Talk:Causes of World War I/Archive 1

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In Intro the assination of the Archduke was a conspiracy involving 8 individuals and a foreign government devised by the Okrana; shouldn't this be stressed more in the opening? Nobs 04:25, 23 Apr 2005 (UTC)

Yikes! Okrana involvement is a myth. Evidence points only to the involvement of the Russian Military Attache's office, General Artamonov (a colonel at the time) and War Minister Werchovsky (a captain at the time [yes promoted to war minister from captain in two years...only a spook could do it]). There is no evidence regarding where the Attache's office was getting its instructions.

Werchovsky 18:13, 16 May 2007 (UTC)

Peregrine: "the war blame tended to be placed on all participants more or less equally", where does this come from? Seems I recall extensive discussion of Germany's War guilt. Nobs 17:02, 9 May 2005 (UTC)

Nobs && Peregrine: That would seem to be my recollection and what is documented at Aftermath of World War I#Treaty of Versailles as well. -- Mucus 19:26, 9 May 2005 (UTC)

Immediately after the war there was some tendency to blame Germany on the part of the Allies, mostly by the people involved and the national governments. However, in Germany there was a lot of work done to try to disprove claims that they had "started" the war for obvious reasons. There was some sympathy for this in the United States, and a fair amount of academic work in the 20s and 30s became more balanced. (Although many people continued to write one sided accounts for personal reasons). I will try to elaborate on this at some future time, but will be busy for some days. Any help with this section is much appreciated as I'm basically piecing it together from memories of university. Peregrine981 08:14, May 10, 2005 (UTC)

The whole issue of German war guilt and reparations is what ultimately can be traced to the cause of the rise of Adolf Hitler. Germany was not a party to "negotiations" of theVersailles Treaty, hence it was refered to commonly as "Das Diktat" or the "Veersailles Diktat" in Germany in the 1920's. Yes, later the Dawes Plan and other plans helped Germany with reparations, but the government of France was unwaivering in its efforts to collect reparation payments (even to the extent of seizing factory machinery factory machinery). Nobs 16:12, 10 May 2005 (UTC)

I absolutely agree, but within the academic interpretation of the war the emphasis has shifted to and from German war guilt. national governments still adhered to the German war guilt theory. We might also want to check into differences in national historiography for their interpretations. Peregrine981 03:31, May 11, 2005 (UTC)

We need to clarify what is generally understood and accepted today vs common popular sentiments of that era after the war (after all, even "world public opinion" is cited as a cause of Germany's defeat in 1918 by reporting from that era, despite the fact militarily Germany was not defeated on the battlefield. Nobs 03:36, 11 May 2005 (UTC)

Peregrine: The Historiography section is brilliant (don't let me interrupt if you're not done with it yet). Perhaps some reference like "unresolved issues over War guilt were a cause of World War II" or your own words to that effect. Good work! Nobs 18:44, 12 May 2005 (UTC)

Thanks for the encouragement. I have added some reference to war guilt in Germany leading to the Nazis. Feel free to elaborate if you wish. I have gone almost as far as quick internet searches and my memory permit. Unfortunately I don't have access to a library where I live, so I am frustrated in my attempts to expand the details of the early period which is quite neglected by the internet.Peregrine981 11:52, May 13, 2005 (UTC)

I live in the library here where I'm online (though) the hours are shortened cause semester just ended. List the references & what you're looking for, I'll assist.. Nobs 00:50, 14 May 2005 (UTC)

Thanks for the offer. If I recall correctly a good summary is found in a book by the name of The Origins of the First World War: Controversies and Consensus by Annika Mombauer. Published in London: Longman, 2002.

I'm looking for is some discussion of the earlier years of historiography between 1920 and 1960. Thanks for whatever you can do! Peregrine981 01:36, May 14, 2005 (UTC)

I'm on it tomorrow AM. Talk to me on User_talk:Nobs and maybe we can get some realtime discussion going. Any specific questions ready? AJP Taylor's Origins of the First World War is also very good. Also, I'd like to make the link between Black Hand and Okhrana, then rewrite the opening. As traditionally all references to WWI begin with the assassination, maybe demonstrating that it was the covert activity of an foreign intelligence bureau of a putative Head of State that preciptitated the war may have some impact on the issue of War guilt. Nobs 03:10, 14 May 2005 (UTC)

Sometimes there is confusion between Russian Military Intelligence and the Okhrana. There is no credible evidence of Okhrana involvement in the assassination of Franz-Ferdinand. There is however extensive evidence of Russian Military Intelligence involvement through Artamonov and Werchovsky in turn acting through the Chief of Serbian Military Intelligence Dimitrievic. Albertini, for one, deals with this issue (although since Dimitrievic's confession was suppressed at the time, a sworn confession to the Serbian Court wherein he states that Russia funded the hit) he could not state with certainty that Russia had been the sponsor of the assassination. Werchovsky 16:33, 23 May 2007 (UTC)

Should the Finnish Civil War be included in the Contemporary conflicts section? It was, in many ways, a part of this all. --HJV 21:10, 10 February 2006 (UTC)

Berlin - Bagdad Railway

The Bagdad Railway was considered an encrouchment upon British interests in India (and Persian Gulf). Britian felt disrupting the Suez-Aden-Bombay shipping line could split India, Singapore and Hong Kong away from the British Empire. This parellals some work I'm doing on St. John Philby, regarding the Baghdad-Damascus-Jerusalem-Mecca railway line; in otherwords if this idea was ever constructed, a Muslim could make the Hajj by rail from Berlin. Nobs 18:42, 29 May 2005 (UTC)

Perhaps simple language like this:

The Berlin-Bagdad Railway was feared in London as an attempt to split the British Empire in two.

Nobs01 14:50, 17 Jun 2005 (UTC)

Seems good. Were the British the only power concerned about the railroad? If not we should mention that as well. Also, might be good to include information about German strategic motivations, such as concern about being surrounded. Peregrine981 15:39, Jun 17, 2005 (UTC)

The Berlin-Bagdad railway project was one of several large railway enterprises being considered in the Guilded Age. In America, it was the cross continent linking the Atlantic to the Pacific at Promontory, Utah; in Russia it was the Trans-Siberian Railroad; in Africa it was Cecil Rhodes' Cairo to Capetown Railway; the French Empire envisioned an attempt to "ring the Meditterranean" by rail (I think the Orient Express out of Paris was the first leg of it, and it envisioned linking Morroco to Cairo etc); and the Germans envisioned the Orient Express being extended into the Berlin-Bagdad Railway, which both the British Empire & French Empire feared threatened British & French interests East of Suez. It was at a minimum considered "colonial competition", and would cross what later became the Sykes-Picot line [1] defining British-French interests.(It should be noted, the Berlin-Bagdad Railway was not the only great envision railway building scheme that failed). Nobs01 16:15, 17 Jun 2005 (UTC)

Berlin-Baghdad Railway - Soon after the Oriental Railway had transported its first passengers through the Balkans to Constantinople in 1888, German bankers received permission from Turkish leaders to construct a railway deeper into Turkey. By 1903, other nations in Europe had realized that Germans were planning to construct a railway which would provide a rail link from Germany to the Persian Gulf. This would have given Germany open access to African colonies, trade with India, and oil from Iraq. The new and huge impact of oil as fuel was recognised by the British, for its impact on German industrial and growing naval potential (see Engdahl). The Suez Canal and the British control of shipping could be avoided by rail, and German power would threaten the British, French and Russian entente. They feared the Baghdad Railway would permit Germans to dominate the political and economic arenas of Europe (see Jastrow).

Why should this have been removed? Is it false? It seems well referenced, and relevant to the causes of WWI, no to mention the establishement of Kuwait as a buffer country to protect the Persian gulf from rail-port accessibility.Bcameron54 05:18, 31 December 2006 (UTC)

it was removed because historians do not include it anymore. back in 1910 to 1914 British pulicists warned about the German RR. But historians do not think it was very important. German trade was small and of course the British dominated the Indian Ocean. Rjensen 15:40, 31 December 2006 (UTC)

Are you referring to modern British and American historians? These have been known to be unbalanced in perspective, at times. I refer you to WF Engdahl's "A Century of War" which you did not delete from references, for a non-Anglo account. Your dismissal of Jastrow's account (not a British publicist) is not supported, except by your statement. Good referencing meets Wikipedia standards. The fact that some historians do not say so and some do, makes it relevant. The fact the the British controlled the Indian ocean and continued to do so does not speak to the percieved German threat, nor British policy at the time.Bcameron54 16:58, 31 December 2006 (UTC)

Summary

I appreciate the attempt to summarize in the introduction, but what exactly does this mean, "The top governing of the monarchies"? I don't think that is a clear explanation.Peregrine981 14:05, July 26, 2005 (UTC)

Answer: I agree (I wrote the summary). Perhaps it is a bad header...I meant the complex governmental relationship between the existing monarchy and the emerging "democratic" governing. Do you understand what I mean?

At the moment I do not however how to formulate a better entry - please have a try at it! Regards, Dennis : Dna-Dennis 14:47, 26 July 2005 (UTC)

Communication Issues

I wonder if we could provide some concrete examples of how telegraphic slowness and communication issues contributed to the war? As it stands now it isn't really clear. Trains and automobiles were also slower, but did that contribute to the war? I seem to remember a story, possibly apocryphal, of one Russian general's decision to cut the wires after the general mobilization order had been issued, so that it couldn't be withdrawn. Peregrine981 12:43, August 5, 2005 (UTC)

I think I know what you're referring to, after the General (but not the partial) mobilizationorder was withdrawn (the Czar was getting cold feet) Janushkevich remarked to Sazonov that when the order was reissued he would "smash his telephone" and otherwise ensure that he could not be reached by another cancellation. I don't know if he actually did anything to that effect, and am quite certain it had no impact on events. --Loje 19:05, 30 March 2007 (UTC)

• Good suggestion, I guess I should have thought of it when I made the contribution. I wrote it after I had read the book "Thirteen days" (I've listed it in "sources") but it was a library book, which I now have returned. :( Either I have to borrow it again, or we could try to find some info on the internet. By the way, since you seem to be interested in the causes, I recommend that book. But beware, even though it is not a particularly long book, I found it very complicated, as it covered the diplomacy of those 13 days in quite extreme detail. It took me a while to dig through it...

Regards, Dennis Nilsson. Dna-Dennis 11:46, 6 August 2005 (UTC)

I'd be happy to look into this book when I get a chance, although I have no access to a library at the moment so it may have to wait a while. I'll look around for examples as I get a chance. Peregrine981 04:03, August 7, 2005 (UTC)

french domestic politics and the break up of WW1

I added a short chapter on the role of domestic french politics in the causes of world war 1 Could anybody comment ?

The Rise of Nationalist Sentiment

I am surprised to see no mention of Italy's unification and irredentism ("Italia irredenta") and of the French revenchism about Alsace-Lorraine in the ideological origins of WW1.

I feel that the whole article - however very interesting - is written from a british point of view as if WW1 was an anglo-german war!

The lack of a section on the domestic tensions of Austro-Hungary while there are mentions of the domestic politics of France & Germany, is also surprising. The Austro-Hungarian empire is perhaps the only participant whose domestic situation is generally accepted as a key reason for its decision to go to war.

I think a major revision of this article is in order

This article is kind of a mess. There's a lot of useful specific material here, but a lot of general statements that aren't really defensible (calling the dominant forces in the Third Republic "left wing" is most certainly wrong, for instance). More than that, though, this article seems completely disorganized. There's no logical order to it, and it doesn't give anywhere near a competent narrative of the July Crisis, which should be at least one of the key elements of an article on the origins of World War I. And why on earth is there a section about the Congress of Vienna?

