects for easy ontology

I take this as identifying 'linguistic frameworks' as the tautological constructs of (for example) mathematics.

"the philosopher’s work lies in constructing linguistic frameworks (a kind of ‘conceptual engineering’) and making practical decisions about which to adopt for which purposes."

— Amie L Thomasson, Carnap and the prospects for easy ontology

Consistent with the interpretation of linguistic framework suggested above.

"Internal questions, questions asked within, or using the framework, are questions that make use of the relevant terms (property terms, number terms, material object terms) according to the rules introduced. To introduce a linguistic framework, according to Carnap, requires introducing 'a system of new ways of speaking, subject to new rules' "

— Amie L Thomasson, Carnap and the prospects for easy ontology

Again, the linguistic framework is a tautological system. It is then pointed out that there are many 'linguistic languages' and they can be invented as one pleases. However, to apply them requires practical choices between them.

"for a question to be asked meaningfully the terms in it must be governed by rules of use: we must be using a linguistic framework to ask an (internal) existence question. "

— Amie L Thomasson, Carnap and the prospects for easy ontology

"external questions can be given a pragmatic construal according to which they are really asking about the advisability of adopting the new linguistic framework."

— Amie L Thomasson, Carnap and the prospects for easy ontology

"The acceptance of a linguistic framework can 'be judged as being more or less expedient, fruitful, conducive to the aim for which the language is intended' "

— Amie L Thomasson, Carnap and the prospects for easy ontology

and, in talking about Quine:

"The real distinction instead [of the analytic/synthetic distinction] is between existence questions asked using a linguistic framework and existence questions that are supposed to be asked somehow without being subject to those rules — asked, as Quine puts it ‘before the adoption of the given language’. "

— Amie L Thomasson, Carnap and the prospects for easy ontology

So far, I have not found any use for 'linguistic framework' other than as a tautological framework. Maybe you can point some out to me, Bob? Brews ohare (talk) 03:54, 1 June 2013 (UTC)

From your comments, it seems that the basis for our different interpretations is that I think that Thomasson is using 'framework' and 'linguistic framework' to refer to the same thing, and you think that Thomasson means them to be different. I looked at the quoted excerpts that you presented and I didn't see anything that contradicted my interpretation and supported yours. I have the impression that we aren't going to be able to settle this. --Bob K31416 (talk) 12:09, 1 June 2013 (UTC)
Bob: The only place two frameworks are mentioned that I have found is in the Carnap quote, where the adjective 'linguistic' is not used. What is needed is a quote showing that Thomasson means something other than a tautological framework. I believe the last quote I provided referring to Quine is strong evidence that she does not use linguistic framework to refer to something more general. So, to put it differently, why do you think that she does? Brews ohare (talk) 13:36, 1 June 2013 (UTC)
I searched Thomasson's book Ordinary Objects and found no mention of 'linguistic framework'. I also searched her other paper The Easy Approach to Ontology and found no mention. So it would appear that this terminology is not used elsewhere by Thomasson. Brews ohare (talk) 13:49, 1 June 2013 (UTC)
Here is another author's discussion (bold font added):

Existence is the acceptance of a linguistic framework. Language is segregated into specific sets of terms, definitions, and usage-rules and variables, together which constitute a linguistic framework. Each framework postulates a set over which its variables range. The criterion of each entity's existence is met and accepted just in case its linguistic framework is accepted and adopted into general use. Nowhere is there talk of reality, mind-independent existence , or objectivity.

— Jonathan R Curtis, On Carnap's theory of linguistic frameworks
This author goes on to quote Carnap (underscore mine):

If someone decides to accept the thing language, there is no objection against saying that he has accepted the world of things. But this must not be interpreted as if it meant his acceptance of a belief in the reality of the thing world: there is no such belief or assertion or assumption, because it is not a theoretical question. To accept the thing world mans nothing more than to accept a certain form of language, in other words, to accept rules for forming statements and for testing, accepting or rejecting them.

