Talk:1948 Palestine war/Archive 7

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Religious character of the war

Should we add a section to discuss whether the Palestine war was, at its core, a religious or a nationalistic one? This could also include religious motivations that animated the Palestinian Arab and foreign volunteer fighters, as well as the religious significance of the region.

Benny Morris asserts in his book that "The 1948 War was a war of religion as much as, if not more, a nationalist war over territory." On the other hand, other scholars have stated that religion was merely a tactical tool by the Arab leaders.

Morris provides various quotes to back his point. A couple excerpts:

The Jewish rejection of the Prophet Muhammad is embedded in the Qur'an and is etched in the psyche of those brought up on its suras. As the Muslim Brotherhood put it in 1948: "Jews are the historic enemies of Muslims and carry the greatest hatred for the nation of Muhammad." Such thinking characterized the Arab world, where the overwhelming majority of the population were, and remain, believers.

In 1943, when President Franklin Roosevelt sent out feelers about a negotiated settlement of the Palestine problem, King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia responded that he was "prepared to receive anyone of any religion except (repeat except) a Jew." A few weeks earlier, Ibn Saud had explained, in a letter to Roosevelt: "Palestine ... has been an Arab country since the dawn of history and ... was never inhabited by the Jews for more than a period of time, during which their history in the land was full of murder and cruelty.... [There is] religious hostility ... between the Moslems and the Jews from the beginning of Islam ... which arose from the treacherous conduct of the Jews towards Islam and the Moslems and their prophet."

Historians have tended to ignore or dismiss, as so much hot air, the jihadi rhetoric and flourishes that accompanied the two-stage assault on the Yishuv and the constant references in the prevailing Arab discourse to that earlier bout of Islamic battle for the Holy Land, against the Crusaders. This is a mistake. The 1948 War, from the Arabs' perspective, was a war of religion as much as, if not more than, a nationalist war over territory. Put another way, the territory was sacred: its violation by infidels was sufficient grounds for launching a holy war and its conquest or reconquest, a divinely ordained necessity.

In the months before the invasion of 15 May 1948, King Abdullah, the most moderate of the coalition leaders, repeatedly spoke of "saving" the holy places. As the day of invasion approached, his focus on Jerusalem, according to Alec Kirkbride, grew increasingly obsessive. "In our souls," wrote the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna, "Palestine occupies a spiritual holy place which is above abstract nationalist feelings. In it we have the blessed breeze of Jerusalem and the blessings of the Prophets and their disciples."

The jihadi impulse underscored both popular and governmental responses in the Arab world to the UN partition resolution and was central to the mobilization of the "street" and the governments for the successive onslaughts of November-December 1947 and May-June 1948. The mosques, mullahs, and gulema all played a pivotal role in the process. Even Christian Arabs appear to have adopted the jihadi discourse. Matiel Mughannam, the Lebanese-born Christian who headed the AHC-affiliated Arab Women's Organization in Palestine, told an interviewer early in the civil war: "The UN decision has united all Arabs, as they have never been united before, not even against the Crusaders.... [A Jewish state] has no chance to survive now that the `holy war' has been declared. All the Jews will eventually be massacred. " The Islamic fervor stoked by the hostilities seems to have encompassed all or almost all Arabs: "No Moslem can contemplate the holy places falling into Jewish hands," reported Kirkbride from Amman. "Even the Prime Minister [Tawfiq Abul Huda] ... who is by far the steadiest and most sensible Arab here, gets excited on the subject."

On 2 December [1947] the gulema, or council of doctors of theology and sacred law, of Al-Azhar University in Cairo – one of Islam's supreme authorities – proclaimed a "worldwide jihad in defense of Arab Palestine."

Amayorov (talk) 14:22, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Please read something other than just Benny Morris. Just clutching at snippets of POV-infused statements from Benny Morris is no way to go about understanding the topic, let alone establishing anything in a neutral, encyclopedic voice. Please gain an appreciation of some other sources. Iskandar323 (talk) 16:41, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

It's not just Morris – the religious character of the war has been discussed at length in much of Israeli historiography.

If you disagree, we could include reference to other historians that consider that religion was only a minor factor. That is, in fact, exactly what I proposed. Amayorov (talk) 19:49, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

"Israeli historiography" – if it's an Israeli narrative then it needs to be delineated as such, but yes, more voices than Morris would be needed to support this, otherwise it's a Morris narrative, and we already have too much Morris. Though frankly, the sad clutch of quotes above hardly makes the point that Morris seems to think it does. Iskandar323 (talk) 20:00, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Just as "pro-Palestinian" or "Arab" historiography must be disclaimed.