I would suggest a pretty substantial rewriting, and even more so a reorganization of the article. I would suggest that the article begin with a summary of European diplomatic history starting with the unification of Germany in 1871. The level of detail would be very light for 1871-1890, rather more detailed for 1890-1905, quite detailed for 1905-1914, and extremely detailed for June 28 - August 4 1914. After this material, we could return to discussion of various ideological, structural, and so forth, causes of the war, and have a discussion of the historiography. I'd be happy to take a gander at reworking the thing, but I'd like to hear what the people who've worked on it have to say before I do anything. john k 06:23, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

1/ from 1899 to WWI, or to be more precise from June 22, 1899, when Waldeck Rousseau was appointed "President du Conseil" (head of the government) the left parties were in charge, first the "bloc des gauches" (1899-1905) and later a string of socialists and "radicaux", except for the period 14/01/1912-21/01/1913, when Poincare, a pragmatist, was "President du Conseil". It can therefore be said that the left parties were the dominant forces in France during that period.

2/ the Congress of Vienna shaped Europe for the XIX century and some causes of WWI can certainly be traced back to this time. Some historians even go back to the treaty of Westphalia!

3/ it is true that this article should be reorganised. Ideological, structural and factual causes are not clearly distinct. The summary suggested by john k seems more sensible.

4/ this said, the story of the July crisis can be found anywhere and does not give any information on the deep roots of WWI. It should be clearly explained, but should not be the main part of the article. Jsoufron 16:33, 21 March 2006 (UTC)

What do you mean "the story of the July Crisis can be found anywhere?" This is an encyclopedia. Our purpose is to be comprehensive, not to be original. The account of the July Crisis should not dominate the article, but it should be one of the major components of it. john k 20:39, 23 March 2006 (UTC)

The words "July crisis" are not even cited in the article, and it is plainly not acceptable in an encyclopaedia. But after a good description of this crisis, it must be made clear that most historians do not accept to hold it as the real origin of the war, except if one believes in the theory of the "war by schedule" or of the "powder keg". More remote causes form, to quote James Joll, "a pattern of concentric circles", or I would rather say an entangled net of mutual influences, and the tricky part of the job is to give a clear account of this complexity.213.103.23.75 16:16, 2 April 2006 (UTC)

I'd add that, prior to 1899, which is the period apparently under discussion, the sort of centrist republican pragmatists dominated the Third republic. In the first decade of the twentieth century, the dominant force were the radicals, along with various apostate former socialists, who can hardly be described as genuinely "left-wing," except on church-state issues. The Third Republic was born out of the suppression of the Commune, and, no matter how they labelled themselves, it was always dominated by the people who thought that was the right thing to do. The actual socialists were politicall marginalized until the 1930s, and, in general, any leftish group became conservative when it actually got into power. The Third Republic was not leftist in any real sense, even when being governed by governments officially "of the left." (The Clemenceau government, recall, was best known for strike-breaking. And so forth).

And while a brief mention of the Congress of Vienna is perhaps in order, the international system as it existed in 1914 was much more the product of the mid-century unifications. I'm not sure which of the causes can genuinely be traced back to the Congress of Vienna - the Balkans, which were the main immediate cause, were not dealt with by Vienna, and most of the other issues had to do with other states' worries and/or dislike for a strong German state which didn't exist at the time of Vienna. john k 20:44, 23 March 2006 (UTC)

It is true that the Third Republic (1870-1940) was at first intended to be a temporary system in a country where public opinion strongly favoured the restoration of monachy. But public opinion changed quickly and as early as 1877, the general election sent back a wide republican majority to the parliament. Then gradually this majority swung to the left. Of course left side politicians of the time could look rather strange by modern standards: strong nationalists and even bellicists, colonialists (with often more than a hint of racism), sometimes male chauvinists, and so on. But they were definitely "left wing" for their time. As for the Commune of Paris, we must see it without romantism : it was a very extremist and violent revolt, closely related to the great blood bath of the French Revolution called "la Terreur", and in turn a great source of inspiration for Lenin and Stalin. "Genuine" left side politicians had no hesitation about the necessity to stop it. 83.177.250.205 22:08, 24 March 2006 (UTC)

Balkan Wars & Russian Dom. Pol.

Shouldn't there be a small section on the Balkan wars and other events in the Balkans that are part of the causes of the war? Possibly also Turkey's problems, and rise of Serbia could be put here. The "first bullet" was fired in the Balkans, after all, so it's a pretty important region to all of this. (ie what I'm proposing is adding a Balkan wars section under specific events).

Secondly, I think that Russian domestic policies should also be mentioned (similarly to the Franch policies). The internal problems in Russia (strikes, demonstrations, etc 1905-1914) led Russia to take a more aggressive stand to suppress these problems. (in short, here I propose adding a Russia section below "French Domestic Politics") --HJV 02:48, 18 March 2006 (UTC)

Perfectly right. This underlines my feeling of the article beeing focused on the anglo-german relations. We need a wider point of view. Jsoufron 09:54, 21 March 2006 (UTC)

Potsdam war council 1912

Would anyone happen to know what is the name of the article in Wikipedia that deals with this meeting? It would be nice to have the meeting included in this article. They (zee Germans) had a war council in December 1912, where (among all other things) Tirpitz said that Germany would be ready for a war in 18 months time, as the Kiel canal and the u-boot programme will be finished by then. "Surprisingly" 18 months from the meeting was, in fact, July 1914 :)--HJV 23:44, 24 March 2006 (UTC) This comes from a book written by a German historian, Fritz Fischer, fist published in German in 1969, and later translated (Fritz Fischer, War of Illusions, German Policies from 1911 to 1914, Chatto, 1975). He quoted an entry in Admiral von Muller’s diary, December 8th, 1912, reporting a meeting involving among others the Kaiser himself, Admiral von Tirpitz and General von Moltke, where the decision to attack France and Russia was made. A one-and-a-half year delay was considered necessary for the fleet and the army to get ready, knowing that 2 or 3 years later Russia would have become too powerfull to be defeated. This is a strong point for those who advocate the German war guilt. Nevertheless, it does not prove that other governments were not following a similar war path in the same time...Jsoufron 10:40, 28 March 2006 (UTC)

"decision was made" -- pretty strong statement. What's the exact quote? Most historians say he discussed England as a likely future enemy. That is the sort of planning every country does. See John C. G. Röhl, The Kaiser and His Court. Wilhelm II and the Government of Germany, Cambridge 1994, see [2]Rjensen 10:57, 28 March 2006 (UTC)

Of course "decision was made" it is an overstatement and I apologize. The conclusion of the meeting (if we belive Fischer) was that a conflict was unavoidable and that Germany would have to declare war as soon as it would be ready for it. Fischer seems now to be generally accepted (he nearly lost his work as History Professor in Germany following his books' publications), but recent more comprehensive reviews show that several other countries were "on the war path" at the same time, hence the explosive evolution of the July crisis. See (if you can afford it, I only read a review!) Hamilton, Richard F., and Holger H. Herwig, eds. The Origins of World War I. New York: Cambridge University Press 550 pp., $60.00, ISBN 0-521-81735-8 Publication Date: February 2003.Jsoufron 16:19, 28 March 2006 (UTC)

I think most recent work has tended to suggest that Fischer greatly overestimated the importance of the meeting. Basically, the question was whether Germany should go to war in December 1912, in the context of the Balkan Crisis. Tirpitz said Germany wouldn't be ready for 18 months, and others (e.g. Bethmann) also opposed war. The whole "18 months" bit was mostly a way to get the Kaiser to back down, not expressing actual plans to go to war in 18 months. It is notable that when, in July 1914, Tirpitz was consulted about whether Germany should go to war, he once again said that the fleet would not be ready for another 18 months! Fischer took this event out of context and gave it an interpretation which most historians would now agree was not correct. john k 17:40, 28 March 2006 (UTC)

(This is not to say that it's inaccurate to say that "Fischer seems now to be generally accepted." I would say this is more or less true, especially since most of the essence of what Fischer said had already been said, but in a less polemical tone, by non-German historians like Albertini. But certain of Fischer's emphases are, I think, largely out of power. In particular, his argument that Germany had decided for war long before July 1914 has not been widely accepted. His argument that Germany's desire for war came out of a conscious "grasp for world power," is also outside the consensus, which more usually sees German actions as a result of pressures of German domestic politics. john k 17:42, 28 March 2006 (UTC))

Starting a temp article

Hello all, I'm going to start working on a new version of this article at User:John Kenney/Causes of World War I. I'll let you know when I start to get it towards being reasonable. john k 03:35, 22 April 2006 (UTC)

But first, as a preview, I've added a brief description of the July Crisis. It is pretty criminal for an article called Causes of World War I to not have any discussion of the basic chronology of the July Crisis. john k 03:46, 22 April 2006 (UTC)

Yes, this does need a complete rewrite

I'm just an ip address, but I find the article as a whole very dissatisfying. I think the primary reasons for that are: 1) a much too flexible understanding of the notion of "cause" and too much deflection of attention to any number of things that might have prevented the war if they had been different and/or gave it its particular character but certainly weren't "causes" per se; 2) too much attention to the historiography and debates that are academic in a metaphorical as well as literal sense. The result is a lot of text that says too little for trying to say too much. Obviously, the July crisis is the place to start with the revision. The Austrian heir apparent was assassinated in Sarajevo. The Austrians suspected Serbian complicity, if for no other reason than where the assassination took place, and issued an ultimatum. Serbia refused the ultimatum and the Austrians declared war. From there, a system of interlocking alliances and preemptive strategies did the rest. May 29, 2006.

well that is ONE interpretation. The problem is that it does not explain why Britain and France would take millions of casualties over one more in a long series of episodes in the Balkans. (of the USA for that matter). Rjensen 02:04, 30 April 2006 (UTC)

It is really difficult to be clear and short about the causes of WWI. Take this example: Austria's claims about Serbia's responsibility in the assassination were founded on much more serious ground that the simple fact that it took place in Serbia; but on the other hand Serbia did not reject the ultimatum, but only a detail, that is the control of Serbian police investigations by Austria, which seems hardly enough to sparkle a war.217.19.195.242 05:05, 30 April 2006 (UTC)

A couple of points - the historiography discussion is one of the few decent things about this article. I'd add that the Austrian ultimatum was purposely designed to be rejected, and that the Serbs knew quite well that their response would probably not be accepted as adequate by the Austrians. Anyway, I've not actually done much in the way of rewriting. I don't really have any books in front of me, and those I do have are mostly packed. But I definitely intend to do a rewrite. You can see my planned outline at User talk:John Kenney/Causes of World War I. Most of the sections are historiographical, but that's largely because I've reduced most of the narrative to one section "Discussion of European diplomatic history 1890-1914." Even so, I think that for any article of this sort, a structuring based around historiography is the only way to go. john k 07:00, 30 April 2006 (UTC)

I agree with you about the historiography note; it is quite important and, I think, good. One thing I would like to see in a rewrite is a more comprehensive account of the nationalism issue. It really is a complex issue that is very deep indeed, which had an equally deep impact upon the entire situation. Maximilli 21:19, 11 August 2006 (UTC)

ENTENTE with Britain was not an alliance

The Bitish/French Entente and the British/Russian Entente was NOT a formal alliance, in fact Germany was still banking on British Neutrality even when they had went into Luxemburg. I don't think it would be fair to list the Entente as a cause of WW1 per se, but consequence of the tension in Europe which was caused by the troulbes in the Balkans and Germany's ambition to have "its place in the sun" and upset the balance of power.

207.159.196.253 15:45, 4 August 2006 (UTC)

I guess I'm in a bit of a minority, but I don't really agree that a complete reworking is required. Explaining the origins in an overly chronilogical way gets very confused, so I think that making clear distinctions between the different strands of cause by type, rather than time is simpler. This way new additions can be added fairly easily without jumbling the article's chronology, which is often a problem in these articles. This article presently lays out pretty much all the main arguments in an equal manner, and then discusses the debate between these arguments and the historians who presented them, which seems to me to be the most NPOV way of doing things. And there is now a fairly detailed discussion of the July Crisis, so I don't see what the problem is. The section headings, ideological, structural, and specific, may be a bit confused, but I find it hard to group them differently. Oh, and if you think this article is bad, just wait till you see the Causes of World War II.Peregrine981 07:39, 30 August 2006 (UTC)

I have had an interest in WWI since 1976 when I was eleven years old. To be quite honest I have for most of these years been a Germanophile, meaning I was a german sympathizer. I have read many books on the related subjects. I also realize that WWI had an enormous influence on WWII.