— Rudolf Carnap, Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 4, pp.20-40; §2
From Carnap's other statements, I'd gather that which "rules for testing" to adopt are pragmatic issues of a practical nature.
Two questions arise: Does this quote define a 'linguistic framework' as a tautological system with its "terms, definitions and usage-rules" or something more general? The reference to 'testing' seems to lie outside tautology, but to lie within the notion of a "form of language". It would appear that perhaps a "form of language" consists of two parts: its 'linguistic framework' and its 'rules for testing, accepting or rejecting'? Do we want to take this question to a more general search? Brews ohare (talk) 14:18, 1 June 2013 (UTC)
(Note that I inserted my message here because this was where the discussion was when I began composing the message.)
In the article you gave that you denoted by "another author's discussion", the author does the same thing as Thomasson, regarding shortening 'linguistic framework' to 'framework' for less cumbersome use of the term. The author uses 'linguistic framework' exclusively until p. 4, where 'framework' without 'linguistic' is first used. Thereafter, the author nearly always uses 'framework' without 'linguistic' to have less cumbersome wording. Here's where 'framework' is first used alone in that article on p. 4. I think you can see from the context that 'framework' is just a shortened version of 'linguistic framework' and has the same meaning.
"The basic tenet of Carnap’s position has been touched upon in the previous section. Here, I present it concisely: existence is the acceptance of a linguistic framework. Language is segregated into specific sets of terms, definitions and usage-rules and variables, together which constitute a linguistic framework. Each framework postulates a set of over which its variables range. The criterion of each entity’s existence is met and exhausted just in case its linguistic framework is accepted and adopted into general use. Nowhere is there talk of reality, mind-independent existence, or objectivity."
Then if you continue in the article, using edit-find for "framework", you will see that 'framework' is almost exclusively used instead of 'linguistic framework'. This is also less cumbersome when it comes to discussing various examples of linguistic frameworks in the article. For example, the linguistic framework for mereology is referred to as the 'mereology framework', instead of the more cumbersome 'mereology linguistic framework'. Also note the title of the article, "On Carnap’s Theory of Linguistic Frameworks", which supports the notion that the only frameworks discussed are 'linguistic frameworks'. --Bob K31416 (talk) 15:57, 1 June 2013 (UTC)
Here is another source worth looking at. On page 117 is said:

a linguistic framework is a logical framework if all the internal questions formulable within it admit of analytic answers, but a factual framework if at least some of the internal questions formulable within it admit of non-analytic answers.

— Alex Miller, Philosophy of Language, p. 117
This formulation clearly supports your interpretation. Brews ohare (talk) 14:56, 1 June 2013 (UTC)
My conclusion is that it is unclear whether all writers use 'linguistic framework' in the same way, but I'm willing to accept that some follow your usage. Where does that take us? Brews ohare (talk) 15:11, 1 June 2013 (UTC)
On p. 118 we have the assertion about the pragmatic nature of adoption:

The acceptance [of a linguistic framework] cannot be judged as being either true or false because it is not an assertion. It can only be judged as being more or less expedient, fruitful, conducive to the aim for which the language is intended...The acceptance or rejection of abstract linguistic forms, just as the acceptance or rejection of any other linguistic forms in any branch of science, will finally be decided by their efficiency as instruments, the ratio of the results achieved to the amount and complexity of the efforts required.

— Rudolf Carnap, Language, Truth, and Logic, p. 250, p. 256; edited by Alex Miller
Brews ohare (talk) 15:28, 1 June 2013 (UTC)
The question of the meaning of 'linguistic framework' is pretty much a red herring if the main issue is to decide what Carnap's position is. It is apparent that he considers a 'form of language' to consist of two parts: its tautological part and its rules for testing the terms used by the tautological part. We have the following: "After the new forms are introduced into the language, it is possible to formulate with their help internal questions and possible answers to them. A question of this kind may be either empirical or logical; accordingly a true answer is either factually true or analytic.[...]To be sure, we have to face at this point an important question; but it is a practical, not a theoretical question; it is the question of whether or not to accept the new linguistic forms. The acceptance cannot be judged as being either true or false because it is not an assertion. It can only be judged as being more or less expedient, fruitful, conducive to the aim for which the language is intended." Brews ohare (talk) 15:40, 1 June 2013 (UTC)

Carnap section (Part 1)

At present, the section on Carnap is about his internal questions, external questions, and framework, and I think that we should use the first three paragraphs of §1 Thomasson as a basis for this. Other info can then be added. --Bob K31416 (talk) 16:53, 1 June 2013 (UTC)

I don't disagree with any of that, but it does seem to me to return to an earlier form in which meta-ontology is a word coined by Inwagen with some subsequent use within a specific school Philosophy. If you are proposing to reflect that with the above I'm happy to agree ----Snowded TALK 16:53, 1 June 2013 (UTC)
Bob: Several questions: (i) Are we talking about the introduction? I was. If so, your proposal seems rather lengthy and very much focused upon Carnap. That probably then requires more about Quine, and we end up in a morass of ontology that distracts from the topic of meta-ontology. (ii) Why is Thomasson a preferable expositor of Carnap than Carnap himself? IMO Carnap is a more authoritative source on what Carnap's position is, he has very extensively written about his views, his work is the origin of all the derivative blather about him, and he is clearer than Thomassson. Brews ohare (talk) 17:09, 1 June 2013 (UTC)
My mistake. I thought it was for the Carnap section, rather than the lead of the article. I'd rather not get into discussing this proposal for changes in the lead before finishing current work on the Carnap section, because any changes in the Carnap section may affect what should be in the lead. --Bob K31416 (talk) 17:43, 1 June 2013 (UTC)
Bob: I see that I was off in another direction, so I moved copied my proposal for the introduction to the next thread. However, I still ask my second question: Why Thomasson? Brews ohare (talk) 17:20, 1 June 2013 (UTC)
Earlier you wrote, "Why is Thomasson a preferable expositor of Carnap than Carnap himself?" — It's a matter of Thomasson being a preferable expositor of Carnap over Wikipedia editors. --Bob K31416 (talk) 17:56, 1 June 2013 (UTC)

