Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

See also: United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231

Not to be confused with Comprehensive Plan of Action.

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
Officials announcing the agreement
Created	14 July 2015
Ratified	N/A (ratification not required)
Date effective	18 October 2015 (adoption) 16 January 2016 (implementation)
Location	Vienna, Austria
Signatories	Current China France Germany Iran Russia United Kingdom European Union Withdrawn United States (2018)
Purpose	Nuclear non-proliferation

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA; Persian: برنامه جامع اقدام مشترک, romanized: barnāmeye jāme'e eqdāme moshtarak (برجام, BARJAM)), commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal or Iran deal, is an agreement to limit the Iranian nuclear program. The agreement was reached in Vienna on 14 July 2015, between Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations S.C.—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, U.S.—plus Germany) together with the European Union.

Formal negotiations began with the adoption of the Joint Plan of Action, an interim agreement signed between Iran and the P5+1 countries in November 2013. Iran and the P5+1 countries engaged in negotiations for the next 20 months and, in April 2015, agreed on an "Iran nuclear deal framework" for the final agreement. In July 2015, Iran and the P5+1 confirmed agreement on the plan, along with the "Roadmap Agreement" between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The negotiations centered around imposing restrictions on Iran's nuclear facilities, including the Arak IR-40 reactor, Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, Gachin Uranium Mine, Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, Isfahan Uranium Conversion Plant, Natanz Uranium Enrichment Plant, and the Parchin Military Research complex.

The agreement was formally activated on 20 January 2014. It was criticized and opposed in the U.S., Israel, Saudi Arabia, and by Iranian principlists.

The U.S. withdrew from the pact in 2018 and sanctions were imposed under the policy of "maximum pressure". The sanctions applied to all countries and companies doing business with Iran and cut it off from the international financial system, rendering the nuclear deal's economic provisions null.

Timeline

The agreement included a series of provisions describing actions that Iran would undertake for specified periods of time. Iran agreed to eliminate its stockpile of medium-enriched uranium, cut its stockpile of low-enriched uranium by 98%, and reduce by about two-thirds the number of its gas centrifuges for 13 years. For the next 15 years, Iran agreed to enrich uranium only up to 3.67%. Iran agreed not to build heavy-water facilities in the same period. Uranium-enrichment activities would be limited to a single facility using first-generation centrifuges for 10 years. Other facilities would be converted to avoid proliferation risks. The IAEA would have regular access to all Iranian nuclear facilities to monitor compliance.

In return for verifiably abiding by those provisions, Iran would receive relief from U.S., European Union, and United Nations S.C. nuclear-related sanctions.

The JCPOA forms part of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231. The Security Council (S.C.) enacted it on 20 July 2015 and adopted it on 18 October. It took effect on 16 January 2016. The JCPOA was to remain in effect for eight years or until receipt by the S.C. of an IAEA report stating that IAEA had reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remained in peaceful activities, and terminates ten years from Adoption Day.

On 12 October 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that the U.S. would not make the certification provided for under U.S. domestic law, but stopped short of terminating the deal.

In 2018, IAEA inspectors spent an aggregate of 3,000 calendar days in Iran, installing seals and collecting surveillance camera photos, measurement data, and documents for further analysis. In March 2018, IAEA Director Yukiya Amano said that the organization had verified that Iran was implementing its nuclear-related commitments. On April 30, the U.S. and Israel said that Iran had not disclosed a past covert nuclear weapons program to the IAEA, as required.

On 8 May 2018, Trump announced the U.S. withdrawal from JCPOA, pledging to negotiate a better deal (which did not happen).

Following the U.S. withdrawal, the E.U. enacted an updated blocking statute on 7 August 2018 to defeat U.S. sanctions on countries trading with Iran. In November 2018, U.S. sanctions came back into effect, intended to force Iran to alter its policies, including its support for militant groups in the region and its development of ballistic missiles.

In May 2019, the IAEA certified that Iran was abiding by the main terms, though questions were raised about how many advanced centrifuges Iran was allowed to have, as that was only loosely defined in the deal.

On 1 July 2019, Iran announced that it had breached the limit set on its stockpile of low-enriched uranium, which the IAEA confirmed.

On 5 January 2020, in the aftermath of the airstrike that targeted and killed Iranian general Qasem Soleimani, Iran declared that it would no longer abide by the deal's limitations but would continue to coordinate with the IAEA, leaving open the possibility of resuming compliance. In December 2020, Iranian officials expressed further willingness to rejoin the deal, provided that U.S. officials did the same and made assurances regarding lifting sanctions.

Background

See also: Nuclear program of Iran and Nuclear proliferation

Nuclear technology

A fission-based "atomic" nuclear weapon uses a fissile material to cause a nuclear chain reaction. The most commonly used materials are uranium 235 (²³⁵
U) and plutonium 239 (²³⁹
Pu). Both uranium 233 (²³³
U) and reactor-grade plutonium have also been used. The amount of uranium or plutonium needed depends on the sophistication of the design, with a simple design requiring approximately 15 kg of uranium or 6 kg of plutonium and a sophisticated design requiring as little as 9 kg of uranium or 2 kg of plutonium. Plutonium is almost nonexistent in nature, and natural uranium is about 99.3% uranium 238 (²³⁸
U) and 0.7% ²³⁵
U. Therefore, to make a weapon, either uranium must be enriched or plutonium must be produced. Uranium enrichment is required for nuclear power, although not to the same degree. For this reason, uranium enrichment is a dual-use technology suitable for both civilian and military purposes. Key strategies to prevent proliferation of nuclear arms include limiting the number of operating uranium enrichment plants and controlling the export of nuclear technology and fissile material.

Iranian nuclear activity, conflict with IAEA and Western countries, 1970–2006

See also: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons § Iran

Iranian development of nuclear technology began in the 1970s, when the U.S. Atoms for Peace program began providing assistance to Iran, then led by the Shah. Iran ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970.

In 1979 the Iranian Revolution deposed the Shah. Iran's nuclear program fell into disarray as "much of Iran's nuclear talent fled the country in the wake of the Revolution". Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, initially opposed nuclear technology.

In the late 1980s Iran reinstated its nuclear program, with assistance from China (which entered into a bilateral agreement with Iran in 1990), Pakistan (which did the same in 1992), and Russia (which did the same in 1992 and 1995), and from the A.Q. Khan network. Iran "began pursuing an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle capability by developing a uranium mining infrastructure and experimenting with uranium conversion and enrichment".

In August 2002 the Paris-based National Council of Resistance of Iran, an Iranian dissident group, publicly revealed the existence of two undeclared nuclear facilities, the Arak heavy-water production facility and the Natanz enrichment facility. In February 2003 Iranian President Mohammad Khatami acknowledged the existence of the facilities and asserted that Iran had undertaken "small-scale enrichment experiments" to produce low-enriched uranium for power plants. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors visited Natanz. In May 2003 Iran allowed IAEA inspectors to visit the Kalaye Electric Company, but refused to allow them to take samples.

In June 2003, an IAEA report concluded that Iran had failed to meet its obligations under the safeguards agreement, and Iran, faced with the prospect of being referred to the U.N. S.C., entered into negotiations with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (the E.U. 3). The U.S. took no part in these negotiations. In October 2003 the Tehran Declaration was reached between Iran and the E.U. 3. Iran agreed to cooperate fully with the IAEA, sign the Additional Protocol, and temporarily suspend all uranium enrichment. In September and October 2003 the IAEA inspected several facilities. This was followed by the Paris Agreement in November 2004, in which Iran agreed to temporarily suspend enrichment and conversion activities, "including the manufacture, installation, testing, and operation of centrifuges, and committed to working with the EU-3 to find a mutually beneficial long-term diplomatic solution".

In August 2005, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad accused the Iranian negotiators of treason. Over the next two months, the E.U. 3 agreement fell apart as talks over the Long Term Agreement broke down; the Iranian government "felt that the proposal was heavy on demands, light on incentives, did not incorporate Iran's proposals, and violated the Paris Agreement". Iran notified the IAEA that it would resume enrichment at Esfahan.