I would implore these readers to explore the internet archives website. It was there that I found books written during the time in question. Many are very good. The two best ones are "Evidence in the case" by James Beck and "J'accuse" by A.German. If you take the time to read these books you will know who is responsible for WWI. It was Germany and Kaiser Wilhelm II. The old saying "first impressions" is really true. The impression at the time was overwhelmingly that Germany and her subordinate Austria had indeed started the war. Read the books. They are free. Decide for yourself. Go to www.archive.org/details/texts —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.84.230.67 (talk) 03:12, 14 January 2008 (UTC)

During the years since "Evidence in the case" was written, it was revealed that important sections of the Yellow and Orange Books were falsified creating a false timeline and to place war guilt on Germany and Austria-Hungary. While the British did not falsify their documents in the same way, they were taken in by the false Russian and French statements and included certain assumptions or excuses in their footnotes when the timeline would not quite fit together due to the French and Russian lies. Significant revelations bearing on war guilt continued through world war II as more Entente suppressed documents were captured or revealed, perhaps most significantly, the signed confession of the Chief of Serbian Military Intelligence to ordering the hit on Franz Ferdinand which he submitted to the Serbian Government in exile before his execution. After World War II, the release of suppressed documents slowed to a trickle. So, early works like Beck's may have some place in the historiography section, but are not that valuable for the general article. Please discuss proposed changes on the talk page before making edits.Werchovsky (talk) 19:11, 14 January 2008 (UTC)

A thorough investigation should be done on the accuracy of "evidence in the case". You did not comment on "j'accuse". I found that book very interesting. Also I read "Vandal of Europe" written by a former director of Krupp that was very damning of the kaiser. I guess in the final analysis Germany paid heavily for its mistakes by losing 35% of its territory between the two wars. Those lost lands will never be returned to Germany. I used to sympathize with the Germans but after what I have learned , I really think they got what they deserved considering all the people that died. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.84.230.67 (talk) 20:16, 14 January 2008 (UTC)

I see "j'accuse" was also written in 1915 and anonymously. Albertini is an excellent source; with 2200 pages, excellent citations and some interviews with the key players after the dust settled, reading it through is indispensable for an accurate and detailed understanding of the "Origins of the World War", and you will be happy to learn that he places primary responsibility on Germany, although he died before he could write his concluding chapter. Again, I recommend you discuss your edits in advance on the talk page.Werchovsky (talk) 21:32, 14 January 2008 (UTC)

I could not find the Albertini book at internetarchives.org/details but it is available used at Amazon for $14.00 so I will order it. Wonder why it is not available at the archives. well not all books, even old books are available. I recently read a book called "An empress in exile" by Princess Hermine, the kaiser's second wife. That book was also not available at the archives. Before I discovered the archives I was buying these old books used from Amazon for about $5.00 each, not a big cost. But I really love that archive because I have already downloaded into PDF files about 70 books primarily on German History. This is because I really wanted to figure out if possible who started WWI or who was primarily responsible for it. Now before the advent of the internet, one would have great difficulty finding these books written in 1914 to 1930. Libraries typically do not keep older books, probably because they literally fall apart.

Well, I am hoping these participants in this article will add to it so that it loses its fairly obvious bias towards Germany. As a former German Sympathizer I can understand to some degree where you guys are coming from, but I do believe with further investigation/education you guys will learn to become a bit more open minded. It is obvious that my attempts to edit this article have been thwarted by someone who just does not want both sides of the argument displayed. I will continue to edit this article as I believe it is very important for people to see the whole picture pro and con, until I get blocked. But from reading the Wikepedia bylaws, I do not believe my edits constitute vandalism as someone has alluded to. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.84.230.67 (talk) 16:14, 15 January 2008 (UTC)

Naval arms race

I deleted "Germany was hopelessly outguned" & added this:

"This ignores the self-evident fact Kriegsmarine had narrowed the gap by nearly half, and the Royal Navy had long felt (reasonably enough) a need to be stronger than any two potential oppenents; the United States Navy was in a period of growth, making the German gains very ominous, indeed."

I believe Keegan, among others, has mentioned the "2 opponent" standard. Sounds to me like somebody is a Ferguson disciple--or didn't do enough research. Trekphiler 08:53, 30 September 2006 (UTC)

What I'm wondering is, is there anyone else at all who has published work supporting this line of thinking (i.e.; the Ferguson one). His account is actually the only one I've seen purporting to debunk the naval race as a major cause. Not that it isn't compelling, I'm just wondering if other scholars agree. -Grahamdubya 18:42, 30 October 2006 (UTC)

I think most scholars would agree that the naval race was a major cause of Anglo-German rivalry and suspicion, but I think that many have also come to the conclusion that in the Bethmann years, at least, England had already pretty clearly decisively won the naval race, and it was clear that Tirpitz would never achieve the ratios he believed he needed for the "risk theory" to work. john k 18:18, 14 November 2006 (UTC)

Mangled history

New International Encyclopedia published in 1926 the fact that the Bagdad Railroad was one of the leading causes of World War One. "Editors" and "contributors" to Wikipedia have erased that fact from the articles that relate to the War. They've mangled history. No article related to World War One should include a picture of Napoleon Bonaparte who had been in his casket for 85 years. The War was caused by people who were alive in 1900, not by people who were alive in 1800. Colonialism and expansionism by Germany were fundamental causes of the War. GhostofSuperslum 07:11, 21 October 2006 (UTC)

Talk:Bagdad Railway contains a verbatim copy of the passage that is in New International Encyclopedia (published in 1926). GhostofSuperslum 16:40, 31 October 2006 (UTC)

its hard to find a historian in last 50 years who thinks Baghdad RR issue was a main issue....few even think it was a minor one. The documents were not open in 1926 when an old encyclopedia repeated the notion that the British were worried about the RR. Documents show they seldom considered it a major factor.

in last 50 years or so historians are agreed the major powers SETTLED the Baghdad RR issue before the war started, therefore it was not a cause. Specific mention - "Some of the optimism should be attributed to the willingness of the German government to compose long-standing differences. ...and in June 1914 a settlement was achieved over the Baghdad railway." from The Coming of the First World War. by R. J. W. Evans (british) and Hartmut Pogge Von Strandman (German) - Oxford UP 1990. Page 16Rjensen 00:20, 2 January 2007 (UTC)6. Likewise this recent quote "Furthermore, many economic and colonial issues which had been causing friction between French, German and British governments before 1914, such as the financing of the Berlin-Baghdad railway and the future disposition of the Portuguese colonies, had been resolved by the summer of 1914." from The Origins of the First World War. by Ruth Henig - Routledge. 2002. Page Number: 39

The people who were alive in 1900 to 1920 knew more about the worrisome changes that the Bagdad Railway created. Later (so-called) "historians" of the last 50 years cannot assess the situation more adroitly than the people who were alive in 1900 to 1920. They had determined that a grave threat to world peace was being built. Later (so-called) "historians" should go and take a long walk on a short pier. GhostofSuperslum 17:47, 15 January 2007 (UTC)

The Railroad issue was settled before the war started and it was not a cause of the war. The people writing at the time did NOT have access to the secret diplomatic and military documents in which policy makers discussed the issue. Those documents are NOW open so historians now have a much better understanding of what the policy makers thought at the time. Rjensen 19:41, 15 January 2007 (UTC)

even if the issues of the railroad were settled prior to the outbreak of war it does not mean that the whole issue was not a contributing factor to the war - at the very least the railroad caused friction between the great powers in the years leading up to the war and contributed to the uncertainty and the desire for the different sides to arm. There are so many issues here that are currently being discussed and it is distressing to see that reference (and references)of these issues has been systematically removed from wikipedia. Further, even if the issue of the railroad was settled by politicians, the fact that it was kept secret from the public means that public misconception of the issues would have been a conributary factor to their willingness to accept war, regards, sbandrews (t) 19:27, 30 March 2007 (UTC)

Oil

One single mention of oil on the whole page and that relegated to the footnotes... Is there some kind of codeword here used for oil? sbandrews (t) 17:23, 18 March 2007 (UTC)

this is about WWI not Iraq!— Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.206.226.136 (talk)

I respectfully think that Rjensen is dead wrong in his interpretation and acceptance of modern "historians" authority and rightness. WW1 had much to do with oil, just maybe not quite as much as the modern day Gulf Wars 1 and 2. "Posterity (or history written by the victors) is as likely to be wrong as anyone else" - Heywood Broun, 1888-1939, US Journalist. In the interests of evenhandedness, I believe that the Baghdad Railway belongs in the "Causes of WW1" page in a balanced, explanatory paragraph. It is referenced by both modern and contemporary published historical writing, and would be balanced, and in keeping with Wikipedia's non-POV policy.Bcameron54 18:41, 4 April 2007 (UTC)

the land area now known as iraq was in WWI, it was one of the first places the UK sent troops - oil is not a new invention, it has dominated commerce and politics since the late 19th C. sbandrews (t) 17:48, 23 March 2007 (UTC)

Often the presence of a single recalcitrant Wikipedian has a drastic effect on the entries that appear on a page. In this article, someone has a dread of the Bagdad railroad, Iraq, oil, and Germany gaining access to German East Africa where there were slaves and wealth and being able to bypass the Suez Canal. Disconnected entries such as "The Schlieffen Plan" rest on the page, while Bagdad railroad is nowhere in sight, even though it was one of the major causes of World War I. GhostofSuperslum 01:00, 4 April 2007 (UTC)

Historians do not make much of the Baghdada RR as a cause of the war. That theory went away when the diplomatic records were opened in the 1930s. I suggest GhostofSuperslum needs to find some historians of recent decades who claim otherwise. Otherwise Wiki goes with the experts. Standard recent histories sayg this: "Some of the optimism should be attributed to the willingness of the German government to compose long-standing differences. ...and in June 1914 a settlement was achieved over the Baghdad railway." [Evans (1990) Page 166.] and "Many economic and colonial issues which had been causing friction between French, German and British governments before 1914, such as the financing of the Berlin-Baghdad railway and the future disposition of the Portuguese colonies, had been resolved by the summer of 1914."[Henig (2002) Page 39.] Rjensen 01:19, 4 April 2007 (UTC)

Kuwait

The Osmanlis began their conquest of Mesopotamia early in the sixteenth century and in 1638 the land passed completely into their power.[3] In the Great War the Arab movement for complete independence from Turkey was encouraged by the British who promised to recognize the autonomy of the Hejaz if its revolt were successful.[4] The independence of the Hejaz was proclaimed by Husein ibn Ali, June 5, 1916, who assumed the title King of the Hejaz, and the Hejaz was recognized as an independent State in the treaty of peace with Turkey.[5] The story of Arabia, over the period 1914-24, may be divided into two phases, the first that of the ascendancy of the British in Arabian affairs, exerted largely through the control of the King of the Hedjaz; the second that of the passing of this influence with the growing suspicion of British purposes and the increasing importance of of the native Wahabi movement, led by the Emir Ibn Saud.[6] During the period 1914-24, Ibn Saud, Emir of Nejd and spiritual leader of the Wahabi or Akhwan movement, steadily extended the outposts of his domain, so that 1924 saw him as the most influential individual in Arab affairs.[7] In 1914 he wisely allied himself with Great Britain and thus was able to wage war without hindrance against his neighbor to the North, Ibn Rashid, Emir of Jebel Shammar, who had espoused the cause of the Turks.[8] Meanwhile Ibn Saud continued to consolidate his position and advance his power to the East. Koweit was his immediate objective.[9]