I agree that references to other historians would be useful. I will work on that. Amayorov (talk) 20:06, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Morris (who recently wrote in Haaretz that Israel should nuke Iran without delay) took up the "jihad" idea after his "conversion" and it's sort of embarrassing. The transparent purpose is to deny the Palestinians any genuine reason for complaint. There were plenty of people on both sides who spouted religious nonsense; let's not play that game here. Zero^talk 12:55, 8 July 2024 (UTC)

Sorry, but what you wrote doesn't constitute a historical argument.

The idea that the 1948 War was viewed through a religious lens was first advocated by Morris in his 2008 book, which was widely praised, even by non-Zionists like Avi Shlaim. This book has become a key reference for many scholars.

Sure, some scholars (Shlomo Ben-Ami, Yoav Gelber, etc) have said that Morris exaggerated the role of a "religious war," and that it wasn't as important as he suggested. However, a discussion of this could still be useful to add to the article. Amayorov (talk) 23:09, 8 July 2024 (UTC)

So you want to over-emphasize the main thing that reviewers of the book criticize as being over-emphasized in the work as one of its key drawbacks? It's the opposite. You should listen to the feedback from academic reviewers, and since they commonly chime in that Morris over-emphasizes religious background and motivations, that makes it more undue and fringe. Iskandar323 (talk) 02:51, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

Morris overload

It's come to my attention that Benny Morris is quite gratuitously over-represented on this page relative to other historians, with 50+ citations and mentions. I'm not sure if any other historian crests half a dozen citations and mentions. On a page with just over 100 citations, the sea of Morris references is quite overbearing. This is a pretty clear balance issue. Iskandar323 (talk) 19:51, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

I think that would be good! However, one must distinguish between backing up objective facts using a historian's research, and representing the conclusions that that historian draws from them as fact.

I don't have a problem with the former. Morris has done a massive amount of primary research, which he quotes in his books and which was later quoted by other authors, such as Shlaim, Flapan, Pappé and others. Amayorov (talk) 20:04, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Iskandar323 is right. إيان (talk) 05:26, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

This is a problem across many Wikipedia articles regarding this history. IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 17:07, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

Seems like this would be a situation to -add- further scholars, not just remove information. Arkon (talk) 17:57, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

There are different Morris "eras", seems to me, and I agree with Arkon, we should add sources, and if that results in Morris being drowned out on any point, so be it. I am not knocking Morris, one of the first sensible scholars from that side of the line but no need to overdo it, is there? Selfstudier (talk) 18:04, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

RfC: Should we mention the exodus of Jews from Arab countries in the lede?

The following discussion is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

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Should we mention the exodus of Jews from Arab countries during and immediately after the war in the lede of this article? Alaexis_¿question? 23:05, 7 March 2024 (UTC)

Discussion (RfC: Should we mention the exodus of Jews from Arab countries in the lede?)

• No, as discussed above in "Recent changes". The beginning of the exodus is only indirectly a consequence of the war and we should be striving for brevity in the lead of this article as there is much information to cover. Note also that though the lead is a summary of the body, the aftermath section of this article currently gives disproportionate attention to this aspect of the war's consequences and results. IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 23:16, 7 March 2024 (UTC)

• Yes. This was a massive event, with hundreds of thousands people fleeing or emigrating. Multiple reliable sources (see the list here) agree that this was one of the major consequences of the war. Therefore a brief mention is warranted. Alaexis_¿question? 23:22, 7 March 2024 (UTC)
• No certainly it was an important event, but it was not an event that is a subtopic of this war. At most a small portion of the emigration was even indirectly related to this war, and the argument that we should include decades of immigration from a large number of countries not even involved in this war makes no sense. And the claim that reliable sources agree that it was a major consequence of the war is just not true. Morris says "The war indirectly created a second, major refugee problem", Schindler says In Arab countries, the defeat of the Arab armies and the exodus of the Palestinian Arabs exacerbated an already difficult situation. In December 1947, a pogrom and the destruction of synagogues in Aleppo persuaded half the city’s Jewish population to leave. In Egypt, arrests, killings and confiscations catalyzed the flight of nearly 40 per cent of the Jewis hcommunity by 1950. In Kuwait, the minuscule number of Jews were expelled. In Iraq, the Criminal Code was amended in July 1948 such that Zionists were lumped together with Anarchists and Communists. The death penalty could be meted out to adherents or they could be sentenced to many years’ imprisonment. Enforced emigration to Israel became the officially permitted route out of Iraq for an increasingly oppressed Jewish community. Israel ironically became the unlikely destination for many Jewish Communists despite their opposition to Zionism. In Libya, Algeria and Morocco, there were periodic outbreaks of anti-Jewish violence. Over 37 per cent of Jews in Islamic countries – the Arab world, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan – left for Israel between May 1948 and the beginning of 1952. This amounted to 56 per cent of the total immigration. And he says that in a chapter on Jewish emigration, not in coverage of this war. It is an attempt at trying to balance what actually was a direct major consequence of this war, the expulsion and flight of 80-90% of the Palestinians from the territory Israel would come to control in this war, with an entirely different topic that was not a part of this war. And a ton of it was from countries not involved in this war at all. There are no sources that treat this as a major consequence of this war, and the claim that there is rests on the assumption that nobody will actually check, as it is so plainly not true, and been shown untrue on this talk page previously. Beyond that, there is no definition of immediately after that includes years and years later. nableezy - 00:09, 8 March 2024 (UTC)