In February 2006 Iran ended its implementation of the Additional Protocol and resumed enrichment at Natanz, prompting the IAEA to refer Iran to the S.C.. After the vote, Iran announced it would resume enrichment. In April 2006 Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had nuclear technology for power generation, not weapons. In June 2006 the E.U. 3 joined China, Russia, and the U.S., to form the P5+1. That July, the S.C. passed its first resolution (nr. 1696), demanding Iran stop uranium enrichment and processing. S.C. resolution 1737 followed in December; followed by others. The legal authority for the IAEA referral and the S.C. resolutions derived from the IAEA Statute and the United Nations Charter. The resolutions demanded that Iran cease enrichment activities, and imposed sanctions, including bans on the transfer of nuclear and missile technology to the country and freezes on the assets of certain Iranian individuals and entities, in order to pressure the country.

In July 2006, Iran opened the Arak heavy water production plant, which led to a S.C. resolution.

Conflict between Iran and western countries, 2007–2015

Four more S.C. resolutions followed: 1747 (March 2007), 1803 (March 2008), 1835 (September 2008), and 1929 (June 2010). In Resolution 1803 and elsewhere the S.C. acknowledged Iran's rights under Article IV of the NPT, which provides for "the inalienable right... to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes".

In a February 2007 interview with the Financial Times, IAEA director-general Mohamed ElBaradei said that military action against Iran "would be catastrophic, counterproductive" and called for negotiations. ElBaradei specifically proposed a "double, simultaneous suspension, a time out" as "a confidence-building measure", under which sanctions and enrichment would be suspended. ElBaradei also said, "if I look at it from a weapons perspective there are much more important issues to me than the suspension of [enrichment]," naming his top priorities as preventing Iran from "go[ing] to industrial capacity until the issues are settled"; building confidence, with "full inspection" involving Iranian adoption of the Additional Protocol; and "at all costs" preventing Iran from "moving out of the [treaty-based non-proliferation] system".

A November 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate assessed that Iran "halted its nuclear weapons program" in 2003; that estimate and subsequent U.S. Intelligence Community statements assessed that the Iranian government at the time was "keeping open the 'option' to develop nuclear weapons".

In September 2009 U.S. President Barack Obama revealed the existence of an underground enrichment facility in Fordow, near Qom, saying, "Iran's decision to build yet another nuclear facility without notifying the IAEA represents a direct challenge to the basic compact at the center of the non-proliferation regime." Israel threatened to take military action.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry shakes hands with Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif after the P5+1 and Iran concluded negotiations about Iran's nuclear capabilities on November 24, 2013

In March 2013 the U.S. and Iran began talks in Oman, led by William J. Burns and Jake Sullivan on the American side and Ali Asghar Khaji on the Iranian side. In June 2013 Hassan Rouhani was elected president of Iran. Rouhani was described as "more moderate, pragmatic and willing to negotiate than Ahmadinejad". In a 2006 negotiation with European powers, Rouhani said that Iran had used the negotiations to dupe the Europeans, saying that during the negotiations, Iran mastered the conversion of uranium yellowcake at Isfahan. Yellowcake conversion is an important step. In August 2013, three days after his inauguration, Rouhani called for negotiations with the P5+1. In September 2013 Obama and Rouhani spoke by telephone, the first high-level contact between U.S. and Iranian leaders since 1979, and Secretary of State John Kerry met with Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, signaling openness to cooperation. Former officials alleged that, in order to advance the deal, the Obama administration shielded Hezbollah from the Central Intelligence Agency and from the Drug Enforcement Administration's Project Cassandra investigation regarding drug smuggling. As a result of the Politico report, Attorney General Jeff Sessions ordered an investigation.

On 24 November 2013, after several rounds of negotiations, the Joint Plan of Action, an interim agreement on the Iranian nuclear program, was signed between Iran and the P5+1 countries in Geneva, Switzerland. It consisted of a short-term nuclear program freeze in exchange for decreased economic sanctions. The IAEA began "more intrusive and frequent inspections" under this interim agreement. The agreement was formally activated on 20 January 2014. That day, the IAEA issued a report stating that Iran was adhering to the terms of the interim agreement, including stopping enrichment of uranium to 20%, beginning the dilution process (to reduce half of the stockpile of 20% enriched uranium to 3.5%), and halting work on the Arak heavy-water reactor.

A major focus of the negotiations was limitations on Iran's key nuclear facilities: the Arak IR-40 heavy water reactor and production plant (which was under construction, but never became operational, as Iran agreed as part of the November 2013 Joint Plan of Action (interim agreement) not to commission or fuel the reactor); the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant; the Gachin uranium mine; the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant; the Isfahan uranium-conversion plant; the Natanz uranium enrichment plant; and the Parchin military research and development complex.

In 2015, the U.S. enacted the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015. It passed the Senate by a 98–1 vote and the House by a 400–25 vote, and was signed by President Obama on 22 May 2015. Under the Act, once a nuclear agreement was negotiated with Iran, Congress had 60 days in which to pass a resolution of approval, a resolution of disapproval, or do nothing. The Act included time beyond the 60 days for the president to veto a resolution and for Congress to vote on whether to override the veto. Congress could invalidate the deal only if two-thirds of both houses overrode an expected veto by Obama of any resolution of disapproval.

A July 2015 Congressional Research Service report said, "statements from the U.S. intelligence community indicate that Iran has the technological and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons at some point, but the U.S. government assesses that Tehran has not mastered all of the necessary technologies for building a nuclear weapon."

Negotiations (2013–2015)

Main article: Negotiations leading to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

Foreign Ministers from the P5+1 nations, the European Union, and Iran in Vienna, Austria, on November 24, 2014

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was the culmination of 20 months of negotiations.

The parties agreed to extend their talks, with a first extension deadline of 24 November 2014 and a second extension deadline of 1 July 2015.

A framework was agreed on 2 April 2015 at Lausanne. Under this framework Iran tentatively agreed to accept restrictions, all of which would last for a decade or longer, and to submit to increased inspections. Marathon negotiations continued, ending in Vienna at the Palais Coburg after 17 days. On 14 July 2015, all parties agreed.

The agreement's complexity reflects the impact of a public letter written by a bipartisan group of 19 U.S. diplomats, experts, and others in June 2015, written while negotiations were ongoing. The letter outlined concerns about several provisions in the then-unfinished agreement and called for a number of improvements to strengthen the prospective agreement and win their support for it. After the agreement was reached, one of the early negotiators, Robert J. Einhorn, a former U.S. Department of State official later at the Brookings Institution, said of the agreement: "Analysts will be pleasantly surprised. The more things are agreed to, the less opportunity there is for implementation difficulties later on."

An analysis by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace claimed that the final agreement was based upon (and buttresses) "the rules-based nonproliferation regime created by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and including especially the IAEA safeguards system".

Participants

According to U.S. State Department Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs Julia Frifield, "The JCPOA is not a treaty or an executive agreement, and is not a signed document. The JCPOA reflects political commitments between Iran, the P5+1, and the EU."

Souvenir signatures of lead negotiators on the cover page of the JCPOA document. The Persian handwriting on top left side is a homage by Javad Zarif to his counterparts' efforts in the negotiations: "[I am] Sincere to Mr. Abbas [Araghchi] and Mr. Majid [Takht-Ravanchi]."

• 
  
  China
  Wang Yi, Foreign Minister
• 
  
  France
  Laurent Fabius, Foreign Minister
• 
  
  Germany
  Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Minister of Foreign Affairs
• 
  
  European Union
  Federica Mogherini, High Representative
• 
  
  Iran
  Mohammad Javad Zarif, Minister of Foreign Affairs
• 
  
  Russia
  Sergey Lavrov, Foreign Minister
• 
  
  United Kingdom
  Philip Hammond, Foreign Secretary
• 
  
  U.S.
  John Kerry, Secretary of State

Provisions

See also: Criticism of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) covered 109 pages, including five annexes. The major provisions are:

Nuclear

Enrichment-related provisions

Capability	Before JCPOA	After JCPOA (for 10-year period)	After 15 years
First-generation centrifuges installed	19,138	capped at 6,104	Unconstrained
Advanced centrifuges installed	1,008	0
Centrifuge R&D	Unconstrained	Constrained
Stockpile of low-enriched uranium	7,154 kg	300 kg
Stockpile of medium-enriched uranium	196 kg	0 kg
The physical limits phase out over 10 to 15 years

Stocks

Over 15 years, Iran would reduce its stockpile of low-enriched uranium by 97%, from 10,000 kg to 300 kg, and limit enrichment to 3.67%, sufficient for civilian nuclear power and research, but not for weaponry. This represented a "major decline" in Iran's nuclear activity. Iran had produced stockpiles near 20% (medium-enriched uranium). Stocks in excess of 300 kg enriched up to 3.67% would be diluted to 0.7% or sold in return for uranium ore, while uranium enriched to between 5% and 20% was to be fabricated into fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor or sold or diluted to 3.67%. P5+1 agreed to facilitate commercial contracts.