In 1924 Turkish nationalists abandoned the Ottoman caliphate (March 3, 1924)[10] which had been held by rulers of Turkey since the 16th century.[11] Had the Ottoman Empire and Germany been able to construct the Bagdad railroad, the Porte would not have lost control of Arabia. Both Turkey and Germany would have become powerful. World War I prevented them from completing the railroad to the Persian Gulf where Kuwait exists (at this time) with United States troops occupying it and nearby Iraq. GhostofSuperslum 15:40, 4 April 2007 (UTC)

good, there seems to be a growing consensus that the Baghdad Railway issue needs to be included in this page as one of the causes of WWI. Even those people who argue that it was not a cause should see that discussion of the issue should appear in this article - if their arguments against it being a cause are as strong as they claim then that should be obvious to the educated reader, right? With this in mind, where should the paragraph on the Baghdad Railroad go, under imperialism, or in a new section titled oil? Comments? Note also, detailed discussions of sources etc. may be better discussed on the talk:Baghdad Railway page, where there has already been much discussion, regards sbandrews (t) 21:40, 5 April 2007 (UTC)

agreed. the railway need not be put forward as a proximate cause of WW1, but as a primary manifestation of the threat of German economic and naval power (through oil) to rival British dominance, and of potential for German evasion of British monopoly on shipping. Even if some historians felt "the railway issue was resolved" - how? in ownership? control? or existence? - this railway manifestation of German rivalry and economic threat was worth British political and military interventions - like the creation of Kuwait to block rail access to the Persian Gulf (in keeping with policy of strategic exclusion of the (rival) dominant european power), and the significant movement of troops to that area thereafter. I suggest that a section on oil and trade be made, as that was the bottom line, whether the railway issue was 'resolved' or not - the economic rivalry and threat of an oil-fired German industry and unfettered trading economy remained, war came, and the railway did not.Bcameron54 04:44, 6 April 2007 (UTC)

ok, oil and trade, it should come after imperialism and colonial expansion (somewhat related sections), it should also make reference to the naval switch to oil, that was key, the chalenge to uk naval hegemony. Have you got a good ref for the kuwait rail block aspect - that's not one I've seen before. Also one detail I'm lacking is where did Germany get it's oil from during the war? All these points about the RR are rather mute if she had a good supply from somewhere else, regards sbandrews (t) 12:38, 6 April 2007 (UTC)

Oh, good God. I concur with everything Rjensen has said. This is all nonsense. Britain went to war with Germany because Germany attacked France and Belgium. This is all a sideshow, and you need to provide some actual sources for these absurd claims. john k 13:42, 6 April 2007 (UTC)

Just to note - mentioning the Baghdad railway alongside the naval race as a cause of friction between Britain and Germany in the years before the war is fine. But that's all it was, and it was only a relatively minor source of friction. An encyclopedia written in 1926 cannot be a reliable source on a subject like this, where there's been vast amounts written since. john k 13:44, 6 April 2007 (UTC)

"For more than two decades, the question of the question of the construction of a modern railway linking Colonial Europe with Baghdad was a point of friction at the center of German-English relations. By the estimation of Deutsche Bank director Karl Helfferich, the person responsible at the time for the Baghdad rail project negociations, no other issue led to greater tension between London and Berlin in the decade and a half before 1914, with the possible exception of Germany's naval fleet." Engdahl - A Century of War, page 22. Wrt your point about the cause being the attack on Belgium, I think we are looking a bit deeper into the causes on this page, but yes, that was part of the linkage certainly, this is another part, regards sbandrews (t) 13:58, 6 April 2007 (UTC)

I'd prefer a reference to an actual book on the origins of World War I. Here, by the way, is the entirety of comments on the Baghdad railway as a source of tensions between Britain and Germany in Luigi Albertini's ''Origins of the War of 1914, still the definitive narrative of the origins of the war, which was published in the 1940s:

1. English governing circles and Grey, who voiced their views, wanted anything but war and were anxious to find a settlement of the questions pending with Germany, such as that of the Portuguese colonies and, more serious still, of the Bagdad railway. The agreement on the former question, based on a sort of mortgage to Germany of part of Angola and Mozambique, was initialled on 20 October 1913, that oon the Bagdad railway not until 15 June 1914. This latter was of great importance, as the Bagdad railway was one of the major sources of friction between the two countries. There still remained, however, the chief cause of all the trouble, German naval construction which threatened the very existence of England and drove her inevitably towards France and Russia...

The basic issue with the Baghdad railway is that it was a major source of tension between Germany and Britain for a decade or two before the war. However, the issue was actually resolved before the July Crisis began, as part of a general warming of Anglo-German relations which occurred right before the war. If we're going to mention the railway, we must mention that the issue was resolved. Beyond that, it seems fairly clear that the naval race was the main cause of tension (as Albertini says, although he perhaps overestimates the danger of the German fleet to Britain in 1914). As to oil, I'm not sure in what way oil is meant to have caused the war. The problem I have with this discussion is that it seems to be driven by conspiracy theorists who are trying to prove some grand theory about oil-driven imperialism as the reason for the war. This simply is not supported by the historiography, and constitutes either original research or else undue weight to a very fringe point of view. [ETA: I am not accusing anyone of doing original research. I am stating that including a lengthy discussion of oil-driven imperialism as the reason for World War I would constitute original research or else a violation of due weight policies, as this is not a theory of the origins of the war found in mainstream historical scholarship.] john k 14:59, 6 April 2007 (UTC)

I don't really have anything to add to this discussion other than to agree with Rjensen and John K. WWI had nothing to do with a blood-for-oil conspiracy. Haber 15:39, 6 April 2007 (UTC)

Engdahl's book is a valid source, it is representative of what a growing number of people are saying about the causes of the first world war, you may not agree with it, but people are saying it - and incidentaly people were saying the same things right after the war. You cannot pick and choose references limiting them to the ones that mirror your opinion. There is no 'standard text' for the causes of WWI. I am not a *conspiracy theorist*, I simply want even weight given to all ideas in this article, at present it is simply censored. sbandrews (t) 16:38, 6 April 2007 (UTC)

It is not censorship to follow wikipedia's policies on due weight. And there certainly are standard sources on the origins of World War I. Albertini remains the standard work on the chronology of the July Crisis, although perhaps not for other subjects. James Joll's The Origins of the First World War is probably the standard recent work on the subject more broadly. He discusses the Baghdad railway somewhat more extensively than Albertini. He also even mentions oil in context of the railway. What he says does not, however support an argument that oil was a major cause of the war. Here's Joll's remarks on the subject:

One other factor provided a basis for agreement [between Britain and Germany on the subject of the Baghdad railway]—a factor which a few years later would have made agreement improbable if not impossible: the growing realization of the importance of the oil deposits in Mesopotamia and southern Persia. In 1914 this was still a comparatively new development, and it had taken decades to develop the technology required for extracting, refining and transporting the oil. But in 1912 the British Admiralty decided to start converting some of the fleet from coal to oil fuel and to construct new oil-fired Dreadnoughts; and already by 1914 25,000 tons of oil a month were being imported from south Persia. Oil was about t o become a strategic as well as a commercial product, though the implications were only just beginning to be realized. The British, after negotiations between the Turkish government and the various international groups which held concessions to drill for oil, succeeded in winning a controlling s hare in the oil companies operating i n Mesopotamia and Persia. Although the German financial groups involved finally failed to win more than a 25 per cent share of the exploitation of oil deposits in Turkey, this was less because of a failure of the two governments to agree than because of the chronic German shortage of capital. The Turkish government w as also able to exploit the fact that the American Standard Oil Company was now offering to pay cash for a transfer to them of the oil concessions – whose legal status was undoubtedly confused, if not dubious – so that the British and German governments and financiers quickly settled their differences in the face of the new threat.

Although the British and Germans succeeded in reaching agreement over their economic and strategic interests in Turkey in spite of their wider imperial rivalry, it remains uncertain who got the better of the bargain, because, however these agreements might have worked out in peacetime, war broke out within two months of the initialling of the Baghdad Railway agreement (and the railway itself was still hundreds of miles from Baghdad)...The Anglo-German negotiatoins about the Baghdad Railway showed, like the bargaining about the Portuguese colonies, that it was still possible to find a basis for specific agreements even within the framework of the wider rivalry between the two countries; and in any case ordinary diplomatic and e conomic relations continued right up to the outbreak of war, and it was only at the last minute —and not always even then—that they were subordinated to preparations for war. Nevertheless the case of Turkey—like that of China a decade earlier—and the complex story of Anglo-German co-operation and rivalry there suggests that here was an area in which imperialist rivalries among the European Great Powers were contributing to the instability which made the outbreak of war possible.

Basically, the s trongest we should say about the Baghdad Railway issue, on the side of it being a cause of war, is more or less what Joll says - that it was just one example, among many, of imperialist rivalries that made the European scene more unstable, and thus indirectly made war more likely. As to oil, it seems fairly clear that Joll is saying that the oil issue actually made Britain and Germany more likely to co-operate. john k 18:35, 6 April 2007 (UTC)

I can't remember that I ever said the RR was a *major* cause of the war, I said that this article has no mention *at all* of either the RR or oil, and that I thought that was wrong. The quotes you have provided are just the sort of thing I would like to see in the article. I am not a historian, so I will have to be guided by others who have more knowledge, if would you like to suggest a length and title for the section to be included that you consider 'due weight', and we can move on from there, I am not trying to make unreasonable demands here, sbandrews (t) 18:49, 6 April 2007 (UTC)

So England went to war because Germany invaded Belgium? And would be done by Christmas? That's what England said at the time, to send its own people to war. And others say the causes were complex, deep, and much about economics. Oil was recognised then for its potential impact for a German navy on the coal-fired British navy, but also on German industry. It was and is still all about economics and power. One point was not so much to seize that oil, but to exclude German access from oil and trade and address the growing German threat to the dominance of the British Empire. England went to war for very good reason, and that was not to protect Belgium and France, or for a cascade of treaties that led it into costly action against its interests after some foreign prince got shot in the Balkans, but to protect its Empire from a real threat, and sustain division and balance on the continent. The stakes were huge. We have several historians saying one or another thing, so why not be balanced about it? More historians more recently saying one thing in one language, by the way, does not make it more likely true. Being balanced does not mean neutral, either, but it does mean not to silence those who disagree. Think wiki, this is Wikipedia, not your essay. Bcameron54 19:27, 6 April 2007 (UTC)

Bcameron, perhaps you can support some references to support your position here? I'm not trying to be an apologist for the British here, but I think it's hard to dispute that the British basically went to war because they thought that a German victory over France would be disastrous to their interests. (Not because of the invasion of Belgium, which I did not posit as the reason Britain went to war. A German invasion of France alone would also have led to British involvement, without doubt.) Why they thought this is a bit more complicated - long-standing British opposition to a single power dominating the continent and concern about Germany's increasing naval strength were the main factors. In terms of actual German threats to the dominance of the British Empire, I think that's overplayed - the French and Russians were much more serious direct threats to the British Empire. Beyond this, the basic fact is that talking too much about Britain obscures the basic fact that Britain was only a side-player in the crisis. The key decisions were taken in Vienna, Berlin, and, to a lesser extent, St. Petersburg and Belgrade. Finally, please give some sources on your arguments. What recent works on the origins of the First World War make the arguments you are making? john k 20:45, 6 April 2007 (UTC)

"Oh, good God. I concur with everything Rjensen has said. This is all nonsense. Britain went to war with Germany because Germany attacked France and Belgium. This is all a sideshow, and you need to provide some actual sources for these absurd claims. john k 13:42, 6 April 2007 (UTC)" - just to remind you how you entered the debate - you seem to have forgotten. However, I agree that it would be usefull if Bcameron were to provide more references. And I certainly don't agree with you that Britain was only a 'side player', but all this is besides the point - can we not get started on repairing the damage that has been done to the article? How big a section is fair, and what should its title be? We can work on references later. sbandrews (t) 21:11, 6 April 2007 (UTC)

Morris Jastrow, Jr. "The War and the Bagdad Railway - the story of Asia Minor and its relation to the present conflict" 1917. JB Lippincott. Professor Jastrow of Philadelphia wrote in introduction to the second impression ""...I felt it desirable to emphasize that the various issues which confronted Europe at the outbreak of the war in 1914, - among which was, as I endeavoured to show, the Bagdad (sic) Railway was the largest single contributing factor, - have been moved into the background through the supreme and paramount issue... ...the existence of a ruthless militarism in close alliance with an entirely antiquated form of autocratic government..." Why someone up there repeatedly deleted this contemporary, academic reference is baffling to me. Many history students are biased towards modern secondary references (weight of evidence being confused with repetition), not contemporary references. Both are equally susceptible to the pressures of their times, and it is wrong to delete one because it does not fit today's point of view (see EH Carr, "What is History?", for that discussion).