Hi Bob: What would you like to say? For example, there are several quotes from Carnap and other authors above about the 'form of language' and its two parts: the tautological or logical part, and the part about tests and reasons for adoption. Is that the topic you want to discuss? What does Thomasson say about this that isn't said better elsewhere? Brews ohare (talk) 18:09, 1 June 2013 (UTC)

First, here's my previous message of 16:53, 1 June 2013.
"At present, the section on Carnap is about his internal questions, external questions, and framework, and I think that we should use the first three paragraphs of §1 Thomasson as a basis for this. Other info can then be added."
Is this approach acceptable?--Bob K31416 (talk) 18:38, 1 June 2013 (UTC)
Go ahead and propose some text. Brews ohare (talk) 19:54, 1 June 2013 (UTC)

Revision of Carnap section

I recommend replacement of the entire section Carnap's approach. Bob has suggested basing a revision upon the following introduction by Thomasson in Carnap and the prospects for easy ontology:

"Carnap famously argues that there are two “kinds of question concerning the existence or reality of entities” (1950, 206): internal questions and external questions. To be able to speak about a kind of entity at all, or inquire about its existence, we must introduce terms for the relevant entity as part of a ‘linguistic framework’. Internal questions Carnap initially characterizes as “questions of the existence of certain entities of the new kind [asked] within the framework”; they include questions (asked within the framework of everyday language) such as “Is there a white piece of paper on my desk?” (1950, 207), or (asked within the framework of natural numbers) “Is there a prime number greater than 100?” (1950, 208-9). The answers to internal existence questions, Carnap holds, “may be found either by purely logical methods or by empirical methods, depending upon whether the framework is a logical or a factual one” (1950, 206). In either case, internal existence questions may be answered straightforwardly using standard analytic methods (here: of mathematics) or empirical methods (here: of looking). There is no special mystery here, and no special role for philosophy. These are existence questions even Hume could love.
"The metaphysician’s existence questions are generally expressed as highly general questions such as “Do numbers exist?”, “Do material objects exist?”, “Do properties exist”. But although Carnap uses specific questions as his examples of internal existence questions, that is not to say that general existence questions could not be asked—and answered—as internal questions. They certainly can be answered that way, as we can get trivial entailments from, e.g. ‘five is a number’ to ‘there are numbers’ (1950, 209). Carnap argues, however, that metaphysical questions, e.g. about the existence of numbers, can’t be intended as general internal questions, for:
nobody who meant the question ‘Are there numbers’ in the internal sense would either assert or even seriously consider a negative answer. This makes it plausible to assume that those philosophers who treat the question of the existence of numbers as a serious philosophical problem and offer lengthy arguments on either side, do not have in mind the internal question (1950, 209).
Thus, he concludes, the sense in which these general existence questions are raised and seriously debated by philosophers must be an external sense."
"External questions are raised “neither by the man in the street nor by scientists, but only by philosophers” (1950, 207). They include questions such as “are there numbers?”, or “is the thing-world real?”. Carnap argues that if we take external existence questions literally (as attempted theoretical or factual questions), they are ill-formed pseudo-questions. As a result, neither the nominalist’s nor the Platonist’s answer to the question ‘do numbers exist’, taken as an external question, should be embraced. Instead, the best we can do with them is to reinterpret them as implicitly practical questions regarding whether or not to accept the relevant linguistic framework: “we have to make the choice whether or not to accept and use the forms of expression in the framework in question” (1950, 207). Reconstrued as practical questions about the advisability of adopting a certain linguistic framework, there is here again no special philosophical or ontological insight into reality involved. Instead, the philosopher’s work lies in constructing linguistic frameworks (a kind of ‘conceptual engineering’) and making practical decisions about which to adopt for which purposes."

It seems likely that this can be boiled down considerably for the present purpose of outlining sufficient of Carnap's ontology to make the meta-ontological comparison with Quine clear. Brews ohare (talk) 20:17, 1 June 2013 (UTC)

I take the purpose of the first paragraph to be a discussion of Carnap's 'form of language' and its two aspects: the logical and the factual. Then we have to point out that only questions posed within a 'form of language' make sense, and that instead metaphysicians have dwelt upon 'external' questions, that is, formulated outside any particular 'form of language' and ostensibly applicable in principle to any one of them, which is nonsense to Carnap. If all this can be made clear, it is all we need to establish Carnap's ontology. Thomasson is way too wordy about this, and the point gets lost in her allusions and digressions. Brews ohare (talk) 20:35, 1 June 2013 (UTC)

I've been working on a draft. Before going too far, I would like to present for comments the part with info from the first paragraph of the Thomasson excerpt above.