After 15 years, all limits on enrichment would be removed, including limits on the type and number of centrifuges, Iran's stocks of enriched uranium, and enrichment sites. According to Belfer, at this point Iran could "expand its nuclear program to create more practical overt and covert nuclear weapons options".

Centrifuges

Iran initially possessed centrifuges sufficient for one nuclear weapon, but not for nuclear power. Over ten years, Iran would secure over two-thirds of its centrifuges in storage, reducing active units to 6,104 centrifuges, with only 5,060 allowed to enrich uranium. Enrichment would be restricted to the Natanz plant. The centrifuges there were limited to IR-1 centrifuges, Iran's oldest and least efficient; Iran would warehouse its advanced IR-2M centrifuges during this period. Non-operating centrifuges would be stored in Natanz and monitored by IAEA, but could be used to replace failed centrifuges. Iran agreed to build no enrichment facilities for 15 years.

Research

Iran could continue research and development work on enrichment only at the Natanz facility and had to respect specific limitations for eight years. The intent was to maintain a one-year breakout interval.

Reactors

With cooperation from the "Working Group" (the P5+1 and possibly other countries), Iran was permitted to modernize the Arak heavy water research reactor based on an agreed design. Arak was to be limited to 20 MWt to support allowed research and production, while minimizing plutonium production and avoiding weapons-grade plutonium. Spent fuel was to be sent out of the country. All heavy water beyond Iran's reactor needs was to be exportable. In exchange, Iran imported 130 tonnes of uranium ore in 2015 and in late 2016 was approved to import 130 tonnes in 2017. For 15 years Iran agreed not to research or engage in spent fuel reprocessing, build additional heavy-water reactors, or accumulate heavy water.

Fordow would stop researching and enriching uranium for at least 15 years. The facility was to be converted into a nuclear physics and technology center. For 15 years Fordow would maintain no more than 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges in six cascades in one wing. Two of the six cascades would be transitioned for stable radioisotope production for medical, agricultural, industrial, and scientific use. The other four would remain idle. Iran agreed to keep no fissile material there.

An Additional Protocol extended the monitoring and verification provisions for as long as Iran remained a party to the NPT.

Inspections

A comprehensive inspections regime would monitor and confirm Iranian compliance.

The IAEA was to have multilayered oversight "over Iran's entire nuclear supply chain, from uranium mills to its procurement of nuclear-related technologies". For sites such as Fordow and Natanz, the IAEA was to have 24-hour access to nuclear facilities and to maintain continuous monitoring (including via surveillance equipment). The agreement authorized the IAEA to use sophisticated monitoring technology, such as fiber-optic equipment seals that could send the IAEA information; satellite imagery to detect covert sites; sensors to detect minute nuclear specimens; and tamper- and radiation-resistant cameras. Other tools included software to gather information and detect anomalies, and datasets on imports. The number of inspectors tripled to 150.

Inspectors could request access, informing Iran of the basis of the request, to verify the absence of prohibited activities and nuclear materials. The inspectors were to come only from countries with which Iran had diplomatic relations. Iran could either allow the inspection or propose alternatives that satisfied the IAEA's concerns. If the inspectors were not satisfied, a 24-day process would ensue. Iran and the IAEA were to have 14 days to reach agreement. For the following week a majority of the Commission could require Iran to take specific actions within three more days. This allowed the U.S. and its allies to insist on responses that Iran, Russia or China could not veto. After three days of non-compliance, sanctions would be automatically reimposed.

Breakout

These provisions were intended to extend the "breakout time"—the interval during which Iran could prepare enough material for a single nuclear weapon—from two to three months to one year. Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation supported these estimates. By contrast, Alan J. Kuperman, coordinator of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project at University of Texas at Austin, disagreed, arguing that the breakout time would be only three months.

After ten years or more, the breakout time would gradually decrease. By the 15th year, U.S. officials said the breakout time would return to the status quo ante of a few months. The Belfer Center report stated: "Some contributors to this report believe that breakout time by year 15 could be comparable to what it is today—a few months—while others believe it could be reduced to a few weeks."

Exemptions

Iran was granted exemptions prior to 16 January 2016. Their reported purpose was to enable sanctions relief and other benefits to start by that date. The exemptions allowed Iran to:

• exceed the 300 kg of 3.5% LEU limit;
• exceed the zero kg of 20% LEU limit;
• keep operating 19 "hot cells" that exceed the size limit;
• maintain control of 50 tonnes of heavy water that exceeded the 130-tonne limit by storing the excess at an Iran-controlled facility in Oman.

Sanctions

Further information: Sanctions against Iran

Iran had to submit a full report on its nuclear history before it could receive any sanctions relief. At the time of the agreement, Iran was subject to a variety of sanctions imposed by an array of organizations. Once IAEA verified compliance with the nuclear-related measures, U.N. sanctions would terminate. Some E.U. sanctions would terminate and some would suspend. That would allow Iran to recover approximately $100 billion of its assets frozen in overseas banks. No U.N. or E.U. nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures were to be imposed.

Additional E.U. sanctions would be lifted after eight years of compliance, including some on the Revolutionary Guards.

The U.S. agreed to suspend its nuclear-related secondary sanctions. This was not tied to a date or compliance but was expected to occur "roughly in the first half of 2016". Some sanctions would continue: those on conventional weapon sales for five years; those on ballistic missile technologies for eight. But sanctions related to human rights, missiles, and support for terrorism remained in effect. Many U.S. sanctions apply worldwide; E.U. sanctions apply only in Europe.

Snapback

Any of the P5+1 could invoke a "snapback" provision, under which sanctions would be reimposed. Snapback sanctions would not apply retroactively to previously allowed contracts.

Dispute resolution

Any party could refer allegations of non-compliance to the Joint Commission monitoring body. Complaints by a non-Iran party that were not resolved to the complainant's satisfaction within 35 days would allow the complainant to cease performing its commitments, notify the S.C., or both. The S.C. would then have 30 days to adopt a resolution to continue the sanctions relief. Absent such a resolution, nuclear-related U.N. sanctions would automatically be reimposed. Iran said it would then cease performing its nuclear obligations. This would allow any permanent S.C. member (U.S., United Kingdom, China, Russia or France) to veto sanctions relief.

This procedure implied that the U.S., U.K., or France could reinstitute sanctions if it concluded that Iran was non-compliant, though since that might cause Iran to withdraw from the agreement, they might be reluctant to do so.

Expiration

After 15 years, many provisions of the JCPOA would expire, including most enrichment provisions.

International reaction

Main article: Reactions to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

Pictured here, Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry shaking hands at the end of negotiations on 14 July 2015, Vienna. They shook hands on 26 September 2013 in the United Nations Headquarters for the first time.

The JCPOA received a mixed international reaction. Many countries expressed hope that it could achieve its goals, while Iranian adversaries in the Middle East, including Israel and Saudi Arabia, and some U.S. lawmakers saw it as defective and appeasing Iran.

Unique elements

JCPOA was the first of its kind in the annals of non-proliferation. The 159-page JCPOA document and its five appendices is the longest text of a multinational agreement since World War II, according to BBC Persian.

It was the first time that the S.C. had recognized a developing country's nuclear enrichment program and backed a multinational agreement within the framework of a resolution (2231). For the first time in U.N. history, a country—Iran—was able to rid itself of 6 U.N. resolutions—1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, 1929—without abiding by them for a single day. Sanctions against Iran were lifted for the first time.

Iran was the first country subject to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter that ended its case by diplomacy. All other cases ended by regime change, war, or acquiescence.

Gary Sick said that during the history of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), no country other than Iran had ever voluntarily agreed to such restrictions.

John Kerry with Hossein Fereydoun, the brother of 7th President of Iran Hassan Rouhani and Mohammad Javad Zarif during the announcement of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

During the final negotiations, Kerry stayed in Vienna for 17 days, the longest interval a Cabinet official had devoted to a single international negotiation in more than four decades. Zarif broke the record for an Iranian Foreign Minister staying far from home with an 18-day stay in Vienna, and set the record of 106 days of negotiations over 687 days, more than any other chief nuclear negotiator in 12 years. The negotiations became the longest continuous negotiations with the presence of all five foreign ministers of the permanent S.C. members.