Albertini (above), and FW Engdahl are references enough to warrant the Railway in Wikipedia.Bcameron54 22:45, 6 April 2007 (UTC)

good, well we can all agree on Albertini then at the very least - I will try and get a copy, regards sbandrews (t) 23:47, 6 April 2007 (UTC)

Albertini and Joll and other historians say the RR issue and oil issues were resolved--ended--by June 1914. They brought England and Germany closer together, not further apart. Morris Jastrow was an archaeologist who read a lot of newspapers but had never seen any of the diplomatic notes that Albertini, Joll etc have used. Jastrow in 1917 did not know the issue as been resolved. He never claimed even to have talked to German, Turkish or British diplomats. In a word, Jastrow is not a reliable source and cannot be used in Wiki. As for Engdahl, no one seems to have actually quoted what he said or what sources he used. I note from Amazon.com: There are several serious drawbacks to the book. Most importantly, the author does a great disservice to this subject by stating or (more often) implying that everything that occurs is part of some vast, organized conspiracy. It could allow critics/skeptics to dismiss the otherwise strong arguments of this book. Engdahl states that certain people `mysteriously' die, or brings up vague connections between various participants, but never explores these in depth. Second, there are not nearly enough references in this book to provide independent evidence to support many of the claims. The author should have done a MUCH better job documenting independent sources for his claims. Third, there is way too much hyperbole in this book, the language is just way overblown: everything is enormous, catastrophic, etc. The poor value of the Jastrow book can be seen by reading it--the best parts are about the ancient Hittites! See [12] for full text. Rjensen 01:01, 7 April 2007 (UTC)

I quoted Engdahl above - do you even read what people write? You keep on bringing up the same argument over and over - yes the RR issue was 'settled' before the war, but that just isn't the point is it, the point is that it caused friction *in the years leading up to* the war. You use amazon.com as a source of advice on the quality of books!!!! That's hilarious! But I think you say it all nevertheless, "It could allow critics/skeptics to dismiss the otherwise strong arguments of this book" - there are a lot of good quotes in that book - one of which I used above - do please take the time to read it, regards sbandrews (t) 04:33, 7 April 2007 (UTC)

If you disagree with the message, attack the messenger? For Engdahl, at least post the whole Amazon review (well, you cited it...), which is favourable:

"7 of 7 people found the following review helpful:

Shocking - read this to learn how the world really operates, January 31, 2007 Reviewer: Utah Blaine

If you want to understand how the world economy runs and how it is dominated by the United States, why most of the `big events' in international affairs of the 20th century occured, why the US invaded Iraq, and why the US is threatening Iran, in short if you want to know the facts that are driving the headlines, READ THIS BOOK. This book is far from perfect, as I explain below, and you may not agree with everything that Engdahl says (I don't), but I guarantee that it will change your worldview forever.

The fundamental theme of this book is to describe the relationship between international monentary policy, banking, and the geopolitics of oil, and how the confluence of these three economic factors has central link between virtually all of the great events of the 20th century. Engdahl starts by discussing the state of the British empire at the end of the 19th century, the threat posed by the industrial rise of Germany, and the role that new technologies play in this rivalry. Central to this technological revolution is an energy revolution and access to oil. He described how the large banking conglomerates of NYC and London formed and grew in power as a result of WWI and their intimate link to oil. This is tied in to the growth of the US economy before and during WWII, and the supreme position the US found itself in after the war. There is a lengthy discussion about the Bretton Woods conference in which the world formally accepted a link between the dollar and gold. The most interesting part of the book is the discussion of the floating of the dollar in the late 60s and the relationship between the dollar and 1973 oil shock. Finally, Engdahl explains how manipulations of the price of oil and the strength of the dollar have been made over the last 30 years to carry out various policy objectives. There is some discussion of peak oil in the final chapter.

There are several serious drawbacks to the book. Most importantly, the author does a great disservice to this subject by stating or (more often) implying that everything that occurs is part of some vast, organized conspiracy. It could allow critics/skeptics to dismiss the otherwise strong arguments of this book. Engdahl states that certain people `mysteriously' die, or brings up vague connections between various participants, but never explores these in depth. Second, there are not nearly enough references in this book to provide independent evidence to support many of the claims. The author should have done a MUCH better job documenting independent sources for his claims. Third, there is way too much hyperbole in this book, the language is just way overblown: everything is enormous, catastrophic, etc. Even with all these negatives though, I still rate this as a five star book because I believe that Mr. Engdahl's central argument regarding the relation between monentary policy, international banking, and the geopolitics of oil is correct, and this is the best single volume source that explains how these are tied together and how they have evolved over the past 100+ years.

Incidentally, there are two somewhat peripheral point brought up by Engdahl that most 21st century Americans will find interesting. The economic choices made by the British empire over 50+ years as it declined from the late 19th century until it was definitively replaced by the US after WWII are now being made by the US. Second, if you want to know why the US invaded Iraq, and why we are trying to instigate a war with Iran, read this book. The issue had absolutely nothing to do with WMD, Saddam's war crimes, or violations of UN resolutions. The overwhelming majority of people have no idea why we went into Iraq, and more importantly what the stakes are if we fail. People may say that it is about oil, which is true, but not in the way people think. We may never see one drop of Iraqi oil in the US, yet we still invaded. Finally, if you are sceptical of Mr. Engdahl's claim, take a look at the book `Sunrise at Abadan' about the British and Soviet invasion of Iran in 1941. Both countries were literally fighting for their lives, yet they committed vast resources to invade and occupy Iran. Richard Stewart (a retired major in the USMC) described how oil from Iran was absolutely critical to the British war effort.

Bottom line though - a shocking, eye opening book that I highly recommend, even if it is far from perfect."

There are lots of other Amazon reviews and testimonials on this book by satisfied customers, if that is the new standard for evaluation of references in Wikipedia! Your selective citing of a convenient fragment of a "source" is very unbalanced, and I think historians should be spanked when they do that in writing history. I happen to think that his referencing is better than average. Read the book and judge it yourself.

Next, for your assessment of Jastrow (the pdf link doesn't work, I would appreciate seeing it, although I have the book), his not having claimed to have spoken to diplomats about what he saw and read of is not to discredit his interpretations. Diplomats' words are not reliable sources for those interested in balanced interpretations, so I am rather assured that he doesn't claim them as his sources. I'm glad you didn't complain that his sources weren't politicians. I think you dislike the message he offers, and you have attacked and ridiculed him, rather than his message, except to tiresomely cite the authority of later modern historians who did read what diplomats said, and then said that the RR issue was all nicely settled, and that was that. Nothing that you say suggests that he was factually wrong, just that you disagree. As for his reliability, well, he was there at the time. If you think his writing and thinking is shallow, please read the preface to the second impression - he was well informed, thoughtful, and cautious in his verdict. If you think Jastrow is an unworthy reference for Wikipedia, well, what would an Amazon customer review say? And if you think his writing on the Hittites is more worthy, what do you think his sources were?

I think there is enough material to offer the RR as an issue, a manifestation among the many causes of WW1, at least as much as the Crimean war - surely that was settled! - and that Wikipedia can handle some uncertainty with balance in such a complex topic. Bcameron54 05:20, 7 April 2007 (UTC)

It seems fairly evident from descriptions of Engdahl's book that he has engaged in no primary research of the origins of World War I, but rather is making a polemical argument based on secondary sources. He is not an appropriate source for wikipedia. Nor is Jastrow, who is really a primary source about what (some) people believed about the origins of the war in 1917, not a good reliable source on the actual causes of war - as Rjensen has noted, Jastrow had no access to the diplomatic documents that would be necessary to actually make the case that the Baghdad Railway issue was actually a key cause of the war. He is also not an appropriate source for this article. I would be happy to include a statement similar to Joll's on the subject of the Baghdad railroad. john k 16:59, 7 April 2007 (UTC)

now you really have lost me - could you point me to the specific wiki guidelines that you think disqualifies Engdahl. What descriptions of Engdahl's book are you using? I hope not the Amazon.com one? Please quote your sources, as you have asked others to dosbandrews (t) 17:04, 7 April 2007 (UTC)

I'm reading between the lines of the amazon reviews, and also looking at information about Engdahl more generally. At the very least, it is clear that Engdahl is not a historian, and that he is relying on secondary sources for his discussion of the origins of World War I. It would also appear, although I cannot say this for sure without reading the book, that he traffics in conspiracy theories. I don't understand why we should use him as a source when there are perfectly credible standard sources like Joll that are available for us to use. john k 18:09, 7 April 2007 (UTC)

can I make this quite clear - amazon.com is not, in any way, a source of information, between the lines or otherwise! That review could be written by some amatuer - he could be 10 years old - this is laughable! sbandrews (t) 18:18, 7 April 2007 (UTC)

I looked at all twenty reviews in an effort to gain some sense of the contents of the book. I do not trust the reviewers' judgments of the quality of the book (obviously, as the reviewers all loved it), but I assume that they would have some sense of what the basic line of argument is. Given that there don't appear to be any legitimate reviews of the book, I don't have much else to go on. I repeat that there is no reason to use Engdahl, who is not a historian and who has not done any original research on the origins of World War I, when we can cite respectable sources like Joll. john k 18:32, 7 April 2007 (UTC)

I just noticed you said you haven't read the book! So your judgment on it containing conspiracy theories is based solely on *reading between the lines* of anonymous reveiws submitted to an online book store? :) sbandrews (t) 18:58, 7 April 2007 (UTC)

Sigh, whatever. Engdahl is not a historian. He has not done any archival research on the origins of World War I. Perfectly good, standard, historical sources, like Joll, are available which discuss the Baghdad railway in a sensible way. Engdahl, from everything I can tell about him, is a conspiracy-monger (and this is not just Amazon reviews— which, btw, one does not need to "read between the lines" about to tell that the book deals in conspiracy theories - they say it straight out!— but also everything available on Google about the guy, which all pretty clearly points towards "fringe conspiracy theorist.") john k 19:26, 7 April 2007 (UTC)

read on google? is google a source too, I thought it was a search engine. sbandrews (t) 19:43, 7 April 2007 (UTC)

Oh, please. john k 22:37, 7 April 2007 (UTC)

I had a look at wiki's entry, F. William Engdahl, no mention of conspiracy, maybe that needs your attention? sbandrews (t) 19:48, 7 April 2007 (UTC)

I would need better sources than I have to modify his wikipedia article. But a web search reveals enough that is dubious that I don't want to use him as a source on this. But this is really beside the point. Engdahl's book is not a book about the origins of World War I. He is not a historian. He has no academic credentials at all, so far as I can tell. There are literally hundreds of books by academic historians on the origins of World War I. Why should we use a dubious source like Engdahl when there's plenty of good sources that exist? You keep on avoiding this issue by carping about me using google. john k 22:37, 7 April 2007 (UTC)

carping on? I mentioned it once? is that carping on? I make it a matter of policy when editing Wikipedia that my edits are consistent across the encyclopedia - you should do the same, if you are going to trash Engdahl here, you should do so also on his bio page. If your sources are not good enough there, they are *certainly* not good enough here. sbandrews (t) 22:56, 7 April 2007 (UTC)

Er, no, it is on you to demonstrate that Engdahl is an appropriate source for this article, when, quite obviously, he is not. And you continue to avoid the main point, so I'll repeat it again: Engdahl is not a historian, he has not written a book about the topic of this article. There are plenty of reputable sources discussing the Baghdad railway and the origins of the First World War, such as Joll. Why should we cite Engdahl? john k 23:26, 7 April 2007 (UTC)

well thank you, that's at least a move in the right direction, I will look into Engdahl and try to prove him fit for use on this page. And yes let's use Joll and as many sources as we can - lets not limit ourselves by discounting sources that, for example, we have not yet read. The article currently has very poor inline citations - some sections just look 'tagged on', there is much work to do. Kind regards, sbandrews (t) 23:48, 7 April 2007 (UTC)