No, it's a part of the IP conflict but not a significant-enough part of the 1948 war to merit being mentioned in the lead. While Morris says this is an "indirect" result of the war, I think the balance of sources do not treat this as a significant effect of the war, even indirectly. Further, in the RM for the article about the exodus, I quoted Tessler's book explaining the complicated factors he said was behind the exodus, and the war was only a small part of it; I won't reproduce the whole quote here but it applies to this RfC as well. It's something that happened over years during and after the war (1948-52), which is further evidence that while it's a part of the conflict, it's not a huge part of the (47-) '48 war. Levivich (talk) 01:25, 8 March 2024 (UTC)

• No, it wasn't a part of the 1948 war. Lots of things happened as a result of the foundation of Israel, but that's not the topic of this article. Zero^talk 02:48, 8 March 2024 (UTC)

  Elaborating, the exodus of Jews was a result of the foundation of Israel and the consequent implementation of Israeli policy. It would have happened without the war that accompanied Israel's foundation, so it is factually incorrect to call it a consequence of that war. Zero^talk 11:09, 25 March 2024 (UTC)

'It would have happened without the (1948) war. That is as hypothetical at least as the argument that the exodus was consequential on that war. For one thing, in an alternative history, one could imagine that the old Zionist priority to privilege Ashkenazi immigration over aliyah from 'Arabized' Jews (i.e. deemed slack, uneducated etc.,) probably would have prevailed, esp. given that they were the victims of a Holocaust whose mass immigration to the US and Great Britain was systematically blocked by those powers, for the usual electoral-antisemitic motives. 'Consequence' does not mean strictly an assertion of some mechanical 'post hoc ergo propter hoc' reasoning. Nishidani (talk) 13:25, 25 March 2024 (UTC)

• Ummmm. There is way to much in the lede already. It should be cut significantly down with superfluous language removed. It DOES NOT read as neutral. Most of the factual information should be in the body of the article. With that said, if the lede stays "as-is" then, yes, information about an exodus should be added if nothing more than to provide a more balanced perspective and neutrality. Slacker13 (talk) 05:49, 8 March 2024 (UTC)

No: It wasn't a direct effect of the war; just an indirect side-effect in the aftermath of the conflict. Iskandar323 (talk) 06:18, 8 March 2024 (UTC)

agreed Slacker13 (talk) 21:57, 9 March 2024 (UTC)

You might want to amend your vote and clarify your position on this, @Slacker13. IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 22:04, 9 March 2024 (UTC)

• No I do not see evidence that this event was sufficiently closely related to be DUE in the lead of the article. (t · c) buidhe 04:44, 21 March 2024 (UTC)
• Yes The Jewish exodus from Arab countries was one of the most important consequences of the war, along with the Palestinian refugee problem. I agree with Alaexis. Marokwitz (talk) 07:27, 25 March 2024 (UTC)

  The ethnic cleansing of Palestinians wasn't a consequence of the war: it began before the war, was partially a trigger for the war, and intensified during the war by design. It was a direct impact on the civilian population in the warzone. The subsequent exodus of Jews from other countries due to a range of push and pull factors, one of which was negative sentiment arising from the war (and the ethnic cleansing it entailed), was a consequence, but not a direct impact of the conflict. The two phenomena are in entirely different categories of immediacy to the conflict. Iskandar323 (talk) 12:26, 25 March 2024 (UTC)

  The expulsion of Palestinians started only in April 1948 – six months into the civil war – and was a direct consequence of the conflict. According to Morris, the majority of the Palestinians fled out of fear of being caught up in hostilities, rather than being directly expelled. Therefore, the circumstances precipitating the flight of both the Arabs and the Jews were not dissimilar. Amayorov (talk) 20:59, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

  Untrue. It began in 1947. Iskandar323 (talk) 21:04, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

  The expulsions began only in April 1948. The only village vacated before April 1948 was the Qisariya village in mid-February – with a total population of 1'114. Amayorov (talk) 19:39, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

  That's completely false. Selfstudier (talk) 21:28, 6 July 2024 (UTC)

  The expulsions began only in April 1948. The only village vacated before April 1948 was the Qisariya village in mid-February – with a total population of 1'114.