According to Carnap, to discuss some entity the corresponding terminology of a linguistic framework is needed. In this framework, questions regarding the existence of these entities are called internal questions. An example of entities and their framework would be 'paper' and 'desk' in the framework of 'everyday language'. An internal question in this framework could be, “Is there a white piece of paper on my desk?” The answer can be found by the empirical method of looking at the desk. Another example is the linguistic framework of 'natural numbers' and an internal question could be, “Is there a prime number greater than 100?” The answer here can be found by a logical method. Linguistic frameworks are either factual or logical, depending on whether internal questions are answered using empirical or logical methods.

--Bob K31416 (talk) 00:04, 2 June 2013 (UTC)

Bob: Seems to me that 'everyday language' is not a framework in the sense of Carnap. My understanding is that a framework is more structured than that. For example, 'ordinary language' in the sense of Wittgenstein is not what Carnap had in mind. In ordinary language a term like 'paper' may have a variety of unrelated meanings - a material, a scholarly article, etc. Could you support the example of 'everyday language' with a source? Brews ohare (talk) 00:13, 2 June 2013 (UTC)
The framework of 'everyday language' is specifically mentioned in the first paragraph of the Thomasson excerpt above. --Bob K31416 (talk) 00:16, 2 June 2013 (UTC)
Bob, you are correct that Thomasson says this. However, if we look at the source she cites in this connection, she has elided a few phrases to reach her conclusion. What Carnap actually says is:
" Let us consider as an example the simplest kind of entities dealt with in the everyday language: the spatio-temporally ordered system of observable things and events. Once we have accepted the thing language with its framework for things, we can raise and answer internal questions, e.g., "Is there a white piece of paper on my desk?"...(This evaluation is usually carried out, of course, as a matter of habit rather than a deliberate, rational procedure. But it is possible, in a rational reconstruction, to lay down explicit rules for the evaluation.)[...]To recognize something as a real thing or event means to succeed in incorporating it into the system of things at a particular space-time position so that it fits together with the other things as real, according to the rules of the framework."
Now I'd say that this borders on what Thomasson has said, but clearly Carnap has a "rational reconstruction" of a single empirical observation in the context of neighboring "things" as an example of verification of one sentence. The "rules of the framework" in this instance are simply the other objects in the vicinity among which the desk is picked out as the location of the paper. He is not suggesting that the entire edifice of "everyday language" is one huge all-encompassing instance of his technical "framework". That would make a mockery of his entire effort, as 'everyday language' in its entirety is an unstructured morass about which one can say anything and distinguish nothing. Brews ohare (talk) 01:14, 2 June 2013 (UTC)
I think that Thomasson summarized this info reasonably well. Regarding your comments:
  • The "rational reconstruction" is just an alternate method compared to simply looking at the desk. Per Carnap, "This evaluation is usually carried out, of course, as a matter of habit rather than a deliberate, rational procedure."
  • Thomasson didn't say that Carnap is "suggesting that the entire edifice of 'everyday language' is one huge all-encompassing instance of his technical 'framework'."
--Bob K31416 (talk) 02:50, 2 June 2013 (UTC)
Bob: I think your proposed sentence "An example of entities and their framework would be 'paper' and 'desk' in the framework of 'everyday language'." is too easily misconstrued. Can't we do better? Brews ohare (talk) 04:27, 2 June 2013 (UTC)
Could you expand on your point? I'm not following what you mean. Also note that the example, “Is there a white piece of paper on my desk?” was Thomasson quoting what Carnap wrote. --Bob K31416 (talk) 12:14, 2 June 2013 (UTC)
Here is my problem. The statement "An example of entities and their framework would be 'paper' and 'desk' in the framework of 'everyday language'." provides very little guidance as to what framework is and how "paper" and "desk" fitting inside a "framework" adds anything. As 'everyday language' includes anything I can think of, seemingly I can say 'eggs' and 'Tea party' fit inside a framework. Likewise " An internal question in this framework could be, 'Is there a white piece of paper on my desk?' " doesn't help me understand what an 'internal' question is - it just looks like a question the same as any other: 'Were eggs thrown at the Tea party?' 'Are circles round?' 'Are kids a nuisance?" Brews ohare (talk) 13:45, 2 June 2013 (UTC)
The way I see a 'framework' is not just some words drawn from 'everyday language' but a construction that may or may not employ words from everyday language, but whatever words are used they are placed in a tightly constructed relationship with one another that may be brand new, or may abstract or distill from 'everyday language'. So, for example, Euclidean geometry refers to 'triangles' and 'circles' and 'straight lines' and 'points', all words found in everyday language, but they are restricted in their relationships inside the framework of geometry to form a logically connected whole. One can then ask the empirical question "is the edge of the door a straight line?" One could answer this question based upon everyday language, but one also could answer based upon the 'framework' which would be more demanding because one would have to establish that the 'edge of the door' held the correct relation to other properties that the 'framework' attaches to straight lines. (For instance, is the edge of the door the shortest distance between the corner-points of the door?) The conclusion is probably that the edge of the door is not a straight line in the sense of the framework, but some approximation to it.
In the example 'the paper is on the desk' one could interpret that in everyday language, but if 'paper' and 'desk' belong to a framework their membership implies a structured relationship between paper and desk that is much more restrictive than all the possible relationships the everyday words might bear one to another in everyday language. Carnap suggests that such statements aren't instinctively thought through from inside a framework, but claims that if we think back over what we mean by such a statement we might reconstruct a context we weren't actually aware of that could be taken to be a framework. Personally I find that to be a conjecture that needs elaboration to help the reader envision what the 'framework' might be. Brews ohare (talk) 14:11, 2 June 2013 (UTC)
In my opinion, we are going to do better by trying to distill Carnap, for example, Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology, than by adding the complication of deciding whether Thomasson has clearly presented Carnap's ideas. Brews ohare (talk) 15:28, 2 June 2013 (UTC)