The negotiations included "rare events" in Iran–U.S. relations over their entire history. Kerry and Zarif met on 18 different dates—sometimes more than once per day—and in 11 different cities. On 27 April 2015, Kerry visited the official residence of the Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations to meet his counterpart. The encounter was the first since the Iran hostage crisis. On the sidelines of the 70th session of the United Nations General Assembly, President Obama shook hands with Zarif, the first such greeting in history. The event was unique in the form of diplomatic ranks, as a head of state shook hands with a minister. Obama said, "Too much effort has been put into the JCPOA and we all should be diligent to implement it."

Process

Incorporation into international law by the Security Council

Main article: United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231

The S.C. formally endorsed the agreement on 20 July 2015.

On 15 July, the American ambassador to the UN, Samantha Power, circulated a 14-page draft to Council members. On 20 July, the S.C. unanimously approved resolution 2231 by a 15–0 vote. The resolution delayed implementation for 90 days to allow for U.S. Congressional consideration under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015.

Speaking immediately after the vote, Power told the S.C. that sanctions relief would start only when Iran "verifiably" met its obligations. Power also called upon Iran "to immediately release all unjustly detained Americans", specifically naming Amir Hekmati, Saeed Abedini, and Jason Rezaian, who were detained at the time, and Robert A. Levinson, who had been missing in the country. Hekmati, Abedini, and Rezaian were released in a January 2016 prisoner exchange, which Kerry said the nuclear agreement had accelerated.

European Union

On the same day that the S.C. approved its resolution, the E.U. formally approved the JCPOA via a vote of the E.U. Foreign Affairs Council (the group of E.U. foreign ministers) meeting in Brussels. This set into motion the lifting of certain E.U. sanctions, including those prohibiting the purchase of Iranian oil. The E.U. continued its sanctions relating to human rights and prohibiting the export of ballistic missile technology.

Review period in the U.S. Congress

See also: Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015

Secretary of State John Kerry, Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz, and Secretary of the Treasury Jack Lew defending the JCPOA at a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 23 July 2015

The agreement's legal status in the U.S. was disputed. Under U.S. law, the JCPOA is a non-binding political commitment. According to the State Department, it specifically is not an executive agreement nor a treaty (as defined in U.S. law). In contrast to treaties, which require two-thirds of the Senate to consent to ratification, executive commitments require no Congressional approval and are not legally binding as a matter of domestic law, but in some cases they may be considered such and bind the U.S. under international law.

On 19 July 2015, the State Department officially transmitted the JCPOA to Congress. The referral included the Unclassified Verification Assessment Report on the JCPOA and the Intelligence Community's Classified Annex to the Verification Assessment Report. The 60-day review period began on 20 July and ended on 17 September. A resolution of disapproval was brought to the Senate floor but failed. A resolution of approval was brought to the House floor, and also failed. As a result, the agreement went into effect after the congressional review period.

Congress and the administration

Obama repeatedly urged Congress to support the agreement, noting the inspections regime's vigor and criticizing opponents for failing to offer a viable alternative. Vice President Joe Biden met with Senate Foreign Relations Committee Democrats, seeking their support.

Republicans generally rejected the deal. Cruz said that under the agreement "the Obama administration will become the financier of terrorism against America in the world." Former Governor Mike Huckabee of Arkansas, a candidate for the 2016 Republican presidential nomination, called Obama "naive". Obama cited the support of Democrats typically associated with strong defense backgrounds, saying, "This is a deal that has been endorsed by people like Brent Scowcroft and Sam Nunn... historic Democratic and Republican leaders on arms control and on keeping Aerica safe.".

Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell promised that Republicans would discuss the agreement respectfully in September. Democrat Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer distinguished the nuclear and non-nuclear aspects. His conclusion was: "when it comes to the nuclear aspects of the agreement within ten years, we might be slightly better off with it. However, when it comes to the nuclear aspects after ten years and the non-nuclear aspects, we would be better off without it."

Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said that JCPOA "puts U.S. in a far better place in terms of insight and access" than no agreement.

Public discussion

The discussion extended to the wider public. Major campaign donors took sides, with opponents (Sheldon Adelson, Paul Singer, and Haim Saban) outspending supporters (Ploughshares Fund, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, George Soros, S. Daniel Abraham, Tim Gill, Norman Lear, Margery Tabankin, and Arnold Hiatt) by millions of dollars.

Some groups welcomed the JCPOA, such as the National Iranian American Council (NIAC), and Iranian American Bar Association.

Public letters of support abounded (often bipartisan):

• 73 Middle East and foreign affairs scholars supported the deal. Signatories included John Esposito, Ehsan Yarshater, Noam Chomsky, Peter Beinart, John Mearsheimer, and Stephen Walt.
• More than 100 former U.S. ambassadors and senior State Department officials. Signatories included Daniel C. Kurtzer, James R. Jones, Frank E. Loy, Princeton N. Lyman, Jack F. Matlock Jr., Donald F. McHenry, Thomas E. McNamara, and Thomas R. Pickering.

• Five former U.S. ambassadors to Israel and three former Under Secretaries of State: R. Nicholas Burns, James B. Cunningham, William C. Harrop, Daniel Kurtzer, Thomas R. Pickering, Edward S. Walker Jr., and Frank G. Wisner.
• 60 national-security leaders. Republican signatories included Paul O'Neill, Carla Anderson Hills, William Perry, and Nancy Landon Kassebaum. Democrats included Madeleine Albright, George J. Mitchell, Tom Daschle, Carl Levin. Others included Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft, R. Nicholas Burns, Thomas R. Pickering; Ryan Crocker, Stuart Eizenstat; Eric T. Olson, Michele Flournoy, and Robert Einhorn.
• 29 U.S. scientists, mostly physicists, many of whom had held Q clearances and been longtime government advisers. The five primary authors were Richard L. Garwin, Robert J. Goldston, R. Scott Kemp, Rush D. Holt, and Frank N. von Hippel. Six Nobel Prize in Physics laureates co-signed the letter: Philip W. Anderson, Leon N. Cooper, Sheldon L. Glashow, David Gross, Burton Richter, and Frank Wilczek. Other scientists included Siegfried S. Hecker, Freeman Dyson, and Sidney Drell.
• 36 retired military generals and admirals. Signatories included James E. "Hoss" Cartwright, Joseph P. Hoar, Merrill McPeak, and Lloyd W. Newton, Robert G. Gard Jr., Claudia J. Kennedy,; Lee F. Gunn, Garland Wright, Joseph Sestak, and Paul D. Eaton.
• 75 arms control and nuclear nonproliferation experts. Signers included Valerie Plame, Joseph C. Wilson, Hans Blix; Morton H. Halperin; and experts from the Brookings Institution, Stimson Center, and other think tanks.
• 26 Jewish leaders supported the deal; signers included three former chairs of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations as well as former AIPAC executive director Tom Dine.
• 340 rabbis organized by Ameinu. Signers included Sharon Brous, Burton Visotzky, Nina Beth Cardin, Lawrence Kushner, Sharon Kleinbaum, and Amy Eilberg.
• 11 Democratic Jewish former members of Congress. Signatories included Levin, Barney Frank, Mel Levine, Steve Rothman, and Robert Wexler.

Public letters from opponents included:

• 200 retired generals and admirals. Signers included Leon A. "Bud" Edney, James A. Lyons, William G. Boykin, and Thomas McInerney.

U.S. pro-Israel lobby groups were divided. American Israel Public Affairs Committee spent millions opposing it. J Street came out in support, and planned a $5 million advertising effort. In the first week of August J Street launched a $2 million, three-week ad campaign in support of the agreement, with TV ads in Colorado, Maryland, Michigan, Oregon, and Pennsylvania.

Leaders of the Reform Jewish movement stayed neutral.

Conversely, in late August a group of 900 rabbis signed an open letter by Kalman Topp and Yonah Bookstein calling upon Congress to reject the agreement. The Orthodox Union and American Jewish Committee also announced opposition to the agreement.

Anti-JCPOA bus advertisement in New York City. The bus ad was sponsored by New York Assemblyman Dov Hikind, an opponent of the agreement.

United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) opposed the deal, although the group's president and co-founder, nonproliferation expert Gary Samore, disagreed. Foundation for American Security and Freedom and Veterans Against the Deal ran opposing ads.