Of course one can dismiss sources one has not read. That's what reviews are for, for instance - to tell you whether a book is worthwhile. That Engdahl appears not to have been reviewed in any mainstream or scholarly media available online does not speak well for him. john k 00:03, 8 April 2007 (UTC)

Proposal

For the new section, I have two titles to suggest, either 'Geopolitics', or 'Ottoman sucession'. Both of which are currently missing from the article and both of which allow for a balanced discussion of the Baghdad Railway, while at the same time keeping the title neutral. Comments? sbandrews (t) 13:30, 7 April 2007 (UTC)

I looked at the Jastrow book. He was an archaeologist and most of the book deals with the Hittite Empire 2000+ years before, and Ottoman history before 1880. The period since 1900 is based on a few magazine articles. He was unaware of the solution the main powers reached in 1914. Rjensen 13:34, 7 April 2007 (UTC)

I can live with Jastrow's unawareness of the diplomatic "solution" which seems to centre on the financing of the RR, which is quite alright to delineate. I think that a section on "Geopolitics" is appropriate, to address the economic and military rivalry and important strategy of access to oil and trade. Bcameron54 14:06, 7 April 2007 (UTC)

good, we can prominantly state that the financing of the RR was settled, I think we are all happy with that, rjensen? sbandrews (t) 14:45, 7 April 2007 (UTC)

time to take up the pen. I will draft here a proposed section in a while. Bcameron54 05:46, 22 July 2007 (UTC)

GEOPOLITICS:

 German rivalry to the colonial British Empire in industry and trade, and the introduction of oil.  Are these suitable items to frame a section?  —Preceding unsigned comment added by Bcameron54 (talk • contribs) 02:45, 30 December 2007 (UTC) 

Proposal - Main WWI article

The main WWI article has been flagged as overlong - we are asked to move material through here, the July crisis section looks a good candidate, being longer in WWI than here, comments? sbandrews (t) 09:46, 8 April 2007 (UTC)

swapped them over sbandrews (t) 00:09, 9 April 2007 (UTC)

Causes of World War I#Contemporary justifications, politico-moral

This section need expanding/merging/deleting? A better title? What does it mean? Is is encyclopaedic? sbandrews (t) 10:32, 8 April 2007 (UTC)

Conflicting data

In the July crisis and Declaration of War section, it is stated that Austria-Hungary declared war on July 28. In the Web of Alliances section, the declaration of war date is July 30. Which is it?Nschoem 21:10, 8 April 2007 (UTC)

well spotted, its July 28th according to Henig, sbandrews (t) 21:36, 8 April 2007 (UTC)

July 28th

Currently we have:

• The Serbians, relying on the hope of support from Russia, ordered mobilization and gave an equivocal response which led to Austrian rejection, and to a declaration of war on July 28. The Russians mobilized in support of their Serbian allies.

This reads like Serbia was prepared to risk an Austrian attack - Henig (1989) page 25 says that this is "not definitely established" - is Henig wrong? sbandrews (t) 22:08, 8 April 2007 (UTC)

I don't know what you mean by that, but it is a fact that mobilization was ordered on the 25th, three hours before the reply was sent. For that matter something about Russia proclaiming a period preparatory to war at about this time probably belongs in there too (military preparations on all fronts were ongoing before their partial mobilization against the undefended Austrian frontier). This is supposed to describe the order in which military preparations were being started right? --Loje 22:35, 8 April 2007 (UTC)

hi, I didn't mean to question the mobilisation, that is the logical thing for them to do, sounds fine, it's just mobilisation, combined with 'equivocal response' sounds to me like we are saying that they wanted/expected war as a response to their reply, I'm more questioning Henig I suppose - sbandrews (t) 22:46, 8 April 2007 (UTC)

Oh, I didn't notice that part. Obviously they were prepared to risk an attack, its hard to see how any deviation from full acceptance could have been seen as something other than at least a risk of war, I'll have to look at Henig I suppose. Whether war was desired, it was made more probable by these moves, but that could have been more the risk of such action than the goal. I've heard it suggested that the mobilization was to appease those in the government who favored resistence that the reply was not a cave in.--Loje 23:02, 8 April 2007 (UTC)

ah, thanks for that, Btw, due to a reorganisation, your edit is now in the main WWI article, (explanation above) sbandrews (t) 00:20, 9 April 2007 (UTC)

Certainly the Serbs knew that there was a great risk of war. I don't think they wanted a war, but Pasic felt that he couldn't really avoid it if the Austrians really wanted one - if he gave in to the Austrian demands, his government would fall and a more nationalist government would come in and war would probably still happen. john k 04:04, 9 April 2007 (UTC)

indeed the Kaiser thought the reply was good enough (Henig 1989 p29) so I think equivocal is too hard a word, but its hard to find a better one.. sbandrews (t) 10:45, 9 April 2007 (UTC)

• The Serbians, relying on the hope of support from Russia, ordered mobilization and gave a veiled response which led to Austrian rejection, and to a declaration of war on July 28. The Russians mobilized in support of their Serbian allies.

Veiled? I'm not sure what that means. Basically, the Austrians mostly agreed to most of the conditions, but rejected the one about Austrian officials investigating the crime in Serbia. On some of the others, reservations were expressed. I'm not sure what one word gives the best sense of this, but "equivocal" seems more or less correct to me. john k 17:11, 9 April 2007 (UTC)

veiled is the word henig uses - not me. Who else uses equivocal? sbandrews (t) 17:14, 9 April 2007 (UTC)

Word choice is not an issue which has to be sourced, in that it's basically one of paraphrasing, which we are allowed to do. I don't think the term "veiled reply" clearly makes sense unless it is further explained. john k 17:20, 9 April 2007 (UTC)

essentially my point with "equivocal reply", well perhaps I'll try rephrasing it more. sbandrews (t) 17:25, 9 April 2007 (UTC)

"Equivocal reply" actually was a very kind way of putting it. It was, in fact, a pack of lies. The troubles begin well before getting to the enumerated demands. Take this sentence from the preamble, for example: "For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised at the statements, according to which members of the Kingdom of Serbia are supposed to have participated in the preparation for the crime committed at Sarajevo;". Serbia, in fact, was not at all surprised, and it was not supposition but established fact. According to documents and the Prime Minister's hand written notes, PM Pasic had been briefed on the participation of several Serbian Military Officers in the assassination conspiracy on or about June 5 while the assassins and their weapons were on their way from Belgrade to Sarajevo. Following that briefing, the civilian government secretly investigated the activities of these members of the military. There is also cabinet member testimonial evidence that PM Pasic knew about the assassination plot even before the June 5 briefing. Beyond that, Austria-Hungary had provided advance information to Serbia. By the time he got the Austrian letter, PM Pasic knew far more than the Austrians. Except for point #10, which is simply a promise to report on progress on the other demands (the Serbian response to point 8 was also accepted by Austria, but it too contains lies, for it promises an immediate inquiry, where in fact a secret one had begun long before receipt of the Austrian letter, and the promised punishments have not been executed to this day), there is something wrong with all the Serbian responses. Especially amusing is point 7, the arrest of Major Tankosic and Milan Ciganovic. Serbia stated that it had complied with the demand to arrest Tankosic, but then turned arround and released him, even though there was overwhelming evidence he had committed extremely serious crimes in violation of Serbian law. On Milan Ciganovic's arrest, Serbia said he could not be found, but in fact the Chief of Police had told him to get out of town, a fact that Austria was aware of. Transparent lies are the hurled gauntlet of diplomacy. Did anyone really expect Austria not to pick it up?

Werchovsky 17:57, 16 May 2007 (UTC)

Delays and misunderstandings in diplomatic communications

In the (now) rather muddled 'origins of war' section it mentions 'delays and misinderstandings'. Delays, yup that's ok, but can someone tell me what the main misunderstandings were, regards, sbandrews (t) 19:22, 11 April 2007 (UTC)

The Willy Nicky telegrams 30th July 1:20 (available online) the phrase "The military measures which have now come into force were decided five days ago" was used by the Czar and gave the Kaiser the mistaken impression that the mobilization was secretly underway for five days already.

Luigi Albertini, in his The Origins of the War in 1914 vol.3 page 545-46 explains that to convince the Czar to sign the orders for general and partial mobilization Janushkevich informed the Czar the Austria was mobilizing in Galicia on the Russian frontier (which was false) and he suggests that the General knew this was the case at the time.

Albertini also maintains that Paleolouge (French Ambassador to St. Petersburg) was misrepresenting the events in Russia to his government, concealing the impending mobilization from France while telling Sazonov that Russia had his country’s complete support. Just some examples--Loje 01:04, 12 April 2007 (UTC)

ok, many thanks, though would you agree that if Albertini's analysis is correct the latter two are better described as lies/deception than misunderstandings? sbandrews (t) 09:02, 12 April 2007 (UTC)

You're right, that would be a more accurate characterization.--Loje 17:01, 12 April 2007 (UTC)

Russo-Serbian Alliance?

Treaties allying Russia and Serbia are mentioned in several places, what treaty is that exactly?--Loje 23:24, 24 April 2007 (UTC)

Well spotted, Russia and Serbia were certainly allys, but perhaps there was no specific treaty - this is why this article needs inline citations - I put a fact tag next to one - regards, sbandrews (t) 12:27, 25 April 2007 (UTC)

Indeed, there was no formal alliance between Serbia and Russia. john k 14:39, 25 April 2007 (UTC)

New 'Alliances' Graphic

I've replaced the old graphic with one of my own. The old one was good, but I wanted to adjust a few things. Here's why I prefer the new one:

• Each country has the same size reigon.
• The nature of the relationship (by treaty, alliance, or otherwise) is graphically, rather than textually, indicated; though it is lacking a key.
• It is easier to read at a smaller size (partly because of the above).
• Most importantly -- the reason I made the image -- it graphically indicates which countries are connected and which are not, and how far unconnected some are. For instance, Italy was less-connected to the Balkans than Germany, yet they share a tier in the old version.

I figured I should provide a rationele for the switch; so, there you go! --Xiaphias 05:37, 17 May 2007 (UTC)

One thing, the yellow between Serbia and Russia for example - does this indicate a treaty? If so which treaty and why is there no date - if not why is it yellow? Otherwise looks ok..., regards, sbandrews (t) 13:55, 17 May 2007 (UTC)

I couldn't find any information for the direct Balkan links -- if anyone has this information, let me know, and I'll add the dates.--Xiaphias 18:44, 18 May 2007 (UTC)

until you find the info or modify the image I'll revert to the old image then if that's ok, sbandrews (t) 18:48, 18 May 2007 (UTC)

Well, this Wikipedia page makes clear that Russia and Serbia were allied, so I've adjus,ted their color accordingly. I couldn't find any formal agreements between Bulgaria and the Central Powers, so I changed those colors to light blue, "aid" (they provided military aid, obviously). If anyone has a date for the Russo-Serbian alliance, I'll add that to. Oh, I also corrected a date which the old chart got wrong -- the year of the Anglo-French treaty. --Xiaphias 08:54, 19 May 2007 (UTC)

Update: I just added the German-Ottoman alliance of 1914, and I greyed Italy (being neither a Central Power nor a member of the Triple Entente). Anything else need adding/correcting? --Xiaphias 09:14, 19 May 2007 (UTC)

thanks, unfortunately the wiki page you point to gives no reference for the allies statement, and indeed johnk (section above on this page) states that there was no formal alliance - and I trust his expertise on this question. Just because one wiki page makes an unfererenced claim doesn't mean we should repeat it here - and the question of a treaty binding Russia to Serbia is central to the history of the causes of WW1, we need to get it right, currently your image is still missleading in my opinion, sbandrews (t) 10:15, 19 May 2007 (UTC)

Well as I said, if you have more accurate info, I'm happy to hear it; it this point, though, the graphic accurate depicts Wikipedia's info. --Xiaphias 18:55, 19 May 2007 (UTC)

not the info on this page - where the presence of a formal treaty or alliance between russia and serbia has been questioned by three editors (see the avove section). You have introduced an unreferenced claim that such a formal alliance exists, if you cannot provide a reference you should alter the graphic, not leave it there to mislead wikipedia readers. sbandrews (t) 19:54, 19 May 2007 (UTC)

I have to second the objection about Serbia, it should be switched to "aid", even the article cited doesn't refer to an alliance, this is what that category is for. This is particularly true in that the kind of non-intervention in the instance mentioned in the other article, and a second time during the Balkan wars was precisely the kind that was taken as casus belli in 1914.