Carnap introduced the idea of a 'framework' or a 'form of language' that makes more precise the relationships between entities used in everyday language. The discussion of a proposition within a framework can take on a logical or an empirical (that is, factual) aspect. The logical aspect concerns whether the proposition respects the definitions and rules set up in the framework. The empirical aspect concerns whether the framework is actually useful in some or another practical situation. An example of entities and their framework would be 'squares' and 'rectangles' in the framework of 'geometry'. An internal logical question in this framework could be, “Is a square a rectangle?” The answer can be found by a logical analysis. An internal empirical question would be “Is this desk top a square or a rectangle?”. The answer here is found by observations and comparisons with the relations required by the framework for squares and rectangles. (For example, are the diagonals equal or not?) In contrast to these 'internal' questions, are what Carnap calls 'external' questions that purport to have meaning outside or external to any framework. An example of what could be an external question is “Is a square a real thing?” According to Carnap, the term 'real' in this question cannot be posed meaningfully except in a comparison of frameworks. To be meaningful, such a question is to be interpreted as asking whether a square, as proposed in some particular geometry, is a useful concept. It is one question that might be addressed in deciding the issue: “Are we using a geometry adequate for this situation?” (For example, Euclidean geometry, spherical geometry, Riemannian geometry.) Any other interpretation of “Is a square real?” is considered by Carnap to be nonsense.

Brews ohare (talk) 16:25, 2 June 2013 (UTC)

It seems that the general thrust of your remarks is that you disagree with Thomasson's interpretation of Carnap and you are offering your own. The reliable source is preferable, unless there is a clear error in the reliable source, which I don't see in this case. --Bob K31416 (talk) 20:10, 2 June 2013 (UTC)
Bob: I think Thomasson is unclear, and the sentences I have referred to in your quote box are even more unclear and unhelpful in understanding the concepts. Do you wish to address my points made here that these sentences do nothing to illuminate the concepts?
I certainly don't want to appear to be rowing my own boat here: I believe the statements made in the quote box immediately above can be supported by reference to Carnap directly, or one of the other sources already quoted above. Brews ohare (talk) 21:26, 2 June 2013 (UTC)
Aside from your interest in sourcing various points, which I agree should be done, do you in fact have any issues with what is said? Do you think the boxed material misrepresents Carnap in some way? If so, how, specifically, please? Brews ohare (talk) 21:36, 2 June 2013 (UTC)
No thanks. There would be too much discussion for me since you didn't keep a single sentence of what I wrote and rejected the reliable source for no good reason, as far as I can see, and your version doesn't look very good to me and I expect the required discussions with you would be too long. So I'll probably leave it at that unless there are enough editors who come into this discussion to support my preliminary draft to form a sufficient consensus. I'm not holding my breath on that one. : ) --Bob K31416 (talk) 22:55, 2 June 2013 (UTC)
Bob, there are so many threads and long discussions that its difficult for any editor to follow what is being proposed. Am I right in thinking that you are proposing replacing the whole of the Carnap's approach section with your boxed proposal? If so, and if we took an equally brutal approach to the Quine section removing the long quotes, then combining both I think (if I have it right) that I would support that. I've been on planes for most of the period of this debate so I may have got it wrong in which case apologies ----Snowded TALK 23:53, 2 June 2013 (UTC)
Yes, the TL;DR effect is strong here. My boxed version came from just the first of the three paragraphs of the Thomasson excerpt, which are at the top of this section. So a rough estimate of the final version would be three times as long as my current boxed version. I stopped at this stage to get comments before continuing. Sure glad I did that. --Bob K31416 (talk) 01:17, 3 June 2013 (UTC)

Bob: I can understand some trepidation about lengthy discussion. You could, of course, wait until that happens instead of responding to a prediction.