Supporters included MoveOn.org, Americans United for Change, and Global Zero. Iran Project, and the United Nations Association of the U.S.supported the agreement. Colin Powell expressed support.

Retired U.S. Senators Carl Levin and John Warner published a supporting op-ed. Retired Republican Richard Lugar and Democrat J. Bennett Johnston wrote in support of the agreement.

Foreign diplomats joined the debate. Israeli ambassador to the U.S. Ron Dermer was an opponent. European ambassadors including Sir Peter Westmacott supported it.

The Roman Catholic Church expressed support, led by Bishop Oscar Cantú.

Michael Mandelbaum claimed that nonproliferation ultimately depended on deterrence, not agreements. Alan Dershowitz claimed that the involvement of Russia and China made the deal irrelevant.

Committee hearings

A Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing took place on 23 July. Kerry, Treasury Secretary Jack Lew, and Moniz testified. Chair Bob Corker said the agreement codified rather than dismantled the Iranian program. Ranking member Benjamin Cardin remained neutral. Other Democrats, led by Barbara Boxer, expressed support. Corker and Cardin requested to review the IAEA-Iran document. Kerry, Lew, and Moniz said that without JCPOA, international sanctions would collapse. Republican senators gave vociferous speeches denouncing the deal.

The three also testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Republican Committee chair Ed Royce claimed that the deal traded permanent sanctions relief for temporary restrictions and criticized the inspection regime. Ranking member Eliot Engel was not in support.

Senators John McCain (Republican of Arizona), the committee chair, and Jack Reed (Democrat of Rhode Island), the committee ranking member, at a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee on the JCPOA, 29 July 2015.

Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, General Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Kerry, Moniz, and Lew appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Carter and Dempsey had been invited to testify by Republican Chair John McCain, who opposed the deal. Ranking member Jack Reed stressed the need to independently validate the deal.

Carter assured the committee that the U.S. could employ military force if needed and that he did not expect other Iranian misbehavior to stop, another reason to limit its nuclear program. Dempsey testified that the agreement reduced the chances of a near-term military conflict.

IAEA has confidential technical arrangements with many countries. Some Republican lawmakers called such agreements "secret side deals" that restructured the deal. Cruz introduced an unsuccessful resolution seeking a delay in the review period, arguing that the review period should begin upon receipt of all relevant documents.

State Department spokesman John Kirby responded the P5+1 had been fully briefed and that related questions could be addressed in a classified setting. Various experts lined up on both sides of the controversy.

Congressional reactions

The Washington Post listed 12 issues raised by U.S. senators including Corker, Bob Menendez, Jim Risch, Marco Rubio, and Ron Johnson, including the efficacy of inspections at undeclared sites; the effectiveness of the snapback sanctions; the significance of limits on enrichment; the significance of IAEA side agreements; the effectiveness of inspections of military sites; the consequences of walking away from an agreement; and the effects of lifting sanctions.

Republican leaders vowed to kill the agreement.

One area of disagreement was the consequences of walking away, and whether renegotiation was a realistic option. Schumer, an opponent, called for retaining and strengthening sanctions, and to continue negotiating. President Obama argued that renegotiation was unrealistic, that the Iranian people would see further concessions as "total surrender of their sovereignty", and that other countries would not continue to support the existing sanctions regime. Senator Al Franken accepted the claim that no better deal was feasible. Representative Sander M. Levin announced his support. Senator Cardin said that if the agreement were implemented, the U.S. should increase military aid to Israel and friendly Gulf states. Senator Bill Nelson and Foreign Relations Committee members Tim Kaine and Barbara Boxer announced their support.

The Associated Press reported that the classified U.S. Intelligence Community assessment concluded the agreed inspection regime would diminish Iran's ability to conceal a covert weapons program. Ten active and former Democratic members of the House Select Committee on Intelligence (including Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi and Intelligence Committee ranking member Adam Schiff) cited this assessment, which was available for members of Congress to read, as a reason to support the agreement.

Congressional votes

A resolution of disapproval was initially expected to pass both the House and Senate.

Two-thirds of both houses are required to override a presidential veto. On 20 August 2015, Pelosi claimed that House Democrats had the votes to sustain a veto of a resolution of disapproval. By 20 August, about 60 House Democrats had announced their support, versus about 12 opponents.

By early September 2015, 34 senators had confirmed their support, ensuring that the Senate could sustain a veto. This proved to be moot, since by 8 September, all senators had announced their commitments, with 42 in support (40 Democrats and two independents) and 58 opposed (54 Republicans and four Democrats). Without 60 votes on either side, the other could filibuster any resolution. A key part of obtaining even limited support came during an August 2015 meeting at which top diplomats from the UK, Russia, China, Germany, and France told 10 undecided Democratic senators they had no intention of returning to negotiations.

Initially, the House leadership planned to vote on a resolution of disapproval. Speaker John Boehner instead chose to advance a resolution of approval to force Democratic supporters to formally register their views. On 11 September 2015 the resolution of approval failed on a 162–269 vote; 244 Republicans and 25 Democrats voted no, while 162 Democrats and no Republicans voted yes. The same day, Congress passed resolutions claiming that the requirements of a congressional review period were not met (by party-line vote) and that that would prevent the U.S. from lifting any sanctions (all Republicans and two Democrats in favor).

Iranian review

See also: Iran Nuclear Achievements Protection Act, Iranian Government's Reciprocal and Proportional Action in Implementing the JCPOA Act, and Majlis special commission for examining the JCPOA

Khamenei gave Rouhani guidelines for how to proceed. On 21 June 2015, the Iranian Parliament (Majlis) formed a committee to study the JCPOA and decided to wait at least 80 days before voting. Zarif and Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) chief Ali Akbar Salehi defended the deal in Parliament.

In televised remarks on 23 July 2015, Rouhani rejected domestic criticism by Iranian hardliners, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. He claimed a popular mandate to make an agreement based on his election in 2013 and said the alternative was suffering under continued sanctions. A two-page, top-secret directive from Iran's Supreme National Security Council instructed newspapers to avoid criticism or giving any impression of disagreement at the highest levels of government.

On 3 September, Khamenei said that the Majlis should make the final decision. The same day, Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani voiced his support. Former presidents Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami and moderates within parliament announced their support. Most prominent opposition leaders, including Mir-Hossein Mousavi, a 2009 presidential candidate under house arrest for his role as a leader of the Green Movement, also announced their support.

The anti-agreement coalition included former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, former head of AEOI Fereydoon Abbasi, ex-nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, and various conservative clerics and IRGC commanders. This group claimed that Iranian negotiators caved on many key issues and were outmaneuvered.

Anti-JCPOA representatives of Islamic Consultative Assembly protested Ali Akbar Saheli and made death threats toward him Iranian defense minister Hossein Dehqan said on 2 September that Iran would not allow the IAEA to visit every site or facility that it wishes.

The Majlis commission for examining the JCPOA invited Ali Shamkhani, as well as members of a former nuclear negotiation team including Ali Bagheri and Abbasi, to a hearing. During the session, ex-chief negotiator Saeed Jalili said that "approximately 100 absolute rights" of Iran had been conceded and that the deal turned Iran's right to adopt nuclear technology under the NPT into mere permission. He claimed that the deal violated the terms Khamenei set. Commission members Masoud Pezeshkian and Abbas Ali Mansouri Arani criticized Jalili's testimony. In another session, negotiators Abbas Araqchi and Majid Takht-Ravanchi defended the deal.

The leading reformist newspapers, Etemad and Shargh, supported the deal. The leading conservative papers, Ettelaat and Kayhan, criticized its terms.

Many Iranian dissidents, including Nobel Peace Prize laureate, human rights activist, and Iranian exile Shirin Ebadi and former political prisoner Akbar Ganji came out in support. Others opposed the agreement, including Ahmad Batebi, Nazanin Afshin-Jam, and Roozbeh Farahanipour.

On 13 October the Iranian Parliament approved the JCPOA supplemented by text unilaterally added by Iran and not agreed to by the P5+1, with 161 votes in favor, 59 against and 13 abstentions.

Adoption Day

On 18 October 2015 E.U. High Representative Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif jointly announced "Adoption Day".

On 20 September 2015, Director-General Yukiya Amano of the IAEA went to the Parchin missile production facility, along with Director of Safeguards Tero Varjoranta, to obtain clarifications on the site's nuclear activities. The next day, Amano professed satisfaction with the samples submitted by the Iranians to the IAEA. IAEA experts were not physically present during the sampling, but Amano said the procedure met "strict agency criteria". In June 2016, IAEA investigators reported that they had reported traces of uranium found at the Parchin facility in December 2015.