  From from Morris's 2008 book:

  ''During this period [by the end of March 1948] Jewish troops expelled the inhabitants of only one village-Qisariya, in the Coastal Plain, in mid-February.

  Though the Arabs had initiated the violence, they were quickly evincing signs of demoralization. ... Flight was the earliest and most concrete expression of Palestinian demoralization. Within twenty-four hours of the start of the (still low-key) hostilities [on 30 Nov 1947], Arab families began to abandon their homes in mixed or border neighborhoods in the big towns. Already on 30 November 1947 the HIS reported "the evacuation of Arab inhabitants from border neighborhoods" in Jerusalem and Jaffa. Arabs were also reported leaving the area around the Jewish Quarter of Safad (the town was predominantly Arab) and fleeing the villages of Jammasin and Sheikh Muwannis, bordering Tel Aviv. By 9 December, the HIS was reporting that "Arab refugees were sleeping in the streets [of Jaffa]" and "wealthy families were leaving the [coastal] citiesheading inland. [Many initially fled to the family's village of origin.] Rich people are emigrating to Syria, Lebanon, and even Cyprus." In one or two sites, there was deliberate Jewish intimidation of Arab neighbors to leave.

  Despite the haphazard efforts of some Arab local authorities, the following months were marked by increasing flight from the main towns and certain rural areas. By the end of March 1948 most of the wealthy and middleclass families had fled Jaffa, Haifa, and Jerusalem, and most Arab rural communities had evacuated the heavily Jewish Coastal Plain; a few had also left the Upper Jordan Valley. Most were propelled by fear of being caught up, and harmed, in the fighting; some may have feared life under Jewish rule. It is probable that most thought of a short, temporary displacement with a return within weeks or months, on the coattails of victorious Arab armies or international diktats.'' Amayorov (talk) 19:41, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

  The Nakba did not start or end in 1948

  "When did the process of displacement actually begin? Though displacement of Palestinians from their lands by the Zionist project was already taking place during the British Mandate, mass displacement started when the UN partition plan was passed. In less than six months, from December 1947 to mid-May 1948, Zionist armed groups expelled about 440,000 Palestinians from 220 villages." Selfstudier (talk) 20:14, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

  Almost a half million Palestinians were displaced between December 1947 and May 1948. The greatest outflow of refugees took place in April and early May 1948 coinciding with the start of operations by Zionist paramilitary organizations. Trying to downplay what occurred pre Israel is not a good look. Selfstudier (talk) 20:28, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

  "from December 1947 to mid-May 1948" – that is technically correct. Plan Dalet was only drawn up towards the end of March 1948, and practically all these expulsions happened between April 1 and May 15, 1948. Before then, it was the upper and middle class families that had evacuated, rather than expelled. Amayorov (talk) 20:21, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

  Says Morris Iskandar323 (talk) 20:25, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

  According to Pappé, by the end of March 1948 thirty villages were depopulated of their Palestinian Arab population. So unless they were villages entirely populated by the upper and middle classes, something is rotten in the state of Morris' storytelling. Iskandar323 (talk) 20:28, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

  Pappé's "Ethnic Cleansing" does, indeed, refer to 30 villages, but doesn't provide their names or a reference. The nearest reference is in the next paragraph – which is to Morris. This again illustrates Pappé's general sloppiness with historical fact.

  Morris' book "The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem revisited" (2004) provides an exhaustive list of each Palestinian settlement, the date of its depopulation, and the causes. He does care to distinguish direct expulsion from flight due to fear. This painstaking work again confirms his assertion (see p.1-13 and 130). Amayorov (talk) 20:53, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

  Does Morris contradict Pappé? Iskandar323 (talk) 21:04, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

  I hadn't realised quite how bad Morris' warped and selective narratives were. Now I realise it's very spun. Iskandar323 (talk) 20:24, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

• No per Nableezy, Levivich and Buidhe, The 'exodus' narrative emerged later to draw a false equivalence between the radical programmatic ethnic cleansing which Yishuv and then Israeli forces imposed on Palestinians during the war, and what occurred to Jews in Arab countries after the cessation of hostilities, often at the open invitation of the new state of Israel, which adopted a policy of encouraging Jews in those countries to make aliyah, not always successively, as their conditions deteriorated very much as a consequence of the impact of the image of mass expulsions on the 'Arab street'.Nishidani (talk) 09:04, 25 March 2024 (UTC)
• Yes The Jewish exodus from Arab countries was one of the most important consequences of the war. Vegan416 (talk) 23:29, 1 April 2024 (UTC)

  Can you give any sources that say that a. it was a consequence of the war, and b. it was one of the most important of those consequences? nableezy - 23:33, 1 April 2024 (UTC)

• No, it's not of great enough significance in regards to the war and it occurred after the cessation of hostilities. TarnishedPath^talk 10:31, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.