However, let's put that aside for the moment. Let me reiterate my problem with your proposal, which I think is accurate, and which deserves some attempt at response from you. Your statement is:
"An example of entities and their framework would be 'paper' and 'desk' in the framework of 'everyday language'."
How does that help me to understand what a 'framework' is? Apparently, it seems, any two nouns from English can be viewed as belonging to a framework, which seems to say that 'framework' is just a synonym for all entities referred to in 'everyday language'.
Likewise, your statement:
"An internal question in this framework could be, “Is there a white piece of paper on my desk?” "
does nothing to illuminate what an 'internal' question is. It would seem I can take any two nouns from the English language, arbitrarily call them part of the 'framework' of 'everyday language' and then pose any question involving these two nouns and call it an 'internal' question.
Example: 'Nose' and 'foot' belong to the 'framework' 'everyday language'. So a question 'internal' to the framework 'everyday language' is: "Is the foot on the nose?'"
That isn't what you mean, but you haven't said enough to distinguish what you do mean from my silly example. Something has to be added about the 'framework' incorporating relationships among its members, and possibly rules for membership.

My boxed version is just my preliminary and tentative attempt to address these issues, and is not an attack upon you or the process of arriving at a good formulation. Brews ohare (talk) 00:03, 3 June 2013 (UTC)

OK, Bob for what it is worth I think you are going on the right lines, in particular you are building from the sources rather than using the sources to support and interpretation, at least that is my interpretation of what is going on :-)
Brews I suggest you back off and let Bob create a proposed replacement without subjecting each stage to lengthy commentary. Then when he has it we attempt a controlled discussion
Bob, if you are happy with that I will back off until you have completed and make sure I spend time reviewing the result
Deal? ----Snowded TALK 13:43, 3 June 2013 (UTC)
Snowded: You could help out here, but I don't think appointing yourself to some kind of 'deal'-maker is how to go about it. There is no 'dealing' involved. Brews ohare (talk) 16:11, 3 June 2013 (UTC)
I was proposing a way forward Brews and asking, using the colloquialism "Deal?" if you would buy into it. That is not in any normal use of english offering myself as a deal maker. I realise it would be difficult for you not to make extensive comments, but I am suggesting holding off for a period to let Bob develop something. If you can't/won't do that then its 'no deal' obviously. ----Snowded TALK 16:33, 3 June 2013 (UTC)
(edit conflict)Snowded, Thanks. I'll look at it some more, but I'm not guaranteeing that I'll present anything. It'll be awhile. --Bob K31416 (talk) 16:37, 3 June 2013 (UTC)
I think its probably the only way forward without involvement of other editors. That is unlikely as the multiple threads and multiple repeats are daunting to any editor coming at this afresh. ----Snowded TALK 00:03, 4 June 2013 (UTC)

A sourced version of Carnap proposal

Below I repeat a summary of Carnap's position presented in an earlier thread with accompanying footnotes to assist in the assessment of the accuracy of this presentation. The footnotes are taken from Rudolf Carnap (1950). "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology". Revue Internationale de Philosophie. 4: 40–50. In my opinion this document in its entirety provides a very clear presentation of Carnap's views with many examples. The presentation below is a very brief summary that cannot replace a reading of this paper.

The argument may be raised that this paper by Carnap is an inadequate basis for understanding his work on this topic. Of course, an assessment of the value and reception of his contribution has to be established through other sources. However, I very much doubt that any other author will present Carnap's position more articulately than Carnap himself.

If there are objections that this summary inadequately presents Carnap's views, I would appreciate help in reformulating this summary. Brews ohare (talk) 17:08, 3 June 2013 (UTC)