Also, I think the graphic is remiss in that it makes no mention of the Triple alliance, which involved firmer legal commitments than the triple entente. It really seems to be a view in retrospect rather than a portrait of the pre-1914 alliance structure. Belgium should be included too, since not only was the violation of Belgium what actually brought Britain into the war and strictly defined, but such an event was almost inevitable with the Shleiffen plan being what it was.--Loje 05:23, 20 May 2007 (UTC)

Sure, I'll change Russia's relation with Serbia to 'aid'. With regard to Belgium, how do you propose it be incorporated -- that is to say, how would you classify its relationship with Britain? The 1839 Treaty of London doesn't specify this, and I'm not aware of any evidence that it had a stronger relationship with Britain than with any other great power. --Xiaphias 14:48, 20 May 2007 (UTC)

Oh, I didn't think of that, you're quite right. Perhaps a seperate bubble, maybe above or below "the balkans", and with a note saying "neutrality guaranteed by the great powers" would work. Having lines from each power going to Belgium would be so messy as to defeat the purpose of the graphic (to simplify)--Loje 20:23, 20 May 2007 (UTC)

It ended up being a while brfore I got around to it, but I moded the graphic as per your suggestions, changing Russia-Serbia to 'aid' & depicting the Triple Alliance rather than the Central Powers (the logical choice, being that this graph depicts PRE-ww1 relations). --Xiaphias 06:11, 20 June 2007 (UTC)

During this period, the Great Powers paid far more attention to their interests than to the treaties they had signed. While Britain and other Great Powers had guaranteed Belgian neutrality, long before the war Lloyd George and others were on the record as saying that Belgium could not remain neutral (since Germany could not be effectively blockaded by mining the North Sea if goods could come through the English Channel and Belgium to Germany) and of course Germany used a similar "necessity defense" in William II speech applogizing for and justifying the actual invasion. Italy's attitude toward the Triplice was quite mercenary, willing to fulfill its treaty obligations if properly compensated. During the annexation crisis of 1908-9, Russia and France both walked away from their obligation under the Secret Treaty of 1892 to mobilize and attack Germany in response to Austro-Hungarian mobilization against Serbia, but fulfilled the same obligation in 1914. 69.110.44.23 16:40, 25 June 2007 (UTC)

I note you left Rumania off your alliance chart. Rumania was a junior member of the Triplice. Russia regarded Rumania as pivotal and so sent the Czar to Constanza on June 1 (old calendar) to break Rumania off from the Triplice, and Rumania agreed not to renew its membership. At the time of the outbreak of war, however, Rumania was still a member of the Triplice as I understand it. 69.110.44.23 17:07, 25 June 2007 (UTC)

The Hague Edits

I'm highly skeptical of the contention that the Great Powers were going to accede to such an infringement of sovereignty as compulsory arbitration, much less that Germany would start a general war to stop it from happening. A source to the effect that such a determination was expected at the convention of 1915 seems called for.--Loje 17:27, 1 July 2007 (UTC)

Let me echo Loje sentiment. Concrete and intractable, short of war, problems confronted the Great Powers. The Treaty of Frankfurt stood in the way of France reclaiming Alsace-Loraine, the birthplace of President Poincarre. The Treaty of Berlin stood in the way of Russia getting access to the Mediterranean in time of war. Serbia's March 1909 declaration stood in the way of her ambitions to take over Bosnia. Germany felt the wolves circling and saw its military edge slipping away bit-by-bit. Austria-Hungary feared Serbian irredentism. England felt its naval and industrial supremacy threatened by Germany. ...and so on. Any concerns about a convention must be minor by comparison. What on earth is this convention doing in the opening paragraph? Let's delete it now.

Werchovsky 18:33, 10 July 2007 (UTC)

Agreed, in fact the lead/lede could do with a general expansion and tidy up, probable best to base it on the introduction to any of the classic texts - it could comfortably be twice as long as it now is, sbandrews (t) 19:09, 10 July 2007 (UTC)

Russian Mobilization

In any discussion of the July crisis, the details of Russian mobilization are central. I am not an expert on Russian mobilization, and reading and rereading Albertini on the subject leaves many questions without clear answers. Did the military hoodwink Sasonov into believing it could execute partial mobilization in order to later get the order switched to general mobilization (Alberini's answer is "Maybe.", but perhaps there is a clearer answer today)? What are the operational details of the partial mobilization improvisational order? Was Sasonov really stupid enough to believe that mobilization in Poland against Austro-Hungarian Galicia could be easily distinguished by Germany as not being a mobilization against adjoining German territory and that Germany would not mobilize in response? Was the partial mobilization order really sent out and if so what were the practical consequences compared to simply waiting 18 hours for the general mobilization order; were men and supplies sent to the wrong places as a result? When Nicholas II decided to add Baltic Seas Fleet mobilization against Germany to the partial mobilization order, did his ministers and generals go along with this move, that was likely to lead Germany to believe Russia was mobilizing against her, as another means of forcing the general war? Besides selling assets in Germany, what tangible steps did Russia take during the period prepratory to war and before mobilization? What intelligence monitoring did Germany, Austria-Hungary, France and Serbia have of the Russian period prepratory to war and subsequent mobilization? My understanding of the Secret Treaty of 1892 comes from the U.S. Congressional record where it states that in the event of mobilization by one of the Triplice, France and Russia both must mobilize and commence action against Germany, but Loje struck out mention of this treaty requirement from the chain of events section? Was that because the detailed terms of the treaty are provocative?

Werchovsky 21:37, 16 July 2007 (UTC)

No, I'm not sure that a partial mobilization against a non-entente member was considered by the parties a trigger for war with Germany (I'll try and find a reference but I remember reading somewhere that the French were concerned to avoid this exact interpretation).

Even if it does because the Russian period preparatory to war began and their partial mobilization decided far in advance of Austrian Mobilization, the contention that it was the result of some treaty obligation is implausible. That was why I changed it.

As for the rest, they are interesting questions (I've some of my own) but the page is about Causation and the course of events doesn't warrant such in-depth debate. Perhaps a seperate July Crisis page should be there, it seems a logical continuation of other pages since there is one for the assassination and a brief one about the ultimatum.

--Loje 20:09, 18 July 2007 (UTC)

Secret Treaty of 1892

"2. In case the forces of the Triple Alliance, or of one of the powers which are a party to it should be mobilized, France and Russian, at the first indication of the event, and without a previous agreement being necessary, shall mobilize all their forces immediately and simultaneously, and shall transport them as near to their frontiers as possible."

"3. "...(enumeration of forces)...These forces shall begin complete action with the greatest dispatch so that Germany will have to fight at the same time in the east and in the west."

Of course, in this crisis, The Powers pursued their perceived interests in which their treaty obligations only figured marginally. But British entry into the war is somehow still attached in this section to Belgian neutrality (despite the consensus view that Britain would side with France whether Germany invaded Belgium or not; and statements by British cabinet members during the years just prior that in the case of a European war, Belgium could not remain neutral), while all reference to The Secret Treaty of 1892 has been removed as a causation of mobilization and war, this despite the fact that one strong argument used in favor of Russian Mobilization and war during internal Russian debates was that a failure of Russia to mobilize would cause France to lose faith in her treaty partner. As we analyze the march to war, we need to keep in mind that their were personalities with axes to grind and they were happy to use whatever weapons lay at hand including the treaty of 1892.

I think to understand causation you actually do need to know the answers to the questions I raised (for if Russia had not mobilized, diplomacy would have had more time and perhaps been successful if Britain would have expressed her position on war in absolutely clear terms, which given enough time she might have). For example, Sasonov (and Isvolski) stands accused of provoking the war for revenge, pan-slavism, and the Bosphorous. To properly understand causation we should at least make an effort to determine if Sasonov didn't understand the impracticality of partial mobilization and the ridiculousness of mobilizing the navy but not army against Germany, or if he did it intentionally to bring about the war despite the Czar's misigivings. Was Russian General Mobilization a kind of accident caused by men who did not know what they were doing, or did they just need a way arround the Czar and so started partial mobilization in order to slide into general mobilization? Here is one of the more sweeping accusations against Sasonov and Isvolski:

"Byzantium was the litmus test of the pan-slavists and the principal goal of the war, all the remainder were of minor significance. To make the war against the United Kingdom to take Constantinople was, at the very least ridiculous. But to ally with the United Kingdom, to make it bleed, along with the other Western powers fighting the Germans and their allies, for the Germans to embed the Great Fleet, to keep intact the Russian Army and by overland route to occupy Constantinople; was a plan really of great scale of the slavophile clubs. It was the reason for which His Majesty had given into the panel in full. Misters Sazonoff and Iswolsky could provoke Germany and Austria. At once after the assassination of the Archduke François Ferdinand, the Minister for War began the mobilization. The murder was consummated thanks to the good offices of the Russian military agents at Belgrade. The young assistant military attaché, Captain Werchovsky, later Minister of War under Kerensky, with whom I have been a family friend for a long time, confirmed to me, without too much obstructing the truth, about the initiation, preparation and execution of the odious plot." (From the Twilight of Autocracy by Louis Trydar Burzinski and badly translated from French by me.) The extensive and very expensive bribery of the French press from 1912-14 by these two men in league with Poincare, the nature of their relationship, and the terrible grudge Isvolski had against the Austrians and Germans make Sasonov's actions worthy of close scrutiny.

Werchovsky 19:16, 19 July 2007 (UTC)

Werchovsky, I think you greatly exaggerate the way in which the Entente agreement was understood. You might want to read George F. Kennan's "The Fateful Alliance: France, Russia, and the Coming of the First World War" for some insight into the understanding of the text that those writing had.

Much more importantly however none of the diplomatic crises between its advent and the July Crisis elicited the response you claim the treaty required from Russia or France. The fact that they had never ordered General mobilization against Germany over Austria before (France didn't in this case either) and, as previously mentioned, the exact timeline of Russian decision making July 23-25th which was not in reaction to Austria seem to largely discredit the notion that Russia jumped to partial mobilization against Austria out of a strict interpretation of the treaty. As such I still don't think we should flatly assert that their mobilization was solely a result of this as the earlier version of the timeline implied.

--Loje 20:30, 19 July 2007 (UTC)

I think I have been misunderstood. I didn't claim anything, least of all about the "Entente agreement". I just quoted The Secret Treaty of 1892, which was very definitely a treaty and not an "entente" or informal understanding (such as the sets of letters between Lord Grey and France and Lord Grey and Russia) as it is quoted in the U.S. Congressional Record. The language was quite plain and there is no need for a great historian to explain its meaning. If you think the quote is inaccurate, please provide the text of The Secret Treaty of 1892 that is at odds with what I wrote. Frankly, I'd love to have another source for the Treaty but I just can't find one. By the standard you laid out of "solely as a result", Britain's entry into the war should not be tied to Belgian Neutrality, as that was a secondary argument although a very handy one for public opinion, just as the literal terms of the Secret Treaty of 1892 were just a handy weapon to push the Czar and any cooler heads in Russia. I'm just looking for symmetry so as not to have an anti-German article. That in 1908-9 France did not mobilize supports my point that all these treaties were of secondary importance compared to national interests. I'll buy a copy of George Kennan's book if it contains a complete translation of the Secreat Treaty of 1892, but if its just spin, it can't compete with the plain language of The Secret Treaty of 1892 itself, or what was said at signing such as:

 General Boisdeffre: "Mobilization is the declaration of war.  Mobilization compels ones neighbor to do the same; mobilization involves the execution of strategic transport and concentration."
 Czar Alexander:  "It is thus that I understand it."