Implementation Day

Last meeting between diplomatic teams of Iran and the U.S., at the Palais Coburg Hotel in Vienna

After the IAEA certified that Iran had met the relevant JCPOA requirements, all nuclear sanctions were lifted by the UN, the E.U. and the U.S. on 16 January 2016, "Implementation Day".

That day Washington imposed sanctions on 11 companies and individuals for supplying Iran's ballistic missile program. According to Kerry, $1.7 billion in debt with interest was to be paid to Tehran. But some Iranian financial institutions, including Ansar Bank, Bank Saderat, Bank Saderat PLC, and Mehr Bank, remained on the SDN List and U.S. sanctions with respect to Iran, including existing terrorism, human rights and ballistic missiles-related sanctions, remained in effect.

Status in U.S. law

In a letter sent to then Representative Mike Pompeo, the State Department said that the JCPOA "is not a treaty or an executive agreement, and is not a signed document".

According to the Congressional Research Service, different definitions of "treaty" are used in international and U.S. law. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "The term 'treaty' has a broader meaning under international law than under domestic law. Under international law, 'treaty' refers to any binding international agreement. Under domestic U.S. law, 'treaty' signifies only those binding international agreements that have received the advice and consent of the Senate."

Deterrence

Michael Eisenstadt, Director of the Military and Security Studies Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, wrote that deterrence must remain the "core imperative" for U.S. policy. Einhorn wrote that maintaining a credible deterrent was essential.

Obama stated that the U.S. would continue its policy of deterring any Iranian efforts to develop nuclear weapons, including via military force. Flexibility meant that Obama rejected specifying "the penalties for smaller violations of the accord" in advance.

Dennis Ross and David Petraeus claimed that deterrence including military force was essential to preventing Iran from nuclear weapons and called on Obama to clearly state that policy.

Khamenei claimed that his fatwa and not JCPOA was the reason Iran would not acquire nuclear weapons.

U.S. withdrawal (2017–)

See also: Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, and Iran's 2018 lawsuit at ICJ against the United States

The U.S. certified in April 2017 and in July 2017 that Iran was complying with the deal.

On 13 October 2017 President Trump announced that he would not make the certification required under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, accusing Iran of violating the "spirit" of the deal and calling on the U.S. Congress and international partners to "address the deal's many serious flaws".

Trump left Congress to decide whether to reimpose sanctions. Trump's aides sought to enact rules indicating how the U.S. could reimpose sanctions. Trump listed three items that could provoke the U.S. to reject deal: intercontinental ballistic missile development, Iranian refusal to extend the constraint period, and evidence that Iran had reduced the time needed to manufacture a bomb to fewer than 12 months.

Rouhani said that exiting JCPOA would "carry a high cost" for the U.S., and that no President could do so.

Theresa May, Emmanuel Macron, and Angela Merkel supported the deal in a joint statement. Federica Mogherini, the European Union's foreign policy chief, said that the agreement was working well and that no one country could break the deal. Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov confirmed that Iran was in compliance.

U.S. withdrawal (May 2018)

Main articles: United States sanctions against Iran and United States withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

Trump announces U.S. withdrawal on 8 May.

On 8 May 2018 the U.S. officially withdrew after Trump signed a Presidential Memorandum ordering sanctions reinstatement, opting instead to seek a comprehensive and lasting solution working allies. The IAEA continued to certify Iranian compliance. Other signatories state that they would work to preserve the deal even absent the U.S..

Consequences of U.S. withdrawal

See also: Snapback (sanctions)

The U.S. policy of "maximum pressure" involved global sanctions.

The Iranian rial fell by some 20%, 35,000 to the dollar to 42,000 in 2021. International banks that traded with Iran paid large fines. The American flag was set on fire in Iran's Parliament. According to IDF sources, IRGC Quds Forces based in Syria launched rockets at Israeli military targets the next evening, the first time Iran had directly targeted Israel. All major European companies abandoned doing business with Iran out of fear of U.S. punishment.

Khamenei's conditions for Europe to preserve the JCPOA

Following the U.S. withdrawal, Khamenei presented seven conditions for Europe to sustain JCPOA. Among them was that European powers must take steps to preserve business relations with Iranian banks and purchase Iranian oil. He rejected the need to hold discussions about Iran's ballistic missile program and regional activities.

Defection of Iran (2019)

One year after the U.S. withdrawal, Iran took countermeasures. Iran halted sales of excess enriched uranium and heavy water to other countries. Rouhani said that Iran would resume enrichment of uranium beyond 3.67% if other parties could not let Iran benefit from JCPOA's economic provisions.

In May 2019, the IAEA certified that Iran was abiding by the deal's main terms, but raised questions about the limits on advanced centrifuges, as that was only loosely defined in the deal. In a meeting with senior officials, Khamenei described negotiations with the U.S. on another nuclear deal as "poison".

On 8 May, Iran announced it would suspend implementation of some parts of JCPOA, threatening further action in 60 days unless it received protection from U.S. sanctions.

On 7 July, Iran announced that it had started to increase uranium enrichment beyond the agreed 3.67% limit. IAEA stated that its inspectors would verify Iran's announcement. Zarif sent a letter to his European counterpart Federica Mogherini notifying her about Iran's noncompliance.

On 4 November, Iran doubled the number of advanced centrifuges it operated. Iran was enriching uranium to 4.5%. On 5 November 2019, Iranian nuclear chief Ali Akbar Salehi announced that Iran would enrich uranium to 5% at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, adding that it already had the capability to enrich uranium to 20%.

Diplomatic conflict (2020–)

In 2020, Trump and Pompeo asserted that the U.S. remained a "participant" in the agreement, despite having formally withdrawn, in an effort to persuade the S.C. to reimpose pre-agreement sanctions on Iran for its breaches of the deal after the U.S. withdrew. The agreement provided for a resolution process among signatories in the event of a breach.

After the Iranian regime's arrest of human rights activist Farhad Meysami, the U.S. State Department supported him in a statement. Meysami then rejected their support over the U.S. withdrawal.

President Biden stated his intention to rejoin the Iran deal. Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, advised against this, saying that stopping Iran's regional aggression and preventing Iran from building nuclear weapons should be the priority.

Re-entry negotiations

2021

In April, talks between the original parties took place in Vienna. The president put the meetings on hold in June. Enrique Mora, E.U. coordinator for reviving negotiations with Iran, attended President Ebrahim Raisi inauguration in August. Iran sought E.U. assurances that the unilateral U.S. withdrawal would repeat. On 14 October, Iran and the E.U. agreed to further negotiations in Brussels. Iranian deputy foreign minister Ali Bagheri reiterated Mora's statement that "the E.U. was ready to collaborate with Iran and the other parties". U.S.

A joint statement by French, German, U.K., and U.S. leaders on 30 October welcomed "President Biden's clearly demonstrated commitment to return the U.S. to full compliance with the JCPOA and to stay in full compliance, so long as Iran does the same." Talks resumed in Vienna on 29 November, with representatives from Iran, China, France, Germany, Russia, and the U.K. present.

A European diplomat said that in June, 70% to 80% of a draft deal had been agreed upon. Bagheri called everything discussed so far merely a “draft” and presented Iran's draft. Western negotiators called Iran's proposals unacceptable. Iranian negotiators insisted that the U.S. first lift all sanctions before Iran would scale back its nuclear program, contradicting the previous understanding of "compliance for compliance." On 9 December, negotiations continued as Russia and China pushed Iran to revise its stance.

2022

On 20 February, 250 members of the 290-member Iranian parliament, which had been controlled by hardliners since 2020, issued a statement urging Raisi to comply with their requirements.

The U.S. engaged in indirect talks with Iran in Vienna, mediated by China, Russia and E.U. JCPOA revival became a priority for the Biden administration when the Russian invasion of Ukraine spiked global energy prices. About a million barrels/day of Iranian oil would be added to the international market, which would lower crude oil prices and reduce the threat of nuclear war.

On 5 March, Iran claimed it had reached an agreement with the IAEA to resolve all outstanding question about undeclared materials from three nuclear sites by late June. IAEA chief Rafael Grossi, who visited Iran in early March, was to present those findings to the governing body by July. Russian demands to explicitly protect its economic relations with Iran were a stumbling block for the U.S. Later, Russia received U.S. guarantees to protect its trade with Iran from international sanctions. Meanwhile, Iran confirmed the removal of IRGC from a U.S. terror blacklist to be another demand.