Carnap introduced the idea of a 'framework' or a 'form of language'[1][2] that uses a more precise specification of the relationships between entities than that used in everyday language.[3] The discussion of a proposition within a framework can take on a logical or an empirical (that is, factual) aspect.[4] The logical aspect concerns whether the proposition respects the definitions and rules set up in the framework. The empirical aspect concerns the application of the framework in some or another practical situation.[5] An example of entities and their framework would be 'squares' and 'rectangles' in the framework of 'geometry'. An internal logical question in this framework could be, “Is a square a rectangle?” The answer can be found by a logical analysis. An internal empirical question would be “Is this desk top a square or a rectangle?”. The answer here is found by observations and comparisons with the relations required by the framework for squares and rectangles.[5] (For example, are the diagonals equal or not?) In contrast to these 'internal' questions, are those Carnap calls 'external', those questions that purport to have meaning outside or external to any framework.[6] An example of what could be an external question is “Is a square a real thing?” According to Carnap, the term 'real' in this question cannot be posed meaningfully except in a comparison of frameworks.[7] To be meaningful, such a question is to be interpreted as asking whether a concept is useful.[8] For example, is a square, as proposed in some particular geometry, a useful concept. This particular question is one that might be addressed in deciding the issue: “Are we using a geometry adequate for this situation?” (For example, Euclidean geometry, spherical geometry, Riemannian geometry.) Any interpretation of the question: “Is such-and-such real?”, as other than inquiring about the utility of the concept of such-and-such, is considered by Carnap to be nonsense.[9][10][11]
Quotes
[1] Rudolf Carnap Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology “To accept the thing world means nothing more than to accept a certain form of language, in other words, to accept rules for forming statements and for testing accepting or rejecting them.”
[2] ibid: “If someone wishes to speak in his language about a new kind of entities, he has to introduce a system of new ways of speaking, subject to new rules; we shall call this procedure the construction of a linguistic framework for the new entities in question.”
[3] ibid “The acceptance of a new kind of entities is represented in the language by the introduction of a framework of new forms of expressions to be used according to a new set of rules. There may be new names for particular entities of the kind in question; but some such names may already occur in the language before the introduction of the new framework. (Thus, for example, the thing language contains certainly words of the type of "blue" and "house" before the framework of properties is introduced; and it may contain words like "ten" in sentences of the form "I have ten fingers" before the framework of numbers is introduced.)”
[4} ibid “After the new forms are introduced into the language, it is possible to formulate with their help internal questions and possible answers to them. A question of this kind may be either empirical or logical; accordingly a true answer is either factually true or analytic.”
[5] ibid “Results of observations are evaluated according to certain rules as confirming or disconfirming evidence for possible answers.”
[6] ibid “From the internal questions we must clearly distinguish external questions, i.e., philosophical questions concerning the existence or reality of the total system of the new entities. Many philosophers regard a question of this kind as an ontological question which must be raised and answered before the introduction of the new language forms. ”
[7] ibid “To be real in the scientific sense means to be an element of the system; hence this concept cannot be meaningfully applied to the system itself. Those who raise the question of the reality of the thing world itself have perhaps in mind not a theoretical question as their formulation seems to suggest, but rather a practical question, a matter of a practical decision concerning the structure of our language. We have to make the choice whether or not to accept and use the forms of expression in the framework in question.”
[8] ibid “To be sure, we have to face at this point an important question; but it is a practical, not a theoretical question; it is the question of whether or not to accept the new linguistic forms. The acceptance cannot be judged as being either true or false because it is not an assertion. It can only be judged as being more or less expedient, fruitful, conducive to the aim for which the language is intended. Judgments of this kind supply the motivation for the decision of accepting or rejecting the kind of entities.”
[9] ibid “Thus it is clear that the acceptance of a linguistic framework must not be regarded as implying a metaphysical doctrine concerning the reality of the entities in question.”
[10] ibid “From these questions we must distinguish the external question of the reality of the thing world itself. ... In contrast to the former questions, this question cannot be solved because it is framed in a wrong way. To be real in the scientific sense means to be an element of the system; hence this concept cannot be meaningfully applied to the system itself.”
[11] ibid “the decisive question is not the alleged ontological question of the existence of abstract entities but rather the question whether the rise of abstract linguistic forms or, in technical terms, the use of variables beyond those for things (or phenomenal data), is expedient and fruitful for the purposes for which semantical analyses are made, viz. the analysis, interpretation, clarification, or construction of languages of communication, especially languages of science.”

Brews ohare (talk) 17:08, 3 June 2013 (UTC)

In my opinion not all these footnoted quotations are necessary to the WP article on Meta-ontology. Their purpose here is to help those editors who apparently feel that the presentation is at odds with Carnap's views to revisit that assessment. The quotes show that this summary adheres closely to what Carnap has to say. Brews ohare (talk) 16:47, 4 June 2013 (UTC)