According to Albertini, Russia had changed its orders to its military (in 1912 as I recall?) and instead of immediately opening hostilities when mobilization was ordered, the military was instead to stand by for a second order and so operational matters were evolving. To know how the treaty was to be implemented in 1914 we have only to look at the minutes of the July 1914 Franco-Russian summit where Serbia and Austria were on the agenda. Can someone round up a copy? Until that's done, lets assume the worst; that Poincare counseled nothing but firmness and sticking by the treaty and Czar Nicholas II agreed as is hinted at by Paleologue. If we assume the worst while we wait, then perhaps the wait will be shortened as it may compell the French or Russians to look more closely in their archives and give us the minutes.

Werchovsky 04:03, 20 July 2007 (UTC)

"By the standard you laid out of "solely as a result", Britain's entry into the war should not be tied to Belgian Neutrality" It isn't, as it stands your view is reflected in the text on the topic. It doesn't change the fact that your treaty couldn't have been the main reason for Russian mobilization. It isn't just 1908-9, there was also during the first Balkan war when significant Russian and Austrian military measures were taken, but the preparation for invasion of Germany was never made. This is especially interesting in that in that case the Austrian mobilzations WAS partly aimed at Russia.

Besides which you still haven't explained how the treaty could have influenced a decision to mobilize predating any Austrian mobilization.

--Loje 14:57, 20 July 2007 (UTC)

I am glad we agree that neither Belgian Neutrality nor The Secret Treaty of 1892 should be used as justifications in the timeline; this will just leave Japan's entry with motives ascribed...perhaps that should go too for consistency by I will leave that to someone else. I'll also switch the Entente propaganda term "Ultimatum" to the more neutral term "Demarche". I've seen many Entente diplomatic cables use the word "Demarche" before the Entente settled on the term "Ultimatum". Ultimatum to many people implies a threat of war, while of course in this case, it was just a threat to recall Austria-Hungary's Ambassador not backed up by an immediate mobilization order.

I think with respects to the Russian and Austro-Hungarian mobilizations there may be some overestimation of the preordaned nature of the sovereigns' final decision. Each sovereign hesitated at the brink, in the case of the Czar, even after the Ukases were signed, and so the means used by ministers and generals to push the sovereigns over the edge and into war such as the argument "France will lose confidence in us as an ally." or claims regarding the border incident at Temis-Kubin are still contributing causes to the war despite the prior consensus toward war and the preparatory steps and plans toward war already taken.

Looking forward to the results of your investigation of the Secret Treaty of 1892 that you mentioned on 18 July.

Werchovsky 19:16, 20 July 2007 (UTC)

"it was just a threat to recall Austria-Hungary's Ambassador not backed up by an immediate mobilization order."

Well, if you look at Orgins of the war in 1914 Vol. III p. 385 (bottom of the page) you'll see that Berchtold instructed (July 24th) that Grey should be told that: "if the Austrian demands were not complied with within the time limit, his Government would break off diplomatic relations and begin military preparations (not operations)." it's found in #104of the British Documents.

--Loje 22:31, 20 July 2007 (UTC)

You edited out the best part where the telegram says the letter was not an ultimatum but a demarche (and of course "military measures" do not necessarily (and as it turns out, did not immediately) include the dangerous step of mobilization)?

Communication by the Austrian Ambassador.

Sir E. Grey, Count Mensdorff telephoned after you had gone, to ask if he could see you this evening. I said you had left the Office and that I did not know when you would be at your house. He asked me if I could call at the Embassy on my way home.

I did so and he told me that he had just received a telegram from his Government authorising him to explain to you that the step taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatum but a "d‚marche with a time limit," and that if the Austrian demands were not complied with within the time limit his Government would break off diplomatic relations and commence military preparations (not operations). Count Mensdorff wished to let you know this as soon as possible in view of the concern you had expressed at the ultimatum; he said that though it might not be much of a difference it was undoubtedly a "nuance" of one.

24.7.14 H.M.

Cf. A II No. 13.

there are of course any number of these representations that the note was not an ultimatum:

Document 10: Telegramm: Sir Edward Grey to Sir G.Buchanan (July 25, 1914):

Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

Tel. (No.352.)

Austrian Ambassador has been authorised to explain to me that the step taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatum but a démarche with a time limit, and that if the Austrian demands were not complied with within the time limit, the Austro-Hungarian Government would break off diplomatic relations and begin military preparations, not operations.

In case Austro-Hungarian Goverment have not given the same information at St.Petersburg (Paris) you should inform Minister of Foreign Affairs as soon as possible; it makes the immediate situation rather less acute.

I would also point you toward Berchtold's telegram to Giesl on 23 July:

"The term ultimatum chosen by you for our to-day's step at Belgrade is incorrect inasmuch as fruitless expiry of time limit will be followed only by a breaking off of diplomatic relations, not by immediate commencement of state of war. State of war will begin only with declaration of war or Serbian offensive."

After receiving the negative Serbian reply, Franz-Joseph and Berchtold made a series of statements to the effect that the breaking of diplomatic relations did not lead necessarily to war.

The presentation of the demarche was accompanied only by the threat of the Austro-Hungarian legation returning to Austria-Hungary...and of course, mobilization and the declaration of war did not take place until 2 days after Serb forces accidentally and momentarily crossed the border into Austria-Hungary. There is quite a body of evidence that the note was a demarche while it was not an ultimatum threatening war directly.

Werchovsky 04:58, 21 July 2007 (UTC)

"mobilization and the declaration of war did not take place until 2 days after "

This sitesays that the mobilization order was given a few hours after the ultimatum expired, but it wasn't scheduled to begin until the 28th even on the 25th.

The gap between expiration and declaration of war was to give Serbia a chance to give in while displaying the seriousness of the Austrian attitude, (they planned to add the demand that Serbia pay the costs of mobilizing).

--Loje 04:09, 22 July 2007 (UTC)

The website you place a link to is trying to simplify. There are two kinds of mobilization orders, the papers that the various national leaders sign (quite a few signatures are required and its sometimes hard especially on weekends to track these guys down), and then the official postings of mobilization. The Czar and Austro-Hungarian Kaiser signed things ahead of time so that when they made their final decision the order could be implemented quickly, perhaps by a simple phone call. I think we should be more concerned with their final decision: the actual posting of the orders as that act is the difficult and expensive one to reverse and is on display to enemy states prompting reciprocal measures.

Strangely, I can't find in Albertini any statement saying clearly what the actual date of partial Austro-Hungarian mobilization against Serbia was (the actual posting of the notices), but only the plan that first alarm take place on the 28th of July and the first day of Mobilization on the 29th. If you have the date from a credible source of the actual postings, that would be helpful.

Yes, Berchtold and others put forward the idea of making Serbia pay for Austro-Hungarian mobilization. Let's hope they were just saying that to gain more support internally for continuing to pursue a settlement short of war with the plan to negotiate the demand away later as surely they knew this demand could not be made to stick. Serbia would be put through the ringer enough by implementing the terms of the demarche.

Werchovsky 08:15, 22 July 2007 (UTC)

Rise of William II section seems unscholarly; flawed; factual errors

There are too many errors and bias in this section. I will move it to the discussion page soon unless someone has the inclination to repair it. I place my comments below the offending sections:

Under the political direction of its first Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, Germany secured its new position in Europe by an alliance with Austria-Hungary and a diplomatic understanding with Russia.

--->This is misleading in that several treaties and amendments are being referenced and the implication of the word "understanding" is that
there was no treaty between Russia and Germany which is false.  Its better just to specifically state the treaties by name, date and contracting parties.

Bismarck began pursuing alliances and peace treaties. He made peace with almost every nation in Europe except France.

--->Exactly the opposite it true.  The Treaty of Frankfurt was signed with France in 1871.  It was not necessary to make peace with any other
nations because Germany was not at war with any European Powers until 1914 (except for a few days with France in January 1871).
--->Nations make peace.  Chancellors do not.  There is a better way of saying this.

He feared greatly that a war might destroy the newborn nation he had created in the 1860s.

--->Germany was formed in 1871!

By the time of Wilhelm I's death, a system of alliances kept a tight peace in Europe.

--->  The Balkans had a pattern of rebellions and wars that contradict the "tight peace" statement. Take for example the Serbian-Bulgarian war of 1885-6.

The ascension of Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1888 brought to the German throne a young ruler who, despite his rash diplomatic judgment, was determined to direct policy himself. After the 1890 elections, in which the centre and left parties made major gains (and partly because of his disaffection at inheriting the Chancellor who had guided his grandfather for most of his career), Wilhelm engineered Bismarck's resignation.

--->This is far too simplistic and argumentative.  

Much of the fallen Chancellor's work was undone in the following decades. Wilhelm failed to renew the 1887 Reinsurance Treaty with Russia,

--->The treaty as written was unworkable and in conflict with Germany's other obligations.
  William II and Nicholas II subsequently signed a much more favorable treaty to Germany at Bjorkoe; one that was not in conflict with Germany's
commitments.  If one talks of letting the Reinsurance Treaty lapse, one must mention that it was later replaced, if only for a short time.

presenting republican France with the opportunity to conclude a full alliance with the Russian Empire in 1891-94. Between 1898 and 1900, Wilhelm undertook the creation of a German navy capable of threatening Britain's century-old naval mastery,

----->Germany's navy was never capable of threatening Britain's naval mastery.  This needs to be toned down.

prompting the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale of 1904.

---->I note Wikipedia states, and I believe with some validity, that it was the impending Russo-Japanese War that prompted the Entente Cordiale
and no mention of Germany's naval construction program is made.  Please provide a footnote supporting the causality.

In 1907, the alliances was expanded to include Russia, forming the Triple Entente.

----->An entente and an alliance are different things. The dates cited for the formation of the two ententes are the dates that the Powers
reconciled their Colonial Empire differences.  It was not until a series of letters were exchanged that the Ententes took on characteristics
similar to those of a military alliance, most notably the November 1912 Cabon-Grey letter laying out Britain's commitment to defend the North
Sea and the French Northern Coast.  You may want to discuss the dates over which the Entente evolved into a military understanding rather than
just mentioning the date on which colonial differences were resolved.

Also, please note the lack of agreement between subject and verb in the phrase "the alliances was"; this adds to the confusion.

Werchovsky 07:49, 6 August 2007 (UTC)

Rise of Kaiser Wilhelm II

Under the political direction of its first Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, Germany secured its new position in Europe by an alliance with Austria-Hungary and a diplomatic understanding with Russia. Bismarck began pursuing alliances and peace treaties. He made peace with almost every nation in Europe except France. He feared greatly that a war might destroy the newborn nation he had created in the 1860s. By the time of Wilhelm I's death, a system of alliances kept a tight peace in Europe.

German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck.

The ascension of Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1888 brought to the German throne a young ruler who, despite his rash diplomatic judgment, was determined to direct policy himself. After the 1890 elections, in which the centre and left parties made major gains (and partly because of his disaffection at inheriting the Chancellor who had guided his grandfather for most of his career), Wilhelm engineered Bismarck's resignation.

Kaiser Wilhelm II.

Much of the fallen Chancellor's work was undone in the following decades. Wilhelm failed to renew the 1887 Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, presenting republican France with the opportunity to conclude a full alliance with the Russian Empire in 1891-94. Between 1898 and 1900, Wilhelm undertook the creation of a German navy capable of threatening Britain's century-old naval mastery, prompting the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale of 1904. In 1907, the alliances was expanded to include Russia, forming the Triple Entente. Werchovsky 15:51, 13 August 2007 (UTC)

Duplicate naval sections?

There appears to be some overlap between sections Causes_of_World_War_I#Arms_Race and Causes_of_World_War_I#Anglo.E2.80.93German_naval_race . These sections should probably be consolidated, and coordinated with articles High Seas Fleet and Fleet Acts... AnonMoos 21:12, 18 September 2007 (UTC)