By May, talks to revive the JCPOA had stalled. On 7 May, Mora visited Iran to restart the talks.

Iran demanded that the U.S. delist the IRGC from its terror blacklist in exchange. The Biden administration replied that the original deal did not involve this listing and that the two matters were "separate", and that if Iran wanted sanctions relief beyond the original deal, it would have to make additional commitments. On 24 April, after a phone call with Bennett, Biden decided to keep the IRGC on the blacklist, backed by a bipartisan majority of U.S. Senators. In a contradictory statement, Iran Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian said the listing was not the "main hurdle". In June Tehran said that it was removing 27 U.N. surveillance cameras. Rafael Grossi said the move could be a “fatal blow” to negotiations. On 16 June, the Biden administration announced sanctions against Iran's petrochemical industry. In a 5 July interview, U.S. Special Envoy for Iran Robert Malley said that Iranian negotiators had added demands, such as the IRGC delisting, that were outside the JCPOA scope. Iran insisted the listing was a unilateral U.S. action.

On 6 July, the U.S. announced sanctions targeting the Iranian petrochemical industry, while initiating legal proceedings against entities based in Singapore, Vietnam and the United Arab Emirates. The sanctions were announced after a round of indirect talks between the U.S. and Iran in Qatar. Biden and his team expressed their commitment to reviving the deal through mutual compliance, but the U.S. tightened sanctions against Iran after Trump withdrew from the agreement. While E.U. officials showed continued interest, U.S. officials warned that the negotiating window was closing.

After indirect talks between the U.S. and Iran failed, British sources expressed skepticism that Khamenei wanted to revive a deal. Iran accused French, British and U.S. diplomats of stalling. Iran grew more critical of Grossi. According to Iran's foreign ministry, the accord's finalization was up to the U.S.

In August, Iran demanded closure of a multiyear IAEA probe as a condition for restoring the JCPOA. European negotiators presented a "final" text, after another round. The draft did not include Tehran's demand that the U.S. lift the IRGC's terrorism designation, according to a senior U.S. official, who also claimed that Iran had dropped its call for IAEA to end the investigation into traces of uranium at three undeclared sites.

On 2 September, Iran's Foreign Ministry said that it had responded to U.S. proposals, but the U.S. State Department demurred. According to EU's chief negotiator Josep Borrell, the parties had initially issued a series of "reasonable requests", notably that Iran had dropped its demand to delist the IRGC. Iran insisted on more guarantees about unilateral withdrawals from the agreement. Later Borrell said that the process was "in danger".

On 10 September, France, Britain, and Germany released a statement that they had "serious doubts as to Iran's intentions and commitment". Iran's Foreign Ministry dismissed the criticism. Hopes faded, while the price of WTI crude increased by 2%. Iran increased its oil exports to China, circumventing economic sanctions. During a 16 September interview before his talk at the United Nations, Ebrahim Raisi said that Iran saw no differences between the Trump and Biden administrations."

At a 12 October Washington news conference, U.S. State Department spokesperson Ned Price said that reviving the JCPOA was "not our focus".

On 17 October, former U.S. diplomat Richard N. Haass wrote on Twitter, "Iran's support for Russia & crackdown on protests has ended any chance the U.S. will rejoin the JCPOA anytime soon".

On 31 October, Malley said that the U.S. supported restoring the JCPOA, but that talks were not the focus at the time. In November, Italy's Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani stated that Europe should "do its utmost" to revive the nuclear deal.

On 15 December, IAEA announced that it would send a delegation to Tehran on 18 December to clarify outstanding issues with regard to nuclear material discovered at three sites. The Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) cited Mohammad Eslami, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, as saying that this interaction would hopefully remove obstacles and ambiguities. Earlier Iran reported it had enriched uranium to its highest level of 60%, one step away from weapons grade. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi confirmed the invitation by Tehran, where a technical team would address outstanding safeguard issues. Despite political unrest in Iran after the death of a young Kurdish woman in police custody in September and additional sanctions on Iranian entities, "the definitive death of the JCPOA is not a foregone conclusion", according to Near East Policy experts, assuming Tehran abandoned its position on IAEA probes. Iran also participates in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which implements safeguards for fissionable materials in all peaceful nuclear activities.

On 20 December, a meeting was held in Amman, Jordan, to further discuss details of a possible deal. Josep Borrell noted the bloc did "not have a better option than the JCPOA to ensure that Iran does not develop nuclear weapons". According to the Iranian foreign ministry, Hossein Amirabdollahian said the talks are "based on a draft that is a result of months of difficult and intensive negotiations".

In a 29 December interview with Russian media, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that the JCPOA had "no reasonable alternative" and that the transition to Plan B would lead to "escalation, an arms race, open conflict with irreversible consequences." Politico reported that Grossi would again visit Iran in January for further discussions on Iran's nuclear program and cooperation with the agency, according to two European diplomats. Earlier, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian commented during a meeting with Oman's Sultan Haitham bin Tariq in Muscat that Iran was still open to negotiations to revive a nuclear deal.

2023

In early February, Director General of the IAEA Rafael Grossi warned against "a defeatist approach to the signatories' sluggish efforts to revive the JCPOA". He asserted his strictly non-political role and stressed that an alternative to the 2015 nuclear deal might be another way forward. Grossi was criticised for giving the international community a false sense of security by saying Iran does not have nuclear weapons. The IAEA report on the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, a sensitive Iranian uranium enrichment site, found that two cascades of IR-6 centrifuges were configured in a way "substantially different" from what Iran had previously declared. Iran had claimed the difference was due to a human error. On 31 January, the U.S. State Department authorized a waiver to the sanctions, which allows Russia to develop the profitable enrichment site, a move that some criticised because it allows Iran to develop its nuclear program with Russian-state controlled firms. Earlier Grossi had denied suggestions that Russia's growing alliance with Iran could somehow block the IAEA's work to monitor Iran's nuclear programme. A visit by the IAEA chief to Tehran is scheduled for February to continue the negotiations.

On 4 March, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi met with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and other top officials in Tehran. Earlier the IAEA detected uranium particles enriched up to 83.7% at the underground Fordo site. In the meantime, Iran had given assurances that it would reinstall monitoring equipment at a number of sensitive locations, a move viewed as a vast improvement after years of stonewalling on the issue. A recent IAEA report said, "Iran expressed its readiness to... provide further information and access to address the outstanding safeguards issues". Grossi later said he "looks forward to... prompt and full implementation of the Joint Statement". The IAEA censured Iran twice in 2022 for failing to cooperate.

In early April, the IAEA confirmed that Iran would allow a 50% increase in inspections at the Fordow facility. In the meantime, reports had surfaced that the U.S. would be ready for a nuclear deal, with a limited reduction of economic sanctions in return for a partial freeze on further nuclear activities by Iran. The U.S. and its allies had favored such an approach since January. Iran had rejected such a partial deal initially, and Iran's foreign minister had pointed out that some members of the Iranian parliament would seek a timeline to freeze all further negotiations. An interim deal was in focus again on 3 April, according to the Jerusalem Post, but actual talks on the deal remained stalled, according to the source.

At a meeting with Iran's Foreign Ministry on 20 May, Khamenei said that entering the JCPOA was taqiyah. Later, he said he had no objection to a newly negotiated deal as long as Iran could keep its nuclear infrastructure.

In early June, European powers resumed internal talks about Iran's nuclear capabilities. Preliminary negotiations with France, Germany, the U.K., and Ali Bagheri Kani were again taking place in Oslo. A U.S. State Department official also acknowledged that direct connections had been concurrent, a first since President Trump abandoned the plan in 2018. An Israeli newspaper confirmed that the U.S. and Iran are working on an agreement to stop Iran from making highly enriched uranium. Iran and Western powers had been approaching each other by releasing prisoners accused of espionage and terrorism. Hardliners on both sides criticized any interim agreement.