enough

Another thread opened with another lengthy set of text. It includes the phrase "However, I very much doubt that any other author will present Carnap's position more articulately than Carnap himself." which may well be right, but it is not the way Wikipedia works. ----Snowded TALK 00:01, 4 June 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: What has 'the way WP works' got to do with this anyway? Brews ohare (talk) 01:47, 4 June 2013 (UTC)
How many times Brews? We do not use primary sources to summarise an overall position. You keep ignoring that, in fact you argue its wrong. You may be right but (and I repeat) its not the way things work around here. ----Snowded TALK 02:13, 4 June 2013 (UTC)
Snowded: Your view simply put is that a statement made by Carnap is not best sourced to Carnap but to some paraphrase by a third party. You also apparently believe that any summary of a source cannot be attempted by a WP editor, but must be a verbatim quote from a third party.
That is not how it works around here.
What does work around here is that points in an article are attributed to sources and footnotes provided. If another editor finds the source does not support the statement, then they object, and either the statement is changed or a different source is found.
Now, you do not wish to engage in any such comparison of sources and assertions, but have devised a different way to do things, that leads to zero progress. You simply announce your own personal opinion and your own personal view about violation of WP policies. Without, of course, pointing out what is the cause of the violation, nor why the policy applies, nor what changes in statement would fix things to meet your approval. Brews ohare (talk) 04:44, 4 June 2013 (UTC)
In the preceding thread we have a case in point, where instead of offering any objections or pointing out any place in the preceding thread where Carnap has been misrepresented, you open a new thread to bitch about generalities, the need for third-party sources where none are required, and my failures to understand you and 'what works'. Brews ohare (talk) 04:51, 4 June 2013 (UTC)
I haven't bitched about anything Brews. I have patiently pointed out issues. So have other editors both directly and in RfCs. just look at this page, thousands of words split over multiple sections, mostly using primary sources. As to progress, we will make zero progress until you learn to work with other editors and respect policy. I thought you had improved but this is now borderline ArbCom enforcement report again ----Snowded TALK 05:40, 4 June 2013 (UTC)
Back to 'primary sources', eh Snowded? If you think some portion of the above segment about Carnap has an issue involving WP policy, why is it that you never refer to any part of any WP policy that supports your position? Instead, you just wave the suggestion of violation without spelling out the offending material and which portion of what policy applies. Could it be that you misunderstand the role of primary sources on WP? I think so. Brews ohare (talk) 14:40, 4 June 2013 (UTC)
I've spelt it out Brews here and elsewhere. You have a long record of thinking you "know" ...----Snowded TALK 15:01, 4 June 2013 (UTC)
This response avoids anew any attempt by yourself to be clear about your position. You "have spelt it out here and elsewhere" only in your imagination. Not only have you said NOTHING about the above segment about Carnap (aside from your general displeasure), but you have followed this same pattern of referral to non-existent discussion again and again. Brews ohare (talk) 15:09, 4 June 2013 (UTC)
I acknowledge that you hold that opinion Brews ----Snowded TALK 15:25, 4 June 2013 (UTC)
An evidence of your acknowledgment would be a substantive comment about the above segment about Carnap pointing out exactly how WP policy regarding primary sources applies here. Brews ohare (talk) 16:43, 4 June 2)013 (UTC)
Read the opening two comments in this thread Brews. Then in WP:PRIMARY note "Material based purely on primary sources should be avoided" ----Snowded TALK 23:50, 4 June 2013 (UTC)
The policy is: "All interpretive claims, analyses, or synthetic claims about primary sources must be referenced to a secondary source." Can you point to something in the above segment about Carnap you consider to be interpretation, analysis, or synthesis? If you point something out, maybe it can be fixed or sourced differently. Brews ohare (talk) 15:34, 5 June 2013 (UTC)

and where is the secondary source Brews? Strings of direct quotations are selections so they are by their nature a form of interpretation ----Snowded TALK 21:43, 5 June 2013 (UTC)

No. The section is not a string of quotations; it is supported by a string of quotations from Carnap, whose sole purpose is to show that the position of Carnap is well portrayed. However, at this point I am unconcerned about your inability to appraise this section, because it is going nowhere. Its only purpose at this point is to make clear to Bob what Carnap's position is based upon Carnap's own words. It would appear that Bob doesn't want to hear about this, so I have quoted third parties about Carnap to the same effect. Bob will ignore them as well, I'm afraid.
Bottom line here is that the treatment of Carnap will remain erroneous and unsupported by any sources, let alone Carnap himself. Brews ohare (talk) 02:16, 6 June 2013 (UTC)
Exactly, your selection supported by a string of quotations. You will be consistently ignored by many editors until you get your mind around this ----Snowded TALK 06:32, 6 June 2013 (UTC)

I have no further expectations for this proposal, as I have already said. What disturbs me more is that you, Snowded, will not participate in helping Bob correct obvious deficiencies in his paragraph. Brews ohare (talk) 12:21, 6 June 2013 (UTC)

Although I haven't responded so far to your more recent comments on these issues, I've been working outside this discussion on a response to them. Looks like your points have been spread between two sections. It would be helpful if you consolidated your points in one place. --Bob K31416 (talk) 13:21, 6 June 2013 (UTC)
Bob: I am glad to hear this. Brews ohare (talk) 13:30, 6 June 2013 (UTC)
May I suggest that you move your appropriate comments that are here to the section "Finished draft from Bob K31416"? --Bob K31416 (talk) 13:32, 6 June 2013 (UTC)
Yes, Bob, of course. Brews ohare (talk) 14:01, 6 June 2013 (UTC)
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