On 18 June, further indirect talks between Iran and the U.S. were advancing in Oman, after the U.S. allowed the release of blocked Iraqi payments to Iran. According to Al Jazeera, details of the talks were not made public, even though Iranian foreign minister spokesperson Nasser Kanani acknowledged the negotiations, saying "Muscat negotiations were not secret". The U.S. also concluded that if an agreement was negotiated, more American citizens held in Iran could be released and additional assets unfrozen. But Middle East experts remained skeptical about a partial deal. An interim agreement would not require the U.S. Congress's approval, but many representatives oppose such a deal. On 4 July, Iran-Iraq Joint Chamber of Commerce chairman Yahya Ale Eshaq confirmed the release of assets in Iraq worth $10 billion, used for non-sanctioned goods. This will give Iran the freedom to double its trade volume with Iraq to $20 billion in the coming years, boosting its regional standing. As a consequence, the IAEA will impose no more punitive measures on Iran, as European allies see no advantage in it, according to the same source. Israel said earlier that it opposes "mini-agreements" with Iran, and the original agreement as well.

In late August, after months of secretive negotiations first in Oman and then with Qatari officials in New York for a possible release of American prisoners, agreements between the U.S. and Iran led to a gradual easing of sanctions on Iranian oil sales, particularly for eastern markets such as China. Despite the unlikelihood of a newly negotiated JCPOA, data showed that the sale of Iranian oil had reached a maximum since the Trump administration withdrew from the nuclear deal five years earlier, resulting in a significant price drop of crude, to below $85 a barrel. Some analysts suspected this development was intentional, to keep the rising prices of U.S. gasoline in check for the 2024 election year. The U.S. State Department insisted on continued enforcement of sanctions, but at the same time, some reports indicated that Iran was slowing its uranium enrichment. Concurrently a possible release of $6 billion worth of frozen Iranian oil assets stuck in South Korea was made public. According to the International Energy Agency, Iranian oil production reached 3 million barrels a day in July, with a further increase to at least 3.4 million barrels in August, levels matching those before the deal was canceled in May 2018.

In the first week of September, the U.S. State Department officially released the $6 billion of frozen assets in South Korea to Qatar and signed the deal to finalize the prisoner exchange of five U.S. prisoners in Iran for five Iranian detainees in U.S. prisons. The funds will be paid to Qatar through a Swiss-based intermediary and can be used by Iran only for non-sanctioned goods. The White House acknowledged the difficult agreement but stressed the importance of an immediate release of the detainees.

In late August, the IAEA confirmed that Iran has slowed down its program to enrich uranium to 60%. This move has been interpreted as increasing the chance that some sanctions could be lifted. Iran has always said that its uranium stockpile is intended for peaceful purposes. With the expected exchange of prisoners between the U.S and Iran and the release of frozen funds, recent direct communications indicate an improved diplomatic climate between Iran and Western nations that would increase the chance that an agreement could be negotiated. But with significant opposition from both political parties in the U.S., the Biden administration appears to seek an informal agreement to avoid backlash from the deal's opponents. Concurrently, the sale of Iranian crude is peaking to levels that have not been seen since sanctions were reintroduced in 2018. Recent trade data shows that some economic sanctions on the Iranian petroleum industry have been lifted.

The IAEA report in early September indeed confirmed a slowdown in Iran's uranium enrichment, but it also ascertained that "no progress" has been made with regard to Iran's reporting and that there is still no access to the camera equipment at the enrichment site. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi expressed his disappointment about that issue.

In mid-September, the relationship between the IAEA and Iran further deteriorated when Iran announced its rejection of the IAEA's most experienced nuclear inspectors. While this is formally permitted by Iran's safeguards agreement, Grossi condemned it as "disproportionate and unprecedented". Iran said its action was made in response to Western countries' "misuse" of the IAEA Board of Governors "for their own political purposes". Grossi called Iran's decision "another step in the wrong direction" and said it "constitutes an unnecessary blow to an already strained relationship between the IAEA and Iran."

On 18 September, Iran's president Ebrahim Raisi spoke at the 77th session of the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) and said that Iran would never give up its right "to have peaceful nuclear energy". He also said the American withdrawal from the deal trampled on U.S. commitments and was "an inappropriate response" to Iran’s dedication to fulfill the conditions of the JCPOA. He urged Western powers to return to the nuclear deal. The presentation was controversial, and Israel left the assembly hall in protest. On the sidelines of the meeting, Raisi and Grossi expressed their commitment to restore communications and planned an official visit by Grossi in Tehran in the following weeks.

In October, Qatar and the U.S. put Iran's access to these funds on hold due to the Israel–Hamas war, although Iran denied any involvement in Hamas's attacks. According to a news statement, the funds are not frozen and remain untouched in a Qatari financial institution based on a quiet agreement between Qatar and the U.S. Iran's permanent U.N. mission in New York said in a statement, "the money rightfully belongs to the people of Iran, earmarked for the government to facilitate the acquisition of all essential and sanctioned requisites for Iranians." The funds are under close supervision by the U.S. Treasury and are intended for goods that support humanitarian efforts in Iran. In November, a bill passed the U.S House of Representatives in an attempt to permanently block the funds that were paid to free five Americans detained in Iran, but the measure is unlikely to pass the U.S. Senate. The funds were blocked in reaction to brutal attacks by Hamas fighters against mostly Israeli civilians on 7 October although Secretary of State Antony Blinken later acknowledged that "we have not yet seen evidence that Iran directed or was behind this particular attack".

2024

As of September 2024, Iranian President, Masoud Pezeshkian, and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi appear to be open to negotiations with all JCPOA parties despite deteriorating relations between Israel, Western nations, and Iran due to conflict with Hamas and other Iranian proxies. After additional sanctions were imposed on the Iranian aviation sector due its involvement with exports of missile components to Russia, Iran expressed concern and denied it delivered such missile parts to the region. An E.U. spokesperson confirmed that E.U. foreign policy chief Josep Borrell is actively engaged in reviving nuclear negotiations with Iran in an attempt to keep diplomatic channels open. The latest IAEA report confirms the expansion of the Iranian uranium enrichment program. The Fordow facility now routinely enriches uranium to 60% purity. The IAEA report also says that Iran informed the agency that eight clusters of advanced IR-6 centrifuges have been installed at the site but not brought online. The larger site at Natanz saw the addition of 15 cascades, with an enrichment purity of 5%. IAEA head Rafael Grossi expressed hope for a meeting with Pezeshkian in the "not too distant" future. Recent IAEA board resolutions require Iran to cooperate with the investigations into uranium traces and call for a reversal of the decision to bar official inspectors from nuclear sites.

On the sidelines of the 68th General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) spokesman Behrouz Kamalvandi said on 18 September that his country regularly undergoes inspections by the IAEA and its nuclear program is "transparent". Kamalvandi also met with representatives of Russia's Joint Institute for Nuclear Research to exchange technical details and assure continued cooperation. On 17 October the Iranian news agency ISNA reiterated Kamalvaldi's position, saying, "Tehran is ready to restore the JCPOA, but its realisation requires serious negotiations."

See also

• 2016 U.S.–Iran naval incident
• Agreed Framework
• Begin Doctrine (The common term for the Israeli government's preventive strike to the potential enemies' capability to possess WMD)
• Black Cube (a private intelligence company founded by former Israeli intelligence officers)
• Budapest Memorandum
• Disarmament of Iraq
• Disarmament of Libya
• United Nations S.C. resolutions concerning the nuclear program of Iran
• U.S. national emergency with respect to Iran
• Mehdi Sarram

External links

• "Joint statement by E.U. High Representative Federica Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif" at the European External Action Service (EEAS)
• Full text of the agreement:
  • Via EEAS:
    • "Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action"
    • "Annex I: Nuclear-related commitments" Archived 2 March 2019 at the Wayback Machine
    • "Annex II: Sanctions-related commitments"
      • "Attachments to Annex II"
    • "Annex III: Civil nuclear cooperation" Archived 2 March 2019 at the Wayback Machine
    • "Annex IV: Joint Commission"
    • "Annex V: Implementation Plan"
  • White House. "The Iran Deal". Medium. Archived from the original on 4 August 2015.

Videos

• Inside the Iran Nuclear Deal with the Lead U.S. Negotiator (2015) - Miller Center
• On The Same Page: America's Middle East Allies and Regional Threats - Foundation for Defense of Democracies — 1/15/2021
  • UAE Minister of State Yousef Al Otaiba
  • Bahrain Ambassador to U.S. Rashid al-Khalifa
  • Israel Ambassador to U.S. Ron Dermer
• Iran Nuclear Deal Progress Report – Nuclear Threat Initiative (2017)
• "The Iran Nuclear Deal Explained" – The Wall Street Journal (2015)